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ABSTRACT
ECONOMIC (MPUcAHws 
THE LIMITS TO STABILITY : THE AFTERMATH OF THE PARIS
AGREEMENT ON VIETNAM, JANUARY 1973 - AUGUST 1974.
The Paris Agreement of 27 January 1973 was intended, at 
least by some of its authors, to end the war and to bring peace 
to Vietnam and Indochina. Studies on the Agreement have gen­
erally focused on the American retreat from Vietnam and the 
military and political consequences leading to the fall of Saigon 
in April 1975.
This study will seek to explore a number of questions which 
remain controversial. It addresses itself to considering whether 
under the circumstances prevailing between 1973 and 1974 the 
Paris Agreement could have worked. In the light of these circum­
stances it argues that the Agreement sought to establish a frame­
work for future stability and economic development through 
multilateral aid and rehabilitation aimed at the eventual survival 
of South Vietnam.
The main thrust of the study is the interraction between the 
US and the Asian protagonists, considered on their own terms. 
Special prominence is given to the role of Japan, who endeavour 
-ed to contribute, under the Agreement's auspices, the centre 
of gravity for the economic dimension. From the Indochina
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perspective the protagonists include the communist power centres 
of North Vietnam and Cambodia and the government of South 
Vietnam. The consequences of the accord for East Asia are also 
examined where it complemented new realities emerging there 
in the form of the Japan-China dialogue, the assumptions of 
US strategy and the diplomacy surrounding them.
The attempt is made to identify through the day-to-day 
course of events the different stages in the evolution of the 
intended design. Especially close attention will be paid to 
certain periods to identify major turning points when the 
conjunction of events had a crucial bearing on the final out­
come. Equal consideration is given to explain how and why 
the Paris Agreement lost all credibility and was no longer a 
possible framework for stability in Vietnam and Indochina.
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A NOTE ON VIETNAMESE, CHINESE & 
JAPANESE NAMES
Vietnamese names are presented in the 'standard' 
Romanised form of 'quoc-ngu' with surname first: for 
example, 'Le Due Tho', Le being the surname although 
the personal name rather than the surname would be 
used; hence 'Mr. Tho'.
Chinese names are also presented in the 'standard' 
form of Romanisation, 'hanvu pinvin' officially adopted 
by the Western media since 1979 with surname first foll­
owed by personal name: for example, 'Zhou Enlai' would 
be referred to as 'Premier Zhou'.
Japanese names are given in the Romanised form, as 
in 'romanii' and used as they are in Japan, with surname 
first followed by personal name, hence 'Nakasone Yasu- 
hiro' referred to as 'Mr. Nakasone'.
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PART I
12
INTRODUCTION
The Paris Agreement of January 1973 was intended, by at least 
some of its authors, to end the war and to restore peace in Vietnam. 
The aftermath of the Agreement, particularly the military and polit­
ical consequences leading to the collapse of South Vietnam in April 
1975 have generated much debate. The standard interpretation of 
the Agreement argues that it inaugurated a 'decent interval' before 
the fall of Saigon. The term has been most strongly identified with 
Frank Snepp, a foremost critic of the US involvement in the last 
stages of the war in Vietnam. Snepp alleges that one of the architects 
of the accord, then US National Security Adviser, Henry Kissinger, 
never seriously intended the Agreement to work anyway and was 
'merely trying through its convolutions' to secure a 'decent interval'
between the US withdrawal and the fight to the finish among the
1
two contending Vietnamese parties. The 'only thing' the Paris
Agreement did guarantee, Snepp continued, was a US withdrawal-
2
from Vietnam which depended on American actions 'alone'.
Kissinger was then obliged in the Agreement's aftermath to apply
'political and military salves' to prop up the Nguyen Van Thieu
3
regime which only weakened it further.
Stanley Kamow’s monumental work on Vietnam alleges the
Paris Agreement's 'only accomplishment’ was to stop the conflict
4
pending a political solution which 'might never be achieved'. He 
regards the US disengagement in South Vietnam following the
13
accord as only allowing the Thieu regime to gain time, a 'decent
interval' in which to resist the communist challenge.
These views have much in common with that of Arnold Isaacs,
who said only the two signatories who negotiated the accord, the
US and North Vietnam, derived anything from it.Washington
managed to disengage militarily and Hanoi won an end to the
bombing and a US withdrawal from the South. Only South Viet-
Mr ^
nam received nothing, 'neither a political settlement/a peace'.
What the US really wanted, Isaacs continued, was 'some form
of honourable compromise' that would not represent a visible,
6
humiliating defeat of American objectives. Whether this also 
meant an 'indefinite survival' of a non-communist US-backed 
regime in the South is questionable since he reproaches the 
Agreement for being full of provisions that would almost cer­
tain ly prove 'unworkable' in Vietnamese conditions.
Existing literature on the Paris Agreement have thus been inc­
lined to focus primarily on the US-Vietnamese relationship. The 
outcome of the 'peace' has also been examined in purely military 
terms. Guenther Lewy for instance, has sought to explain American 
strategy and tactics and the trayVail of Vietnamisation. He consults 
classified information about the war contained in the archives of the 
US military services in the form of after-action reports of military
operations, command directives, field reports and staff studies on 
7
the pacification effort. Relying on empirical records as a method
of historical inquiry, he concludes that statistical data was 'one type
of evidence' but 'no major conclusion' in his study depended on
the accuracy of any particular set of figures.
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Many of the conflicts and difficulties associated with imple­
mentation of the agreement, according to Walter Scott Dillard,
were 'inherent in the nature' of the Paris Agreement and its 
8
protocols. The instruments for enforcing the peace, the Two 
and Four-Party Joint Military Commissions and the Interna­
tional Commission of Control and Supervision (ICCS), were 
unable to perform their tasks satisfactorily in securing an 
adequate ceasefire and to see that the accord was fully imple­
mented (See Appendix I). The disparate goals, motives, opera­
ting assumptions and actions of the parties to the peace have 
been blamed for the failure to achieve what the signatories be­
lieved they could achieve with the signature of the accord.
The contribution of these works notwithstanding, the 
'standard' view was based very much on hindsight, arising 
from what actually happened in 1975. It was also rooted in 
sentiment already generated in the anti-war movement in the 
US during the mid-1960's among those who were convinced 
that the US could neither win the war, nor secure an adequate 
peace. Much of the writing has also been concerned with the 
moral dilemma posed by the war and has appealed to the cons­
cience and ideological fervour of the public at large. There are 
also those, including Robert Shaplen who suggest that the 
media played a role in shaping the public assumption that the 
war was doomed to come to an ignominious end.
The study however seeks to offer a different interpretation 
of the aftermath of the Paris Agreement of 1973. It seeks to
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explore the implications of the accord through a detailed 
account of the changing situation between January 1973 and 
August 1974. The intention is to relate the implications of the 
Agreement to international realities and to consider whether 
under some circumstances it could have 'worked'.
A study of the Paris peace in international perspective 
requires that attention be paid simultaneously to decision­
making on all sides. The main thrust of the study is the 
interraction between the US and Asian protagonists, consi­
dered on their own terms. In Indochina the latter include 
North Vietnam and the Cambodian resistance and the govern­
ment of South Vietnam. Hanoi's decisions are also examined 
in that perspective.
The study also undertakes to examine the consequences 
of the Paris Agreement for East Asia where it complemented 
new realities emerging there entailing the cooperation betw­
een China and Japan. From this perspective the Japan-China 
dialogue, the assumptions of US strategy in Indochina and 
East Asia and the diplomacy surrounding them are given 
more weight than in existing studies.
Some consideration where pertinent, is given to the 
decisions of the other protagonists, including the Soviet 
Union and France, which made a significant impact on the 
course of events in Indochina. Moscow had an interest in 
preventing further tension in Vietnam from interfering with 
improved East-West detente in Europe and its relations with
16
Hanoi. France's role in the resolution of the Cambodian 
conflict, along the lines of a negotiated settlement are also 
noted, with special reference to the efforts of its Ambassa­
dor in Peking.
This thesis is not a study of the negotiation of the Agree­
ment; nor is it a study of Hanoi’s decision to resume the 
offensive, which was still in balance in 1973 and early 1974; 
nor yet again, is it a military history of the ceasefire period.
Beginning with the actual circumstances of January 1973 
the study attempts to chart the detailed course of events by 
examining the assumptions of both the US and the Asian 
protagonists. Their respective motives are identified as far 
as possible to demonstrate how they were interrelated and 
what they were intended to achieve across the spectrum of 
Indochina and East Asia. An attempt is made to identify the 
changing phases critical to the outcome of the accord to sugg­
est how and why the situation developed in the 18 months 
following the Agreement Finally we must consider how the 
Agreement ultimately collapsed after it lost all credibility and 
was no longer a possible framework for peace in Vietnam 
and Indochina.
A central feature of this study is to demonstrate that the 
Paris Agreement was concerned with the survival of South 
Vietnam and was intended to establish there, a possible 
framework for future stability and economic development 
through multilateral aid and reconstruction. The study
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addresses itself to this aspect of the Paris Agreement by 
emphasising broadly three themes.
Distinct emphasis is given to the role of Japan, who 
acting with the US, attempted to make a central contribution 
to this economic dimension. In South Vietnam, within the 
context of the Paris Agreement, Japan pursued a strategy 
for rehabilitation and reconstruction aimed at stability in 
the Indochinese peninsula. A vital part of this design, was 
a joint international effort to establish an aid consortium 
for South Vietnam, entailing the cooperation of Japan, the 
World Bank (International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development), the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The proposal was 
directed towards eventual economic self-sufficiency there.
An important component of the equation was the oil fac­
tor. The exploration and eventual discovery of oil off the 
coast of South Vietnam and its possible part as a basis for 
the continued survival and economic viability of South Viet­
nam are also investigated. The study considers in particular 
the growing significance of the oil question after October 
1973, within the overall context of the ’peace' and its impact 
on other decisions.
The study also argues that underpinning the intended 
structure of peace in South Vietnam, was a design to open a 
dialogue with North Vietnam, not dissimilar to the US rapp­
rochement with China in 1972. The aim was to inaugurate a
18
process whereby Hanoi's commitment to take the South by 
force might be assuaged. The US hoped to establish a post­
war relationship with Hanoi to lay the foundations for recon­
struction and possible normalisation of relations.
China hailed the Paris Agreement as an achievement for 
North Vietnam and the Provisional Revolutionary Government 
in South Vietnam (PRG) because it ended the US involvement 
there. The settlement of the Vietnam question was now the 
preserve of its peoples, to be pursued free from external 
intervention. But China feared possible Soviet domination in 
the wake of the US withdrawal and preferred an uneasy co­
existence between North and South Vietnam, rather than an 
Indochina dictated by Hanoi. Peking as opposed to Hanoi, 
did not call for the abolition of South Vietnam or the resigna­
tion of its President, Nguyen Van Thieu. Favouring stability 
in Indochina, which implicitly meant stability for Asia as a 
whole, China advocated the reconstruction of both North 
and South Vietnam.
Following the normalisation of relations in September 
1972, China encouraged Japan, under the auspices of the 
China-Japan dialogue, to participate in this process. From 
January 1973 onwards Tokyo engaged in dialogue with Ha­
noi aimed at normalising diplomatic relations and possibly, 
at eventual exploitation of the economic potential of North 
Vietnam, in the form of oil.
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This framework was dependent entirely on the military 
and security situation stabilising in both Vietnam and 
Cambodia. Some attention is given to the situation on the 
ground following the signature of the accord where it had 
an effect on its outcome.
A related purpose is to demonstrate how the North Viet­
namese gradually and after long debate, came to the conclu­
sion that the Americans would let South Vietnam collapse and 
how Hanoi reached the decision to challenge the Paris Agree­
ment. In particular Hanoi worked to secure a complete Ameri­
can withdrawal to strengthen its grip on the South. Different 
groups within the leadership argued variously for a prolong­
ed but deliberate respite and a lightning offensive as the best 
means of attaining the latter goal.
It is not possible to consider the survival of South Viet­
nam without also taking into account the events in Cambo­
dia. Cambodia's continued existence as an independent 
nation and the possibility of a negotiated peace there hinged 
to a very large extent on the outcome of the Paris Agree­
ment on Vietnam. We need to consider the differences be­
tween the Khmer factions in their perception of the 'peace' 
from January 1973 onwards, together with the US-China 
dialogue and the roles of China, and of France, in the 
search for a negotiated settlement.
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Some may argue that a comprehensive historical investi­
gation of the subject is impossible until unrestricted access 
to government archives is permitted under the 'thirty year 
rule' or its equivalent in 'open societies'.
Where the US is concerned, the White House Papers 
of each presidency have been housed since the 1940's in 
a Presidential Library, under the auspices of the Office of 
Presidential Libraries of the National Archives and Records 
Administration (NARA, independent government agency, 
formerly NARS). The US presidents immediately preceding 
and following Richard Nixon have had their papers housed 
respectively at the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library at the 
University of Texas in Austin, the Gerald R. Ford Library 
at the University of Michigan in Ann Arbor and the Jimmy 
Carter Library at Atlanta, Georgia.
However given the circumstances surrounding the depart­
ure of Nixon from office in August 1974, it was not possible 
for some time to establish a Nixon Presidential Library. Again­
st his wishes, the White House records of his presidency (1969 
-74) were eventually transferred to the National Archives in 
1986. Some of these records were opened under the auspices 
of the Nixon Presidential Materials Project housed in a NARA 
building in Alexandria, Virginia. One element of the collection 
belongs to the 'White House Special Files’ created by Nixon in 
September 1972 to take in especially sensitive files, but they 
concerned domestic politics rather then national security issues.
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It was not until 19 July 1990 that the Richard M. Nixon 
Libhry and Birthplace was opened at Yorba Linda, California. 
Although it contains Nixon's Congressional and vice-presiden 
-tial papers, the library will apparently only hold copies of the 
presidential papers, and only a very careful selection of them.
The originals are stored in a government warehouse at Alexandria, 
Virginia. Nixon managed however to succeed in blocking the 
release of some 150,000 pages of important documents.
These limitations are compounded by the fact that then 
National Security Adviser and later Secretary of State, Henry 
Kissinger's papers have been deposited in the Library of 
Congress and will not be opened for some fifty years. An 
attempt in 1980 to have them declared subject to the manda­
tory classification review system failed in the courts.
These restrictions make it necessary to rely substantially 
on the Kissinger memoirs: The White House Years and esp­
ecially, the Years of Upheaval for an insight into the Paris 
Agreement and its aftermath. However this material has to 
be understood in the context of the wider machinery of gov­
ernment and of the foreign policy ambitions of the Nixon 
years.
There is a need to place the Nixon presidency in histori­
cal perspective and to relate the Paris Agreement to his 
objectives in Asia in terms of his worldwide 'structure of 
peace'. Nixon's view of China's place in Asia and the world 
and his rapprochement with Peking eased the way for the
22
signature of the accord. The search for 'outside powers' 
particularly China and Japan, to lend a moderating influence 
on the peace in Indochina and to work together for stability 
there and in Asia as a whole has been a pronounced feature 
of his design. Nixon's attempts to broaden Japan's involve­
ment with Vietnam to become an active participant in its 
postwar reconstruction, opening up in the process Japan's 
own dialogue with North Vietnam, have made a particular 
impact on Tokyo's subsequent emergence in the region.
In this context Nixon's foreign policy ideas expressed 
in his Foreign Policy Reports and in various messages to the 
US Congress from 1973-74 have provided a useful source of 
official thinking on Capitol Hill. US Congressional documen­
tation in the form of hearings, prints and reports from both 
the House of Representatives and the Senate also make them 
an indispensable source, on the US side. Use was made of 
official government publications of the period, especially 
the Department of State Bulletin, which offered a valuable 
interpretation of the complexities of foreign affairs. News­
papers, particularly The New York Times and The Interna­
tional Herald Tribune were also consulted.
23
In Hanoi, Peking and Moscow the archives of the party, 
state and government look likely to remain forever closed 
making it impossible to delve into records of decision-mak­
ing in these places. It is difficult therefore to study the 
internal debates and ideological struggles within their res­
pective communist parties. However a body of information 
surfacing in the form of monitored broadcasts might give 
insight into the complexities of the different 'lines of action' 
and alternative strategies advocated by different sections of 
the leadership at different times. It is essential to subject 
this material to careful analysis.
Primary sources relevant to this effort thus include 
monitored news materials from the communist world to be 
found in the British Broadcasting Corporation's Summary 
of World Broadcasts, a major part of which can be found 
in its transmissions for the Far East (SWB/FE). Translations 
here from news reports and broadcasts of articles in the Viet­
namese press include those from Nhan Dan. Ouan Doi Nhan 
Dan. Hoc Tap and the Vietnam News Agency (VNA). Those 
from the Chinese radio include articles^Renmin Ribao. and 
New China News Agency (NCNA). On the Soviet side, news 
transmissions from Moscow can be found in the Summary of 
World Broadcasts. Soviet Union. (SWB/SLH which contains 
articles from Pravda. Izvestiva and TASS. Since 1975 more 
refections from Hanoi and Peking have surfaced, particular­
24
ly in the SRV Foreign Ministry White Book on Relations 
with China. 4,5,6 October 1979 (SWB/FE/6238/A3/1-16) and 
SWB/FE/6242/A3/1-20 and the PRK (People's Republic of 
Kampuchea! White Book on China- Cambodia Relations, 
released by the PRK Foreign Ministry on 10 July 1984, 
(SWB/FE/7703/C/1-34).
(Material from the Federal Broadcasting Information Ser­
vices (FBJS) relevant for the period under study have not 
however been consulted.)
On Cambodia, the primary sources are as above, to be 
found in the BBC's Summary of World Broadcasts. Far East. 
(SWB/FE1 with transmissions from the Voice of the NUFC. 
(The Front for the National Union of Cambodia) and AKI. 
There is a need to differentiate these from official publications 
in the form of The Black Paper. Facts and Evidence of the Acts 
of Aggression and Annexation of Vietnam against Kampuchea. 
published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Democratic 
Kampuchea, 1978 and Dossier Kampuchea. Volumes I-III, 
edited by Le Courrier du Vietnam. (Hanoi, 1978) which form 
part of the sources on Cambodia.
Colonel-General Tran Van Tra’s account of the last two 
years of the Vietnam War, Vietnam: History of the Bulwark 
B2 Theatre. Vol.5: Concluding the Thirty Years War, which 
was translated in February 1983 by the Joint Publications 
Research Service (JPRS) in Arlington, Virginia makes a 
contribution from the South Vietnamese communist angle. It
25
might be useful to mention here that the work, which gives 
some evidence of the extent of the debate and disagreements 
in Hanoi about the conduct of the war in the South, appeared 
in Ho Chi Minh City in 1982, after which the author was 
placed under house arrest for two to three years and 'dis­
appeared'. Other material from the communist world include 
the memoirs of Van Tien Dung, Our Great Spring Victory: 
Hoang Van Hoan, A Drop in the Ocean: Enver Hoxha, Reflec­
tions on China. Volume 2, 1973-77 and Andrei Gromyko, 
Memories.
For an account of how South Vietnam perceived the last 
years of the war, particularly in relation to the economic 
aspect of the Paris Agreement, it is possible to consult The 
Palace File by Nguyen Tien Hung and Jerrold Schecter. The 
authors have relied extensively on the hitherto secret corres­
pondence between US Presidents Nixon and Ford and South 
Vietnamese President Nguyen Van Thieu from 31 December 
1971 to 22 March 1975. The Final Collapse by Cao Van Vien, 
Thieu's last chief of the Joint General Staff has been used 
for insight into how the South Vietnamese military saw the 
last stages of the war and for the part the discovery of oil 
might have played in reviving the war effort.
The importance of the discovery and confirmation of oil 
in South Vietnam and its possible part in economic recons­
truction aimed at eventual self-sufficiency cannot be over­
stated. Saigon's invitations to international bidding of its
26
concessions in 1973 and 1974 were made in anticipation of 
larger ambitions: The prospect of eventual stability in Indo­
china and an economic 'takeoff in South Vietnam compara­
ble to that of South Korea or Taiwan is daunting.
Japan's forays into both North and South Vietnam and its 
own capacity as 'arbiter' of the peace will be given special 
prominence in this work. The Japanese dimension of this study 
has been gleaned from the proliferation of Japanese newsaper 
articles, in the Asahi Shimbun. Mainichi Shimbun and Nihon 
Keizai Shimbun amongst others, available in translation in the 
form of the Daily Summary of the Japanese Press (DSJP). 
These news materials have been utilised to establish a coherent 
picture of the US and Japanese views of events in Indochina.
The result is to allow one to get a more comprehensive 
picture of US diplomacy and perceptions and some 'behind-the 
-scenes' information, of North Vietnam's diplomacy and glim-’ 
pses of its decision-making, of events on the ground in Viet­
nam and Cambodia and of the 'Asian' dimension of the study, 
particularly the Chinese and Japanese aspects. The attempt 
may not be definitive, but might give an insight into under­
standing the actualities of the period which takes us further 
than previous American-centric studies.
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CHAPTER I
THE SETTING 
JANUARY - FEBRUARY 1973
'I believed then, and I believe now, that the Agreement 
could have worked. It reflected a true equilibrium of forces 
on the ground. If the equilibrium were maintained, the agree 
-ment could have been maintained. We believed that Saigon 
was strong enough to deal with guerrilla war and low-level 
violations. The implicit threat of our retaliation would be 
likely to deter massive violation^. We hoped that with the 
programme of assistance for all Indochina, including North 
Vietnam, promised by two Presidents of both parties, we 
might possibly even turn Hanoi's attention (and manpower) 
to tasks of construction if the new realities took hold for a 
sufficient period of time. Hanoi was indeed instructing its 
cadres in the South to prepare for a long period of political 
competition. We could use our new relationships with 
Moscow and Peking to foster restraint.
We had no illusions about Hanoi’s long-term goals. Nor 
did we go through the agony of four years of war and sear­
ing negotiations simply to achieve a 'decent interval' for 
our withdrawal. We were determined to do our utmost to 
enable Saigon to grow in security and prosperity so that it
29
could prevail in any political struggle. We sought not an 
interval before collapse, but lasting peace with honour.
But for the collapse of executive authority as a result of 
Watergate, I believe we would have succeeded.'
*
Henry Kissinger
'The United States leaves us without any alternative 
except that if we sign, aid will continue and there is a 
pledge of retaliation if the agreements are violated. Other 
-wise they will leave us alone. Kissinger treats both Viet- 
nams as adversaries. He considers himself as an outsider 
in these negotiations and does not distinguish between 
South Vietnam, as an ally, and North Vietnam, as an 
enemy '
3f( 3«C
Nguyen Van Thieu
Henry Kissinger, The White House Years. (London, Weiden- 
feld & Nicolson, 1979), p. 1470.
Nguyen Tien Hung & Jerrold L. Schecter, The Palace File. 
New York, Harper & Row, 1986), p .145.
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I : I
THE PARIS AGREEMENT 
27 JANUARY 1973
At the initialling on 23 January 1973 of the Paris Agreement
on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam, the North
Vietnamese view as indicated by 'Special Advisor1 Le Due Tho
was that it inaugurated a 'new atmosphere', to be the 'first
stone' marking a new relationship between Washington and 
1
Hanoi. The Agreement was interpreted as representing the 
fulfilment of two American objectives: One objective sought 
to maintain the status quo and prolong the division of Viet­
nam through the containment and isolation of Hanoi; Detente 
with Hanoi's allies, Moscow and Peking, who were its 
chief arms suppliers might bring about the second objective 
of draining it of munitions to force it to end the war.
Hanoi’s own aims were to secure the American withdrawal 
from South Vietnam, weaken the Thieu regime and strengthen 
its own and Viet Cong forces there. Tho publicly discounted 
the existence of the 'so-called' North Vietnamese forces in
South Vietnam, completely rejecting the idea since in the accord
2
there was 'not a single word' implying their presence (App­
endix I).
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Behind Tho's emphasis on the 'loose nature' of the main 
provisions of the Agreement was Hanoi's intent to reunify 
the country. Tho referred to the current Agreement as 
stipulating that the 17th parallel was 'only a provisional 
military demarcation line' not a political or territorial bound­
ary (Ch. V:Article 15(A)). It was also stated in the Agree­
ment that the two zones of Vietnam should consult each 
other as soon as possible to reunify the country. On this 
basis Tho asserted, the Vietnamese people would advance 
to the reunification of the country, a 'necessity of history' 
which no force could prevent. Repeatedly questioning the 
ability of the South Vietnamese factions to create a 'great 
national union' (Ch.IV: Article 12), he implicitly warned
3
that as long as 'imperialism' existed, there would be war.
In Hanoi the Paris Agreement represented a 'partial vic­
tory' and was seen as laying a firm foundation for Vietnam's 
revolutionary cause. The North Vietnamese Party and Govern­
ment appeal of 28 January said the accord ushered in a 'new
turning point' and provided the basis for the Vietnamese peo-
4
people to march forward to 'new victories'.
The Vietnam People's Army (PAVN) in Hanoi interpreted 
the contents of the Agreement as having met all four 'basic 
demands' it had made in the past; that the US respect the 
independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of 
Vietnam; withdraw all US and vassal troops, dismantle its 
military bases and pledge not to continue its military invol
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-vement or intervene in the internal affairs of South Viet­
nam so that its people could determine their own political 
future; that the PRG be recognised as one of the two South 
Vietnamese sides and that in South Vietnam, two administra­
tions, two armies and two zones of control be acknowledged
5
and that the US pay war reparations.
On the ground in South Vietnam where the war was being 
fought, specifically the area known to the Viet Cong as B-2 
other views were declared. Tran Van Tra, Head of its milit- 
ary delegation to the Two-Party(JMCj described the Agree­
ment as the ’clearest manifestation' of the balance of forces 
on the battlefield at the time. Its signature rested on the 
basis of the 'enemy' and of themselves weighing the streng­
ths and weaknesses of each other and of the balance of 
6
forces in the world. The Americans had been willing to 
accept a 'partial defeat', Tra conceded, but it was really 
the PAVN that had won a 'victory' albeit not as yet a 
'complete victory'.
The withdrawal of 'all US and vassal troops' from South 
Vietnam was singled out by Tran Van Tra as the 'most impor­
tant provision' of the Agreement which affected the conduct
of war as a whole. On the battlefield the 'balance of forces
7
changed in an important way in North Vietnam's favour. From 
then onwards South Vietnam's 'puppet troops' were forced to 
fight alone without the effective aid and support of the US.
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South Vietnamese President Nguyen Van Thieu described
the Paris Agreement as ’only a ceasefire agreement' giving no
8
guarantee of a stable long-lasting peace. While the Agree­
ment ended the 'first phase1 of his country's struggle, the 
defeat of communist military aggression, the 'next phase' 
as Thieu saw it, would be a political struggle, to resolve the 
question of who would govern South Vietnam. Cao Van 
Vien, the last chief of the Joint General Staff (JGS) of the
South Vietnamese Armed Forces, said the accord was an 
9
'imperfect agreement'. The circumstances leading to the 
signature of the Paris Agreement made it the turning point 
which set South Vietnam on its relentless course towards 
decline and finally, total collapse. In theory, the accord 
terminated the war but while true peace prevailed in the 
North, military conflict continued in the South. No clause 
in the agreement, Vien argued, called for the withdrawal of 
communist forces, nor was there any understanding about 
keeping them at bay. North Vietnam maintained its large 
forces in the South to back an eventual settlement to its 
advantage while standing ready to cope with all eventuali­
ties. There could be no peace, Vien said, unless 'one side
prevailed' and forced the other to surrender uncondition- 
10
ally.
Nguyen Tien Hung, Thieu's Special Assistant for Econo­
mic Reconstruction, believed the Paris Agreement 'contained 
the seeds' for South Vietnam's destruction. He chronicles in
34
The Palace File how the American demands for the North Viet­
namese withdrawal of troops from South Vietnam were under­
mined through successive negotiations until the US 'capitulat­
ed to Hanoi's demands' for a ceasefire-in-place with neither
11
a regroupment of its forces nor provisions for its removal.
President Thieu's major preoccupations were the North 
Vietnamese presence in the South, the status of the Demilita­
rised Zone (DMZ), the supervisory mechanism and Hanoi's
potential violation of the Agreement, of which clearly the
12
first was the most critical. This was complicated by the 
fact that Hanoi did not see its troops in South Vietnam as 
'outside forces' because Article I of the accord said in eff­
ect that Vietnam was one country (Appendix I). This clause 
also calls into question the status of the DMZ separating 
North and South Vietnam. To Hanoi the DMZ was thus a 
'temporary separation line'; to Thieu, it was an international 
boundary between North and South, formalising the separa­
tion of the two countries to deny North Vietnam's claims that 
North and South were one. The definition of the DMZ was
critical to Thieu's reasoning that North Vietnamese troops
13
were 'foreign' to South Vietnam.
The essence of US National Security Adviser, Henry 
Kissinger’s strategy as embodied in the Paris Agreement of
27 January 1973 was to maintain an 'equilibrium of forces'
14
on the ground in South Vietnam. The idea embodied a 
ceasefire with the armed forces of the two Vietnamese parties
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remaining-in-place (Ch.H: Articles 2,3) pending the 60-day 
withdrawal of US and other foreign forces ffom South Viet­
nam. The dismantling of all US military bases there (Ch.II:
6) would be accompanied by a flat prohibition against the 
introduction of 'any outside military forces' (Ch.II:7). 
Kissinger believed that if the equilibrium 'between the 
forces that existed on the ground' in South Vietnam was 
upset, the alternative would be recourse to continued or 
renewed war.
Despite these ambiguities, the Paris Agreement secured
a separation of two vital issues, the military and the political
(Appendix I). US President Richard Nixon consistently
held the view that a settlement should involve the specific
15
resolution of military questions alone. The final settle­
ment endorsed by its signatories, the USA, North Vietnam, 
South Vietnam and the Provisional Revolutionary Government 
of South Vietnam (PRG) embodied this principle. Militarily 
the Agreement guaranteed the disengagement of American for­
ces and brought to an end their active combat involvement in 
Vietnam. An immediate ceasefire-in-place and the withdrawal 
of all remaining US troops within 60 days (Ch.ILArticle 5) 
and the release of American prisoners of war was also secur­
ed over the same period of time (Ch.III:Article 8).
Nixon had refused already in November 1972 to make any 
express reference in the accord to the North Vietnamese forces 
because it could have the 'disadvantage of legitimising' any
36
16
force that might remain and was also 'unobtainable'. There
was therefore no provision for the one fundamental question
affecting the very balance of forces on the ground.
In early January 1973 Nixon persuaded Thieu that the
problem of the North Vietnamese troops in the South was
17
'manageable under the agreement'. Nixon's letter of 16
January 1973 to Thieu additionally informed him that the
US did not in principle accept the right of North Vietnamese
troops in the South. In practice they would remain because
the US had not negotiated their withdrawal as part of the
Agreement except in the vaguest terms calling for the remo-
18
val of all 'outside forces'.
At its signature on 24 January 1973 Kissinger emphasi­
sed that 'nothing' in the Agreement established the right of 
North Vietnamese troops to be in the South. If the accord 
was scrupulously implemented, he believed the estimated
145,000 North Vietnamese troops there should 'over a per-
19
iod of time' be subject to attrition. He proposed to do 
this by having a flat prohibition against the introduction in­
to South Vietnam of any outside military forces including 
troops, armaments, munitions and war material (Ch.II: 
Article 7).
The idea of attrition was also implicit in the prohibition 
against the use of infiltration corridors in Cambodia and Laos 
(Ch.II:Article 20). 'Foreign countries' were to put an end to
37
all military activities, totally withdraw and refrain from rein­
troducing military forces there. Under these conditions North 
Vietnamese troops might be cut off from any possibility of re­
newed infiltration into South Vietnam through Cambodia and 
Laos. Their resupply would also be curtailed. Another safeguard 
was implicit in the prohibition against military movement of any 
kind across the DMZ (Ch.V:Article 15).
Kissinger was adamant that the issue of the DMZ had been 
given priority. A demarcation line which defined the territory 
of South Vietnam was ’essential' he said, to the idea of equili­
brium. He saw it as a definition of where the obligations of
the Agreement began, augmenting the military provisions with
20
respect to infiltration and replacement In the text of the 
Agreement however, the 'military demarcation line' between 
the two zones at the 17 th parallel was 'only provisional' and 
'not a political or territorial boundary’ (Ch.V:Article 15(A)).
The wording of this clause hence appeared more sympathetic 
to Hanoi than Saigon.
Nixon might have had his reasons for accepting this clause. 
According to Hung, he was confident that the US was 
capable of detecting North Vietnamese infiltration in the 
South. A secret contingency plan worked out with the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff had been discussed to keep North Vietnam 
targeting information updated 'even after the ceasefire'. A 
communications network was established moreover which 
connected the US Seventh Air Force Base at Nakom Phanom
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in Thailand with Saigon and four regional military headquarters
in South Vietnam. The plan made a major impact and was a
'tangible guarantee' reassuring Thieu that the US was commit-
21
ed to enforcement of the Agreement
The machinery for enforcement of the ceasefire in South 
Vietnam included an International Commission for Control 
and Supervision (ICCS) consisting of members from Canada, 
Hungary, Indonesia and Poland which would oversee the im­
plementation and enforcement of the truce between all parties 
throughout South Vietnam (Ch.VI:Article 18). The ICCS 
would operate in accordance with the principles of consulta­
tions and unanimity. The Four-Party Joint Military Commiss­
ion (JMC) formed by the signatories of the Agreement would 
ensure 'joint action' by these parties and conduct preliminary 
investigations into violations. Beginning its tasks immediate­
ly after the Agreement's signature, it would end its activity 
in 60 days leaving only a Two-Party JMC consisting of the 
two South Vietnamese parties (Ch.VLArticles 16,17).
The convening of an international conference on Vietnam 
in Paris within 30 days of the Agreement was suggested by 
the US for 26 February 1973, to acknowledge and enforce 
the accord internationally (Ch.VI:Article 19). Its participants 
would include the four signatory parties to the accord, the 
four permanent members of the United Nations Security Coun­
cil (China, France, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom) 
the four member's of the ICCS and the Secretary General of 
the United Nations (UN).
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In reality, neither the ICCS nor the signatories of the Act of 
the International Conference could effectively enforce the peace. 
It was to be enforced only by the US. According to Hung, Nix­
on had informed Thieu in November 1972 that 'we both must 
recognise' that the supervisory mechanism in itself was 'no mea­
sure as important' as both parties' firm determination to see to it
that the Agreement worked and their vigilance with respect to the
22
prospect of its violations.
The Paris Agreement also attempted to resolve the question
of the political future of South Vietnam which might be imposed
by outsiders (i.e. the North Vietnamese) or be competitively
23
shaped by the South Vietnamese themselves. Politically the 
Agreement was aimed at entrusting the future of Vietnam to the 
contending South Vietnamese parties themselves. The right of 
its people to 'self-determination' was guaranteed (Ch.IV). A 
joint statement by the US and North Vietnam affirmed that 
they should decide 'for themselves' the political system of 
their choice through democratic elections under international 
supervision (Ch.IV:Article 9(B)). Immediately after the cease­
fire the two South Vietnamese parties would hold consultations 
to set up a National Council for National Reconciliation and 
Concord (NCNRC) composed of three 'equal segments'. The 
NCNRC by unanimous vote would shape Saigon's future 
government and supervistelections leading to it but the 'unani­
mity' rule postponed this indefinitely. The parties would sign
40
an agreement on internal matters of South Vietnam 'as soon as 
possible' and accomplish this 'within 90 days' after the cease­
fire comes into effect (Ch.IV:Article 12).
The unification of Vietnam and the relationship between 
North and South Vietnam was also defined (Ch. V:Article 15). 
It was to be carried out 'step-by-step' through 'peaceful 
means' on the basis of discussions and agreements between 
the two parties 'without coercion or annexation' and 'with­
out foreign interference'. The time for reunification would 
be the prerogative of these parties themselves.
Of special interest in this work is the postwar relationship 
between the US and North Vietnam (Ch.VIHrAiticle 21). The 
US would 'contribute to healing the wounds of war' and to 
postwar reconstruction of the Democratic Republic of Viet­
nam (DRV) and 'throughout Indochina'. This clause tied in 
with Article 14 which stated that the political entity of 'South 
Vietnam’ would accept 'economic and technical aid from any 
country with no political conditions attached'. The Agreement 
was careful to ensure that the political entity of South Vietnam 
whose continued existence was guaranteed, would only accept 
military aid under the authority of the government set up after 
the general elections (Ch.IV:Article 14).
It is significant to note in this context that Kissinger had 
earlier informed the then South Vietnamese Ambassador to 
London, Vuong Van Bac, that the Paris Agreement provided
41
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a 'legal basis' for the US to support South Vietnam. Amer­
ican support for the RVN had hitherto relied on presidential 
pronouncements, but the Agreement now provided a 'legal 
foundation' for requesting Congress for more aid to Vietnam.
But how did 'outside powers' view the Paris Agreement 
• and what were their interests, if any, in the postwar situation 
in Indochina?
The Soviet Union equally had as its ultimate objective the
reunification of Vietnam. A prospect for national accord and
unification was opening up before South Vietnam, Leonid
Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union (CPSU) told Le Due Tho in Moscow on 30 Jan- 
25
uary. The accord was interpreted as an 'important point' in 
Vietnam and in international affairs that would have a 'positive 
effect' on Soviet-American relations.
To both Moscow and Hanoi, the reunification of Vietnam 
presupposed 'continued conflict’. Before the beginning of 
the last set of negotiations with Kissinger in Paris, Le Due 
Tho had emphasised in Moscow on 5 January 1973, the Viet­
namese people's determination to 'continue' the 'just struggle'
26
for 'basic national rights'. In talks at that point with Andrei 
Kirilenko, Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, 
the 'legitimate right' of peoples to decide for themselves how 
their internal affairs be ordered was emphasised.
42
Brezhnev saw the war in the context of detente. On 11
January he described the war as drawing 'little by little' to
its conclusion and suggested Moscow's specific interest by
asserting that the future evolution of Soviet-American rela-
. 27
tions largely depended on how the war was concluded.
Moscow indicated particularly strongly its anxiety for 
peace in a message sent on 27 January when the Soviet tri­
umvirate, Brezhnev, Podgomy and Kosygin described the
Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) as the 'outpost of
28
socialism' in Southeast Asia. The withdrawal of US forces
under the ceasefire would provide 'favourable conditions' for
a 'final and just settlement' of the Vietnam problem through
unification of North and South. The Soviet message while
looking to the ultimate triumph of Hanoi, envisaged such a
process as proceeding in two stages: The first was the
achievement of a 'peaceful, democratic and neutral Vietnam',
a formula that apparently implied the ultimate removal of
the Saigon leadership from power, the second stage leading
to the 'final and just settlement' of the Vietnam problem
would be the unification of Vietnam in accordance with the
29expectations of the people 'without foreign interference'.
The establishment of peace in Vietnam could promote 
peace and security in Asia, the Kremlin leadership urged in 
obvious reference to the preamble of the Agreement (Appendix 
I). Moscow saw this as being strengthened however by the 
'forces of world socialism, national liberation and progress
43
which would help ease 'international tension'. The Soviet 
Union counted on seeing a Vietnamese presence in this con­
text. The consolidation of 'unity, cohesion and joint devel­
opment' of both socialist countries, Brezhenv emphasised to
30
Tho on 30 January 1973, was a 'matter of principle'.
These views were superficially similar to those voiced by
the authorities in Peking. The Chinese daily Renmin Ribao
publicly welcomed the initialling of the Paris Agreement on
23 January 1973 as an event signifying the 'victory' of the 
31
people of Vietnam. In their official message of 27 January 
to Hanoi's leaders, Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai and Zhu De 
urged the people of the North to achieve 'new success' in con­
solidating and building socialism in the DRV. The South in 
contrast, was encouraged under its 'authentic representative', 
the National Liberation Front (NLF) and the PRG together
with the other two political forces, to speedily set up the 
32
NCNRC.
Peking saw two possibilities for Indochina in the period
following the Paris Agreement: either the settlement of the
Vietnam question by peaceful means and its reunification -
the probability of which was 'not great' - or resolution by
33
by the use of force which meant eventual war.
Premier Zhou Enlai urged restraint on the part of Hanoi.
To continue fighting he said, would not produce instant 
results and the question of 'liberating' South Vietnam could 
be considered later. Having compelled the US to withdraw
44
through negotiations the Vietnamese would be left with ’half
34
to one year1 for rest and consolidation. During that time 
Zhou emphasised economic reconstruction of Vietnam which 
might be achieved through 'self-reliance' although the recons­
truction of both North and South Vietnam would require 'inter­
national support'. He warned however that the Soviet Union 
would 'intensify economic aid' to the Vietnamese people after
the war which would 'balance out our influence' there so that
35
the struggle could become 'complicated and acute'.
The Agreement, Zhou observed, concerned itself only with
Vietnam and excluded the problems of Cambodia and Laos.
The 'current situation' in Cambodia was described as 'good'
since Lon Nol controlled only a small area while Sihanouk
remained 'tough and resolute'. Peace in Indochina as a whole
was only 'temporary,' the Premier said, if the war was to
break out again it was unlilkely to invite further US interven- 
36
tion.
On a larger scale the Paris Agreement served China's inter­
ests as well as those of Southeast Asia. Its signature would
aggravate the 'contradictions' between the US and the Soviet 
37
Union in Indochina. On 18 January Zhou had referred to
a 'certain superpower's ambitions' to make wholesale inroads
38
into Asia and to expand its sphere of influence there. 
Increasingly China shared an interest with the US that took 
precedence over Chinese concern with Vietnam. This was to 
maintain a global balance of power in the face of what was
45
perceived as the Soviet threat which Peking meant to make 
every effort to contain in Indochina. The Agreement, if ful­
ly implemented, was seen as removing an obstacle to impro­
ved Sino-American relations; if it came apart the Chinese 
would be forced to jeopardise their relations with the US on 
Hanoi's behalf. Peking wished to put the war behind it. The 
war had hindered the objectives that China set itself for the 
future, a resolution of the Taiwan issue on the lines laid down
by the Shanghai Communique of February 1972 and formal
39
diplomatic ties with Washington and Tokyo.
I: n
THE INDOCHINA PERSPECTIVE : VIETNAM
'...Vietnam takes on a different perspective for itself and for 
us when it is an appendage to the landmass of Asia than when 
you make it a test case to stop a unified Communist thrust across 
the whole world. When Hanoi realised that (US) foreign policy 
could not be blocked by the Vietnam War forever, and when we 
realised that there was more to Asia than Vietnam, we could 
conduct our negotiations in a different framework.1
Henry Kissinger 
1 February 1973
*
Dr. Kissinger interviewed for CBS Television in DSB. 2 
April 1973, p.395.
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In Washington the postwar relationship between the US
and Vietnam was being shaped. The Paris Agreement, Nixon
said on 23 January 1973, was 'only the first step' towards
40
building a 'stable peace' in Indochina and Southeast Asia. 
America's contribution towards this end entailed 'healing the 
wounds of war' and postwar reconstruction of the DRV and 
throughout Indochina as provided for in Article 21.
On his return from Paris Kissinger officially visited Cong­
ress for the first time on 26 January 1973. In a fullscale brief­
ing on the accord he promised Congressional members they 
would be consulted before the Nixon Administration made 
any firm commitment to Hanoi on postwar reconstruction 
aid programmes. In this respect the US was ready to accept 
limitations on military and economic aid to South Vietnam if
North Vietnam would accept limitations on the nearly one bi-
........................................................................ 4 1 ....................
llion dollars it received annually from its allies. The US
was previously described on 9 February 1972 as prepared to
undertake a massive US$7.5 billion five-year reconstruction
programme in conjunction with an overall agreement in which
42
North Vietnam could share up to US$2.5 billion. Discuss­
ion on aid, Kissinger underlined, would only take place after 
the implementation of the Agreement was 'well-advanced'.
A new debate had started at this juncture on Capitol Hill 
over attempts to prevent any future US fighting in Indochina. 
A bill was introduced the same day by Senators Frank Church 
(Democrat, Idaho) and Clifford CJfase (Republican, New Jer-
47
sey) - later termed the Case-Church Amendment - to prohibit
the involvement of hostilities 'in and over or from off the
shores of North and South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia'
43
without prior specific authorisation by Congress. Aimed at 
a prohibition of the bombing of the Ho Chi Minh Trail, the 
bill would take effect 60 days after the signature of the Paris 
Agreement. Should the Agreement break down, Congress­
ional authorisation was required for any decision involving 
further US intervention. If the accord hinged on the threat 
of resumption of US military operations some argued that it 
was even more fragile than supposed. When questioned, Ki­
ssinger refused to indicate what the US might do in this even­
tuality. He apparently believed that the RVN would emerge
44
ahead in the forthcoming political contest with the Viet Cong.
In the interim Washington embarked on a complementary 
strategy to assure North Vietnam's Southeast Asian neigh­
bours of continued US support. The visit of Vice-President 
Spiro Agnew, announced on 28 January, was intended to de­
monstrate to South Vietnam, Cambodia, Thailand and Laos 
the continued US interest in giving them economic aid and 
whatever military aid was permissible under the accord. To 
explain the continued American role in Southeast Asia, Agnew
would also visit Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philip- 
45
pines. Agnew's visit to Saigon (30 January-1 February) att­
empted to ease Nguyen Van Thieu's concern about the RVN's 
future with assurances of continued American backing and
48
affirmed the US position on 'certain key elements' of the
accord. These included Washington's recognition of Thieu's
government as the 'sole legitimate government' of South
Vietnam, that it did not recognise the 'right of any foreign
troops' to remain on South Vietnamese soil and would 'react
vigorously' to violations of the Agreement. According to
Hung, Agnew failed in Saigon to mention the last point which
made Thieu doubt the full extent of the US commitment to
46
react when called to do so.
Agnew's visit to Phnom Penh (1 February) pledged suppor 
-t for Cambodian demands for the departure of North Vietnam­
ese troops. Peace in Indochina, he said, would be incomplete
until a formal ceasefire was achieved in Cambodia and’all for-
47
eign forces' withdrawn. In Vientiane (3 February) Agnew
assured Lao Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma of 'continued
support' for his government's policies of national reconciliation
and neutrality in efforts to achieve a negotiated settlement there,
48
particularly in the post-hostilities period.
In the interim the structure of the framework for peace in . 
Vietnam was taking shape in Washington. In an announce­
ment on 31 January, Nixon said Kissinger would visit Hanoi 
from 10-13 February 1973 to initiate a dialogue concerning 
the current state of compliance with the Paris Agreement, to
discuss the postwar relationship and the reconstruction pro-
49
gramme for all Indochina. Foreign aid in general, whether 
it was with the North or the South, Nixon added, was aimed
49
at a 'potential investment' in peace. For the North he hoped 
that Hanoi would participate with the US and 'other interest 
-ed countries’ in the DRV's reconstruction. Nixon believed 
that the assistance to North Vietnam might divert Hanoi from 
pursuing 'regional hegemony' to building up its economy. At 
the same time the US' newly-established relationships with 
Moscow and Peking could conceivably help restrain Hanoi from 
embarking on longterm goals of dominion over its neighbours.
In the longterm Kissinger's visit to Hanoi was viewed in the
context of establishing a 'postwar relationship' not dissimilar to
50
his first visit to Peking in July 1971. The intention was to 
move relations between Hanoi and Washington from 'hostility 
to normalisation'. A pattern of coexistence might conceivably 
be established with Hanoi in the light of his own experience of 
establishing relations with Peking with whom Washington had 
economic and cultural exchange but no diplomatic ties. While 
the US favoured establishment of such relations with Hanoi 'in 
principle', Kissinger's main goal was to initiate a constructive 
dialogue and to work out the machinery for future exchange of 
ideas.
Kissinger thought it a challenge to absorb the enormous 
talents of the people of Indochina in'tasks of construction' 
rather than in 'tasks of destruction'. Economic aid however 
was to be construed neither in terms of a 'handout' nor of 
reconstruction alone, but as an effort to enable Hanoi to 
work together with other countries, 'particularly Western'
50
countries' in a 'more constructive relationship' and to pro-
51
vide the impetus for peace.
While encouraging peaceful reconstruction over contin­
ued warfare, the purpose of Kissinger's journey to Hanoi
intended to stabilise the peace and warn of 'serious conseq-
52
uences’ should the Agreement be violated. He made clear 
however that any forthcoming aid was conditional upon the 
approval of Congress and on Hanoi's strict implementation of 
the terms of the Agreement. In Hanoi (10-13 February) Kiss­
inger attempted to persuade Premier Pham Van Dong that a 
'strong and independent Vietnam' was not inconsistent with 
American interests. His agenda stressed three items: the imp­
lementation of the ceasefire, normalisation of relations and
53
economic reconstruction.
Already reports from Saigon said hundreds of violations 
had been committed in the first days of the truce. Some mon­
ths, Kissinger conceded, were expected to elapse before the 
settlement accustomed Hanoi to 'more peaceful pursuits'.
But on the ground in South Vietnam 'land grabbing' by both 
sides to seize within the first fortnight of the truce, as many 
'zones of control' as possible had not ceased. Kissinger 
initially reacted by saying this was inevitable since if the
zones of control were to be established, they could only
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coexist 'by testing each other'. The fighting however 
showed no sign of abating by the time of his Hanoi visit. It 
seemed possible that both sides were moving into areas they
51
insisted they had controlled before the ceasefire but inde­
pendent observers regarded these contested areas as firmly 
controlled by no one. The ICCS which was to supervise the 
release of prisoners, troop withdrawals, elections and other 
aspects of the accord was bogged down by its modus 
operandi.
Cao Van Vien, Chief of the South Vietnamese JGS obser­
ved that the ceasefire gave the communists a chance to 'stay
mixed' with South Vietnamese positions in an 'intricate 
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pattern'. The communists, he said, were highly confident 
of their chance of success on the eve of the Agreement and 
aimed to exploit the ceasefire by their policy of 'land grab­
bing' and 'population nibbling'.
Kissinger's visit revealed that Hanoi's ambitions in 
Vietnam and Indochina were not to be constrained by the 
Agreement. In his view Hanoi's interpretation of the issue 
of resupply and infiltration flagrantly transgressed the proto- 
cols. Freed from bombing, the Ho Chi Minh Trail had seen 
the passage of munitions and personnel grow at a more furi­
ous pace than during the war, in direct contravention of Art­
icle 7. The DMZ in particular saw the transit of material
bound not only for South Vietnam but also for Cambodia
56
and Laos in violation of Article 20.
The second item on the agenda, the normalisation of rela-
57tions betwen Hanoi and Washington was 'inconclusive'. 
Hanoi was'not ready to establish any formal ties and besides
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the International Conference on Vietnam in Paris scheduled 
to begin on 26 February 1973 had not yet convened to lend 
international endorsement of the Agreement.
The third item, the economic package, presupposed Con­
gressional approval as well as 'strict implementation' of the 
accord. While this was made public, what was not divulged 
was a secret message from Nixon to Pham Van Dong spelling 
out the procedures for implementing Article 21 which were to
be 'voluntary and distinct' from the formal obligations of the 
58
Agreement. Delivered to Hanoi on 30 January 1973, the
message, drafted by Kissinger had suggested the 'procedures'
for discussion of economic aid.
While in Hanoi Kissinger therefore engaged in a general
discussion of principles, to set up a Joint Economic Commis-
sion (JEC). Intended to design a precise aid programme, the
JEC would begin its deliberations in Paris on 15 March 1973.
An aid amount to Hanoi of US$3.25 billion over a period of
five years was described by Kissinger as an 'appropriate 
59preliminary figure'. Any foreign aid progamme however 
would be subject to the JEC's recommendations and to Cong­
ressional support. The proposals entailed what could be done 
through existing legislation: Kissinger had brought along to 
Hanoi documents on 'bilateral and multilateral programmes' 
in which the US had participated and an outline of various
projects that might be included in an aid programme for 
60Vietnam. Whereas it had previously centred on the Agency
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for International Development (AID), planning a future aid
programme for Indochina was described in Washington on
61
10 February as 'under the supervision' of Kissinger.
Pham Van Dong however interpreted these legislative pro­
cedures as hindrances to what should have been an unmiti­
gated US commitment to aid Vietnam. American assistance, 
Hanoi insisted, was 'unconditional'. Earlier Le Due Tho had
demanded for North Vietnam the entire package of US$7.5
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billion earmarked for all Indochina. The figure originally 
envisaged in Nixon's 9 February 1972 report had been US 
$2.5 billion; after much 'haggling' US$3.25 billion was 
finally settled for.
As for the political provisions of the Agreement, Kissin­
ger found neither Hanoi nor Saigon interested in the setting
up of the NCNRC which he believed would ensure Thieu's 
63
survival. The provision in the accord that the two South 
Vietnamese sides should agree to general elections under 
the Council appeared suspect to both sides. As long as the 
elections were delayed, Saigon's forces might grow strong 
enough to prevent serious political gains and subversion by 
the communists. Conversely, if the elections were scheduled, 
Saigon saw its position weakened. No agreement would be 
made by the PRG unless the accord abolished those restrict­
ions written into South Vietnamese election laws. Hanoi 
seemed to believe that if elections were delayed or evaded 
they and the Viet Cong would have an excuse to resort to
war again, their chief means to victory.
54
In Paris the three sessions of talks between the two Sou­
th Vietnamese parties in the interim - 5,7 and 10 February -
only concerned themselves with procedural questions for
64
the crucial talks on a settlement. The stalling by both 
sides was linked by some observers to the form of foreign 
economic assistance which would be subsequently deliver­
ed and administered. Aid was seen as crucial to the forth­
coming political process in South Vietnam since the chann­
elling of aid to either party would greatly enhance its polit­
ical leverage. The idea of American economic aid to the
North was acceptable to Thieu if Hanoi did not attack the 
65 
South.
In Hanoi Pham Van Dong had dropped a dangerous hint
of renewed warfare if a new relationship did not develop on
a solid basis of mutual interest - suggesting that the accord
66
was only a 'temporary stabilisation' of the peace there.
The tenor of Kissinger's talks in Hanoi however, would 
be juxtaposed against events elsewhere. Significantly it was 
to be all 'part of a pattern' including a visit, announced on 3 
February, by Kissinger to Peking (15-19 February) for 
'concrete consultations' with Chinese leaders in the first 
high-level meeting after the Vietnam settlement and Nixon's 
own plan to confer with Thieu in the spring.
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I : III
THE INDOCHINA PERSPECTIVE: CAMBODIA
'Hanoi wanted Cambodia as a satellite. Itsaim was to dominate 
Cambodia, reopen its southern supply route and demoralise South 
Vietnam by creating the impression that its ultimate overlordship of 
Indochina was inevitable. China, on the other hand, was above all 
interested in an independent Cambodia, Peking did not wish to see 
Phnom Penh as a satellite of Hanoi. It preferred independent states 
in Southeast Asia, not a region dominated by North Vietnam with 
its historic enmity of China and dependence on Moscow. This 
interest happened to coincide with ours, it was also imperative for 
the survival of South Vietnam.
%
Henry Kissinger
'As to the question of peace in Laos and Cambodia, it falls 
within the competence and the sovereignty of the peoples of Laos 
and Cambodia. As to the international guarantee conference, its 
aim is to guarantee peace in Vietnam, and not for Indochina.'
Le Due Tho
*
Henry Kissinger, Years of Upheaval. (London, Weidenfeld & 
Nicolson, 1982); p. 17.
The New York Times. 25 January 1973.
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Kissinger recognised that the failure of the Paris Agreement to
67
include a ceasefire in Cambodia was clearly 'one of its tragedies'.
His rationale for making peace in Vietnam in the absence of formal
arrangements for Cambodia was based on two principles : One, that
Congress would not tolerate any delay in the execution of the accord
on account of Cambodia alone; Two, that the Khmer Rouge might
not be able to prevail by themselves. He had a 'firm expectation'
on 24 January 1973 that the Vietnam ceasefire would be extended
68
shortly to a de facto halt to the fighting in Cambodia.
Kissinger had previously warned that any subsequent failure on
the part of the Khmer Rouge to observe the ceasefire would mean
the continuation of military activities in Cambodia. Before the Paris
Agreement was initialled he had informed Le Due Tho that
’... pending a settlement in Cambodia, (if) offensive military
activities are taken there which would jeopardise the existing
situation, such operations would be contrary to the spirit of Article
20 (b) of the Agreement and to the assumptions on which the 
69
Agreement is based.'
An indivisible conflict, according to Kissinger, required an
indivisible peace. Cambodia was part of Vietnam's war since the
'enemy' moved freely across the border in total defiance of the
concept of sovereignty. Kissinger blamed Hanoi for spreading
the war to Cambodia, calculating that its collapse would exacerbate
70
the disintegration of South Vietnam.
58
The Paris Accord implied the withdrawal of all foreign troops 
and the closing of foreign bases not only in South Vietnam but also 
in Cambodia and Laos (Ch.VII:Article 20). Its military provisions 
included a ban on the use of Cambodian base areas by 'foreign 
countries' to encroach on the sovereignty and security of South 
Vietnam. The goal ideally was to have a ceasefire in Cambodia and 
Laos at the same time as Vietnam.
Despite this provision, Article 20's references were vague. There 
was no deadline set for the withdrawal of 'foreign troops' from 
Cambodia and Laos and no enforcement machinery to guarantee or 
supervise the withdrawal. Only the signatories of the Agreement - 
the three Vietnamese parties and the US - were bound by this to end 
all military operations there. Once the war was over in Vietnam, Le 
Due Tho assured Kissinger that there was 'no reason' for it to cont­
inue in Cambodia. Tho made 'no formal commitment' however
other than 'a private understanding' that Hanoi would 'contribute
71
actively' to restore peace there.
The Khmer Rouge thought otherwise. The Vietnamese, they
believed, were intent on perpetuating a situation to secure Khmer
Rouge dependence. Hanoi had taken measures to ensure that its
Cambodian installations were constantly augmented to reach a point
72
when it would be unnecessary to supply them from Vietnam.
The need to end the war in Cambodia had in fact been discussed. 
Secret talks held intermittently between the Vietnam Workers Party 
(VWP) and the Khmer Rouge representing the Communist Party of
59
Kampuchea (CPK) had grown in intensity with the onset in Paris of 
regular secret consultations on Vietnam. Particularly from 1972 on­
wards when the Paris talks showed signs of becoming conclusive,
the presence of Pham Hung, Secretary of the Central Office, South
73
Vietnam (COSVN) suggested an element of urgency. Vietnamese 
negotiations with the Khmer Rouge for a ceasefire were now critical. 
Pham Hung recognised that North Vietnam could not indefinitely 
sustain the burden of war which it had endured for thirty years. The
North Vietnamese, according to the CPKwere interested in US
74
offers of aid amounting to 'more than US$3 million'.
Immediately prior to the Paris Agreement's signature, friction
between the North Vietnamese and Khmer Rouge representatives
was particularly acute. In the critical period from 24 to 26 January
1973 when the definitive terms of the Agreement had been reached,
Pham Hung warned Pol Pot, General Secretary of the CPK that
Kissinger had specifically informed Le Due Tho that should the
Khmer Rouge continue to refuse to accept a ceasefire, US strategic
75-
and tactical planes would destroy Cambodia 'within 72 hours'.
This was affirmed on Pol Pot's return to the maquis by a letter
76
from COSVN disclosing Kissinger's threats.
These threats did not impress Pol Pot who expected Cambodia's
revolution to achieve nothing from the Paris Agreement, as had been
77
the case with the Geneva Accord of 1954. As Pol Pot's forces 
would continue to fight until 'total victory', Pham Hung threatened 
to leave intact the entire Vietnamese military machinery in Cambodia 
a point'later corroborated by Prince Norodom Sihanouk, the depos-
60
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ed leader of Cambodia. Hanoi simultaneously began to strengthen
79
its system of military occupation by upgrading its bases.
Prepared to go it alone, the Khmer Rouge condemned Hanoi's
signature of the Agreement on 28 January 1973 as a betrayal of the 
80
Indochinese revolution. They reaffirmed the Five-Point declaration
of 23 March 1970 which demanded inter alia, the total withdrawal
from Cambodia of all military personnel, advisors and material of
the US 'and its satellites', an end to the acts of aggression against
Cambodia and the termination of all US support and aid to the Lon 
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Nol regime.
The resolution of the Cambodian problem as Kissinger saw it,
necessitated a negotiated settlement This would ideally involve the
Chinese as intermediary whom he believed had greater leverage than
Hanoi over the Khmer Rouge. The resolution of the Cambodian
question along these lines was first discussed in New York in
November 1972 when Kissinger met Chinese Deputy Foreign
82
Minister, Qiao Guanhua. The meeting revealed what Kissinger ■
called the 'congruence' of Washington and Peking's interests in
their mutual desire for a 'neutral independent Cambodia’ free from
foreign interference. The possibility was also broached of Sihanouk
playing a significant role on the assumption that he would not act
as a 'frontman' for the Khmer Rouge. According to Kissinger,
Qiao's response indicated that Peking was agreeable to the idea
of Kissinger meeting with the Prince on his 'next visit'to Peking,
83
then scheduled for January 1973.
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Kissinger continued therefore to believe Cambodia represented
a 'convergence' of Peking and Washington's interests. To China
the central dilemma was the preservation of Cambodia as a separate
state; to the US Cambodia's collapse might spell the complete dis-
84
mantling of the structure of peace in Indochina. The problem was
to create a different but viable government apparatus that might
act as a guarantee of Cambodian independence and neutrality to
assure its survival in essentially the same form. This idea could
concurrently support the continued existence of a separate and
independent South Vietnam which would also be in both the US'
and China's interests.
A genuine solution for Cambodia, Kissinger believed, required a
a  85
ceasefire and Sihanouk's return which needetj "balance of forces’.
The continuation of war in Cambodia meant maintaining the existing 
situation there. An 'understanding' might be reached with Lon Nol 
that did some justice to the concerns of the prince. Two parties 
would be left to be balanced - Lon Nol's forces and those of the 
Khmer Rouge. This balancing act might also lead to the 'preserva­
tion’ of Cambodia to prevent it from becoming an appendage to 
Hanoi.
The US position on Cambodia was thus reinforced. On 28 
January 1973, the day the truce came into effect in Vietnam, Mar­
shal Lon Nol declared a unilateral halt of offensive operations in 
Cambodia. Kissinger had said the bombing on Cambodia would
be resumed only if the Khmer Rouge insisted on continued hosti-
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lities and 'Only at the request' of the Lon Nol government. On
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5 February the US was reported to have assured Lon Nol that
bombing in Cambodia would be resumed if Hanoi resumed
87
'offensive operations' against his forces. This assurance had 
been delivered in mid-January, prior to the signature of the acc­
ord, to Lon Nol in Phnom Penh by the US Chief of Staff, Alex­
ander Haig, Jr.,. The developments in the Paris talks between Le 
Due Tho and Kissinger as well as the probable contents of the 
Agreement were also made known to Lon Nol. The same assuran­
ce was conveyed in Paris by Assistant Secretary of State, William 
Sullivan to the Cambodian Foreign Minister, Long Boret. Cambo­
dian officials in Phnom Penh were also assured that the US had 
reached an 'unwritten understanding' with Hanoi that the North 
Vietnamese troops would be withdrawn from Cambodia. This 
was perhaps a reminder of the 'private understanding' Kissinger 
said he had with Le Due Tho, mentioned earlier (p.^3).
Steps were being taken however to assure Lon Nol of con 
-tinued military and economic support. In the interim a con­
troversy had broken out in Washington in early February over 
whether the recently-concluded Paris Agreement allowed the 
US to continue furnishing military aid to Cambodia and Laos.
The Defence Department was reported on 2 February to have 
been urged by the State Department and apparently by the
White House office of Kissinger to continue such aid and
88
'not to withdraw' military aid personnel stationed there.
There were those in the Pentagon who had questioned whether 
the continuation of such aid was allowed under the accord.
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The Defence Department's response was that 'in the absence 
of formal ceasefire agreements' in Cambodia and Laos such 
assistance was continuing 'without fundamental change'.
On 7 February Kissinger left Washington for Bangkok, 
Hanoi and Peking. A possible difference of nuance on the 
Cambodian problem might be detected at this point between 
the White House and the State Department. In Bangkok Kiss­
inger's discussions on 8 February with the US Ambassador 
in Cambodia, Emory Swank, revealed that the latter took a 
harder line on Sihanouk and thought him 'irrelevant'. Like 
Lon Nol, Swank preferred negotiations on Cambodia through 
Hanoi. Kissinger preferred Peking, the 'better intermediary'. 
Swank however also wanted an assurance from Kissinger that
neither himself nor any of his associates would meet the prince 
89
while in Peking.
By this time the ceasefire which was supposed to end the
war and limit the conflict on the ground in South Vietnam was
already being tested. The fighting showed signs of laying the
foundations for an extended war engulfing Cambodia. Swank
and Kissinger also disagreed on the utility of military operations
to bring about the ceasefire there. Swank informed Kissinger
that 42,000 North Vietnamese troops remained in Cambodia,
35,000 of which serviced Hanoi's supply system for South 
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Vietnam. The Ambassador thought a ceasefire was 'more 
probable' with a minimum of military pressure while Kissinger 
believed in its absolute necessity. Kissinger later attributed the
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resumption of bombing in Cambodia in February to a renewed
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Khmer Rouge offensive. His purpose was to create a 'balance 
of forces' that would deprive the communists' hope for a milit­
ary solution and thus force a compromise.
This action takes on an interesting dimension when seen
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against one disclosure on 9 February. Sources in the Nixon 
Administration revealed that the US and North Vietnam had 
'secretly' agreed in their Paris negotiations in January that a 
ban on 'foreign military activity' in Cambodia and Laos would 
not take effect immediately. Kissinger and Le Due Tho were 
said to have entered into an 'explicit oral agreement' in which 
the US and the DRV would cease military actions in Cambodia 
and Laos only when 'the principals in the civil wars' in the two 
countries had agreed to a ceasefire.The two men had apparently 
agreed on the interpretation of the term 'foreign military activity'; 
which provided for a cessation of all American air raids and for 
a withdrawal of the 50,000 to 60,000 North Vietnamese troops 
believed then to be in Laos. It explained why the text of Article 
20 made no reference whatsoever to when 'all military actions' 
by foreign countries in Cambodia and Laos should be 'put to 
an end.' This was apparently intentional.
Such a secret agreement might explain the violations of Art­
icle 20 by both sides, following the accord's signature. Already 
US warplanes had attacked communist forces in Cambodia 
for the first time since Lon Nol's unilateral declaration of the 
truce. It would seem therefore that the US might be at liberty
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to stage such raids until a ceasefire was observed by both sides 
in Cambodia. It is significant that on 9 February just as Kiss­
inger was about to arrive in Hanoi, the bombing of Cambodia 
grew in intensity.
Kissinger's conversations with Pham Van Dong and Le Due 
Tho in Hanoi (10-13 February) made little headway towards 
the withdrawal of its troops in Cambodia. After the ceasefire 
Hanoi took the position that withdrawal from Cambodia and 
Laos would have to await two conditions : a ceasefire in Cam­
bodia and Laos and a political settlement in both countries. The 
Phnom Penh regime had to be dismantled before any negotia­
tions could begin and a political settlement could only come 
about with a new government. Only then would Hanoi contem­
plate withdrawal.
But the form of political settlement in Cambodia was open
to debate. The Americans were predisposed towards a
'genuine coalition government1, with Sihanouk at the centre,
the North Vietnamese thought the prince's role disposable en
route to a communist government. Tho also warned Kissinger
that the 'decisive element' in Cambodia was not Hanoi but 
93
the Khmer Rouge.
These differences on Cambodia were not confined to the 
US and North Vietnam. The widening gap between Peking and 
Hanoi's aspirations there was made clear in mid-February to 
Kissinger. Both officially supported the communist insurgency 
led by the prince. As opposed to Hanoi, Peking gave Sihanouk
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full support. In Peking (15-19 February) Kissinger thought
Premier Zhou Enlai seemed more in favour of a structure that
would best guarantee Cambodian independence and neutrality
94than of a Khmer Rouge victory. Peking did not insist on the 
overthrow of the Lon Nol regime, on whose survival Sihanouk's 
balancing act depended. A complete communisation of Cambod­
ia, Zhou suggested, would only accentuate China and South Viet­
nam’s security problems and perhaps eventually place Indochina 
under Hanoi's tutelage.
A ’practical arrangement1 involving Lon Nol's forces without 
Lon Nol thus emerged between the US and China. If these forces 
could survive a setdement and their existence be temporarily 
guaranteed, Sihanouk might return in a definite role as arbiter be­
tween Lon Nol and the Khmer Rouge. Kissinger even suggested 
an 'immediate meeting' between a representative of Lon Nol and 
Penn Nouth, premier of the prince's exiled Royal Government of
National Union of Cambodia (GRUNK) based in Peking to nego-
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tiate a 'coalition structure'. So long as his forces were represent­
ed, Lon Nol need not himself be part of this government.
Zhou cautioned that the civil war in Cambodia was complex and 
involved 'outside forces'. But he would nevertheless convey these 
ideasto Sihanouk. To Kissinger this meant Zhou identified himself
partly with the process, and that Peking was 'approaching an active
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role' in the Cambodian peace negotiations.
But possibly unknown to Kissinger, while he was in Hanoi, the 
search for an alternative solution to Cambodia had begun. On 10
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February GRUNK's emissary in Peking, Sarin Chhak approached
the French Ambassador to China, Etienne Manac'h, to ask if the
. 97Elysee had finally decided to 'modify its policies' on Cambodia. 
Manac'h was responsive and arranged to see Qiao Guanhua, Deputy 
Foreign Minister, with whom Kissinger believed he had reached a 
'convergence of views' on Cambodia. Contrary to this observation, 
Qiao expressed his doubts about the situation in Cambodia, the US 
he thought were in an impasse there.
Kissinger’s refusal to meet Sihanouk in Peking also did not 
augur well. The prince had in fact made known to Kissinger
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through Le Due Tho and Zhou that he was ready to meet him.
On his own account, the Prince indicated a 'readiness' on 28
January 1973 for 'indirect talks' with the US. If Washington
was prepared to act in a 'friendly manner' with an independent
and non-aligned Cambodia, a 'rapid reconciliation' might be 
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achieved. Moderation had been urged by Premier Zhou Enlai
who assured the prince of Peking's support 'to the end' if his
100
forces appeared conciliatory. Two agreements had already 
been signed between Peking and GRUNK on 13 January for
101
the 'gratuitous supply' of military and economic aid for 1973.
On 29 January Sihanouk said that GRUNK was ready to wel­
come Kissinger and that negotiations might be held in Paris,
102
Ottawa or 'another centre' but must not include Lon Nol.
Conciliation was also evident in Sihanouk's statement in 
Peking on 29 January when he disclosed that under an evolv­
ing new policy, the Khmer Rouge would not launch offensive
68
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actions. The final word on this policy of reevaluation had 
not as yet been received from the interior. Khieu Samphan, 
Deputy Premier and Minister of National Defence, however 
had already approved his offer of 'good relations' with the US. 
We now know that the Prince had also asked the leaders of the 
resistance for permission to enter the 'liberated zone' of Cam­
bodia. Although Sihanouk on 6 February denied that he was 
scheduled to meet Kissinger in Hanoi during the latter's visit,
he again reiterated his readiness to meet him 'anywhere and at 
104
anytime'.
Kissinger's lack of response to Sihanouk's overtures was
interpreted by Penn Nouth as a 'grave error' to have serious
repercussions afterwards. As he later explained to Manac'h on
3 March, agreement to a meeting had been a great concession 
105
on GRUNK’s part. These remarks were also disclosed to
William Sullivan, then in Paris for the International Conference
on Vietnam, who confirmed that Washington did not intend to
make contact with Sihanouk.
The US' consistent refusal to make contact had ominous
overtones. All GRUNK resolutions, whether from Peking or
elsewhere had to have the approval of the interior whose
influence was growing by the day. In the spring of 1973 the
Khmer Rouge outlined two alternatives : total victory or com- 
106
promise. The actual choice between these would depend 
on the evolving military situation on the ground. The Khmer
69
Rouge would be forced to negotiate - for the best conditions 
possible - only if military victory remained elusive. The re­
verse was also true.
On his return from his visits to Bangkok, Vientiane, Ha­
noi, Peking and Tokyo, Kissinger's reaction was to call a 
series of meetings in late February with the WSAG (Washin­
gton Special Actions Group). The Cambodian situation was 
analysed in a memorandum of 27 February 1973 which outlin­
ed 'two mutually dependent objectives': One, to strengthen the
Lon Nol regime in Phnom Penh and Two, to achieve a ceasefire 
107
there. Reluctant to repeat the Vietnamese and Laotian exper­
iences in Cambodia, Kissinger said the US kept a 'deliberately 
low profile'. Although the Phnom Penh government was being 
supplied with military and economic aid, Congressional cons­
traints meant funds and personnel were limited. This was a 
situation that was to plague the Administration throughout the 
next two years.
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I :  IV
THE EAST ASIAN PERSPECTIVE
'In the course of these last months, a certain convergence 
of views is being formed between Washington, Peking and 
Tokyo on the future of Asia: it is expressed in the Shanghai 
Communique and in the declaration of Tanaka and of the
Premier of the People's Republic of China Chinese
diplomacy strives to channel to its own advantage the ebb; 
it seeks besides to establish a new equilibrium which may 
be able to favour in the longterm the chances of a more auto­
nomous Asia, more independent in its decisions.'
Etienne Manac'h
13 February 1973*
'...the new Current in Asia is moving forward by a big 
step towards the dissolving of confrontation by blocs, and 
towards peaceful coexistence, transcending differences in 
social systems. This current can now be called the 'spirit 
of the Paris Agreement.'
Mainichi Shimbun 
16 February 1973
Etienne Manac’h, Memoires d'Extreme Asie : Une Terre tra- 
vers^e de Puissances Invisibles, (Paris, Fayard, 1983); p.328.
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From a larger East Asian perspective, the ending of the war 
in Vietnam might help to force the pace to consolidate peace in 
Asia. A new framework of relations entailing the cooperation of 
China and Japan showed signs of emerging from the hoped for 
reduction of international tensions. The intentions of China and 
Japan to promote stability in Indochina for that purpose must 
now be explored.
In Asia, Japan had special significance for Zhou Enlai. 
Japan's sense of 'isolation' from major international devel­
opments possibly accounted for its speed in establishing dip­
lomatic relations with China in September 1972. This was a 
consequence of the 'shock' in Tokyo when it was suddenly
informed of the change in America's China policy in July 1971
108
and of the Nixon visit to Peking in February 1972. An 
informal tacit understanding had since grown up between the 
two capitals in the Japan-China dialogue, and already specu­
lation had arisen about the consequences of a combination of 
Japanese industrial might and Chinese manpower.
Zhou saw Japan's 'future orientation' as at a crossroads, 
involving a separation of politics and economics. In Asia,
Japan planned to expand economically in Southeast Asia
109
including postwar Vietnam. A capitalist nation, Japan 
could not help 'seeking profits from loans or investments' 
offered to Southeast Asian countries/The 'biggest focal
73
point' in the Asian situation after the normalisation of Sino-
Japanese relations in September 1972 according to Zhou
was the 'ending of the Vietnam War1, to mark the beginn-
110
ing of the easing of tension in Asia as a whole.
Under these circumstances Zhou gave emphasis in mid-Jan 
-uary 1973 to the nurturing of a China-Japan 'detente'. In a 
meeting with Kimura Takeo, member of the Liberal Democratic 
Party (LDP) on 18 January, the Chinese Premier said the on­
set of the Vietnam 'peace' raised for both China and Japan 
the critical question of the Soviet Union's ambitions. Zhou
was aware that Japan's small defence expenditure might prove
111
inadequate to ward off Moscow’s military might For
China however any increment in the former could revive the
spectre of Japanese militarism.
Heading the first official Japanese mission to visit China
after the normalisation of relations, was Nakasone Yasuhiro,
Minister of International Trade and Industry (MITI). His talks
(17-22 January) with Zhou discussed the implicit agreement
by China and Japan not to seek 'hegemony' in the Asia-Pacific
and the eventual conclusion of a Japan-China 'Non-Aggression' 
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pact.
Economic issues were prominent including the conclusion 
of a Trade Agreement, the use of funds for the Export-Import 
Bank of Japan and the establishment of a Japan-China Trade 
Council. The first of the agreements expected to be signed 
was the Civil Aviation Agreement on the basis of the Septem-
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ber 1972 Joint Communique. The Zhou-Nakasone dialogue
also saw a tacit agreement by China and Japan 'not to compete’
in their respective assistance to developing countries. China's
emphasis in the Third World would concentrate on agriculture
and light industry while Japanese assistance might take the
113
form of heavy industry. The possibility of joint exploitation
of oil resources on the Chinese continental shelf by Japanese
petroleum refining industry circles was deemed inappropriate
for the time being.
Zhou and Nakasone also discussed the 'Vietnam peace' in
the context of a larger 'Asian peace'. After the ceasefire, China
and Japan would 'cooperate mutually' and extend economic aid
114
in an effort to realise peace there. During Nakasone's Peking
visit, Tokyo made corresponding moves towards Hanoi. Reports
from Jakarta on 18 January 1973 suggested that Japan was
planning to open diplomatic negotiations with Hanoi after the 
115
ceasefire. Yoshida Kenzo, Director-General of the Japanese 
Foreign Ministry's Asian Affairs Bureau revealed that these nego­
tiations would begin shortly when a reconstruction programme 
for postwar Vietnam was expected to be developed.
Japan had no intention however of increasing its contacts with 
Hanoi to the detriment of Saigon. MITI was conspicuous in send­
ing a mission led by its Divisional Director, Ishii Kengo, to Saigon
on 25-26 January to discuss for the first time, economic aid 'on a
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governmental basis' between Japan and South Vietnam. The 
momentum generated by this visit was to create 'at every oppor-
75
tunity’ for MITI, a chain of aid activities including relief for war
victims, rehabilitation of war damage and economic development.
Japan's initiatives towards Vietnam might be explained in
terms of important pronouncements made in Tokyo. At the time
of the initialling of the Paris Agreement on 24 January 1973
Premier Tanaka Kakuei was emphatic that Japan's role in post
-war Vietnam and its international responsibilities should be
enlarged. The Japanese Government was expected to map out
plans for 'an active part' in the rehabilitation of Indochina and
was ready to extend yen credits, 'gratuitous loans' and other
117
types of economic aid on a 'bilateral basis'. Welcoming the
Agreement, Foreign Minister Ohira Masayoshi called for an
international conference to preserve 'peace and stability' in
Indochina. He believed a 'substantially effective’ international
effort for the reconstruction and rehabilitation of Indochina
needed Japan's participation in 'full consultation' with the US
118
and other major nations.
Ohira's statement may have reflected continued Japanese 
irritation over what was considered the Nixon Administration's 
failure to consult fully on key issues with Japan, its major ally in 
Asia. The White House had apparently not kept Tokyo informed 
about the Paris talks. Nor had Japan been invited to the proposed 
international conference on Vietnam in which other major nations 
were scheduled to participate. Yet Japan, it appeared, was expect­
ed to finance a large part of the reconstruction effort in Indochina. 
In this connection Kissinger later explained that the participants of
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the conference were selected by agreement among the parties that
negotiated the settlement Although there was no objection to
Japan's participation, 'unanimity' about its membership in the
119
conference could not be achieved.
In Japan, opportunities the Vietnam 'peace' might offer for 
postwar economic rehabilitation assistance generated wides­
pread interest The Keidanren (Federation of Economic Orga­
nisations) hoped to create a 'Committee for Cooperation with 
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Indochina’. It would shortly send Senga Tetsuya, on its 
Board of Directors on unofficial visits to North and South 
Vietnam. The Keizai Doyukai (Japan Committee for Econo­
mic Development) suggested a big business conference of
Southeast Asian nations including North and South Vietnam
. 121
be convened to discuss Indochina's postwar reconstruction.
Particularly significant was the Japan-Vietnam Trade
Association's statement of 27 January 1973 encouraging the
Tokyo Government to 'correct' its diplomatic and trade poli- 
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cies with Hanoi. It invoked as its basis the 'Trade Consul­
tations Memorandum' signed in 1966 with its Hanoi counter­
part, the DRV Chamber of Commerce, which had built on pre­
vious private trade agreements concluded in 1956 and 1958.
This was reminiscent of a similar strategy between China and 
Japan in the late 1950's and early 1960's which culminated in 
a 1962 Trade Memorandum negotiated between Liao Chengzhi, 
member of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist 
Party (CCP) and Takasaki Tatsunosuke, a Japanese business­
77
man with prewar Chinese connections who later became a mem­
ber of the LDP. 'Liao-Takasaki Trade' or fL-T Trade' subseq­
uently emerged to become an important channel for Peking and
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Tokyo to promote quasi-govemmental relations.
Stressing the parallels, the Japan-Vietnam Trade Association's 
statement encouraged the conclusion of a 'private trade agreement' 
or Trade Memorandum' and the setting up of joint trade missions 
in Tokyo and Hanoi aimed at longterm and stable expansion of 
trade. An informal Japanese delegation for Hanoi was urged as a 
preliminary move. A 'revision' of Japan's diplomatic and foreign 
policies, the normalisation of relations with the DRV and economic 
exchange between the two Vietnamese states were also suggested.
Indochina reconstruction aid was also mentioned in the Prem­
ier’s Administrative speech of 27 January 1973 in which Japan 
might fulfil a role in the stabilisation of welfare, economic const­
ruction and development of Vietnam. Tanaka again proposed the
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convening of an international conference of Asia-Pacific nations. 
Tokyo's enthusiasm was evident in Ohira's 30 January statement 
when he suggested that reconstruction aid need not await the 60- 
day interval for complete US withdrawal and might be extended 
throughout that period.
Three stages were outlined for the implementation of such aid: 
One, emergency aid to war victims, in which Yen 1 Billion had 
been appropriated for fiscal 1973; Two, the creation of an 'Exch­
ange Stabilisation Fund' to maintain 'internal economic balance' 
between North and i>outh Vietnam; Three, a fully-fledged recon-
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sanction and development plan. Japan would be fully respon­
sible for the first stage. On account of their scope the second and 
third stages would require international cooperation. However 
Japan would play a considerable role in the allocation of resour­
ces. Tokyo’s support for the protocols and the conditions of the 
accord was accompanied by its insistence that 'all Vietnamese 
parties' adhere to and implement its provisions.
An unprecedented statement accompanied the euphoria 
surrounding the Vietnam peace. On 30 January Ohira also 
revealed that Japan had in fact maintained 'unofficial contact' 
with the North Vietnamese government since February 1972.
A secret trip to Hanoi for an unofficial exchange of views had
been made then by Miyake Wasuke, First Divisional Director
126
of the Foreign Ministry's Southeast Asian section. The
timing of Miyake's visit had been significant coming at the
height of the US-China rapprochement symbolised by Nixon's
Peking visit. The delicacy of similar contacts after 1973 was to
receive additional emphasis since they would require Ohira's
personal approval. Preliminary contacts however were likely
to be made through Paris which had been instrumental in the
initial success of Miyake's hitherto secret mission. Contacts
were now described as a ’prior condition' to assess Japan's role
in the postwar reconstruction of Vietnam, an exchange of views
on economic assistance and Tokyo's recognition of the Hanoi 
127
government.
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During the first week of February 1973 Japan appeared to be
coordinating its moves towards North Vietnam with those of the
US. It awaited the consequences of Kissinger's proposed visits
to Hanoi and Peking before making a formal decision. A Foreign
Ministry source divulged on 1 February that a decision had in fact
been taken to dispatch officials to Hanoi 'as early as 20 February 
128
1973'. This would be one day after Kissinger's scheduled de­
parture from Peking. As prescribed in Ohira's plan, three officials 
including Miyake himself to discuss emergency aid in Hanoi would 
also sound out possible Japanese recognition of North Vietnam 
along the following principles: One, the DRV's evaluation of 
relations between Japan and South Vietnam; Two, the RVN's 
reaction to Japan's contacts with the North; Three, the pace at 
which normalisation of relations between the US and the DRV 
was likely to proceed in the future; Four, the coexistence of the
two Vietnams as separate entities in the shaping of peace in 
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Indochina.
Japan's forays into North Vietnam were not without obsta­
cles. The beginning of a long and unresolved controversy con­
cerning the PRG's status, would plague the Tokyo govern­
ment in coming months. In anticipation, Ohira emphasised on 
2 February that Japan would continue to maintain diplomatic 
relations with the Saigon government while recognising that an 
'administration' existed in the North. Tokyo had no intention
of contacting the 'liberation forces' in the South although it
130
could not be denied that they existed. Ohira conceded the
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following day however that a situation existed in Vietnam
where the mle of the South Vietnamese government might be 
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'limited'. The Paris Agreement called into question the legi­
timacy of the Saigon Administration's claim to represent Viet­
nam as 'sole government'. The accord's tacit legitimation of 
the PRG's presence in the South suggested moreover that the 
Thieu administration was not the 'only authority' there.
Any establishment of Japanese diplomatic relations with 
North Vietnam would also raise the critical issue of 'repara­
tions'. This was compounded by the fact that Tokyo had re­
cognised the 'State of Vietnam' as the legitimate government 
of Vietnam by the San Francisco Treaty of 1952. Relations 
were established in 1953 and the conclusion of a reparations 
treaty was followed by a general normalisation of relations 
with South Vietnam in 1959.
Japan's quandary was made more complex on 6 February. 
A public statement then by Hoang Tung, Editor of the Hanoi 
daily, Nhan Dan, said Hanoi wished to establish 'normal re­
lations' with Japan, to which Saigon's relations posed no 
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barrier. Hanoi's attitude was 'flexible and realistic' and 
Japan's cooperation with the US during the war was no imp­
ediment. Tung's statement, made before Kissinger’s Hanoi 
visit fitted with the gradual shift in Japan's own approach to 
the question of recognising the DRV.
Tokyo remained cautious. Concern for the 'full implem­
entation' of the protocols of the Paris Agreement was again
81
expressed on 8 February. Chief Cabinet Secretary Nikaido 
Susumu said Tokyo would sound out the DRV and 'other cou­
ntries concerned' about Japan's possible recognition of Hanoi.
A form of 'de facto' recognition might be considered since 
the Agreement called for the future reunification of North and 
South Vietnam. Japan would also examine the USA's moves
including the results of Kissinger's forthcoming visit to
133
Hanoi before dispatching the Miyake mission.
Saigon's disclosure on the eve of Kissinger's Hanoi visit
that it was not opposed in principle to Tokyo's normalisation
of relations with Hanoi eased the way for further formulation 
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of policy. We now know that the idea of American econo­
mic aid to the North was acceptable to Saigon if Hanoi did not 
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attack the South. Private level contacts were gaining ground
at the same time. The visit to Saigon, Phnom Penh and Vientiane
of the Keidanren mission led by Senga Tetsuya would start on
12 February to explore the extension of economic assistance to 
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Indochina.
On a broader level the idea of the Asia-Pacific conference was
also gathering momentum. Ohira suggested on 6 February that
the proposal be first discussed with UN Secretary General Kurt
Waldheim who was scheduled to visit Tokyo on 15 February and
then at an 'emergency conference' of Japanese ambassadors to
Southeast Asia to be held in Bangkok on 17-18 February which
was an occasion to study trends in the post-Vietnam situation and
137
to gauge the reactions of neighbouring countries to the 'peace'.
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That meeting coincided with Kissinger's presence in China.
He believed it essential that the US and China became part of the
'structure of peace' advocated by President Nixon. The role of
the US was to 'share responsibilities' in creative partnerships
with its friends - as expressed by the normalisation of relations
with China - and to move from 'confrontation to negotiation'
138
with its opponents.
Kissinger’s Peking visit (15-19 February) affirmed the 'cont­
inuation of possibilities' in this respect, outlined in the Shanghai
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Communique of February 1972. The two sides agreed that it 
was appropriate to accelerate the normalisation of relations since 
existing channels in Paris were proving inadequate. Each side 
would establish a liaison office in the capital of the other to han­
dle trade and all matters apart from strictly formal diplomatic
140
aspects of the relationship. As a gesture of goodwill the
Chinese agreed to the release of the two US military prisoners
held since 1965 and 1967 within the same period as that of the
US withdrawal from Vietnam.
Kissinger recognised that Zhou Enlai's preoccupation
with the Soviet threat remained undiminished with regard to
the 'current world situation’ and future policies in Southeast 
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Asia. Zhou warned that if the Soviet Union succeeded in 
subjugating Peking, the impact on the world equilibrium of 
forces could 'reverberate' by producing major aggression in 
Asia. It was in their aversion to this possibility, as expressed 
in Vietnam, that Chinese and American interests appeared
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almost parallel: the containment of Soviet power, Kissinger 
concluded, emerged a dominant aim.
One of the principal purposes of the US-China rapproche 
-ment was to terminate the war in Vietnam. American retreat 
from Vietnam should not lead to gains for some other power 
in Indochina. As we have seen, Peking hoped the US disenga­
gement from Asia would guarantee a degree of independence
to every state and preferred four states in'Indochina rather than
142one entity dominated by Hanoi. Four states implied four
separate revolutions and four independent paths to socialism.
In Kissinger's talks with Zhou, the Premier did not press for
the overthrow of the Thieu regime as opposed to Hanoi's insis-
143
tence that he be removed. The Chinese were particularly
anxious to ensure that competition for the reconstruction of
Indochina, especially North Vietnam would not encourage
........................................................................ 1 4 4 .....................
participation by the Soviet Union in any form. If Moscow
had any influence there Peking might face difficulties in help­
ing its Indochinese neighbours reconstruct.
One feature of Kissinger's Peking visit deserves emphasis.
In the 19 months since his first visit in July 1971, Kissinger
noticed that Zhou Enlai had staged a complete 'volte face' with 
145
respect to Japan. China now treated Japan as an incipient ally. 
Mao Zedong even advised Kissinger that he should never visit 
Peking without also stopping over in Tokyo. Although Zhou still 
entertained fears of Japanese militarism in mid-February 1973, 
the 'closest cooperation' between the US and Japan was urged.
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He suggested moreover that the US take the initiative in the crea­
tion of an anti-Soviet coalition stretching from Japan, through
146
China, Pakistan, Iran, Turkey and western Europe.
Japan’s prominence in the emerging US-China-Japan dialogue
with special emphasis on Vietnam was gaining momentum. A
statement on 15 February in Tokyo and Washington simultaneous
ly announced that Kissinger would proceed directly to Japan after
147
leaving Peking on 19 February. The White House had appar­
ently insisted as late as 13 February that a visit to Tokyo was 'not 
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scheduled'. It was subsequendy revealed that talks with Tana­
ka and Ohira were proposed 'all of a sudden1 by the US side on
14 February - while Kissinger was in Hongkong - on direct inst- 
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ructions from Nixon. Both Washington and Tokyo could have
been.awaiting the outcome of Kissinger's dialogue with Hanoi
before deciding whether a Japanese visit was necessary. Only
Ohira, we are later informed, had been aware of the possibility
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of Kissinger visiting Tokyo. (Kissinger had previously visit­
ed the Japanese capital in June and in August 1972.)
In the American context Kissinger’s Tokyo visit was under­
stood to have implications for US aid to Indochina. On 7 Febru­
ary President Nixon in Washington submitted to the Senate the 
draft of new foreign assistance authorisations for Fiscal 73. A 
Congressional hearing on 8 February had expressed concern
about the future US role in Southeast Asia, particularly with re-
151
ference to the rehabilitation of Vietnam. Reconstruction aid
on a bilateral basis - from the US to Indochina - was expected
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to meet domestic American opposition. Secretary of State Will­
iam Rogers proposed that this be balanced by an international 
'consortium' including the Asian Development Bank (ADB) 
and other multilateral organisations. An international effort for 
Indochina's reconstruction and rehabilitation would invite North 
Vietnam's active participation and was a possible contribution 
to the 'investment in peace'. It was assumed Hanoi might be 
prepared to accept UN participation and assistance on longterm 
projects from the US or the World Bank (International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development, IBRD).
Although North Vietnam was not a member of the World 
Bank, the latter’s Vice-President for Asia, Peter Cargill, was 
reported on 10 February to have said the Bank would be will­
ing to play a role in Indochina including making a financial 
152contribution. The Bank was not taking the lead however 
but was anticipating 'more information' from the US and 
other potential donors. One possibility was the Bank becom­
ing chairman of an aid consortium similar to those already 
existing for India, Pakistan, Colombia and Indonesia.
During the hearing Rogers also alluded to 'interested parties' 
which had a stake in the development of events in Southeast 
Asia contributing to such a consortium arrangement. The Inter­
national Conference on Vietnam (Article 19) was also aimed at 
developing the momentum towards an international cooperative 
effort. Japan, Rogers added, would have a major role to play
if a consortium was set up to assist in the reconstruction and
153
rehabilitation of Indochina.
86
At a press conference on the day Kissinger's Tokyo visit 
was announced, Rogers said that Japan's interest in coopera­
ting in the reconstruction of Indochina was 'very much wel- 
154
corned' by the US. The small investment that Congress
would be called upon to make would provide 'cement' for
the Agreement's 'certain obligations' towards Indochina
reconstruction. Kissinger later complimented Japan for its
'responsible role' in Southeast Asia as a 'natural exercise'
of its respect for stability in Asia. The US, he added, did
not consider itself a competitor with Japan for the privilege 
155
of extending aid there.
It was suggested at the time that Kissinger's Tokyo visit 
was intended to explain the discrepancies between the Indo­
china aid formulae advocated by Washington and Tokyo.
Press speculation suggested his consultations with Tanaka 
and Ohira on 19 February 1973 centred on the contents of 
his talks in Hanoi and Peking. Kissinger was said to have
requested a 'large-scale burden' from Japan for the postwar
156
reconstruction of Indochina. The possible recommenda­
tions of the US-DRV JEC, prospects for US recognition of 
Hanoi and US-China relations were also discussed at great 
length.
Whatever its effects, a more cautious approach towards 
Tokyo's role in Indochina emerged after Kissinger's depart­
ure on 20 February. It was announced on 21 February that 
Miyake Wasuke's Hanoi visit, which had been earlier proposed
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for 20 February, would now be deferred. The US Ambassador
to Japan, Robert Ingersoll, had apparently advised Ohira to
postpone Miyake's visit until after the results of Kissinger's 
157
visit were clear.
Contrary to Ohira's original intentions Tokyo decided to 
await the end of the 60-day US withdrawal from Vietnam 
before making any definite moves in Indochina. Japan's plans 
to draw up any aid programme there would now depend on 
Miyake's deferred mission. Tanaka's suggestion for an Asia- 
Pacific conference was also temporarily shelved, the stated 
reason being that the conference of Japan's Southeast Asian 
ambassadors in Bangkok (17-18 February) had failed to achie­
ve consensus on this idea.
In Washington open debate on the merits of US reconstruc 
-tion assistance was simultaneously taking place. On 20 Feb­
ruary Senators of both the Republican and Democratic parties 
urged the debate be delayed until after the US withdrawal from 
Indochina lest the latter be jeopardised. A possible Congression­
al conflict over the Indochina aid issue might also emerge from 
the amendments that Senator Edward Kennedy (Democrat,
Massachusetts) had introduced the same day to a pending mili- 
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tary assistance bill. The amendments would authorise an 
'initial humanitarian contribution' of US$72 million to war 
victims in South Vietnam and Cambodia and would stipulate 
that the funds be channelled through international organisations 
and private relief agencies.
A statement by William Rogers before the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee on 21 February 1973 reiterated the US'
commitment to a postwar programme of relief and rehabilita-
159
tion for Indochina as an ’excellent investment in peace’.
He reaffirmed his belief in the major international consortium 
effort which would require 'full consultations' with 'other 
nations' - for instance, Japan. Kissinger's visit to Asia, he 
added, had been aimed at persuading all countries, particularly 
North Vietnam, to support the concept of foreign assistance. 
No agreement was reached and no concrete results emerged 
from the discussions except for the creation of the JEC.
Planning for any programme of assistance remained tenta­
tive. Rogers ascribed this to the uncertainties prevailing on the 
ground concerning the implementation of the truce. Until the 
situation in Indochina as a whole was clarified, an outline for a 
proposed aid programme, including contributions from other 
nations, would be deferred. In any case Congress would be 
consulted and no commitment would be made without its 
support. No figure had been arrived at and full consideration 
would be given only after the 'most careful planning'.
Within a week, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
approved a bill that would witlfeld foreign aid funds after
30 April unless the Administration agreed to release US$4.5
160
billion in impounded money. By the same token, the bill, 
also called a 'continuing appropriations resolution’ would 
prohibit any aid to North Vietnam without specific Congres­
sional approval.
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By this time the International Conference on Vietnam had 
opened in Paris, lasting from 26 February to 2 March. Rogers 
said it represented an 'unprecedented opportunity' for the 
thirteen parties 'directly and indirectly' involved in the Viet­
nam war to make important contributions to a stable and dura- 
161
ble peace' in Indochina. 'Concerted and constructive inter­
national action,' he hoped would focus on’reconciliation and 
concord' to achieve an international structure of peace in Viet­
nam to guarantee stability and security in Indochina.
During the conference Hanoi opposed mention in the decl­
aration of postwar foreign aid except in general terms.lt also 
.issued repeated insistences that reconstruction aid be given 
directly rather than through an international body.Suspicious 
that an aid programme organised by several nations in con­
cert or by an international agency might substantially reduce
its leverage over it, the DRV said the US owed it aid that
162
could not be diluted by an international contribution. Han­
oi was aware that political resistance in the US would make 
it harder to get an aid bill through Congress than if aid was 
channelled through an international framework. Specifically 
Hanoi demanded 'industrial aid' from the US to build up its 
own infrastructure.
In Paris as in Washington, Rogers responded that the 
exact scope of aid would depend on the findings of the JEC, 
the recommendations of the Administration and on Congress'
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decisions. Private talks after the Conference, between William 
Sullivan, (Rogers' deputy) and Nguyen Co Thach (Vice-For­
eign Minister of the DRV), would discuss economic aid inclu­
ding the functioning of the JEC. The Act of the Paris Confer­
ence pledged to assist and contribute to the 'relief, rehabilita­
tion and reconstructive' effort in Indochina - the manner and 
extent of such contributions depending on the conference 
participants. Significantly Rogers reiterated that while it was 
clear that some participants may not have the ability to make 
any meaningful contribution, others 'nothere represented' 
might wish to play a role in such an effort. Any contribution, 
must however be made in 'full consultation' with respect to
the sovereignty of the recipients and be 'without any political 
163
considerations'.
In Washington, Nixon attempted to assuage critics by 
stating on 2 March that aid to the countries of Indochina, if 
approved by Congress, would come out of funds of the De­
fence Agency or AID and not from the domestic side of the 
164
budget. Funds for North Vietnam however would have 
to come at the expense of some other programme, possibly 
foreign aid payments to other countries, including South 
Vietnam as well as weapons procurement.
But the question of aid was very much dependent on the 
implementation of the Paris Agreement on the ground, which 
showed no signs of significant improvement after more than a 
month. The situation in South Vietnam in relation to the propo­
sed framework for aid might now be examined.
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CHAPTER II
SIXTY DAYS & AFTER 
MARCH - APRIL 1973
H: I
EXPLORING THE OPTIONS
In March 1973 the implementation of the Paris Agreement 
continued to be cause for concern in view of the repeated 
fighting and ceasefire violations on the ground in South Viet­
nam. The continued basis of US aid to Hanoi was defined on 
11 March when the White House announced that it would ask
Congress to approve postwar aid to Hanoi only if it lived up
1
to its part of the Agreement The Administration would go 
ahead with the request on two conditions: the cessation of 
North Vietnamese infiltration into the South and the with­
drawal of troops from Laos. No decision to press forward 
with the controversial programme would be made until mid- 
or late-May: six weeks after the deadline for the withdrawal 
of all US troops from South Vietnam.
The Nixon Administration appeared prepared at this junc 
-ture to allocate from the military and foreign aid budgets 
several hundred million dollars a year for aid to the DRV. 
Moreover if the truce terms were scrupulously observed by
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all parties, some savings should be realised in the US$29
billion budget request for Southeast Asia operations for the
2
fiscal year beginning 1 July 1973. To critics, Secretary of 
State William Rogers made clear at a House Foreign Affairs 
Committee session on 6 March that no commitment whatso­
ever had been made till then for aid to Hanoi. It was necessary 
first to let the 60-day interval of the Agreement elapse and 
to discuss the matter ’at length' with the North Vietnamese.
It might take another 60 days by the time the US made the 
3
request to Congress.
A report submitted to Congress on 14 March 1973 by J. 
William Fulbright, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee concerning the Foreign Assistance Act of 1973 re­
commended a ceiling of US$226 million be set for fiscal 1973. 
This concerned US obligations in, for or on behalf of Cambo­
dia and assistance to North Vietnam which should be prohibit
-ed without specific authorisation and appropriation by Con- 
4
gress. Further obligations for assistance to South Vietnam, 
Cambodia and Laos after 30 June 1973 would be similarly 
prohibited; and the financing of military assistance for South 
Vietnam and Laos would be required to come out of the Forei­
gn Assistance Act appropriations after the same date.
On 13 March both the White House and the State Depart­
ment expressed public concern for the first time over the 
5
ceasefire. This represented some change from the Adminis­
tration's previous position that despite anticipated differen­
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ces, the accord was being carried out satisfactorily. Reflecting 
a 'high-level policy decision' within the Government, the 
statement said North Vietnamese movements were being 
watched 'very closely' with special reference to Articles 7 
and 20. The principle of enforcing the Paris Agreement made 
the US address itself to two unwelcome questions: whether 
Washington could take steps to secure its enforcement and 
whether it had the right to do so.
Washington had already exerted diplomatic pressure 
against Hanoi in a series of notes sent on 4, 6, 14 and 15 
March 1973 warning of 'grave consequences' if the infiltra­
tion continued and culminated in military action on Hanoi's 
6
part Parallel with pressure on Hanoi an attempt was made to 
exert pressure on Moscow. Kissinger warned Soviet Ambassa 
-dor Anatoly Dobrynin on 8 March about the continued supply 
of Soviet war material to North Vietnam which would consti­
tute an 'unfriendly act'. Dobiynin attributed the flow to Peking
in its 'eternal effort' to undermine a relaxation of tension
7
between the US and the USSR. This reassurance was not
entirely convincing since an agreement on economic and.
military aid to North Vietnam in 1973 had in fact been signed
in Moscow on 24 February when Foreign Minister Nguyen
8
Duy Trinh was on his way to the Paris Conference. Moreover 
on 9 March, Trinh was received in Moscow by Andrei Kirilenko, 
member of the Soviet politburo, who expressed the determina­
tion to further 'in every way' the development of cooperation
107
9
between the two countries. In contrast when Trinh stopped
over in Peking, the Chinese did not sign any agreement on
military assistance to Hanoi.
The US began simultaneously to examine the military option.
On 13 March a meeting of the Washington Special Actions
Group (WSAG) resolved not to allow the ’enemy' under any
10
circumstances to mount a big offensive that year. On 14
March Kissinger submitted a memorandum to Nixon outlining
11
Hanoi's possible motives. It was possible Hanoi might be 
’testing the limits' of US tolerance, Kissinger said, on the 
assumption that Washington would not react to its violations 
of the accord so long as it held the prisoners-of-war (POWs). 
Alternatively, Hanoi might have decided to resume the offen­
sive as soon as it had finished resupplying ifctroops. It was 
vital for the future of the accord that 'every' action' be exhausted 
to explore options. Military contingency plans had to be drawn 
up since Hanoi was blatantly taking advantage of the fact that 
all air activity against it had ceased.
On 15 March President Nixon publicly voiced concern for 
the first time about the movement of North Vietnamese milit­
ary equipment into South Vietnam and warned Hanoi not to
12
'lightly disregard' his words. The level of infiltration of men 
and material into South Vietnam in excess of replacements 
permissible under the Agreement was now critical. Nixon 
was particularly concerned on two counts: One, because the 
violations occurred and Two, because they could lead to
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'rather serious’ consequences.
The efficacy of the Paris Agreement, as we have seen, 
rested on the maintenance of the 'equilibrium of forces' on 
the ground. If left unchecked, the issue of infiltration could 
well undermine the entire basis of the accord and reverse 
the principles on which it rested. The slow attrition of North 
Vietnamese troops on the South might give way instead to 
gradual and substantial growth. The communist military 
buildup appeared designed to ensure two ends: that there 
would be no attrition of the North Vietnamese forces 
remaining in the South and that while a protracted political 
struggle was going on, the military balance wouldd not 
move decisively in favour of the Saigon Government.
The Viet Cong had their own charges regarding the imple­
mentation of the accord by Saigon and the US. During the 60 
-day period when the Four-Party JMC was operating, Tran Van
Tra said the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) violated
13
the accord 'more than 70,000 times'. Tra was also incensed 
by the US bombing of Thien Ngon - an attempt to wipe out his 
^delegation to the JMC - followed by subsequent bombing of 
designated 'pick-up points' dotted throughout the South. He 
blamed the US on 17 March for violating the accord by ship­
ping 'great amounts' of munitions from Japan to South Viet­
nam, arguing that the US was guilty of bringing in material
14without the inspection required by the accord. The muniti­
ons shipped in, the US argued were legal under the protocols
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since they were brought in under the 'one-for-one basis' 
through Da Nang. The difference was that the communists 
were increasing their supply of weapons, bringing in new 
ones, at various points of entry, instead of at points specified 
under the Agreement.
By the third week of March Washington's patience was at 
an end. Military contingency plans were being prepared. The­
se included a 'series of heavy strikes' over a two to three-day 
period over the Laotian panhandle and the northern reaches of 
South Vietnam's Military Region I where the North Vietnam­
ese were 'exposed'. To Nixon's concern about what effect 
this might have on the POW's, Kissinger recommended the 
US launch an attack on 24-26 March after the third but before 
the fourth set of POWs were due for release.
But Nixon 'temporised', indicating on 21 March that he
would prefer to hold up the troop withdrawals rather than
attack. Kissinger ascribes this to the effects of Watergate
which were 'boiling' then, to continue in subsequent months
15
to debilitate and eventually destroy the President
At this point, fighting was reported around the outposts 
of Tong Le Chan and Rach Bap on 20 March resulting in the 
'second largest' ARVN relief operation since the ceasefire. 
Tong Le Chan base in Military Region III was a border camp 
lying along enemy lines of communication between Tay Ninh, 
Binh Long and Binh Duong provinces. Its existence, accord­
ing to Cao Van Vien, the South Vietnamese Chief of General
110
Staff (CGS), forced the Viet Cong to make long detours. On
25 March 1973 an intense communist effort began to force the
evacuation of the base. The situation in 16 consecutive weeks
became 'increasingly critical’ resulting in the paralysis by both 
16
the ICCS and the JMC.
In Washington the end of the 60-day period was marked 
by Nixon's address to the nation on 29 March 1973. For the 
first time in 12 years there were no US forces in Vietnam. 
Problem areas still remained : the provisions of the Agree­
ment required an accounting for all those missing in action 
in Indochina; the provision with regard to Laos; and infiltra­
tion. The President warned Hanoi to comply with the Agree­
ment and left its leaders with no doubt as to the 'consequen-
17
ces’ if they failed to do so.
Hanoi appeared more amenable towards the end of the 60-
day period to diplomatic warnings in the form of notes from
Kissinger. On 27 March Hanoi made a 'vague reference' to
private meetings to review the accord. A more explicit note
of 31 March proposed private meetings between Le Due Tho
and Kissinger to 'resolve difficulties' which might arise in the
18
future implementation of the accord.
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II : II
AID AS PART OF THE EQUATION
'It was not only the military situation that was causing 
South Vietnamese officials apprehension. They were at 
least as concerned about critical economic problems. Indeed, 
with the need to keep military manpower levels up and thus 
defence expenditures high, with a drop in foreign exchange 
earnings because of the American withdrawal and with mili­
tary uncertainties still a barrier to the kind of massive foreign 
investment that might fill the gap, South Vietnam was more 
than ever dependent on American financing of its huge 
budgetary and trade deficits.'
*
Lowenstein & Moose
Thailand. Laos. Cambodia & Vietnam: April 1973: A Staff 
Report prepared for the Use of the Subcommittee on US Secu­
rity Agreements and Commitments Abroad, of the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee, 11 June 1973, (Washington, 
D.C., US Government Printing Office, 1973); p.3.
The question of US aid to North Vietnam had been explo­
red in the interim. The US and the DRV officially announced 
on 8 March that the first meeting of the JEC to discuss future 
economic relations would open in Paris on 15 March 1973.
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The US three-man delegation would be headed by Maurice
Williams, Deputy Director of the Agency for International
Development (AID). His deputies would be John Mossier,
former head of the US aid mission in South Vietnam and
Donald Syvrud, Special Assistant to the Secretary of the
Treasury for International Affairs. The North Vietnamese
would be led by Dang Viet Chau, Finance Minister, assisted
by Nguyen Co Thach, Deputy Foreign Minister and Le Khac,
Deputy Chairman of the State Planning Committee.
In Paris the JEC had held five sessions from 15 to 26 March
1
which were described on 27 March as having made 'progress'.
Maurice Williams affirmed on 22 March that the US objective
was to 'construct and reinforce' the peace by postwar recons- 
20
truction. We now know that Congressional staff members
James Lowenstein and Richard Moose - en route to Thailand,
Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam (28 March-19 April 1973) - had
met on 26 March US JEC representatives in Paris, who
described the talks as 'an exploration of the general possi-
21
bilities' of an aid programme in North Vietnam. Hanoi's 
position had apparently involved 'no political posturing’. 
Suspicious of multilateral aid, consortia or any other arrange­
ments which could involve intermediaries, its delegates had 
merely spoken of the US 'moral commitment' to 'healing 
the wounds of war'. There had been relatively little indica­
tion from the North Vietnamese of their specific needs other 
than 'expressions of interest’ in shelter, food and repair of
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industrial and port facilities.
The US delegation therefore had not taken a 'fixed position' 
on the mechanism of the aid programme and preferred to dis­
cuss 'joint technical task teams'. An interest in postwar recon­
struction had been expressed to the North Vietnamese but it 
was emphasised that a programme could not be submitted to
Congress ’while the fighting was going on'. Hanoi, it was sugg-
22
ested, could 'absorb more aid' if there was demobilisation.
Linked to aid was the progress of the political talks between
the two South Vietnamese parties at La Celle-St Cloud. The
first talks, begun on 19 March had exposed the fundamentally
conflicting positions of the two sides. This was with particular
reference to the role of the 'third force' in seeking resolution of a 
23
political settlement. A three-point agenda for negotiations was 
then proposed by both sides. Saigon's chief delegate Dr Nguyen 
Luu Vien called for talks on general elections in South Vietnam, 
the formation of the NCNRC and the 'fundamental question' of 
the reduction and demobilisation of armed forces. The last clause 
had meant the withdrawal of North Vietnamese forces from the 
South. Saigon required agreement on the kind of elections to be 
held for existing offices before the NCNRC was established. The 
Viet Cong representative Nguyen Van Hieu wanted guarantees for 
the formation of a three-part NCNRC with representatives from 
Saigon, the Viet Cong and a third faction representing other South 
Vietnamese opinion. Hieu insisted on a constitutuent assembly 
before the Council was established and general elections.
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Successive sessions of these talks on 22, 26 and 30 March 
developed into venues for mutual recriminations which showed 
no signs of abating.
Washington's attention was focused elsewhere. Nguyen
Van Thieu's imminent visit (2-7 April) to the US was aimed
at obtaining directly from Nixon, the minimal assurances
underwriting the survival of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN).
Specifically Thieu wanted to secure two items : An American
pledge to intervene with airpower in case of a repetition of
a fullscale North Vietnamese offensive; and a US guarantee
of sufficient economic assistance to meet the costs of
reconstruction above the existing US$500 million a year 
24
economic support.
At San Clemente (2-3 April) Nixon privately repeated the
pledges he had made in his correspondence with Thieu and
promised to meet 'all contingencies' in case the Agreement 
25
was grossly violated. The Joint Communique of 3 April
1973 threatened 'vigorous reactions' to any ceasefire violations
and emphasised the 'unconditional withdrawal' of all forces
26
foreign to Cambodian and Laos. Thieu however did not fully
comprehend the gathering impact of Watergate. Believing that
Nixon would continue to pledge US support with airpower,
Thieu could not foresee later developments including the War
Powers Act and the bombing prohibition which would inhibit 
27
the President’s powers.
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Nixon’s public statements promised Thieu adequate and 
substantial economic assistance for the rest of the year. For 
the initial years of the postwar era the President committed 
himself to seek Congressional authority for a level of funding 
to assure economic stability and rehabilitation in South Vietnam. 
The 'limited resources' of the Indochina region, the Communi­
que said, would require 'external assistance' to preserve the 
necessary social and political stability for 'peaceful evolution'. 
The economic development and self-sufficiency of South Viet­
nam also depended on its ability to promote and attract foreign 
investment. 'Other nations as well as international institutions',
it hoped, would meet the RVN's needs in a concerted programme
28
of international assistance.
Thieu's private secretary and nephew, Hoang Due Nha, 
later disclosed that Nixon's staff had attempted to get the 
South Vietnamese to concede to the 'specifics' of the econo­
mic assistance programme. The President, they argued, could
not commit Congress in advance to economic aid. Saigon thus
29
had to 'fight every inch of the way' on the Communique.
Thieu's visit to Washington (4-7 April) coincided with the
passing of the Byrd Amendment, sponsored by Senator Harry
Byrd (Independent; Virginia), to preclude the transfer of foreign
aid funds from other programmes to provide aid for Hanoi. This
might have some connection with the return on 2 April, from
30
Paris, of Maurice Williams to the US for consultations. On 
5 April the Senate voted overwhelmingly to forbid any direct
117
or indirect assistance to North Vietnam unless Nixon obtained
31
specific and prior approval of Congress.
Hanoi's response to developments came from Xuan Thuy,
its representative to the Paris talks for more than four years.
In Paris Thuy asserted on 5 April that the US was trying to
32
'stall' on applying provisions of the accord. Only three mines
had been removed from North Vietnamese waters to date and
reconnaissance flights had been conducted over theDRV only
'from time to time'. At the JEC talks, when asked to discuss
Article 21 Ch. 8 refering to reconstruction assistance, the US
only talked 'in generalities' on economic aid and refused to
go into details. Hanoi wanted US contributions 'at the level
of destruction' caused by their forces in Vietnam.
It was disclosed on 6 April while Thieu was in Washington,
that he had asked Nixon for an American aid commitment of
more than US$700 million yearly through to 1975 with a sharp 
33
reduction after that. As economic aid to the RVN was
currently running at US$600-700 million a year from all
US sources, Thieu's aides had envisaged a need for a modest
increase in 1974-75 to cover additional reconstruction efforts.
Thieu also met Pierre-Paul Schweitzer, Director of the Intema-
34
tional Monetary Fund (IMF) on the same day.
In Washington, Thieu's ideas for 'economic Vietnamisa- 
tion' took shape. Although he had been in touch with Nguyen 
Tien Hung, professor of economics at Howard University 
and an economist at the IMF, the two men had not met face to
118
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face since September 1971. Thieu now arranged for Hung to 
be briefed by Finance Minister Ha Xuan Trung on the economic 
discussions at San Clemente. Hung was also privy to a series 
of studies and economic models on South Vietnam's possible 
remodelling of its economy and government structure by plan­
ning, tax reforms, export incentives and employment policies. 
From US$1 billion in 1975, US economic support to the RVN 
•would be reduced by 1980 to US$100 million. Appearing opti­
mistic that his plans for economic self-sufficiency might reduce 
dependence on the US completely by then, Thieu suggested
that Hung contribute to the economic reconstruction of South 
36
Vietnam. Longterm economic development was not however
guaranteed. Thieu, according to Hung, had not received any
firm commitment from Nixon or the World Bank (International
37
Bank for Reconstruction and Development, IBRD). A 
subsequent disclosure by Kissinger, in his letter dated 25 
March 1974 to Senator Edward Kennedy (Appendix III), 
throws some light on this:
'In April 1973 President Thieu asked the IBRD (World 
Bank) to help form an aid group for the RVN. The IBRD 
agreed to make the effort, provided that this would be acceptable 
to the bank membership and that the group could be organised 
in association with both the IBRD and the ADB (Asian Develop 
-ment Bank).'
This explains why on his return to Saigon on 14 April,
Thieu envisaged the 'end' of a difficult period and the begin-
119
ning of a new era of peaceful reconstruction for his country.
He declared the convening by South Vietnam of an interna­
tional conference 'within 6 weeks' to discuss multinational
38
economic assistance in the 'postwar period’.
Thieu secured only limited reassurances from Nixon re­
garding the situation on the ground in Indochina. Kissinger 
however preferred a 'dual track' approach combining diplo­
macy with military action in Vietnam in response to continued 
transgressions of the Paris Agreement. On 2 April he sent
Nixon a detailed memorandum of further possible responses
39
- both diplomatic and military - to Hanoi's violations.
Beginning on 4-5 April a considerable increase in military 
activity was reported by Saigon with peaks of sharp but
40
limited fighting which might invite further intensification.
In Washington the WSAG revealed an extensive complex of
surface-to-air missiles south of the DMZ around Khe Sanh and 
41
in the Ashau Valley. Following Defence Secretary Elliot 
Richardson's statement on 3 April that bombing could not be 
ruled out, the Joint Chiefs of Staff responded with demands 
for intensive bombing for 3 days. Kissinger as we have seen 
preferred to resort to diplomacy.
On 5 April while Thieu was in the US, a note was sent 
to Hanoi rejecting 'emphatically1 the DRV's contention that 
the responsibility for implementing Article 7 regarding in­
filtration rested only on the two South Vietnamese parties.
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The note insisted that Hanoi respected Articles 7 and 20 and 
warned of the 'most serious consequences' if violations con­
tinued. At the same time Kissinger proposed a meeting with
Le Due Tho at a ‘mutually agreeable time' in Paris during 
42
the first week of May.
To get a clearer picture of the deteriorating military situa­
tion in Indochina, Nixon sent General Alexander Haig, Jr., 
Army Vice-Chief of Staff to Bangkok, Vientiane, Phnom 
Penh and Saigon (8-12 April) to make a general assessment. 
To lay particular emphasis on the military threat to Cambo­
dia, Haig would confer in Saigon with US officials as Thieu 
was away. In South Vietnam pressure had been kept up at 
Tong Le Chan although the two-party JMC - which had taken 
over from the four-party JMC on 28 March - remained at an 
impasse over the issue. An incident involving the downing of 
an ICCS helicopter by the Viet Cong on 7 April further aggra­
vated what was already a tense situation. Haig therefore found 
truce observer activities in Saigon at a standstill.
On his return to Washington Haig met with Nixon on 15 
April. His report to the President would serve as a focus for 
a major decision on what was to be done about the disintegra­
ting ceasefire. A visit of this nature, Kissinger said,used to
be a 'precursor to strong decisions' in the past; but this time,
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Nixon’s obsession with Watergate diverted his attention.
Washington began to weigh the possible options regard­
ing pre-emptive strikes. This was a response to the continu­
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ing reports of a weapons buildup by Hanoi and of military 
activities by its forces in South Vietnam and Cambodia. Nix­
on's dilemma was this: while he did not want to take any 
precipitate action that might destroy the ceasefire, he had to 
persuade Hanoi to live up to the terms of the Agreement and 
to dissuade it from possible plans for an offensive. The Pre­
sident apparently wanted to keep all possibilities open. Altho­
ugh incensed by the stepped-up communist military activity, 
the Administration regarded it 'premature' to describe the 
situation in Cambodia and South Vietnam as critical.
Among the courses of action considered were urgent diplo­
matic representations to North Vietnam, the Soviet Union and 
China, to halt supplies into South Vietnam. Other options 
included the use of airpower to attack the missiles in the 
Quang Tri area; renewed mining of the principal ports of 
North Vietnam and resumed bombing on a heavy scale over
a limited duration of military targets in the Hanoi-Haiphong 
44
area. These moves were aimed at forcing greater compliance
with the ceasefire without fullscale resumption of war.
On 15 April Hanoi accepted the proposed Kissinger-Le
45
Due Tho meeting for 'any day after 15 May'. Kissinger 
believed Tho wanted as long as possible* calculating that the 
US would not make any military attack until after the nego­
tiations took place. Simultaneously Hanoi issued a note on
16 April outlining the US and the RVN's transgressions of
46
the accord to the participants of the Paris Conference.
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By mid-April 1973, according to the US, 35,000 fresh
North Vietnamese troops had entdSd South Vietnam, the total
increase in combat personnel and supplies being 'greater than
47
before the 1972 Easter offensive'. In addition to infiltration
a new North Vietnamese offensive was commencing in Laos.
To avoid transgressions against the Agreement, Kissinger
recommended bombing for 16 and 17 April on targets in Laos.
This was accompanied by a note from Kissinger on 17 April
condemning Hanoi's actions while responding with 'indigna-
48
tion and dismay' to their message of 15 April. Agreement
was reached however for a meeting in Paris between William
Sullivan and Nguyen Co Thach on 27 April to precede the
Kissinger-Tho talks.
At this stage developments reached what Kissinger referfcd
to as a 'turning point'. The WSAG had met on 17 April in
Washington to conclude that the prolonged bombing of the
Ho Chi Minh Trail could not be endorsed unless the missiles
south of the DMZ were first destroyed. This required a full
49
seven days of bombing. At the same time Kissinger had 
been shaken to hear that Watergate might touch Nixon himself. 
Under these circumstances Nixon could not be persuaded to 
start a prolonged bombing campaign. He recommended that the 
WSAG wait for a clearcut provocation from Hanoi while contin 
-uing with planning. In retrospect the decision actually allowed 
Hanoi to build up reserves and threaten Saigon unchallenged.
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With the mounting transgressions in the South a decision
was taken on 19 April to retaliate diplomatically against 
50
Hanoi. The US suspended the JEC talks in Paris and recall­
ed Maurice Williams to Washington for consultations. All mine- 
sweeping operations in North Vietnamese waters were also 
halted. Secretary Rogers warned Hanoi at the same time that 
unless it lived up to the ceasefire provisions, the US would 
cancel reconstruction aid plans. The three developments were 
the latest moves in what appeared to be a campaign to under­
line US displeasure at Hanoi's continued and flagrant breach 
-es of the accord. A statement by the DRV Foreign Ministry 
on 19 April denounced the suspension of minesweeping and of 
the JEC as evidence of a 'premeditated plan' to prolong the
blockade of North Vietnam in conjunction with the stepped-up 
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war in Cambodia. Despite a ban on such activity, the US 
resumed on the same day military reconnaissance flights over 
North Vietnam. This policy decision to violate parts of the 
Agreement 'if necessary' was seen as pressure on Hanoi to 
halt the 'more serious violations’ and as 'signals' of retalia­
tory action.
In response to Hanoi's 16 April note, the US circulated 
on 20-21 April a note to the participants of the Paris Con­
ference outlining violations of the accord by Hanoi and the 
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PRG. It listed the charges aired by Washington in recent 
weeks. On 20 April Hanoi accepted the preliminary meeting 
between Sullivan and Thach. On 21 April Kissinger informed
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Nixon of Hanoi’s message and discussed the NSC meeting
planned for 26 April to make the final decision. This meeting 
53
never took place.
By 23 April Kissinger was aware that Nixon was not going
54
to order any retaliation against Hanoi. If the US could neither 
threaten nor offer incentives, if it was criticised for attempting 
to maintain the Agreement by force and yet pressed not to pro­
vide economic incentives, Kissinger wondered which might 
be a motive for upholding the accord’s implementation.
The political talks at La Celie-St Cloud did not fare any 
better. They continued throughout April as a venue for angry 
debate. Issues marginal to the political talks themselves 
obscured the real problems. The session on 3 April, coin­
ciding with Thieu’s US visit, saw angry exchanges about 
the purpose of further aid to South Vietnam. On 12 April, 
both sides submitted new formulations of their respective 
proposals without substantially modifying conflicting posi­
tions. The session of 18 April stalled. That of 25 April 
witnessed both sides trading new plans for a political sett­
lement a mere two days before the end of the 90-day period 
stipulated in the Agreement. Saigon presented a two-point 
proposal with a firm calendar that would culminate with nat­
ional elections on 26 August 1973. The Viet Cong responded
with a six-point proposal that they claimed went to the
.55
'fundamentals' and avoided setting deadline. The chasm 
between the two sides thus widened.
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By the end of April 1973 the potential economic frame­
work for stability in Vietnam faced uncertain prospects. Ki­
ssinger was preoccupied with the aid question as a method of 
restraining Hanoi. At the suspension of the JEC on 19 April, 
Rogers said a reconstruction programme in Indochina was 
a 'major influence' in ensuring the integrity of the peace and
even in 'altering the framework of relationships' between
56
the US and North Vietnam. Particularly close attention 
this spring, he said in this US foreign policy report, would 
be devoted to ensuring that the US had the means and capabi 
-lity of pursuing this policy to a successful completion. This 
programme would be one in which 'other nations, notably 
Japan', and members of the European Community also make 
an 'important contribution'.
An 'active effort', according to Lowenstein and Moose, was 
underway in Washington 'as of late April 1973' to find new
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ways to put more dollars into the South Vietnamese economy. 
Among the possibilities being explored was some means of 
increasing Defence Department procurement in Vietnam.There 
had been reservations given the withdrawal of US troops and 
the heavy requirement for supplies, equipment and contractual 
services available 'only to the US’. In 1972 Vietnam, it was 
disclosed, received US$20.3 million in soft loans from Japan, 
the United Kingdom and the Asian Development Bank (ADB). 
In 1973 Saigon expected a total of US$50.1 million in foreign
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assistance from donors 'other than the US', of which Japan 
would contribute US$20 million. On top of the US$50.1 mill­
ion in regular ongoing economic assistance, the RVN expected 
specific reconstruction, development and humanitarian assistance.
The report dated 11 June 1973 warned that even if the Viet­
namese economy was supported 'at the present level', US 
economic assistance to Vietnam in fiscal 74 would have to 
increase substantially from the fiscal 73 level of US$649.3 
million to US$800 million. Although it was possible that 
'certain components' of the existing programme could be 
'renamed' to give them the appearance of reconstruction aid,
this figure would not provide for a significant reconstruct- 
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ion programme.
This situation was exacerbated by the US' reluctance at
the opening of the 6th annual meeting of the ADB in Manila
(26-28 April) to contribute to a special development fund 
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for the region. ADB Vice-President C.S.Krishna Moorthi 
said the US$525 million fund would have 'meaningful import' 
for Asia. The Bank had been assured of support from the Nix­
on Administration but the US contribution faced Congression­
al objections. US delegate, Under Secretary of the Treasury,
Paul Volcker, said on 26 April that there were 'legitimate
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questions' to the US reluctance to contribute. The US move 
was said to be holding up some pledges from other countries, 
including Japan who had pledged, in addition to US$45.5 
million promised for loans earlier in the year, to give a third
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of the US$525 million fund. Apart from the fund, the ADB, 
its President Inoue Shiro said, had agreed on major assistance 
to Indochina and would have an ’important role’ in the recon­
struction of Vietnam. As North Vietnam was not a member, 
it was unclear if it could participate in the Bank's programmes. 
Despite Inoue's hope that the US might contribute 'in due time', 
Volcker indicated the contrary. The low procurement patterns
followed by the ADB rules he said made it difficult for Ameri-
61
can companies to compete.
These developments were in fact linked to a larger strategy 
concurrendy taking shape in which Japan would have a pro­
minent role in Indochina. And it involved North as well as 
South Vietnam.
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II : III
JAPAN AT A CROSSROADS
' the post-Vietnam peace guarantee structure has a 
different nature from any of the security systems in which 
the US took part, taking the initiative, after the end of World 
War n. In the cold war age there were no world peace main­
tenance systems devised by the US, whether they were bilater­
al or collective, which did not entail, at the very foundation, 
the concept and action of ’military commitment'... the role 
of big powers for ensuring international peace has basically 
changed from 'intervention with power’ to 'restraint of power’. 
Herein lies the basic nature of the Paris Resolution.'
Nihon Keizai Shimbun
4 March 1973*
'The adjustment of diplomatic relations with North Vietnam 
will lead to the establishment of diplomatic relations by both 
sides of a divided nation, and this will become a big step toward 
rectification of the cold war structure. This is also a test case of 
our country's new diplomacy toward Asia.’
Tokvo Shimbun 
17 March 1973**
'If there are some people who hesitate to establish diploma­
tic relations with North Vietnam because of the fluidity and 
uncertainty of the war situation in Indochina, they may be said
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to be those who do not understand the spirit and mechanism 
of the Paris Agreement ...the present confusion in Indochina 
cannot become a reason for further delay in our recognition 
of North Vietnam.'
Asahi Shimbun 
15 April 1973
* in DSJP. 7 March 1973, p.2. 
in DSJP. 17 March 1973, p.l.
a|c
in DSJP. 19 April 1973, p.2.
All developments on Indochina had been subject to scrutiny
by Japan. Tokyo's conspicuous absence at the Paris Conference
had led the ruling Liberal Democratic Party's (LDP) Secretary-
General, Hashimoto Tomisaburo, to lament on 26 February
1973 that he did not recall any instance in which Japan was
properly consulted internationally in the 'process of problem 
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solving’. Japan, he said, was not even a member of the 
UN Security Council. Despite its exclusion and the lack of 
political recognition due to it as a leading economic power, 
Japan was nevertheless gauging its role in the rehabilitation 
of Indochina.
Diplomatic relations with Hanoi as we have seen, had 
been held in abeyance. Vice-Foreign Administrative Minister 
Hogen Shinsaku's recent visit to South Vietnam revealed that
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there were no objections to Japanese recognition of the DRV.
Foreign Minister Ohira emphasised on 26 February though
that Japan should not hesitate to establish relations with the
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DRV under favourable circumstances. Two days later Prem­
ier Tanaka was privy to a plan for the dispatch of a multiparty 
dietmen's mission to North Vietnam for reconstruction purposes.
Its exponent was none other than Kimura Takeo who had met
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Zhou Enlai in January 1973.
But the proceedings of the Paris Conference were said on 1
March, at the Lower House Budget Committee, to cast doubts
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on Indochina rehabilitation. The Paris resolution of 2 March 
also dampened any hope for the Asia-Pacific conference. Han­
oi's express preference for bilateral over multilateral aid was 
discouraging. This notwithstanding, Tokyo appeared anxious 
to accomodate to Hanoi's demands. Ohira stated on 8 March 
that his ministry might consider a change to favour bilateral as 
against multilateral aid to the DRV. The latter, he conceded,
might prove difficult to implement and thus make a new
66reconstruction programme unfeasible. On 12 March Ohira
said for the first time that although Tokyo was not in contact
with the PRG, Japanese extension of aid to Indochina might
67
include areas under its control.
These statements did not go unnoticed. Hanoi's goodwill 
towards Tokyo was evident in Paris, where on 14 March 1973, 
the North Vietnamese General Representative, Vo Van Sun, per 
-sonally called on Japanese Ambassador, Nakayama Yoshihiro,
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to discuss matters of 'mutual interest’ to both sides. This
level of contact set a new precedent. Unofficial contacts had
previously been carried out in Paris and Vientiane but now it
looked as if Paris would set the stage for ambassadorial-level
contacts between Japan and the DRV. What followed was the
official confirmation on 15 March of Miyake Wasuke’s visit to
the DRV to lay the foundation for further planning by Tokyo.
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Miyake's visit was now timed for around 20 April.
Japan had no intention however of slackening the pace of
its contacts with South Vietnam. The reconstruction of the
RVN had been studied in the interim (12 February-3 March)
by the Keidanren official, Senga Tetsuya, who also visited 
70
Cambodia and Laos. He proposed on his return to Tokyo 
that 'non-reimbursable’ aid be extendeded simultaneously for 
economic reconstruction and refugee relief. The rebuilding of 
South Vietnam's infrastructure might be followed by capital 
investment and reconstruction aid in forestry, fisheries, 
marine resources and agriculture. The Keidanren would dis­
cuss the programme in the context of a broader Indochina re­
construction plan and would establish an Indochina Committee
to examine the consequences of war damage in South Vietnam,
71
Cambodia and Laos to gauge the likely amount of aid. South 
Vietnam was singled out as 'an exception' however since a 
reconstruction plan existed to which the Thieu government 
hoped Japan would respond.
More immediately Tokyo was preoccupied by the question
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of its relations with Moscow and Peking in which context it
might improve relations with Hanoi. Zhou Enlai, as we have
seen, had described Japan in the spring of 1973 as being 'at 
72
a crossroads'. On 3 March Japan's armed forces had draft­
ed their first military doctrine setting forth fundamental plans
for defending the nation from any attack by the Soviet Union 
73
or China. Purely military in character, the plan did not
reflect Japan's diplomatic posture towards the two nations.
Tokyo was ready simultaneously to remove the major
obstacle to concluding a peace treaty with the Soviet Union,
who had refused after World War II to sign the San Francisco
Treaty of 1951 between the allied powers and Japan. Although
Moscow had later signed a 'declaration of peace' with Japan
in 1956 to end the state of war between them, Tokyo rejected
any peace treaty unless four Soviet-held islands (Etorofu, Ha-
bomai, Kunashiri and Shikotan) were returned. Negotiations
over the treaty had begun in the autumn of 1972 when Foreign
Minister Ohira visited Moscow for talks with his Soviet counter- 
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part Andrei Gromyko.
A Japanese Foreign Ministry statement on 7 March 1973
now indicated that it might be possible for Japan to sign a
treaty officiallv ending the war without having obtained the
75
return of the four islands. It was subsequently disclosed 
that Premier Tanaka had sent a letter to General Secretary 
of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), Leo­
nid Brezhnev, on 6 March proposing that negotiations on the
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peace treaty be reopened. Joint economic development of 
Siberia was also sought by Tokyo. Japan's Ambassador to 
Moscow, Niiseki Kinya, had delivered the letter to Brezhnev, 
which resulted in an 'unprecedented meeting' with the Soviet 
leader lasting some two and a half hours. What was signifi­
cant about this conversation was the fact that Tanaka's letter 
omitted Japan's claim to the islands; and the length of the 
conversation itself - especially when Brezhnev had declined 
to see Ohira in 1972 - was interpreted as an indication of 
Moscow’s desire to improve relations. On 12 March, after 
the Brezhnev-Niiseki meeting, Tanaka publicly expressed
for the first time, his hopes to visit Moscow for talks with
77
Kremlin leaders 'whenever an opportunity arises'. An 
'authoritative Soviet source' informed Kvodo on 16 March 
that Moscow was receptive to the idea of Tanaka visiting the 
Soviet Union although it was 'impossible' to improve Japan­
ese-Soviet relations without concluding a formal peace treaty
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between the two countries.
Regarding China, the important exchanges of mid-January
were strengthened by the Peking visit (17 February-26 March)
of Saionji Kinkazu. Resident in China for some time after 1949
and described as Japan's 'unofficial ambassador', Saionji had
been credited with the diplomacy leading to the Japan-China 
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rapprochement. A statement on 7 March by Zhou Enlai dur­
ing his meeting with Saionji, confirmed the planned visit to
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Japan of Liao Chengzhi. Liao, as we have seen, played an 
important part in the institution of 'Memorandum Trade' be­
tween China and Japan in the 1950's and 1960’s. As Head 
of the China-Japan Friendship Association he would lead 
in April, the first high-powered mission to visit Japan since 
September 1972.
While in Peking Saionji referred on 8 March to the fact 
that both China and the Soviet Union had been courting Japan. 
These moves, he said, provided an opportunity for the settle 
-ment of many 'pending issues' despite the danger that unless
Japan maintained 'principles' it would be involved in Sino- 
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Soviet confrontation. China's cultivation of Japan might be 
interpreted as an attempt to block the efforts of the Soviet 
Union, China’s foremost adversary, from extending its 
influence in Asia. This was evident in Liao Chengzhi's state­
ment of 10 March when he invoked the Joint Communique
of 29 September 1972 as the basis for determining the future
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of Sino-Japanese relations. Echoing Zhou Enlai's fear of 
the Soviet Union, Liao accepted it as a matter of course for 
an independent nation like Japan to have substantial defence 
power: in an 'emergency' situation it would have to rely on 
the US nuclear umbrella since China's nuclear potential was 
too small to be of any use. China was not opposed to friend­
ly relations between Japan and 'other countries' and under­
stood the circumstances under which Japan needed resources.
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But if Japan supplied fuel through the Tyumen oil pipeline 
to the Soviet military forces for a possible invasion of 
China, ’considerable measures', Liao warned, could be taken.
The Japan-China dialogue was also to provide a forum 
for regular political consultations. Saionji's departure from 
China on 26 March coincided with the exchange of ambassa­
dors between the two countries: Chen Zhu left for Tokyo on
83
27 March and Ogawa Heishiro left for Peking on 29 March.
On 2 April Ohira transmitted a letter to Foreign Minister Ji
Pengfei with the express intention of making a 'strategic
arrangement' for periodic consultations between Tokyo and
Peking in the near future; while envisaging a possible visit 
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by Ji himself to Japan.
In Tokyo the enthusiasm generated by the proposed Miyake
visit to Hanoi was proving contagious. Contact with Hanoi
was also sought by the Japanese opposition. Nishimura Kani-
chi of the Japanese Socialist Party (JSP) was said on 19 March
to be planning to visit Hanoi 'at the earliest possible opportunity'
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and might go there at about the same time as Miyake. Nishi­
mura had in fact visited Hanoi immediately prior to Miyake’s 
secret visit in February 1972 and had conferred with Premier 
Pham Van Dong.
At this point a debate opened in Tokyo concerning the quest­
ion of the PRG. Vexed by Japan's relations with the Vietnamese,
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the JSP's Den Hideo on 24 March accused the Foreign Ministry
at an Upper House Budget Committee of alleging that the PRG
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was a 'government without a capital'. Ohira's cautious res­
ponse had reiterated that Japan respected the 'right to self-deter­
mination' of the South Vietnamese people specifically 'both 
parties' in South Vietnam. On Den’s insistence, Ohira empha­
sised that the Paris Agreement did not imply any question of 
the PRG's recognition. Japan would maintain diplomatic 
relations with the 'legally constituted' government of South 
Vietnam and there was no question of recognising the PRG.
The possible admission of PRG members into Japan as 
raised by Den complicated matters. Justice Minister Tanaka 
Isaji's response was that depending on 'circumstances' such 
as aid, they might be permitted to enter the country. The 
actual facts of the situation warranted examination. When 
questioned whether Nguyen Van Hieu of the PRG (Deputy 
leader at the La Celle-St Cloud talks) might come to Japan for 
reconstruction talks; Tanaka replied that Tokyo was prepared
to receive him 'if the individual and conditions were as 
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mentioned’.
A flurry ensued in the Japanese cabinet since Tanaka's 
remarks made no reference to the Thieu Administration. A 
Five-Point statement was hurriedly issued later the same day 
by the Chief Cabinet Secretary Nikaido Susumu with an amend­
ment. Tanaka's response now read: 'with the understanding of
137
the Nguyen Van Thieu Government'. The Nikaido statement 
attempted to stress the following principles:
One, that Japan 'consistently maintained' its coopera­
tion in reconstruction aid plans concerning the 'whole' of 
Vietnam; Two, visitors from Vietnam would be limited to 
those linked with reconstruction aid for the entire country; 
Three, the entry into Japan by Hieu would probably not be 
permitted; Four, the facts of the situation as mentioned 
only applied to reconstruction aid to Vietnam; Five, as the 
La Celle-St Cloud talks were still in session the same 
principle would apply to a South Vietnamese government 
mission's request to enter Japan. The issue of the entry of
PRG representatives would thus be examined on a 'case- 
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by-case' basis.
The fiasco provided a field day for the opposition. In­
tending to exploit it to the full, the JSP and other parties 
prepared on 26 March a motion of no confidence at the Diet
Policy Committee. Unless the Government took a definite
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position, they would boycott the Budget Committee. Ohira,
Tanaka and Nikaido quickly issued a statement the same day
saying there was basically 'no reason' to prevent entry into 
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Japan by PRG leaders. There had been 'no discrepancy' 
and the actual facts of the situation on which their entry would 
depend, had merely been individually expressed by Tanaka and 
Nikaido. All this was undone when Vice-Administrative Forei-
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gn Minister Hogen Shinsaku stated the same day that as Japan
recognised only the Saigon Administration, aid in principle
would only be extended to it. Entry by PRG representatives
’would not therefore be approved'. On 27 March Ohira made
91
Hogen amend his statement.
Ohira's anxiety to 'settle' the PRG issue was clearly
directed at papering over the differences since the embarass-
ment over government inconsistencies could not cloud the
imminent Miyake visit to Hanoi. As a gesture of goodwill,
four North Vietnamese technicians of the DRV's Machine
Import-Export Corporation were given approval on 31 March
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to enter Japan for business negotiations for up to 60 days.
Miyake's Hanoi visit was to be part of a larger design 
pursued by Tokyo in its own search for a new Asian order. 
Tanaka and Ohira had previously expressed interest in an 
Asian conference along the lines of Bandung in 1955. Indone­
sia's Foreign Minister Adam Malik had arrived in Tokyo on 2
April for a General Meeting of the Economic Commission for
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Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) to open on 11 April. In this 
connection the Japanese Foreign Ministry disclosed the same 
day that it had examined the possibility of establishing an Asian 
cooperation organisation following the disintegration of the 
Asian and Pacific Council (ASPAC) whose members included 
Japan and South Vietnam. This idea might have had some
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bearing on the visit from 25 March of former MITI Minister,
Miyazawa Kiichi, to Southeast Asia, including South Vietnam
94(4-7 April) with the stated aim of improving bilateral relations. 
Miyazawa also visited Indonesia, Thailand and Burma at the 
same time.
It had been disclosed in Tokyo on 1 April that Miyake
Wasuke would visit Hanoi for 'about a week' from 20 April
for a formal exchange of views on diplomatic relations and
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Indochinese rehabilitation aid. Japan's basic diplomatic 
posture on international issues would also be explained.
Equally important were Hanoi's intentions concerning Indo­
china reconstruction aid including: humanitarian emergency 
aid; the establishment of standards for exchange stabilisation 
and fullscale rehabilitation aid. One billion Yen had been 
earmarked for aid in the Fiscal 73 budget and additional 
disbursements from the reserve fund were being considered. 
One hitherto undisclosed issue possibly connected with 
Miyake's visit was the extension of loans. In this connection 
Asian Development Bank (ADB) President Inoue Shiro expl­
ained in Tokyo on 27 March that although the Bank intended 
to cooperate in the reconstruction and development of Indo­
china, the extension of loans was difficult since North Viet­
nam was not a member of the UN and it had made known its
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preference for bilateral aid. This prefence necessitated an 
adjustment of views when Miyake reached Hanoi.
1 4 0
Hanoi now moved the Miyake visit forward by about a 
week to 14 April. Such was optimism in Tokyo that Tanaka 
and Ohira were described on 9 April as having consolidated a 
policy to recognise the DRV 'even this summer'. As the first 
Japanese governmental contact with Hanoi, the Miyake mission 
was vested with 'extraordinary powers' designed to lay the 
cornerstone of Japan's policy towards North Vietnam.
While not authorised to reach an agreement with the 
North Vietnamese, Miyake, the Foreign Ministry's 'senior 
specialist' and Head of the North Vietnam desk, was urged 
during the visit (14-21 April) to explore Hanoi's intentions. 
Tokyo was ready to recognise Hanoi if'mutually acceptable 
conditions’ were agreed upon. On Ohira's instructions Mi­
yake revealed what Japan could do to help North Vietnam's 
efforts at postwar rehabilitation for which Tokyo had made 
necessary preparations in advance. The question of the DRV’s
participation in the ECAFE and other organisations was also 
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to be discussed.
In the event Miyake held discussions with North Vietnam­
ese Vice-Foreign Minister Hoang Van Tien and Vice-Foreign 
Trade Minister Nguyen Van Dao covering diplomacy, trade 
and economic relations, regional cooperation, the international 
situation and arrangements for future negotiations. The content 
of the talks was not revealed, although on transit in Vientiane
on 21 April en route to Tokyo, Miyake said Hanoi's reaction
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to recognition was 'extremely enthusiastic'.
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It was later revealed on Mi^ke's return to Tokyo on 23 
April that both sides had reached agreement on: One, the 
location of negotiations, believed to be Paris; Two, a target 
date for the establishment of diplomatic relations and Three, 
the general framework for economic aid.
Although Hanoi had expressed preference for a bilateral 
formula, the North Vietnamese were apparently not totally 
opposed to a multilateral arrangement Bilateral aid, if forth­
coming, was envisaged on a large scale and would include 
projects for the reconstruction of war damage, roads, comm­
unication facilities and industry. Although a postwar recons­
truction plan had not as yet been formulated by Hanoi, Tok­
yo's views on regional cooperation and the international con­
ference evoked little response.
Despite the overall goodwill on both sides, Miyake hinted
that this did not mean that was 'no gap' between the respec- 
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tive positions. Refusing to disclose what this was, he 
only said it might be settled by 'mutual effort'. Extensive 
talks were held by Ohira and Hogen with Miyake before a 
statement was issued on 24 April. Speculation in the Japan­
ese press suggested that the PRG was probably the 'biggest 
obstacle' to the talks since Tokyo had no plans to recognise 
it as a legitimate government. According to Miyake himself,
Hanoi had understood the delicacy of the PRG issue and did
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not press for its recognition. This was consistent with
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Ohira's statement on 24 April 1973 which expressed Tokyo's
readiness to begin plenary negotiations for establishing diplo-
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made relations with Hanoi as 'no serious obstacle'emerged.
The goodwill towards Japan notwithstanding, develop­
ments in Hanoi throughout March and April 1973 had pointed 
to a possible escalation of the war in the South. Beginning in 
March 1973 the Vietnam Workers Party (VWP) Politburo had 
'urgently' begun preparations for the 21st plenum of the Party 
Central Committee 'to determine the direction and policies' to
fulfil the 'eventual liberation' of the South and the unification 
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of the country.
The end of the 60-days was marked in Hanoi by the arrival
on 30 March of Tran Van Tra, Head of the PRG delegation to
the JMC to discuss developments in B-2, the code-name for
the southernmost part of Vietnam where the war was being
fought Tra relates that he had met immediately with leaders
of the party, the government and the ministries of National
103
Defence and Foreign Affairs.
However during a break before a plenary session of the 
Politburo, a 'separate meeting' concerning B-2 had been held. 
Attended by members of the Central Office, South Vietnam 
(COSVN) and the Regional Command: Pham Hung, Nguyen 
Van Linh, Tran Nam Trung, Hoang Van Thai and Vo Van 
Kiet; the situation in B-2 was analysed to reach agreement
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on 'our evaluation, observations and estimates' of future de-
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velopments. Experiences were also exchanged with Vo 
Chi Cong and Chu Huy Man of Military Region 5 and Hoang 
Minh Thao also of B-2. The nuances suggested that COS VN 
perhaps had its own ideas about the conduct of war in B-2.
We are aware that in April 1973 Secretary-General of the 
VWP Le Duan had expressed 'extremely important opinions'
to the politburo in preparation for the Party Central Comm-
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ittee plenum. Intended to discuss the 'revolutionary situ­
ation' Le Duan had concluded that the US 'imperialists' had 
been defeated and had withdrawn 'never to return'.
It was only during the 'last third of April 1973' according 
to Tra, that any lingering doubts and dissension about the 
war in the South appeared to have been overcome. An 'ex­
tremely important' conference including delegates from the 
South Vietnamese theatres had taken place. Held to 'reeva­
luate the situation' the conference had delineated the 'path 
of advance' of the revolution in the South with instructions 
for B-2 to maintain the line of'strategic offensive'. The Viet
Cong would be withdrawn from enemy areas to be consoli-
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dated and reorganised 'as soon as possible'.
Tra admits to a 'clashing of many different opinions 
and interpretations' concerning developments in the battle­
fields, but 'unanimous agreement' at the conference was 
107
finally reached. He goes further to say that 'until that
144
time’ not everyone at various echelons, on the battlefields
or 'even at the Central Committee' agreed about the value
of the Paris Agreement The 'balance of forces' between
the enemy and themselves were thus strategically debated.
The role of each theatre Tra stressed, had necessarily to be
'correctly evaluated' if 'dangerous mistakes' were not to be
made. It was not as if 'no mistakes' had been made in the
war, Tra hinted, but these had been 'promptly corrected'.
Even collective leadership, Tra pointedly added, was 'not 
108
always right’. In the event the concerns of all war 
theatres were 'fully resolved': the path of revolution in 
the South was 'revolutionary violence'.
Throughout April Hanoi's diplomatic strategy was corr­
espondingly two-pronged, aimed at seeking from its allies, 
continued support for its military effort in the South while 
requesting aid for reconstruction. En route home from Paris 
Xuan Thuy had elicited in Moscow (8-12 April) a reaffirma­
tion from the CPSU’s leading ideologue, Mikhail Suslov, 
of its 'invariable support' for Hanoi's 'just cause*. The
Soviet Union would 'continue as before' to give the DRV
109
the 'necessary assistance' in the advance to socialism.
By the end of April 1973 initiatives in Hanoi suggested 
that the option of an eventual return to war was kept open. 
But Cambodia had no options, it was bearing the brunt of the 
fighting in Indochina.
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II : IV
CAMBODIA STILL AT WAR
'Sixty days after the Paris Agreement, Cambodia had be­
come the central theatre of the continuing Indochina war. Al­
though the US was not involved with ground troops, the in­
volvement in other ways was direct and intimate. The roles 
of the US in air operations and in Cambodian political affairs
 are intimately related because the principal purpose
of US air operations had become to enable the Lon Nol gov­
ernment to survive in the face of a military offensive by an 
enemy force almost exclusively Khmer and not North Viet­
namese.
3jc
Lowenstein & Moose
Thailand. Laos. Cambodia and Vietnam : April 1973, A Staff 
Report prepared for the use of the Subcommittee on US Secur­
ity Agreements and Commitments abroad of the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee, 11 June 1973, (Washington, D.C., 1973);
pp.l-2.
CRISIS IN PHNOM PENH : 17 - 25 MARCH 1973
By March 1973 Cambodia remained the only country in In­
dochina fully at war. Daily bombing raids by B-52's perpetu­
ated this condition with the US as the direct participant. The
148
Lon Nol regime, at the edge of collapse and faced with severe 
political and military decline, was bolstered annually by US 
$200 million in military and economic aid. The demoralising 
situation posed a threat to Cambodia's continued existence and 
to the survival of South Vietnam. The US now attempted to 
bring about change in its leadership.
The Cambodian political scene had been dominated since 
Sihanouk's ouster in March 1970 by a struggle between two 
men who exercised influence over the President: his brother, 
Lon Non, and former Premier, Prince Sisowath Sirik Matak. 
Since the beginning of 1973 the US had apparently urged Lon 
Nol to persuade Sirik Matak to accept the vacant Vice-Presi­
dency. This effort to share power received a setback on 7 
March when Lon Non publicly declared his opposition to it.
In an unprecedented statement he claimed that a 'mass move­
ment'- from which 'only the communists' could gain - would
110
be unleashed if Sirik Matak joined the government Afraid
that the latter might compromise with the Khmer Rouge, Lon
Non voiced his own concessions: if the insurgents laid down
their arms, they might, under a constitution, participate in
elections and return to join the government.
But there were discrepancies within ruling circles in Phnom
Penh concerning contact with the resistance. Lon Nol himself
had made a speech on 6 March offering to discuss the North
111
Vietnamese withdrawal from Cambodia. But the Marsh­
al was circumspect, avoiding mention of the resistance by
149
name, offering only to negotiate with Hanoi. This contrasted 
with Foreign Minister Long Boret's statement in Paris in 
early March when he said that there was no question of dia­
logue with GRUNK but that his side was willing to talk to
the Khmer Rouge and perhaps allow them to participate in 
112
the Administration.
These discrepancies apart, mounting opposition and gen­
eral public disaffection for the Lon Nol Government had sur­
faced on 20 February in a strike by teachers and students in 
Phnom Penh. It came to a head on 17 March with an assassina­
tion attempt on Lon Nol. Two bombs were dropped on the Pre­
sidential Palace by Captain So Photra, a son-in-law of Sihan- 
113
ouk. Under the ensuing state of emergency proclaimed the
same day all public meetings were banned and a censorship
decree was promulgated. On 21 March Sirik Matak and former
Premier after World War n, Son Ngoc Thanh were relieved of 
114
their duties. Lon Nol's Minister of Information explained 
the next day that 'certain persons' suspected of working for
or sympathising with the 'Viet Cong’ or the 'monarchists'
115
had been arrested. By then the removal of officials found 
'disloyal' to the regime had reached 400. On 25 March Sirik 
Matak was reported to be under house arrest and any possibi­
lity of contact between the Government and the Khmer Rouge
116
reached deadlock.
The crisis in Phnom Penh was paralleled by several initia­
tives from GRUNK aimed at national reconciliation. In Hanoi,
150
GRUNK Ambassador, Sien An said on 21 March that the solu-
117
tion to Cambodia laid in Sihanouk's 23 March 1970 statement. 
We now know that the Prince himself had embarked from mid- 
February onwards on a secret trip to the 'liberated zone'. From 
the interior he issued - on the third anniversary of GRUNK’s 
foundation - his 42nd message to the nation. It reiterated that 
FUNK and GRUNK had offered negotiations 'without pre­
conditions' with 'one or several emissaries' of the US gov­
ernment with a view to finding a solution to the problem of
118
restoring peace in Cambodia. Rebuffed by Washington,
there was no alternative but to continue the war there. In
Peking GRUNK's emissary Chea San marked 23 March by
a request to French Ambassador, Etienne Manac'h, to seek
the ElysSe's intervention to encourage the US to abandon 
119
Lon Nol.
The first sign that either side was prepared to discuss the
possibility of peace emerged on 24 March when the Lon Nol
government rejected another attempt by the Khmer Rouge at
reconciliation. An offer of talks had been transmitted in a
letter to Premier Hang Thun Hak and brought to Phnom Penh
a week earlier, possibly at the time the emergency was pro- 
120
claimed. It was allegedly written by Hou Youn, Minister 
of the Interior in the maquis. The letter contained - among 
other things - a proposal that representatives of both sides 
meet to begin political and military negotiations that excluded 
Lon Nol. The other conditions were not disclosed. Accord­
151
ing to diplomatic sources at the time, the Premier and Hou 
Youn had been exchanging letters for 'about six weeks' sugg­
esting the correspondence might have begun in early February 
after the mice.
The Khmer Rouge response to these rebuffs at reconcil­
iation was to heighten their efforts aimed at eventual victory. 
The ascendancy of the insurgents was also clear to Sihanouk. 
From Guangdong and Hanoi, he visited the maquis and was
able to witness at firsthand the internecine relations between
121
the Khmer Rouge and their Vietnamese comrades-in-arms.
He was particularly struck by the latter's military installations
and bases dotted, without authorisation from FUNK, through 
122
-out the maquis. Correspondingly there was an obvious 
slowing down of military and other aid from China. North 
Vietnamese operations were directed at destruction of the 
insurgents’ best units. Khieu Samphan, Defence Minister 
informed the prince that Hanoi wanted desperately to fore­
stall any hope of a Khmer Rouge 'victory' and was already 
planning to install in any event a government that was Viet­
namese in all but name to serve its own interests in Cambo- 
123
-dia.
Overt Khmer Rouge disenchantment against the Vietnamese
according to Sihanouk, began to be manifested in April 1973.
Anti-Vietnamese feeling led correspondingly to a hardening
of Khmer Rouge policy towards the Americans and all cadres
124
were instructed not to negotiate with the US. There was a
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tendency in some quarters to desist from mention of Sihanouk
who was regarded as too plaint. Although the Khmer Rouge
were openly hostile to Lon Nol, the prince knew full well
125
that he was himself an ’inevitable and temporary ally1.
On arrival in Hanoi on 6 April however Sihanouk gave the 
appearance of having received the allegiance of all factions 
opposed to Lon Nol while in the 'liberated zone'. The Hanoi 
daily. Nhan Dan on 7 April described Sihanouk as the 'hold­
er of the legality, authenticity and continuity' of the Cambo- 
126
dian state. Sihanouk took the opportunity in Hanoi to 
lash out at 'foreign' governments who pretended to be 'Indo­
china peacemakers'. In the maquis he had been instructed to
inform the world outside that no compromise 'in any form or
127
circumstance', no ceasefire and no conference were accepted.
By the time Sihanouk was back in Peking (11-14 April)
the momentum towards resolution of the Cambodian question
was set in motion against a background of domestic political
change. China was engaged in intensive discussions with a
number of powers including France, where a new government
had been formed in Paris by President Georges Pompidou on 6
April; Foreign Minister Maurice Schumann was replaced by 
128
Michel Jobert. On 10 April Deputy Foreign Minister Qiao
Guanhua privately suggested to Ambassador Manac'h in Peking
that the time had come for France to address itself to the Cambo- 
129
di^n question. Paris announced on 12 April the official 
establishment of diplomatic relations with the DRV raising it
153
to full ambassadorial status; France was previously represent-
130
ed in Hanoi by a Delegate-General.
Both superpowers, Zhou Enlai believed, appeared to make
every effort to discredit the prince. A solution that isolated
GRUNK in the long run might lead to a possible division
of the Khmer resistance. The Soviets continued to refuse to
recognise GRUNK and the Americans chose to ignore the up- 
131
heavals in the interior. As we have seen William Sullivan
had said while in Paris in early March that the US did not
intend to make contact with Sihanouk.
The quickening pace of Peking's involvement was indicated
by a series of initiatives which began with the re-emergence on
12 April 1973 of Deng Xiaoping, former Vice-Premier and
Secretary-General of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP),
stripped of his posts during the Cultural Revolution. Reemer
-ging from obscurity, Deng was officially 'rehabilitated' and
mentioned for the first time as 'Deputy Premier' on the occa-
132
sion of Sihanouk's return to Peking from the maquis.
Zhou again endorsed Sihanouk's personal capacity as Head 
of State in his speech of welcome: GRUNK was the 'sole, 
legal government' of Cambodia. The prince's visit to the 
'liberated zone' was a 'great victory’ for the Cambodian peo­
ple’s struggle which would 'hasten the collapse' of the Lon 
Nol regime. The Premier also said 'if the USA agreed to stop 
interfering in the affairs of the Khmers, Cambodia would 
very quickly recover its traditional peace'. Sihanouk, in
154
his speech deliberately revealed that the Cambodian People's
National Liberation Armed Forces (CPNLAF) was fighting
'absolutely alone' without the help of the North Vietnamese
133
against Lon Nol's army and the US air force.
Also at the banquet of 12 April Zhou personally approach­
ed Ambassador Manac'h to request his government to play a
part in resolving the Cambodian problem and to 'give inspira-
134tion' to other countries in this respect. The Premier said 
that France's long association with Cambodia made it well 
suited for a special role in which it might exert some lever­
age on Washington. Both the Chinese and the French saw 
Sihanouk as the incarnation of Cambodian neutrality and in­
dependence leading by mid-April, according to Manac'h, to
a 'certain objective convergence' coming into being between 
135
Peking and Paris.
On his return to Peking Sihanouk had made more allega­
tions about US dismissal of his offers to talk. On 13 April 
he revealed that he had officially proposed to the US 'two 
months ago' that 'some contact' without preconditions be
136
made with Washington on behalf of FUNK and GRUNK.
But Kissinger had made clear to Pham Van Dong and Zhou 
Enlai that Washington had 'no intention' to make contact with 
him. Negotiations with the US meant the ending of US inter­
ference in Cambodia. A ceasefire, under prevailing circums­
tances, Sihanouk said, would split Cambodia into two or more 
parts and entail recognition of the Lon Nol-controlled zone
155
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which would dangerously prolong the war. The prince 
would be making an official visit to the African states of Mali, 
the Congo, Guinea, Zambia and Senegal from the beginning of 
May; and he expressed the hope that Japan might recognise his 
government-in-exile before its 'final victory' over the Lon Nol 
regime.
These recriminations apart, events in and concerning Cambo­
dia were taking place against a wider background of US-China 
dialogue. Since Kissinger’s visit important exchanges between 
Washington and Peking had culminated in the establishment of 
the liaison offices. On 15 March 1973 Nixon nominated David 
Bruce - formerly US Ambassador to the Paris peace talks in 
1970-71 - to head the US Liaison Office in Peking considering
the envoy particularly well-placed in view of his long and
138
distinguished diplomatic career. Huang Zhen, China’s
Ambassador to France was named by Peking on 30 March
to head the Chinese Liaison Office in Washington, having
139
returned from Paris the same day. Han Xu, Chief of 
Protocol of the Chinese Foreign Ministry was named his 
deputy. His appointment appeared to constitute the final link 
of a diplomatic chain which had developed between China, 
Japan and the US. Han Xu had visited Tokyo in January 
1973 and later accompanied Foreign Minister Ji Pengfei to 
the Paris Conference. He was scheduled to visit Japan again
156
on 15 April en route to his post in Washington. That was to
be followed by the epoch-making visit of Liao Chengzhi to
Japan (15 April-18 May).
The decision to establish 'liaison missions' according to
Alfred Jenkins, deputy to Ambassador Bruce in Peking, was
'one step away' from diplomatic relations. He attributed
this on 21 March to a 'direct result' of the Vietnam settle- 
140
ment. The US had been told in discussions with Chinese
leaders since 1972, that there were 'three main hurdles' to
a significant improvement of relations: the 'most urgent' was
the ending of the Vietnam war, followed by the Taiwan issue;
and lastly that of the continued US military presence in Asia.
Under the US-China dialogue, Kissinger responded from
Washington to Zhou's unstinting support for the prince, and
his condemnation of US bombing, with a 'sharp note' on 13
. . .......................................................14,1.....................
April expressing 'extreme disappointment’. He stressed
that it was the responsibility of 'all interested countries' to 
work for moderation to bring about a political solution that 
would give true neutrality and independence to Cambodia. A 
Chinese response on 16 April from Huang Hua, Ambassa­
dor at the UN, explained that Peking had done no more than 
restate previous positions in urging the US to end support
of Lon Nol: its formulation was aimed 'at an individual, not 
142
a structure'.
. In Washington Kissinger was soon in contact with Han 
Xu after the latter1 s arrival on 19 April. In a message dated
157
o24 April to Zhou Enlai he said the US wished to 'repeat its
willingness* to see a settlement of the Cambodian problem
which included all political forces including those of Sihan- 
143
ouk. The US side was now prepared to undertake dis­
cussions with the Chinese side and looked forward to this 
objective either in Washington or Peking after the arrival in 
mid-May of David Bruce to head the US Liaison Office there.
Sihanouk warned on 19 April however that the leaders in 
the interior would never accept a compromise with the Ph­
nom Penh 'clique' and it was completely illusory for the US,
144
France or the Soviet Union to count on such a solution.
The prince had returned to Peking by 24 April where he refer 
-red in a meeting with Manac'h to a 'serious misunderstand­
ing' on the part of the US Administration in its analysis of 
145
the Khmer problem. Hanoi's principal objective, which
alone justified its military intervention in Cambodia, was the
conquest of Saigon. Washington believed erroneously that
Khmer-Vietnamese cooperation existed. In fact the Khmer
Rouge exercised complete autonomy and pledged themselves
to a 'total victory'. The resistance, he warned on 28 April,
were already positioned around Phnom Penh, intending to
isolate it from the rest of the country, to let it fall like a 
146
'ripe fruit'. Only US airpower he admitted, prevented 
such an eventuality.
Meanwhile under mounting pressure from the US to broad­
en its political base, Marshal Lon Nol announced in Phnom
158
Penh on 17 April 1973 the resignation of Premier Hang Thun
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Hak and other members of the cabinet. It was believed 
at the time that the visit (9-10 April) of Nixon's special envoy, 
Alexander Haig had done much to convince Lon Nol that 
only such a course could induce the insurgents to discuss a 
ceasefire and eventual peace. The resignation however had 
little practical significance. All real authority still rested with 
the Marshal.
By 23 April Lon Nol had reached a compromise formula 
for a new all-party Council to oversee the running of nation 
-al affairs. The executive leadership became a four-man coun 
-cil on 24 April under an agreement by which Lon Nol would 
share power equally with the three leading political opponents 
including In Tam, Sirik Matak and former Chief of State, 
Cheng Heng. The temporary departure on 30 April of Lon 
Non for an undefined mission to the US was also aimed at 
shoring up national confidence.
In the interim the US military role in Cambodia was in­
creasingly questioned. On 19 April US air support for the 
war effort against the communists was alleged to be continu­
ing from day to day 'without renewed goverment-to-govem-
ment requests'. It apparently entailed the 'continuous coopera-
148
tion of US and Cambodian military planners. This was foil 
-owed by a direct contradiction of the Cambodian government 
position. Official US sources in Phnom Penh said on 20 April
159
that there had been 'no documented evidence' that Vietnamese
communist troops were serving combat roles in Cambodia since 
149
the truce. The statement also conflicted with the reason 
given previously by Defence Secretary Richardson for contin­
ued US bombing which was to force the DRV to honour Article
20. To paper over these contradictions the State Department 
said on 23 April that North Vietnamese forces were training
and supplying anti-government insurgents in Cambodia and
150
manning heavy weapons there.
In this context previously secret Defence Department infor­
mation was made public on 27 April by a Congressional report 
submitted by Lowensteitt and Moose - who had made an ins­
pection trip to Southeast Asia (28 March-19 April). Containing 
the first detailed official information about the extent and rate 
of American bombing in Cambodia, it confirmed that the 
preponderance of bombing had shifted since March 1973
from striking at North Vietnamese lines of communication
151
to supporting Cambodian government forces. An incr­
ease of bombing from mid-February until the end of March 
was directed at the interdiction of North Vietnamese supply 
routes in Eastern Cambodia leading into South Vietnam. By 
the first half of April however, the 'vast preponderance' of 
the B-52 strikes were aimed at the insurgent forces.'Stepped 
-up US air activity' had been justified on the grounds that 
the enemy effort could destroy the Lon Nol government. The 
US Embassy moreover was now directly involved in planning 
and approving the bombing.
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In an accompanying statement, Senator Stuart Symington of 
Missouri, the Senate subcommittee chairman, said US bomb­
ing was devoted primarily to supporting Lon Nol. The report, 
he said, should correct the 'erroneous1 impression that the 
fighting in Cambodia was between government forces and the 
North Vietnamese since the struggle was 'essentially a civil 
war' between opposing Khmer groups. The 'deep involvement1 
of the Embassy he felt, violated the 'clear intent' of Congress­
ional amendments to limit the involvement of US personnel in 
152
Cambodia.
On 30 April Secretary Rogers presented a State Department
Memorandum to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
setting forth the basis of Presidental authority to continue 
153
bombing in Cambodia. The conflicts in Cambodia and 
Laos, he said, were 'so interrelated1 to the conflict in Vietnam 
as to be considered parts of 'a single conflict'. The importance 
of Article 20 could not be underestimated: it recognised these 
'underlying connections1 among the hostilities in all countries 
of Indochina and required the cessation of foreign armed 
intervention in Laos and Cambodia. The continuation of hosti­
lities in the latter and the presence there of North Vietnamese 
troops, Rogers stressed, threatened the right of self-determina­
tion of South Vietnam as guaranteed by the Paris Agreement.
US air strikes in Cambodia therefore did not represent a 
commitment by the US to its defence but represented instead, 
a 'meaningful interim action' to bring about compliance with
161
Article 20. Unilateral cessation of US air combat activity in
Cambodia without the removal of North Vietnamese forces,
Rogers emphasised would ipso facto undermine the achieve-
154
ment of the accord and of Article 20. The President's 
powers under the US Constitution were described as ade­
quate to prevent such a self-defeating result.
The US had made clear to Hanoi, at the conclusion of the 
Paris talks, Rogers continued, that the armed forces of the 
Khmer government would suspend all offensive operations 
and that US aircraft supporting them would do likewise. If 
the other side had reciprocated, a de facto ceasefire would 
have been brought into force in Cambodia. US air forces need 
-ed to take 'necessary countermeasures' if communist forces 
attacked, and air strikes would continue to be carried out 
'as necessary' until such time when a ceasefire could be 
brought about.
US critics argued that a 'fundamental new situation' had 
been created by the withdrawal of all US armed forces from 
South Vietnam with the return of its POW's. New authority 
henceforth must be sought by the President from Congress 
to carry out air strikes in Cambodia. The issue, according 
to Rogers, was whether the President'^ constitutional author 
-ity to continue action in Cambodia expired with the US with 
-drawal from Vietnam. The issue was also whether the Presi­
dent must 'automatically stop' this action without regard to
162
the consequences even though the Agreement was not being
155 "
implemented by the other side.
The principal argument that military actions in Vietnam 
and Cambodia were closely interrelated because of the indivi 
-sibility of conflict, would be extended in succeeding months 
to diplomatic moves which implied the indivisibility of peace.
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CHAPTER III
THE INDIVISIBILITY OF PEACE I 
MAY-JUNE 1973
' there cannot be stable peace in Vietnam until its
neighbours are at peace. The conflict has been indivisible.
The peace must be too.'
Richard Nixon 
3 May 1973*
US Foreign Policy for the 1970's : Shaping a Durable Peace 
A Report to the Congress by Richard Nixon, 3 May 1973, in 
DSB. 4 June 1973; p.749.
Ill : I 
VIETNAM
In the 'State of the World' message delivered to Cong­
ress on 3 May 1973, President Nixon affirmed that the Paris 
Agreement satisfied the US belief that a settlement in Viet­
nam should resolve only specific military questions. Thus
the 'most feasible and rapid route' to peace was embodied in 
1
the final settlement. The political provisions were 'general', 
requiring further negotiations between the two South Viet­
namese parties, but laying the 'best obtainable foundation'
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for beginning a process of self-determination. It was now 
up to the contending factions, Nixon said, to pursue their 
objectives through 'peaceful means' and 'political competition'.
In his fourth and strongest warning about the communist 
violations of the truce, he said Hanoi had two choices. The first 
was to violate the Agreement and press its military objectives in 
Indochina, continue to infiltrate men and material into South 
Vietnam, retain its forces in Laos and Cambodia and through 
pressure or outright attack renew its aggression against Saigon. 
All of this, Nixon said, would risk 'renewed confrontation' 
and destroy the chances of a new and constructive bilateral 
relationship with the US. The second course was for Hanoi 
to pursue its objectives peacefully and allow 'historical trends' 
in the region to 'assert themselves'. This meant observance of 
the accord and the removal of foreign forces on both sides from 
Laos and Cambodia. If Hanoi chose the peaceful option, years 
of military conflict in Indochina could be transformed into 
political struggle, enabling the US and the DRV to normalise 
relations.
By this time however, short of an all-out communist 
offensive, force was no longer a realistic option from Wash­
ington's point of view. The Administration had to find other 
ways of restraining Hanoi. One possibility was to employ the 
leverage of the major communist powers. 'Outside powers', 
Nixon emphasised, had a strong interest in the maintenance 
of peace in Indochina and could lend a moderating influence
174
to affairs there. With a negotiated settlement it was argued
there could be no reasonable justification for sending Hanoi
large arms shipments; and a military buildup there would
raise questions about the motives of the suppliers. Nixon
went on to underline the 'interdependence'of different world
problems and to explain how a 'meaningful and lasting' impro
-vement of Washington's relations with the Soviet Union and
2
China was linked to the outcome of the Vietnam settlement.
Kissinger would take the opportunity of his forthcoming
visit to Moscow (4-9 May), formally intended to prepare for
Brezhnev's June visit to the US, to conduct an exchange of
views with the Soviet leadership on the situation in Indochina
in 'all its aspects'. Kissinger later referred to the 'efforts'
through which he hoped the US and the Soviet Union would
combine to make an unparalleled contribution to establishing
a global structure of peace, a process which was impeded by
3
the persistent conflict in Indochina.
When Kissinger returned from Moscow on 10 May it seem­
ed both sides expected more rapid resolution in such areas as 
ending the renewed fighting in Indochina. The Soviet Union, 
he said, recognised its 'responsibilities' as a signatory at the
Paris Conference not to encourage violations of the accord
4
by supplying heavy arms shipments to Hanoi. He himself 
would make a 'serious effort’, in talks with Le Due Tho due 
to start on 17 May in Paris, to bring about 'stricter implemen­
tation' of the Paris Agreement. It was disclosed later in the
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month that Kissinger had obtained agreement in Moscow
that both the US and the Soviet Union would restrict the flow
of military supplies to their respective Vietnamese allies at
'cuiTent levels'. He also obtained a promise that Moscow
would 'discourage' major new communist offensives in
South Vietnam by warning Hanoi that the USSR could not
5
be counted upon to replace weapons lost in that way.
The Soviet Union seemed to a certain extent to share
Washington’s perspective. Soviet interest in detente with
the US was indicated by the fact that Saigon rather than
Washington was singled out on 11 May for condemnation
as a force preventing the establishment of peace and stability
in Vietnam, since its continued 'transgressions' of the
ceasefire were described as a 'fundamental obstacle' to
6
political normalisation in the country. There was however
litde sign that the Soviet Union was prepared to take practical
steps to curb all Hanoi's military operations; and on 14 May
during Le Due Tho's stopover in Moscow on the way to the
Paris talks with Kissinger, Moscow reaffirmed its support
7
for Hanoi's 'national aspirations'. The April plenum of the 
CPSU Central Committee it added, had promised to facili­
tate 'in every way' the establishment of peace in the 'whole 
of Indochina'.
China by contrast, was explicitly urging Hanoi to show 
restraint. Before his arrival in Moscow, Le Due Tho stopped
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in Peking (11-12 May) where, according to Hoang Van Hoan, 
member of the Politburo of the VWP, he received the follow­
ing advice from Zhou Enlai:
'We held peace talks with Chiang Kaishek after the Japan­
ese surrender in 1945. In the first year Chairman Mao went 
to Chongqing personally for the talks. And in the second 
year the political consultative conference was convened, an 
armistice mediation group was set up. It was not until 1947 
that the People's Liberation Army (PLA) began its counter­
offensive and wiped out the Chiang Kaishek regime without a 
halt Vietnam too, should win a spell of time to get prepar­
ed and when it begins to fight should eliminate the Nguyen
Van Thieu administration without a halt For after a period
8
of armistice it would be difficult for the US to barge in.'
There is a small amount of evidence that Hanoi may have
been debating at this stage whether to take Chinese advice
and scale down its military activity. Tran Van Tra lamented
that there was as yet 'no upper echelon distribution plan' to
transport and stockpile the supplies designated for B-2's use
in 1974. These supplies were needed to enable the forces in
9
B-2 to 'continue to take the initiative and develop strongly'. 
Weapons and equipment earmarked for 1973 were, by 
contrast, being received and transported efficiently. This 
hiatus might suggest that a respite had been agreed on, at 
least, conceivably, till the end of the Kissinger-Tho talks 
or till later on in the year. Tra mentions attending a plenary
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meeting of the Politburo in Hanoi in May after which he 
gave the problem attention but could find 'no solution'. Tra 
then consulted Dinh Due Thien, head of the Rear Services 
General Department who agreed to lend him 2,000 tons of 
weapons 'in advance' from the total to be distributed to B-2 
in 1974.
From Saigon outgoing US Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker 
said on 3 May in this connection that although fighting con­
tinued in South Vietnam, the number of large battles had 
fallen off sharply. Press repons in early May 1973 suggest­
ed that Hanoi was planning an offensive in the two northern­
most provinces of South Vietnam in the next six to twelve 
10
months. Only a series of 'true political compromises' bet­
ween the communists and the Saigon government or a 'succ­
essful application of international pressure1 on Hanoi could 
head off an assault. Activities such as the building of roads 
and airfields to move supplies which greatly enhanced the 
Viet Cong's military capability had been surmised as intend­
ed for a major attack. By mid-May the likelihood of a major 
North Vietnamese offensive in the foreseeable future was 
believed to be diminishing as the communists appeared to 
concentrate on political activity instead.
En route to Paris in mid-May, Kissinger received an 
intelligence report that a 'general offensive' had been in 
preparation but was being 'postponed' to give Watergate an
1 7 8
opportunity to complete the paralysis of the Nixon presiden-
11
cy and the demoralisation of Saigon. The report, Kissinger 
said, confirmed the US' knowledge of Hanoi's buildup and 
also ’accurately predicted1 that Nixon now lacked authority 
to retaliate against North Vietnamese transgressions.
On the eve of the Paris talks the Viet Cong accused 
the US of bombing inside North or South Vietnam for the 
first time since the Paris Agreement. The US Air Force and 
the Saigon Government had 'repeatedly' bombed the 'libera­
ted areas' of Tay Ninh and Binh Long between 2 and 9 May. 
Liberation Radio linked this move to Kissinger's warning
on 12 May that 'punitive and motivating actions' must be
12
taken to ensure respect for the Paris Agreement.
On 14 May Le Due Tho reiterated the Viet Cong's charge
on arrival in Paris and warned that the talks would be cancell-
13ed if the raids continued. He would meet Kissinger on one 
condition, this being a halt to what he termed 'direct US vio­
lation' of the ceasefire by the bombing on 9 May of Loc Ninh. 
In Washington a Pentagon spokesman said the US was not 
conducting any air combat operations over South Vietnam,
and discounted the possibility that the bombing in Cambodia
14
could have accidentally taken place in South Vietnam. The 
ICCS in any event voted unanimously in Saigon on 14 May to 
investigate communist charges that the US had resumed bomb­
ing in South Vietnam.
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Kissinger did not expect his talks with Le Due Tho to
result in substantial changes to the Paris Agreement since
they concerned 'methods of implementation' rather than 
15
'renegotiations'. This was corroborated by Ambassador
Bunker in Saigon telling President Thieu in mid-May of
American plans to negotiate with Hanoi for 'strict implemen-
16
tation' of the Agreement. In Paris Kissinger's first round 
of meetings with Le Due Tho (17-23 May) were apparently 
conducted in a 'constructive and positive manner'. Press 
reports suggested Kissinger's concern centred on :
One, the inadequate implementation of the ceasefire;
Two, the continued infiltration into South Vietnam and the 
continued utilisation of Laos and Cambodia as corridors for 
that infiltration; Three, the inadequate accounting for the 
missing-in-action; Four, the violations of the DMZ; Five, 
the inadequate cooperation with the ICCS and the slow staff­
ing of the Two-Party JMC; Six, particular concern about the
violations of Article 20 which had required the withdrawal
17
of foreign troops from Laos and Cambodia.
There was no sign at the end of the talks however that 
any of these basic positions had shifted although'signifi­
cant progress' was said to have been made. Politically the 
South Vietnamese insisted that the two parties discuss how 
elections would be run and what offices would be contested 
before a NCNRC was formed and elections had taken place.
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Meanwhile the 9th, 10th and 11th sessions of the La Celle-
St Cloud political talks, held on 3 ,9 and 17 May, had again
18
failed to reach any compromise. Each side continued to 
accuse the other of failing to understand its respective posi­
tions. Militarily almost every aspect of the zones of control 
was in dispute. One fundamental problem was Saigon's 
desire to allow only military control as opposed to the Viet 
Cong's insistence on political control as well
The South Vietnamese interpretation of the Paris talks 
needs to be taken into account. Kissinger, according to 
Nguyen Tien Hung, 'presided' over a final and fatal set of 
political and military concessions that would undermine 
South Vietnam's ability to survive. Nixon's 'political vul­
nerability' on account of Watergate caused Kissinger to be 
'most concerned' with his own survival and he returned to
Paris seeking a ceasefire in Cambodia while 'papering over'
19
the differences between Hanoi and Saigon.
The failure of Kissinger's strategy, Hung explained, rest­
ed in 'two sets of problems'. By now Kissinger's secret 
diplomacy was no longer backed by the use or credible threat 
of force. Originally US strategy was to bomb North Vietnam 
for a month before the talks began but Watergate hindered 
any response to Hanoi's ceasefire violations. On account of 
Nixon's draining power and because he could no longer use
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force against Hanoi, Kissinger exerted greater pressure on 
. 20
Saigon. The relationship between Washington and Saigon 
accordingly deteriorated.
Nguyen Van Thieu did not believe negotiations could end 
the war. Prepared to continue fighting with US support, he 
wanted to maintain an armed truce and consolidate the econo­
mic and political structure of the South. As long as North
Vietnamese troops remained in the South Thieu could not
21
envisage sharing power with the PRG. Most critically Thieu
wanted added to the communique references to the presence
of Hanoi's troops in the South, which the original accord did
not contain. He wanted a serious ceasefire to 'remain in place'
and an immediate delimitation of the areas of control by each
side. Another point of contention was the NCNRC which
Thieu insisted must arrange for formal elections only if it
was tied to a firm date. It would discuss elections and the
nature of the body to be elected, as insurance against the
latter evolving into a three-way coalition government with- 
22
out elections.
On his departure from Paris Kissinger said he would 
report to Nixon in Washington, returning to Paris for a 
second round of talks, beginning on 6 June. Kissinger's 
attempts to extract concessions from Tho were combined in 
the interim with an exertion of US pressure on the Saigon 
regime. On 22 May Assistant Secretary of State William
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Sullivan left Paris for Saigon on a sudden and unexplained
visit, presumed at the time to seek Thieu's approval of points
23
on which Kissinger and Tho might agree. We now know
that Nixon had written to Thieu on 21 May 1973 sending
Sullivan to Saigon to personally deliver the letter and bring
24
Thieu a copy of the new draft communique. Nixon expl­
ained that Kissinger was in Paris to negotiate with Hanoi 
for 'an improved implementation' and that a joint comm­
unique might be issued on 25 May between Washington 
and Hanoi. He also reiterated the 'impossibility' of con­
vening a four-party conference as Thieu suggested and did 
not speak of the use of force against Hanoi. Nixon warned 
Thieu however against backing away from his commitment 
to the Paris Agreement as expressed in San Clemente and on 
the need to sign the communique if he wanted continued 
economic aid.
Intensive discussions in Saigon between Sullivan and 
Foreign Minister Tran Van Lam (24-26 May) were thought 
to have covered technical details of an eleven-point plan to 
end the ceasefire violations. These included the establish­
ment of distinct zones of control in South Vietnam with new
25
orders for all troops to ceasefire. It also covered the possi­
bility of meetings between communists at the front and the 
means of guaranteeing freedom of movement to ICCS mem­
bers and the creation of the NCNRC, to organise countrywide
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elections. While the substance of the talks was not revealed 
Sullivan was reportedly attempting to move Saigon towards 
compromise on these issues. Sullivan later described his 
impressions in Saigon as follows:
'Essentially what is dawning on them is that a territorial 
division of the country, even if it means a PRG retreat from 
the political contest, is a pretty definitive action. If, as they 
fear, it may be coupled with a communist-controlled Cam­
bodia, they realise this could lead to a military balance in
26which they have precious narrow patrimony ...'
Hung discloses however that Thieu refused to accept or 
sign the new communique drafted in Paris and informed Nix­
on that a 'series of changes' would be needed before he would 
concur. 'Most onerous' to Thieu was Kissinger's concession 
to Le Due Tho on the right of military movement across the 
DMZ which Thieu considered 'sacrosanct'. From Saigon the 
Kissinger-Tho talks smacked of a secret deal between the two 
protagonists. Thieu 'could not understand' why Kissinger w as 
giving away the DMZ to Tho. Kissinger, he suspected, might 
have persuaded the North Vietnamese to sign the accord in
January 1973 on the premise that 'outstanding issues' could
27
be renegotiated in the spring.
On its part Saigon appeared receptive to putting out new
ceasefire orders to extend its cooperation with the ICCS and
28
offered on 26 May a truce implementation plan. This would
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delineate zones of control and provide for 'negotiations' on 
where each side stood on 28 January 1973, the day of the 
ceasefire. But it was immediately rejected by the Viet Cong. 
Saigon stood firm however on the zones and the Council and 
urged Sullivan to get the North Vietnamese to agree, at least 
on principle, to withdraw their troops. But it had little hope 
of achieving this. A timetable suggested for carrying out the 
ceasefire was also dismissed as unrealistic in view of the vast 
differences between the two sides. Instead Sullivan urged 
Saigon to be more conciliatory to the Viet Cong. Sullivan's 
departure on 26 May would take him to Phnom Penh, Vien­
tiane and Bangkok to brief the respective governments on 
current efforts to bring peace to Indochina before he return­
ed to Washington.
Back in Washington, Kissinger warned on 29 May that a
great deal depended on whether the 'new understandings'
would be implemented. The lack of implementation he said
was not necessarily a lack of clarity of the old Agreement
but the 'lack of willingness’ to observe provisions that were
clearly understood. A 'major effort' he emphasised had been
29
made to have the truce implemented. On 30 May Nixon 
wrote to Thieu again. Kissinger, he said, had been instructed 
to seek agreement to a 'number of proposals' Thieu had made, 
However even if the changes were not accepted by the North 
Vietnamese, Thieu should sign the document as it was 'use-
185
ful to both of us' and designate his representative to do so,
30
possibly on 8 June in Paris. Nixon explained that he need­
ed action of this kind if he was to obtain from Congress 
'legislative cooperation' required to carry out the 'program 
-mes of peace and stability1 discussed in San Clemente.
From Saigon it was reported simultaneously on 30 May 
that the US and the DRV had decided to issue a communique
on the ceasefire after the resumption of the Paris talks on 6
31
June 'with or without the concurrence of their partners'.
Kissinger and Tho had apparently agreed on a 'sequence of
steps' intended to ensure a 'stricter implementation' of the
ceasefire in South Vietnam and attention would focus on
32
essential aspects of the Agreement. The steps envisaged 
with Hanoi were that the US would halt all air reconnaissance 
missions over North Vietnam and would resume minesweep- 
ing operations and economic aid talks suspended on 19 April.
On the ground, 24 hours after the announcement, the Saigon 
Government and the Viet Cong would order the opposing battle­
field commanders to ceasefire; five to ten days later they would 
issue guarantees of privilege and immunity for members of the 
Two-Party JMC and fully deploy observers in the field to keep 
the peace. Within three months the zones of control would be 
delineated and military commanders from both sides could meet 
to establish safety corridors for representatives of one side travel­
ling through areas controlled by the other the DMZ would be
186
respected and troops and military equipment would be withdrawn 
from the buffer zone and forces on both sides would be demob­
ilised; legitimate ports of entry would be established for the re­
placement of war material by each side on a one-to-one basis and 
the remaining Vietnamese POWs would be released. Politically 
the NCNRC and an election procedure would be set up 'within 
six months' to shape the political future of South Vietnam under 
the terms of the original agreement.
In Saigon US Charge d'Affaires Charles Whitehouse on
31 May provided Thieu with 'precise details' of the US propo- 
33
sals in Paris. Referring to the DMZ it was proposed that the 
last sentence of paragraph 4(B) be broken to read:
'In conformity with Article 15, the DMZ shall be respec 
-ted. Military equipment may transit the demilitarised zone 
only if introduced into S outh Vietnam as replacements pursu­
ant to Article 7 of the Agreement and through a designated 
point of entry.'
Article 7 was also to be rewritten to reintroduce a refer­
ence to elections which the RVN considered essential. Art­
icle 8 would include the delimitation of the areas of control 
as 'determined in conformity' with Article 3(B) of the 
Agreement.
Saigon made no. secret of its resentment at this pressure.
On 2 June Thieu wrote to Nixon giving 'renewed object­
ions' and requested a copy of the latest version of the draft
187
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agreement. Two elements were of particular concern to
Thieu: the first was his wish to have a specific reference
to the electoral process in the communique and the second
was the communist effort to give 'geographical substance1
to their political pretensions by describing their 'territory'
and their 'capital'. In a telegramme on 5 June Nixon assured
Thieu that a sentence had been included on elections and
that the territorial question was 'much vaguer' than in the 
35
previous draft. Nixon wanted Thieu's concurrence that the
joint communique be signed on 7 and 8 June in Paris in the
format 'agreed between our two governments'. Attached to
Nixon's letter was the text of the draft Joint Communique 
36
(Appendix II). Among issues Thieu did not want to renego­
tiate were the DMZ, North Vietnamese infiltration, the issue 
of infiltration after 28 January 1973, the Cambodian and Lao 
ceasefire and elections. The North Vietnamese, Thieu believ­
ed had additionally gained from the June Joint Communique 
since there were no constraints to their crossing the DMZ 
and to their stationing of troops at the delimitation of the
two territories. The question of elections had also become 
37
less clear.
On 6 June Thieu wrote to Nixon complaining that the RVN 
was a 'victim of aggression'. Instead of being punished for 
violating a solemn agreement, Hanoi, enjoying unilaterally 
'all the gains of the communique' was only being asked to
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38sign another one. Nixon's reply the same day was emphatic
that the communique must be viewed as 'final' and was not
subject to further revisions. Nixon said Thieu must sign the
communique 'as it currently exists, despite the minor misgiv-
39
ings' or else face the 'inevitably disastrous consequences'.
By 7 June Nixon was determined to proceed without Thieu.
'All your views', he told Thieu, had been taken into account
and the 'best consideration' of them possible 'favourable to
your interests' had been achieved in the document. Kissinger
had been given instructions to propose to Le Due Tho that
they should sign the text of the communique ’as it now 
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stands'. Thieu's intransigence, Nixon added, would be 
blamed for thwarting 'any realistic prospect' for an agree­
ment on Cambodia since his position deprived the North Viet­
namese of 'any possible motive to achieve an understanding 
with us on this key issue'.
Thieu however remained adamant. On 8 June he informed 
Nixon that he favoured a formula whereby the US and North
Vietnam would approve the communique and call on the RVN
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and the PRG to carry out its provisions. Nixon was unim­
pressed, 'unlike October (1972)', he replied, 'we will oppose
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and not back your action'. Senate and House conferees, he 
warned, would be voting on 11 June on an absolute prohibition 
of funds for military operations in and over Cambodia and Laos. 
Saigon's failure to sign would lead therefore to a [sequence of
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events' which could only be disastrous for the RVN Govern­
ment. By the same token Nixon needed Thieu's reply in time 
for him to instruct his negotiators in Paris to proceed on 9 June.
In Paris meanwhile, Washington's efforts to reason with 
Hanoi culminated on 6-9 June and 12r 13 June in the second 
and third sessions of the 1973 talks. Intended ostensibly ter 
to arrive at a new understanding on implementing the cease­
fire and to deal with the points at issue, 'Nothing new or 
spectacular', Kissinger publicly said, had been added. A ser­
ies of procedures to put into effect more satisfactorily what 
had already been agreed upon was said to have surfaced in 
the document The talks were broken off in mid-session on 
9 June in an attempt, as Kissinger put it, to bring the Viet­
namese parties to a 'common realisation of the significance 
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of certain words’.
We now know that Thieu had informed Charg6 Whitehouse 
in Saigon that he would meet with his National Security Coun­
cil on 9 June to reply to Nixon's letter. Immediately informed,
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Nixon rushed another message to Thieu to force him to sign. 
The communique, Nixon informed Thieu in confidence, was 
intended to 'buy time’ for the US' an arrangement concerning 
Laos - where the withdrawal of North Vietnamese troops over 
60 days would begin on 1 July - and a 'complex three-cornered 
negotiation' on Cambodia were concurrently taking place.
Thieu replied again insisting that the changes be made in
190
the communique before he would sign it. On 10 June White-
house gave Thieu Nixon's answer which said the changes
he requested had been rejected in a ’long and acrimonious
session1 by the North Vietnamese. A 'forty-eight hour delay'
had been arranged moreover during which Kissinger would
return to Washington for consultations. A talking paper was
also enclosed with detailed answers to Thieu's concerns re-
45
garding particularly the delimitation of the zones of control.
On Nixon’s instructions Kissinger would return to Paris on 
12 June to sign the communique since ’we are now at a point 
where no further delay is possible'. Asking Thieu to recon­
sider his position, Nixon referred to the restraint he hoped to 
impose on Chinese and Soviet support to North Vietnam. If 
the US and South Vietnam were 'split by a public confronta­
tion’, he warned, international support for Thieu's position 
would also weaken and the economic advisory group that the
US had been trying to mobilise among friendly nations to aid
46
South Vietnam might also be jeopardised.
Thieu's reply to Nixon on 12 June complained that the
communique Kissinger had negotiated would produce in effect
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'two territories under two governments in South Vietnam'.
On 13 June Nixon warned Thieu that his refusal to sign had 
'repudiated my entire policy of constant support for you'. 
Nixon would be forced to follow Congressional opinion by 
supporting 'only marginal humanitarian necessities' and Thi-
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eu would have to forego all the 'hard decisions and tasks' in­
volving the military and economic programmes described in 
San Clemente. By the same token Nixon had ordered Kissing­
er and Nguyen Luu Vien in Paris to sign as 'no further delay
48
or evasion was acceptable'.
The Joint Communique issued in Paris on 13 June was
described as an 'amplification and consolidation of the origin- 
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al agreement'. All parties, Kissinger said, would have to 
accept the overwhelming reality that no-one could have his 
way in Vietnam by force. The new ceasefire was expected 
to go into effect on 15 June. The points of principal concern 
were embodied in the prohibitions against the infiltration of 
personnel and material into South Vietnam, except as repla­
cements under Article 7 of the original agreement. The pro­
hibitions against transiting the DMZ were stressed. The Com­
munique, containing 14 points, emphasised Articles 3,7, 8 
and 11 of the original agreement, representing the clauses virt­
ually phrase by phrase (See Appendix II). Particular emphasis 
was placed on Article 7 and the duties of the JMC and the 
ICCS, repeated without amendments, were to commence 24 
hours after the new ceasefire came into force.
The basic framework of the Paris Agreement remained un­
touched and the essential points of the draft agreement follow­
ed the 'sequence of steps' outlined earlier, with shorter dead­
lines than those defined in January. There were no mechanisms
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to enforce the ceasefire, and the structure of the Agreement
with its essential problems therefore remained intact What is
not known was whether the document was only a convenient
cloak for more significant secret understandings reached by
Kissinger and Tho in their Paris negotiations. Kissinger was
cynical. There was little likelihood that the new version would
be adhered to since the existing accord was not In any case
he had made observance on the ban on infiltration dependent
on the achievement of an effective ceasefire, which Hanoi,
according to Kissinger, was making it its business to sabotage.
Taken to task for Hanoi's infiltration and non-adherence to
Article 7, Tho had defended himself in Paris by saying the
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ceasefire violations were 'secondary issues'. We now 
know that in June 1973 the Military Commission of the Party 
Central Committee issued in Hanoi a resolution on the 'impor­
tant new situation and missions' which analysed develop­
ments after the Paris Agreement, and possible developments . 
afterwards to set out the military guidelines, missions and 
major policies concerning both the North and South. The 
Politburo also met with the Party committee secretaries and
military commanders in June to discuss the drafting of its
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report to the Party Central Committee.
Kissinger's anxiety to conclude the Paris talks was related 
also to a desire to devote his full attention to Brezhnev's imm­
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inent visit (18-25 June) to the US, which would mark the 
’completion* of a period of bilateral agreements. Central to 
these was the idea of the 'structure of peace' that all count­
ries had a stake in the preservation of the international order. 
Reference to China and Indochina in the Joint Communique 
issued in San Clemente on 25 June 1973 was embodied in 
the pledge that the US and the USSR 'refrain from threaten­
ing the use of force against each other, against the allies of
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the other party or against other countries'. This was a 
clear restriction against the use of military targets and 
would seem to have some relevance in Indochina.
While the pledge seemed applicable to Vietnam, the 
situation in Cambodia still appeared mid-year to be in 
disarray. The Paris talks achieved nothing substantial 
that might alleviate the deteriorating situation there.
m  : II
CAMBODIA
'...the war in Cambodia has always been a product of 
the struggle in Vietnam.'
William Rogers 
8 May 1973
The controversy over the bombing of Cambodia and the 
funds required for it, continued to plague the Nixon Admin-
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istration throughout May 1973. The House Appropriations 
Committee defeated a bid on 3 May to deny funds for the 
bombing of Cambodia. On 7 May Defence Secretary Elliot 
Richardson told the Senate Appropriations Committee that 
the bombing would continue even if Congress refused to 
provide the Pentagon with additional spending authority.
The question of how to end the war in Cambodia was
posed by Secretary of State William Rogers on 8 May with
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specific reference to US objectives there. In hearings be­
fore a Senate Committee for Appropriations, he said the US 
could not unilaterally end the war by terminating its bomb­
ing of the country; when it had done so ten weeks ago the 
North Vietnamese and Khmer insurgents had responded by 
launching a major offensive. The choice for the US, Rogers 
said, was whether to allow a military takeover of Cambodia 
by the DRV and its allies or insist upon observation of a nego­
tiated peace. The bombing in Cambodia was intended to bring 
about a ceasefire that would allow implementation of the Agree­
ment.
The bill which the Committee was considering that day 
Rogers said, was not an 'open-ended commitment' to prolong 
the war but a request for funds until the end of the fiscal year. 
The Paris Agreement had provided a 'mutually acceptable' 
framework for such a lasting peace. A period of adjustment 
was necessary since the overall objective was to help Indo­
china turn away from confrontation and toward the common
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tasks of economic development and political cooperation.
New relationships 'still fragile' he said, were developing in
Asia, which could provide the basis for longterm stability.
The transition to stability was a 'delicate process’ to which
a sudden reduction in the US commitment might sacrifice
54
the progress already achieved.
On 10 May the House of Representatives voted 219:188 
to block the transfer of defence funds - for the first time in 
six years - to finance the continued bombing in Cambodia.
The White House response was to emphasise that it would 
continue nevertheless with the 'right policy' of bombing in 
support of the Lon Nol Government. On 14 May the Nixon 
Administration was further set back by two moves in the Senate 
to bar funds for the bombing. One move denied a Defence De­
partment request to pay for continued bombing by the transfer 
of funds previously provided for other than operational purpo­
ses such as the procurement of weapons. The other, the Case- 
Church amendment, to cut off the use of any funds for milit­
ary actions in Indochina that Congress had not specifically
authorised, would if enacted, have a more binding effect on 
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the executive branch.
The US was simultaneously using an assortment of diplo­
matic channels to negotiate an end to the Cambodian war. 
Kissinger believed that an 'evolutionary process' could be
set in motion in the course of his talks to be held in Paris 
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with Le Due Tho. Some attention was given to the possi-
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bility of bringing about a Cambodian ceasefire but Hanoi was
not helpful. Kissinger's recommendation of a 'joint ceasefire'
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by both Cambodian parties was rejected. As in February, 
Tho insisted on a political settlement before the arrangement 
of a troop withdrawal and before the implementation of Arti­
cle 20. He refused to discuss a political solution for Cambo­
dia, out of deference to the 'sovereignty' of his allies: the 
Khmer Rouge being 'adamantly opposed' to negotiations.
The only political solution envisaged by Tho was the elimi­
nation of Lon Nol and a complete communist takeover, a de­
finition of Cambodian neutrality and independence which to 
Kissinger implied North Vietnamese 'hegemony*.
Other avenues had to be sought towards a solution in 
Cambodia. One possibility was direct negotiations with 
Norodom Sihanouk. Rebuffed previously, the prince had 
been touring a series of African and Eastern European coun­
tries since the beginning of May, to enlist the support of 
friendly governments to mediate with Washington on his 
behalf. In the process he himself made a number of explicit 
overtures to the US. In Dakar, Senegal (11-13 May) he advan­
ced a proposal for negotiations between 'two governments of
sovereign and equal states' to lead to a 'peace with neither 
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victor nor vanquished'. His kingdom would become recon­
ciled with the US on condition that it stopped giving military' 
aid to the Lon Nol regime and withdrew all non-Khmer milit-
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ary personnel from Cambodian territory. Anxious that Kissin­
ger and Tho might reach an agreement on Cambodia in Paris 
over his head, Sihanouk insisted on 18 May in Bamako, Mali, 
that Hanoi had 'no right' to interfere in Cambodian internal
affairs. Washington, if it 'sincerely' wanted to solve the
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question of Cambodia, should contact him.
Kissinger seemed sufficiently interested to raise the ques­
tion of negotiations with Sihanouk in his mid-May negotia­
tions with Le Due Tho; but Tho was again unresponsive: 
partly Kissinger thought because he felt he 'could not deliver
the Khmer Rouge' and partly because Tho considered Sihan-
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ouk to be too much under Chinese influence.
China remained a key factor in any solution. In a conver­
sation in Peking with Ambassador Manac'h on 14 May, Zhou 
voiced his doubts about American readiness to withdraw from 
Cambodia. The US, he thought, feared that its retreat from Indo
-china would create a vacuum which the Soviet Union might 
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fill. The only solution as Zhou saw it was the 'full implemen­
tation’ of Article 20 and subsidiary clauses by all parties concer­
ned, including particularly the withdrawal of 'all forces' after 
the achievement of a ceasefire. However the prospect of Chin­
ese intervention on the Cambodian question alongside the US 
was 'not great'. On 18 May Zhou told David Bruce, the newly- 
arrived Head of the US Liaison Office that Peking was ready to 
cooperate up to a point, being particularly anxious that North
198
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Vietnamese forces vacate Cambodian territory. The question 
of Cambodia should be pursued under the auspices of the US- 
China dialogue through the mediation of Huang Zhen, who had 
just been designated Bruce's counterpan in Washington and 
was due to leave for the US to take up his new appointment 
on 25 May 1973.
To complicate matters, an attempt was underway in Phnom 
Penh to bring about a political compromise in the form of a 
transitional government. In Tam, a member of the High Politi­
cal Council was named Premier-Designate on 11 May. Opposi­
tion leader Cheng Heng however would have preferred former 
deputy Premier, Son Sann, long resident in France and also a 
friend of Penn Nouth. Although Son Sann judged it premature 
to seek a solution that excluded Sihanouk, the prince was not 
to play any part in the proposed government.
Contact with Son Sann was made through the agency of a
French official in Paris from 24 April onwards after which he
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set out for Phnom Penh by 14 May. Once arrived in Cam­
bodia Son Sann called for a largescale popular movement to 
bring about reconciliation between different factions of Khm- 
ers to prevent Cambodia from swinging towards communism. 
Encouraged by these activities, Sum Chhum, Minister of Info­
rmation declared that 'contacts' had commenced between his
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government and the Sihanouk 'insurgents'.
Son Sann left Phnom Penh on 30 May for Paris to try to
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bring about peace talks with Sihanouk's govemment-in-exile.
His departure was the 'first step' in a new effort by the Lon
Nol Government to find a peaceful settlement. The Marshal
was believed to have agreed in principle - at the request of
William Sullivan who visited Phnom Penh on 26 May - to
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negotiate directly with the Sihanouk faction. Sullivan who 
had previously briefed Thieu (24-26 May) on the Paris talks, 
had apparently presented Lon Nol with a plan to end the 
fighting in Cambodia to shore up the Paris Agreement. The 
Marshal was unresponsive. Neither Penn Nouth nor the Kh­
mer Rouge had agreed to the talks and nothing was forthcom­
ing from the latter. Son Sann said on arrival in Paris on 31 
May that he would not personally participate in the talks
even if he succeeded in bringing the two sides together for 
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negotiations.
On 1 June while on a visit to Algiers, Sihanouk condemn­
ed Son Sann as a 'triple agent' in the service of Lon Nol and
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of 'international and US imperialism'. In early June Penn 
Nouth appealed from Peking to the Khmer population to 're­
ject all the intrigues' which comprise the 'so-called peace'
pronounced by the 'clique of traitors', dialogue with whom
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was tantamount to a defence of US bombing.
Back in New York on 27 May, after his first round of talks 
with Tho, Kissinger informed Huang Hua, China's Ambassa-
200
dor at the UN that he believed Chinese and American interests 
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to be 'compatible'. Both, he thought, sought to prevent the 
ultimate emergence of an Indochina under Hanoi's tutelage and 
aligned to Moscow. With specific regard to Cambodia, Kissin­
ger submitted the following proposal to Huang Hua: Washing­
ton was prepared to stop the bombing of Cambodia to with­
draw its 'advisory' group from the country and to arrange the 
departure of Lon Nol for medical treatment in the US. In exch­
ange Washington would expect a ceasefire for a duration of 
say, 90 days and the parallel holding of negotiations on two 
levels: between the Sihanouk faction and the Lon Nol forces
'without Lon Nol', aftd between the staff of Sihanouk and 
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David Bruce in Peking. These negotiations were expected 
to take 'some months’, on account of US 'necessities', a pro­
bable reference to US interests in Cambodia. Once completed 
Washington would not oppose the return of the prince to his 
homeland.
Huang Hua's response was guarded. This proposal he
thought, could incur Hanoi's displeasure although the North
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Vietnamese might not be able to oppose it. In subsequent 
reference to Sino-US designs on Cambodia, Hanoi alleged: 
'After the Paris Agreement on Vietnam, the Chinese lead­
ers and the Americans sought to arrange h political settlement 
in Kampuchea through an alliance between Sihanouk, Lon 
Nol and Son Sann. Kissinger himself related that in late May
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1973, the Chinese leaders accepted the American proposal of 
a package for Kampuchea, comprising termination of US bomb­
ing, departure of Lon Nol, a ceasefire in Cambodia and negotia-
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tions between Lon Nol and the other side.'
On 29 May Kissinger repeated his proposal to Huang Zhen
in Washington. Huang Zhen made a further reservation. Zhou,
he reminded Kissinger, had intimated to Bruce that both Sihan-
and the Khmer Rouge were willing in principle to talk to the
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US and China should defer to the Cambodian parties. To 
underline the importance of the US-China dialogue, Nixon 
met Huang Zhen on 30 May. Nixon then left for the Franco- 
American talks at Reykjavik (31 May-1 June) with President 
Pompidou and Foreign Minister Michel Jobert. Where Cam­
bodia was concerned, Pompidou apparently found Nixon and 
Kissinger 'vague', although the latter was later described by
Jobert as being disposed towards accepting Sihanouk as an 
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'interlocutor'.
But Washington was fast losing its ability to sustain a 
military effort in Cambodia, just as it had already done in 
Vietnam. On 22 May the Senate Foreign Relations Commi­
ttee voted to slash the Administration's military assistance 
funds by more than 40%. In the first absolute anti-war pro­
hibition voted by either house of Congress, the Senate on 
31 May voted 63:19 to cut off all funds for the bombing of 
Cambodia. On 4 June 1973 the Senate approved the Case-
202
Church amendment to cut off all funds for military opera­
tions in Indochina as a whole.
Coupled with these developments, Kissinger appeared 
to have reached the conclusion by the beginning of June 
that the Chinese were prepared to act as intermediaries in the 
Cambodian negotiations. But the Chinese were by no means 
so eager to come forward. Unfortunately a gulf still divided 
the GRUNK and US positions. Confident of Chinese media­
tion, Kissinger was unprepared to abandon his insistence on 
the need for a ceasefire before negotiations with the prince 
could take place and for a transitional period of several months 
before he could return to Cambodia. The result was that a con­
tinuing series of overtures from Sihanouk was rejected in 
Washington. 'Apparently oblivious', as Kissinger complained, 
'of my talks with the Chinese', Sihanouk offered to meet him
in messages relayed on 3-4 June by the Presidents of Guinea
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and Senegal as well as the King of Morocco.
Peking was, however, quite as anxious as Washington to 
hold back the North Vietnamese. China played host to Le Duan 
and Pham Van Dong from 4-11 June, the first time that these 
two leaders had apparently visited Peking together. The differ­
ence of oudook between Peking and Hanoi was clear. Le Duan 
blamed the violations of the Paris Agreement on both Saigon
and Washington. Zhou Enlai however confined his criticisms 
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to Saigon alone. He demanded the US stop bombing Cam-
203
bodia and end its other military activities there adding that ’no
interference' in Indochina, 'under whatever pretext and in
77
whatever form would be tolerated'.
Cambodia was a crucial part of the Sino-Vietnamese dis­
cussions which opened on 5 June in Peking; just before the 
second session of the Paris talks. Speaking less than a month 
after the opening of the US Liaison Office in Peking, Zhou 
pointedly emphasised that Indochina 'belongs only' to the 
Indochinese people and that it was 'up to them' to decide 
the destiny of Indochina. The 'only solution' to the Cambo­
dian problem was the prince and his 'Five-Point' statement 
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of 1970.
GRUNK certainly shared this view. Penn Nouth who met
Manac'h on 3 June confirmed that GRUNK would not accept
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negotiations with the Americans. GRUNK's premier had 
been obliged to delay his departure to join Sihanouk on his 
overseas tour on account of the imminent arrival of the Hanoi 
delegation. In talks with them on 5 June he was able to extra­
ct a useful disclaimer from the North Vietnamese. Le Duan 
and Pham Van Dong asked him to assure the prince that the 
DRV would 'never allow itself to discuss the Cambodian pro­
blem in GRUNK s stead and that a solution rested on the US
80
talking directly with Norodom Sihanouk.
By this time the Chinese had emerged as overt partisans 
of direct negotiations with Sihanouk. On the day of the DRV 
delegation's arrival in Peking, 4 June 1973, important Sino-
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American exchanges were taking place. Huang Zhen, having
arrived in Washington to head the Chinese Liaison Office met
81
William Rogers that day. In New York Huang Hua request-
82
ed a meeting with Kissinger the same day. He delivered a 
message expressing China's disappointment with what he 
termed the 'tentative US thinking' on the Cambodian question. 
The Chinese message stressed that 'all parties concerned' - by 
implication Hanoi and probably Washington too - needed to 
respect Cambodia's sovereignty. Huang Hua emphasised in 
particular that Peking 'could not' conduct talks with the US 
on behalf of Cambodia and that direct talks with Sihanouk 
would be 'necessary' at some stage. China was however pre­
pared to communicate with the Cambodian side, although it 
would have to await Sihanouk's return from his African and 
eastern European tour - since contact with the prince through 
diplomatic channels was currently 'inconvenient'.
This latter undertaking seems to have reinforced Kissing­
er's eonviction that the Chinese were prepared to act as inter­
mediaries on the Cambodian issue. This in turn persuaded 
him that Zhou was in fact committing himself to the US pro­
posal since the Chinese Premier would not be willing to act
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as intermediary 'unless he expected to succeed'. And such 
a commitment on the Chinese part appeared, on the surface, 
to guarantee a satisfactory settlement of the war. A ceasefire 
on this basis, reflecting the military balance,would deny the
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Khmer Rouge*the total victory they demanded It would pre­
serve the structure of 'free Cambodia' and enable Sihanouk 
to return with the support of both the US and China, in the 
capacity of arbiter between the divergent factions. The US 
bombing of Cambodia Kissinger thought might even be 
used as a 'bargaining chip' for the Chinese to enforce the 
setdement on both the Khmer Rouge and Hanoi.
As we have seen, Sihanouk's attempts in early June to 
contact Nixon through 'third countries' were rejected by the 
US. On 11 June the State Department confirmed its rejection 
on the grounds that 'the Cambodian people themselves’ shou­
ld negotiate to resolve their differences without outside inter- 
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ference. The State Department moreover said Sihanouk
had misinterpreted US intentions with his plan to end the war
with 'neither victor nor vanquished' and by his response to
the US asking him to negotiate with Phnom Penh. Sihanouk
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dispelled these assertions on 14 June while in Yugoslavia.
With GRUNK so unforthcoming little could be expected 
on Cambodia from the next round of Paris talks with Hanoi 
(6-9, 12-13 June). Tho maintained once again that Hanoi had 
little influence over its Cambodian ally and rejected the US 
proposal for a joint ceasefire. The Joint Communique on 13 
June contained no solution for Cambodia and no obligation 
on Washington to halt the bombing or to reduce its presence
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there. All that emerged was a 'joint reaffirmation' of the need
for the Cambodian people to settle their own problems and for
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foreign troops to withdraw from their territory.
The new document insisted that Article 20 be 'scrupulous­
ly implemented' meaning that foreign military activity could 
continue in Cambodia until a ceasefire was negotiated by the 
Cambodians and was, to all intents and purposes, the justifi­
cation for continued American bombing. One of Kissinger's 
priorities in Paris was to get some assurance from Hanoi 
through Le Due Tho that he would use his influence with 
the Khmer Rouge to make a political deal and thereby end 
the need for bombing. There was nothing in the communique 
therefore that committed the US to cease such operations. As 
Kissinger himself reiterated in Paris on 13 June, he hoped to 
continue 'diplomatic contacts' that would produce a ceasefire
in Cambodia but 'final results' depended on the decisions of 
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'other parties'.
Kissinger meanwhile was bent upon continuing his dialo­
gue with the Chinese. He had taken the opportunity in Paris 
on 13 June to arrange an 'unscheduled meeting' at the Chinese
Embassy to meet Foreign Minister Ji Pengfei who was on a
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tour of Britain, France and Iran. On this occasion Kissing­
er expressed his full agreement with the Chinese about Siha­
nouk's ultimate role as the Cambodian head of state. There 
must, he insisted, be a 'transitional period' of several months
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before the prince could return to Cambodia. Kissinger was 
also adamant about the ceasefire which was central to his 
position of 27 May. He promised that Washington would 
make a gesture towards Sihanouk as soon as this was brou­
ght about.
Probably unknown to Kissinger, Ji Pengfei's Paris visit 
now gave further impetus to the French initiative on Cambo­
dia: Pompidou also met Ji on 13 June and was pleased to 
know the 'exact position' of the Chinese vis-a-vis Sihanouk. 
A visit by Manac'h to the Quai d'Orsay on 14 June saw Mic­
hel Jobert assuring him that it was particularly vital that the
voice of France was 'not entirely absent' since Paris was
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sympathetic towards the prince.
A Congressional debate in Washington coincided precise­
ly with the Paris talks on 12-13 June. An attempt was made 
to stall further deliberations in Congress until Kissinger's 
return from Paris, but on 12 June the Senate met to debate 
a bill which would cut off funds for military operations in 
Indochina as a whole. Legislation was passed on 14 June 
to cut off all funds for any type of US combat activity 'any­
where in Indochina' unless Congress gave its express 
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consent.
Kissinger was desperate. Briefing the Senate privately on
the new agreement reached in Paris, Kissinger on 14 June
requested that the Administration be given a 'finite amount
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of time' to pursue negotiations on Cambodia/ He referred
208
to some assurances he had received from Tho in Paris that 
could provide the basis for ending the fighting in Cambodia. 
Negotiations there were 'too complex’ and needed an oppor­
tunity to mature. He met with Huang Zhen the same day to 
brief him on the Paris negotiations, to discuss Sihanouk's
impending return to Peking and the possibility of making
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another visit to the Chinese capital. Intended officially to 
brief Zhou on the results of the superpower discussions, 
this visit would follow Brezhnev's forthcoming trip to the 
US and at the same time might provide an opportunity for 
beginning a dialogue with Sihanouk. On 19 June Kissinger 
confirmed to Huang Zhen his readiness to meet the prince 
for political discussions provided a ceasefire had been brou­
ght about in Cambodia by the time of his visit to Peking - ex-
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pected 'around 6 August 1973'. Kissinger was optimistic
about a ceasefire from mid-June onwards. The way would
then be clear for Sihanouk to return to Phnom Penh.
But in Congress Kissinger's voice was not heeded. In
his view the cut-off of funds threatened to deprive the US
of its vital 'bargaining chip' since Zhou 'needed to be able
to persuade the Khmer Rouge that he had bought them the
end of our bombing in exchange for a compromise involving
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Sihannouk and parts of the existing structure'. The talks 
he expected to be conducted through China's good offices 
represented to Kissinger 'the last throw of the dice'. If these
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failed, it would spell the end of Cambodia and with it South 
Vietnam and Laos. On 18 June Kissinger sought the assistan­
ce of Melvin Laird, Counsellor to the President for Domestic 
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Affairs. Through Laird's intervention a bargain was extrac­
ted under which the bombing would be permitted to continue 
until a secret deadline of 1 September. Under the plan, Cong­
ress would have its early end to the bombing and the Admin­
istration's flexibility would have been maintained, since the 
Cambodian insurgents would not have known that the raids 
would stop by a fixed date.
The Cambodian problem, Kissinger explained on 25 June,
should be seen in perspective as the 'very last phase of a very 
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prolonged war'. Refusing to give any details he admitted 
that Cambodia had been discussed with the Soviets during 
Brezhnev's visit to the US (18-25 June) but the 'primary pro­
blem' was whether it was possible in a 'finite period of time' 
to bring about a negotiation there that led towards a political 
settlement and a ceasefire.
Where Cambodia was concerned his memoirs suggest only 
that Nixon concluded his summit talks with Brezhnev by list­
ing a long agenda of topics for later sessions which included
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'Vietnam and Cambodia'. The US-USSR Joint Communi­
que of 24 June saw the two sides stress the need to 'bring an
early end' to the military conflict in order to 'bring peace to
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the entire area of Indochina'. The political future of Cambo-
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dia would be left to the ’self-determination' of its peoples 'free 
from foreign interference'.
The Soviets showed some signs of adopting this attitude. 
After his US visit Brezhnev visited France (25-27 June) for 
talks with Pompidou which covered the latter's imminent visit 
to China in September. At Rambouillet the two leaders discuss­
ed 'international problems' including the Vietnam ceasefire and 
Cambodia. We know that Michel Jobert left immediately after­
wards on 28 June for Washington to meet with Nixon and Ki­
ssinger to brief them on the content of the Rambouillet talks as
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well as to urge a solution in Cambodia centreing on the prince.
While these high-level diplomatic initiatives to bring peace to 
both Vietnam and Cambodia were taking place, a role for Japan 
as direct participant in ensuring eventual stability in Indochina 
was simultaneously being carved out. It is to this we now turn.
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Ill : III
A ROLE FOR JAPAN
'As Japan today moves out in many directions over the 
terrain of multipolar diplomacy, it will be another test of 
statesmanship on both sides to ensure that our policies are 
not divergent. Japan's foreign policy will continue to be
shaped by her unique perspectives, purposes and style....
Our foreign policies will not be identical or inevitably in 
step.What will preserve our alliance in the new era is not 
rigidity of policy but a continuing consciousness of the 
basic interest in stability which we have in common. We 
must work to maintain a consensus in our policies.'
Richard Nixon
3 May 1973*
'At any rate it is important that the Nixon Doctrine, 
which is seeking regional stabilisation for the purpose of 
realising a new balance among the big powers, is being 
developed with the recognition of basic national rights as 
the axis. We should not lose sight of the fact that the present 
international situation is not only asking Japan's diplomacy
towards Asia to recognise North Vietnam but also it is
asking our country's diplomacy to take the position of estab­
lishing well-balanced relations with the two forces in South 
Vietnam. As regards the international question, our country
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is being pressed to promote economic aid again, and re­
checking into its basic strategy, which precedes economic 
aid.'
Nihon Keizai Shimbun
)|g jj;
15 June 1973
US Foreign Policy for the 1970's: Shaping a Durable Peace 
A Report to Congress by Richard Nixon, 3 May 1973, in DSB. 
4 June 1973, p.768.
in DSJP. 19 June 1973, p.4.
Submitting his proposed Foreign Assistance Act of 1973
President Nixon explained on 1 May that a ’new definition’
of American leadership had been sought worldwide, in which
assistance to other nations remained a key part of US foreign 
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policy. The Nixon Doctrine of 'shared responsibilities' 
had encouraged other nations to take an increasing commit­
ment to provide for their own defences, security and econo­
mic development. In this respect it was 'critical' that the US 
should provide a level of foreign assistance that would help to 
assure its allies 'safe passage' through a period of transition.
In Indochina the Foreign Assistance Act was meant to 
assist 'friendly governments’ in building and maintaining 
military capability to protect their independence and secu­
rity as well as help' South Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos to
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begin the task of rehabilitating and restructuring their war- 
101
tom countries. To maintain a stable international order, 
it was important that ’threatened countries’ were not only 
'economically developed’ but also able to defend themsel­
ves 'primarily through their own resources'. Congress was 
asked to authorise US$2.9 billion in foreign economic and 
military aid in the fiscal year ending 1 July - including US 
$632 million for rebuilding all countries in Indochina - ex­
cept North Vietnam, 'until it had fully adhered to the Paris 
Agreement'. If and when that occurred, US assistance for 
reconstruction and development of both North and South 
Vietnam, Nixon believed, would represent a 'sound invest­
ment' in confirming the peace. The legislation that Nixon 
was presenting would authorise the continuation of econo­
mic assistance to South Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos to pro­
vide a sound beginning in the process of rehabilitation and re­
construction there. Referring to the 'mutual benefit' of giving 
assistance, Nixon said Japan's emergence as a 'major econo­
mic power' and its 'significant and increasing contributions'
could play an extremely important role towards ’a lasting 
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peace’ in the Pacific.
Two days later, in his 3 May report to Congress, he des­
cribed the complexity of the current geopolitical environment 
’even in the Asian context alone’ as a challenge requiring Jap­
an to undertake a 'more political role'. Japan was already act-
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ing 'autonomously' in an expanding sphere: its extensive aid
programmes and growing economic ties with communist
powers required that it made decisions on 'broader policy
103
grounds’ than economic calculations.
In both the political and economic dimensions, Japan 
and the US, Nixon continued, had an 'obligation' as allies 
to pursue their individual objectives in ways that also served 
their common purposes. Whether the issue was the world­
wide energy problem, economic or political relations with 
communist countries, or the provision of resources to devel­
oping countries, there was an 'overriding collective interest' 
in a stable global environment. Japan had moreover acceler­
ated and broadened its political involvement in Asia and had 
taken a 'special interest' in the postwar reconstruction of
Indochina, in the process opening a dialogue with North 
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Vietnam.
Acting in consultation with the US through routine dip­
lomatic channels and high-level political consultations, such 
as Kissinger's visits to Tokyo in June 1972 and February 
1973, Japan was beginning to develop a complementary 
strategy. On 1 May 1973 Foifegn Minister Ohira visited Paris 
for one of his periodic consultations on topics which included 
Kissinger's proposed 'New Atlantic Charter' and other Euro­
pean issues, as well as on aid for the reconstruction of Vietnam. 
He reaffirmed the choice of the French capital as the venue for
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the Japan-DRV talks on the establishment of diplomatic relatio- 
105
ns. Tokyo announced the following day that these talks wou­
ld be conducted between the Japanese Ambassador to Paris, Na-
kayama Yoshihiro and the DRV General-Delegate to Europe, Vo 
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Van Sun. Ambassadorial contacts had already been establish­
ed between the two individuals in mid-March when North Viet­
nam accepted Miyake's mission to Hanoi. The objective now 
was an eventual plenary negotiation on the question of Japanese 
recognition of Hanoi, on which a final decision would be taken 
on 7 May following Ohira's return from Europe.
Japan's complementarity with the US was evident in mid- 
May when Ohira ordered a general review of Tokyo’s foreign 
policy. Japan was to engage in multilateral peace diplomacy 
appropriate to its status as an economic power in developing
relations with the US, the Soviet Union, Europe and South- 
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east Asia. The evolving dialogue between Japan and Viet­
nam would constitute one focal point attuned to the progress 
of the Paris talks between Kissinger and Le Due Tho. In con­
formity with this, Ohira recalled Toky o's ambassadors from 
Indochina for policy consultations which took place in para­
llel with the current round (17-23 May) of the Paris talks bet­
ween Kissinger and Le Due Tho.
Discussion in Tokyo however remained cautious. The in­
clination was to hold negotiations with Hanoi, but this step, 
it was urged, should not'be taken until the situation in Cam­
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bodia stabilised. Although the content of consultations with 
the Indochinese ambassadors on 17 May was not revealed, 
they probably discussed the present situation in the respec­
tive countries as well as the timing favoured for the establi­
shment of diplomatic relations with Tokyo and Hanoi. At 
the second session on 18 May ’fluid factors' such as the
outcome of the Paris talks and Brezhnev’s forthcoming visit
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to the US were also taken into consideration.
The two-day conference affirmed in the event that South 
Vietnam had no objections to the establishment of relations 
between Hanoi and Tokyo. Although the infringements of the 
peace by both sides were still a problem, the situation was 
not 'serious enough' to warrant any delay in Tokyo-Hanoi 
consultations since the Thieu regime appeared 'stable1. Ph­
nom Penh and Vientiane were also described as supporting
109
Japanese initiatives towards Hanoi.
One unresolved problem was the question of aid. Japan’s 
inclination as we have seen, was to give aid to Indochina as 
a whole through an international organisation like the UN, 
since multilateral diplomacy implied multilateral aid. Wash­
ington furthermore had consistently emphasised its concern 
that economic aid to Hanoi should not strengthen its posi­
tion vis-k-vis the South. After the Tokyo consultations of 
17-18 May, however some sort of compromise was reached. 
Although the 'multilateral' formula was still recommended,
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'bilateral aid' was now advocated as a temporary measure.
Hanoi was anxious to receive aid and had asked Japan 
during Miyake's April visit, to be specific about the amount 
of its proposed aid, to facilitate the drawing up of the DRV's 
own reconstruction plan. In this connection Hanoi now re­
quested two Polish ministers scheduled to visit Washington
during the first week of May to discuss with it the future 
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of aid to the DRV. In the event the visit was cancelled 
on account of White House displeasure with the Polish team 
of the ICCS who were accused of being biased in favour of 
Hanoi.
On 10 May William Sullivan suggested that although Han­
oi remained suspicious of foreign economic aid and did not 
trust the Soviet Union or China, there might be a 'conscious
parallelism' in aid since its need for assistance might motivate
111
it to comply more fully with the Paris Agreement. Assist­
ance in the region, Deputy Secretary of State, Kenneth Rush 
added on 15 May, was the 'second major task' that confront­
ed the US and that its representatives were 'currently engaged'
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in an assessment of overall needs. As DRV intentions re­
mained 'unclear' a request for assistance would be held in 
abeyance until such time as Hanoi demonstrated its resolve 
to meet its commitments under the Paris Agreement. Restraint 
on Hanoi was also imposed in mid-May by Washington when 
the Indochina reconstruction programme was withheld.
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Washington's restraint appeared to be compensated by 
Tokyo's enthusiasm to shoulder part of the aid commitment 
to Indochina. On 21 May, two days before the end of this 
round of the Paris talks, the Japanese Foreign Ministry dis­
closed that Japan would open talks with Hanoi 'next month'
on the establishment of diplomatic relations and intended to
113
conclude a bilateral aid agreement with it. The outline of 
an Indochina aid agreement was announced, to be the res­
ponsibility of the Foreign and Finance Ministries, so that 
aid could be administered in harmony with the political nor­
malisation talks. Humanitarian emergency aid would be ext­
ended as envisaged under the Paris Agreement, and a disbur­
sement of Yen 1 billion appropriated in the 1973 budget.
Reconstruction aid would be given under the 'multilater­
al formula' to all Indochina without favour to any particul- 
lar country. Tokyo's option was based on its belief in the 
indivisibility of reconstruction and development for the entire 
peninsula. At the same time Hanoi's preferences would be 
taken into account by the 'compromise' solution of extend­
ing bilateral aid until the practical implementation of the mul­
tilateral formula was worked out. A coordination of views 
would be reached between the Foreign and Finance Minist­
ries on the amount of aid to be defrayed from reserve funds 
for the current fiscal year. A concrete plan would then be 
submitted to Hanoi.
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The interval following the end of this round of the Paris
talks (17-23 May) appeared to mark a transition in Japanese
policy on Indochina. On 25 May the Foreign Ministry in
Tokyo announced its decision to transfer Miyake Wasuke
from the Asian Affairs Bureau to the Mission for Intematio-
114
nal Organisations in Geneva as its First Secretary. From
Geneva, Miyake periodically referred from September 1973
to Paris: according to him, a loose aid consortium arrangement
with the World Bank (IBRD) and the ADB was holding deli- 
115 .
berations. We might recall that in April 1973 Nguyen Van 
Thieu requested the World Bank to help form an aid group 
for the RVN (Appendix IE). In this connection Robert Mc­
Namara, President of the World Bank, was later reported to 
have visited Tokyo in April 1973 and a World Bank mission
was sent to South Vietnam in May to review the situation 
116
there. The latter probably explained why in mid-April on 
his return ffom the US, Thieu envisaged the onset of a new 
period of reconstruction with multilateral economic assistance. 
As we shall see later on, Thieu unveiled in the last third of 
May 1973 an eight-year reconstruction plan for South Viet­
nam.
Tokyo was by now moving visibly towards the establish­
ment of diplomatic relations with North Vietnam. Miyake's 
transfer suggested the Japanese Government was ready to ad­
vance ffom the stage of preliminary contacts with Hanoi to
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^fl^g ed  negotiations. Such negotiations were scheduled 
to take place in Paris at the end of June 'at the earliest' but 
the Foreign Ministry revealed that the outcome of the Paris 
talks had been a 'big factor' in the timing.
Hanoi on its part was not unaware of Japan's plans. On 
26 May it postulated three conditions for the establishment 
of relations: 1) Japan must acknowledge the existence of the 
PRG, 2) Hanoi had the right to claim repayment of reparatio­
ns by Japan and a bilateral economic aid plan be launched,
3) The transportation to South Vietnam of US weapons on the
117
basis of the US-Japan Security Treaty be suspended.
Tokyo's response exhibited greater willingness than pre­
viously to give ground on these three issues. It was also pre­
pared the same day to facilitate the entry of PRG officials to 
Japan on condition that they carried North Vietnamese pass­
ports. As for reparations, Tokyo proposed to follow the 
approach adopted under the 'Mongolian formula' under which 
diplomatic relations were established with Mongolia in Febru­
ary 1972, and reparations subsumed in a programme of econo­
mic cooperation. Tokyo was not ready to suspend the transpor­
tation of US forces' weapons to South Vietnam however and
efforts would be made to convince Hanoi of its necessity if and
118
when peace was achieved.
' Tokyo also expressed its desire to appease Hanoi when it
declined on 30 May a request by Saigon for Japan to participa-
119te in thelCCS following Canada's pending withdrawal.
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Canada had alleged in May that the Commission was impotent 
on account of the bias on the part of some 'elements' - an allu­
sion to Hungary and Poland - in favour of Hanoi. A sequence 
of meetings held in Saigon (23-29 May) following the arrival 
of Foreign Minister Mitchell Sharp, failed to resolve the issues. 
Tokyo's refusal to participate in the peacekeeping force was 
based on the excuse that its laws prohibited sending troops 
abroad which made it unable to perform its duties as an ICCS 
member.
This notwithstanding, official attitudes in Hanoi towards
Japan appeared to be in a state of flux at the end of May. A
long article imHoc Tap criticised the 'successes and limita-
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tions’ of the Japanese economic miracle. Thanks to the 
purchase and exploitation of patents elsewhere, Japan man­
aged to restore its economy, especially the industrial sector, 
which enabled it to occupy the third rung of global industrial 
might. Nevertheless, the Japanese model, implemented at 
great cost to a population menaced by growing pollution, 
was seen as a waste of energy reserves and unsuited to the 
Vietnamese expreience.
This criticism apart, Japan was well aware that the situa­
tion in Vietnam might not in fact stabilise. If that was the 
case, the Tokyo-Hanoi negotiations now envisaged for June 
might have to be postponed until after July. The crucial fac­
tor in determining this timing was expected to be the second 
session of the Kissinger-Tho talks (6-9 June). Even before
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the opening of these talks however, Japan was already mak­
ing plain its intention to negotiate with Hanoi and proposed
on 2 June that they might be held 'without attaching any con- 
121
ditions'.
Hanoi's conditions were taken into account but were not
given added emphasis. Japanese-North Vietnamese exchanges
were continuing favourably in the interim. A multiparty Diet
-men's mission to Hanoi (2-10 June) was received by Truong
Chinh, Chairman of the National Asembly, who accepted an
122
invitation from the JCP to visit Japan. Nguyen Van Hieu, 
the PRG's Deputy Representative at the Paris talks was also 
invited. As opposed to the situation at the end of March, To­
kyo now conceded that entry into Japan by these individuals 
would not pose any special problems since the establishment 
of diplomatic relations with Hanoi was on the cards.
The 13 June Joint Communique brought mixed reactions 
in Tokyo. The press believed it only confirmed the provisions 
of the accord, especially the principle for settlement of all pro­
blems by the parties concerned. 'Markedly new elements',
Yomiuri Shimbun said on 15 June, were not to be found in
123
the text of the communique. It was 'dangerous' to spec­
ulate on the profits or losses of the contending parties Asahi
124
Shimbun said, but it was clearly unfavourable to Saigon. 
Ohira however welcomed the communique on the grounds 
that it had contributed to the solution of outstanding politic-
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al issues between the Saigon Government and the PRG and
was, on the whole, 'one advance1. Sufficient conditions,
in the Tokyo Government's view, had been established for
opening diplomatic negotiations between Tokyo and Han-
125
oi, in talks to be held in July 1973.
Tokyo advised Hanoi to reexamine the problems of repa­
rations and of the recognition of the PRG, to 'clarify' its 
views for Tokyo's benefit before the diplomatic talks began. 
Despite these difficulties, the Japanese authorities were opti­
mistic that the talks might be concluded by the autumn. And 
they were ready to give aid. 'Substantial economic coopera­
tion' was promised as Ohira instructed the Foreign Ministry
to formulate a plan for assistance in the reconstruction of
126
Indochina before the opening of these talks.
These positive developments notwithstanding, events 
elsewhere had taken a turn midyear which would have reper­
cussions later on on the overall framework for peace in Indo­
china.
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CHAPTER IV
THE INDIVISIBILITY OF PEACE II 
JULY - AUGUST 15 1973
'...The Soviets, the Chinese and the North Vietnamese had 
all come to the conclusion after July 1 that negotiations were 
dead and the Khmer Rouge were going to win.'
*
Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin to Kissinger 
* HAK II, p.362.
IV : I
THE CAMBODIAN DEBACLE
In Washington Congressional pressure continued through­
out the latter part of June 1973, to mount against funding the 
bombing of Cambodia. On 25 June the House joined the 
Senate in voting to cut off all funds for bombing in Cambo­
dia. The House furthermore rejected, by a tie-vote of 204:
204, a proposed compromise to let the Administration use the 
funds for 60 more days of bombing. It proved impossible to 
keep Kissinger's September 1 deadline secret since it had to 
be named as a cutoff date in a 'public compromise' to impede 
pressure for an immediate halt to the bombing.
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On 26 June the Senate sent the White House a measure to 
cut off all available funds for the bombing. Nixon retained 
the option of rejecting the prohibition of funds and was obli­
ged within two days either to veto the supplemental approp­
riations bill, which embodied the prohibition or bring the 
bombing to a halt.
On 27 June Nixon duly issued his veto. Declaring that 
the bombing ban would ’cripple or destroy' efforts to achieve 
a Cambodian ceasefire, he cautioned that Washington was 
involved in concluding the 'last element' of that settlement.
If this were undone by Congressional action, the full impact 
would include: the removal of the communist incentive to 
negotiate which would undercut ongoing diplomatic efforts 
to achieve a settlement and the reversal of the momentum to­
wards lasting peace in Indochina set in motion in January. 
For Southeast Asia it would gravely jeopardise the ability 
of the Cambodian armed forces to prevent a communist mili­
tary victory which could also threaten the fragile balance of 
negotiated agreements, political alignments and military
1
capabilities upon which the overall peace there depended.
The House however upheld its earlier vote and a new round 
of Congressional efforts to force a bombing halt seemed 
imminent.
To Kissinger these developments jeopardised not only 
Cambodia but the remaining prospects for the Paris Agree-
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[ ment in Vietnam and Indochina as a whole. Melvin Laird
continued to lend his support to Kissinger and urged Cong­
ress that 'very sensitive negotiations' would be in train in 
July which would unravel if the Administration was depriv­
ed of the opportunity to bomb. He also warned that Nixon
would veto every bill that contained a ban on bombing Cam- 
2
bodia.
The result was compromise. On 29 June Congress and Nix­
on agreed on a cut-off date of 15 August 1973. Funds would
L
be witheld on that date on all US military operations through­
out Indochina unless Congress specifically approved an ext­
ension. Nixon still had the right to veto any bill that ordered 
a halt before then. To all intents and purposes however, this 
'compromise' ended the four-year struggle between Congress 
and Nixon over the war: It marked for Kissinger the 'legislative 
end' of all military activity and destroyed what possibility re­
mained of a neutral, free Cambodia. The prospect now was
for a total communist takeover that would render Sihanouk
•->
'nearly as irrelevant as Lon Nol'.
From Bucharest, Sihanouk made a final appeal on 22
June to the US for an honourable end to the war. He also
gave some indication that vengeance would not be exacted
against Lon Nol provided the 'traitor' left the country and
4
that if US intervention ended, the war would stop. A week 
, later on 30 June, the prince castigated the US and the Sovi-
235
et Union aided by France, active in bringing about negotia­
tions, as intent on separating the Khmer Rouge from GRUNK.
These powers were also anxious to enlist the support of China
5
and North Vietnam for a political settlement But Washington
had missed an important opportunity for a negotiated solution
to Cambodia. There were no more proposals from Sihanouk.
A telegramme dated 28 June from Khieu Samphan, operating
in the interior, advised Sihanouk 'not to lower himself any 
6
further.
By now however the prospects for any outside interven­
tion were fading rapidly. The ultimate cause of this was the 
imminent cut-off of US bombing. On 1 July AKI declared that 
the '15 August' compromise demonstrated more than anything
else that the 'superpowers' could no longer collude with one
7
another to 'settle the fate' of other countries.
By early July 1973 the Nixon Administration was giving 
added emphasis to the search for alternatives in Cambodia to 
forestall a military surrender by Phnom Penh to the Khmer 
Rouge. High priority was given to a ceasefire and to start­
ing formal negotiations as soon as possible between the Lon 
Nol and Sihanouk forces, as well as any other 'interested 
parties'. What were described as 'delicate discussions' bet­
ween the US and 'various governments', believed to include 
the Soviet Union, China and North Vietnam, would focus on
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bringing the Lon Nol government and Sihanouk's GRUNK 
8
to the negotiating table. Washington was also requesting 
those governments with contacts in Peking to join in efforts 
to persuade the prince to seek a political settlement guarantee­
ing him some power and not trust a military victory in which 
he might be reduced to a puppet. It was speculated on 6 July 
for instance that the Chinese, the French, the Rumanian and 
Yugoslavian governments had spoken to him, the last two 
while he was on his Eastern European tour.
On his return to Peking on 5 July, Sihanouk said there 
had been 'no secret negotiations'. Through messages relay­
ed to Nixon by Arab and African leaders, the US President
refused to negotiate and had told the prince to talk to Lon 
9
Nol. In an interview with Le Figaro on 5 July 1973, the
prince explained that negotiations with Lon Nol would lead
to a partition of Cambodia since whenever the great powers
10
partition a country, it remains that way. Sihanouk procl­
aimed his readiness to pursue combat with the Americans 
‘till the end and categorically rejected partition of Cambodia 
into 'two parts or two states, two governments or two ad­
ministrations'. He had in fact told the communists in the
maquis that he would 'leave them in power' as he did not
11
want the responsibilities power entailed.
In Washington Kissinger saw Sihanouk's return to Pek-
12
ing as spelling the demise of his Cambodian proposal. He
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put the blame squarely on the conduct of the prince. Sihanouk, 
he insisted, must have been aware that Washington had offer­
ed him a bombing halt, negotiations and a meeting with him­
self in early August. The prince however refused to negotiate 
while simultaneously blaming his own side's intransigent posi­
tion on pressure from the Khmer Rouge. The latter, Kissinger 
judged, were privy to this as the military situation was evolving 
clearly in their favour and with the bombing halt imminent there 
was no longer a need to compromise.
US relations with China towards the latter half of June 1973 
had given the appearance of being encouraging. Kvodo reported 
from Moscow on 25 June that Zhou Enlai would visit the US in 
October 1973 and that Nixon will make his second visit to Pek­
ing in the spring of 1974. We now know that Qiao Guanhua had 
told Manac'h in Peking on 29 June that the possibility of a Zhou
visit to the US should be discounted and that the date of Kissing-
13
er's visit to Peking was not yet fixed.
The Administration continued to work through China in 
the hope of reaching a negotiated peace in Cambodia. Specu­
lation on such an initiative had been fanned by the advance 
publicity on 2 July by the White House that a proposed meet­
ing between Nixon and Huang Zhen would take place on 6 
14
July. Huang moreover was believed to be the first chief of 
mission to be invited there in what was his second meeting 
with Nixon and the first on policy since his arrival in late May.
It was also currently thought that Kissinger might soon make
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another visit to Peking for talks with Zhou Enlai, and possi­
bly the prince, to intensify the Administration's diplomatic 
efforts to achieve a negotiated setdement on Cambodia.
At San Clemente Kissinger made no effort on 6 July to
quell such speculation. No details were divulged although he
said that US policy on Cambodia was devoted to the idea that
all major countries that had an interest in Indochina should
15 •
'use their influence' in the direction of restraint. The pub­
lic expressions of Chinese leaders on this question Kissinger 
revealed, were directed towards the implementation of peace 
'throughout Indochina'. He also confirmed that he would 
travel to Peking later in the summer to confer with Zhou but 
that no date had been set.
The Chinese for their part continued at this stage to serve 
as a channel of communication between the US and the prince. 
We now know that on 6 July Huang Zhen - who conferred at 
much greater length with Kissinger than Nixon - had brought 
a message to San Clemente. It referred to the solution propo­
sed for Cambodia by Kissinger on 27 May and reiterated that 
Peking would, as promised, inform Sihanouk about this 'ten­
tative proposal' now that he had returned from his tour. Kiss­
inger's 6 August visit to Peking was confirmed. Huang Zhen's 
6 July message also cautioned Kissinger against any 'public 
speculation' about the talks between the Lon Nol clique and 
Sihanouk. Such speculation, the message was clear, would 
prove 'extremely disadvantageous' to the search for a Cambo-
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16
dian settlement and 'will even cause trouble'.
Where Cambodia was concerned it is conceivable that the 
Chinese were anxious to see the bombing continue until Zhou 
could persuade the Khmer Rouge that he had been instrument­
al in engineering the decision to end it. In Peking Zhou Enlai 
on 6 July had met Warren Magnusson, the head of a Congress­
ional delegation, who said the Premier was 'visibly angered'
17
when he referred to the turn of events in Cambodia. Magnu­
sson described Zhou's anger as a reaction to the Cambodian 
bombing which would 'soon be over' and quoted Zhou as say­
ing while expressing solid support for the prince, 'How can 
Sihanouk be patient for even ten days when bombs are falling 
on his country?'
China's continued support for the prince appeared calcula­
ted to give him enough autonomy to dissipate the impression 
that he was being used to further the Khmer Rouge's own 
ends. Premier Zhou was however uncharacteristically brief on 
6 July about the 'success' of Sihanouk's tour, at a banquet to 
welcome him. This might be a conspicuous reminder of the 
latter's unsuccessful attempts to reach Nixon in his bid for a 
peace 'without victor or vanquished'. Zhou's homage to the 
prince was followed by a condemnation of US bombing as 
well as a denunciation of the menace of possible South Viet­
namese intervention and the introduction of Thai mercenaries 
18
to Cambodia. The Premier referred to these 'truculent act- 
ions'as 'lifting a rock only to drop it on one's own feet'.
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In Phnom Penh however, the Lon Nol Government offici­
ally proposed negotiations on 6 July with the 'other side' and
19
said that they would accept an immediate ceasefire. The 
move was considered a constraint aimed at some form of 
settlement before the '15 August' deadline. Premier In Tam 
declared on 9 July however that Phnom Penh was not invol­
ved in negotiations with anyone to end the war in Cambodia: 
the'big powers' were instrumental in whatever negotiations
were going on and the Americans had neither consulted nor
20
kept him informed about developments. To Kissinger, int­
ent on thrusting Peking into a mediatory role, the proposal
was 'part of a step planned to provide a diplomatic framework
21
for the Chinese initiative'. In Washington the Nixon Admin 
-istration therefore gave 'strong endorsement' to these propo­
sals and said that Foreign Minister Long Boret’s offer consti­
tuted a 'significant declaration' which set forth a major initia-
22
tive for peace in Cambodia. In Peking however GRUNK 
Premier Penn Nouth condemned the 6 July offer as a 'mano­
euvre', emphatic that any prospect of direct negotiations with
23
the Americans was. up to the resistance to decide.
In the course of the next few weeks China's limited coop­
eration with the US was to cease altogether. There were a 
number of reasons for this. In the first place the Chinese 
had always insisted on strict discretion from the US side 
where the Cambodian negotiations were concerned. China 
insisted officially that the Cambodian people must settle
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their own affairs themselves 'without outside interference'.
Motivated possibly by a sense of disillusionment with the 
US handling of the talks, the Chinese were also beginning 
to explore the possibility of working with a different interme­
diary. On the same day, 6 July 1973, Zhou personally reque­
sted the French Ambassador, Etienne Manac'h, to explain the
Cambodian dilemma to his government and explicitly suggest-
24
ed France's intervention alongside the US. Manac'h passed
on the suggestion in a letter dated 6 July to his Foreign Minis- 
25
ter, Michel Jobert. Jobert endorsed it with some enthusiasm. 
As we have seen, President Pompidou and Jobert himself had 
made an attempt in Reykjavik (31 May-1 June) to engage in dia­
logue with Nixon and Kissinger on the Cambodian problem 
(See p. 202). Manac'h now attempted to convince Jobert that 
support should be given to Sihanouk and GRUNK to enable 
them to gain a foothold in Khmer territory. If this could be 
achieved then sooner or later the Americans would come to 
their senses and see the folly of bombing. And France's 
intervention might be expected to yield worthwhile benefits 
in the future. Sihanouk, Manac'h added in a telegramme to 
Jobert on 7 July, had actually expressed a preference in May
for France's intervention alongside that of the US where his
26
country was concerned. One difficulty was that Sihanouk
had since been smarting from Jobert's remarks of 20 June
which had belittled him at a time when his stature was rising
27
in Phnom Penh, Moscow and Washington.
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Responding to Manac’h on 10 July, Jobert fully concurr-
28
ed that contact be maintained with Sihanouk. The latter 
should be made to understand that France had no intention of 
engineering any solution other than his unconditional return 
to Cambodia. Any attempt to use him as a transitory figure 
in resolving the Cambodian dilemma was unrealistic. Jobert 
had personally made this plain to both Gromyko at Ramboui- 
llet during Brezhnev's visit and to Kissinger while in Reykja­
vik for the summit between Nixon and Pompidou. By mid- 
July therefore a convergence of the Chinese and French posi­
tion emerged on the one hand while the respective stances of 
the US and the USSR, according to France, were being brou­
ght closer.
France was arriving at a view of the Cambodian issue and
in particular of the centrality of Sihanouk, which accorded
satisfactorily with China’s own. On the initiative of Chinese
Foreign Minister, Ji Pengfei, Manac'h made contact on 10 Ju-
29 -
ly with Wang Dong, the Foreign Ministry's Political Director. 
Manac'h emerged with the conclusion that 'other interested 
countries' including the Soviet Union, were manoeuvring 
rapidly and that France should take decisive action now. In 
this connection Manac'h noticed on Sihanouk's arrival in 
Peking on 6 July, that the heads of mission of the socialist 
bloc had been present for the first time to pay their respects 
to the prince. Moscow was represented by its Charge d'Aff­
aires in place of Ambassador Vassili Tolstikov who had dep-
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arted on 30 June for Moscow to attend a session of the Sup-
30
reme Soviet scheduled for 17 July.
Kissinger had noticed 'signs of hesitation' emanating
31from Peking vis-a-vis the US role. In an assessment of 
Cambodian diplomacy David Bruce, Head of the Liaison 
Office in Peking informed Kissinger on 11 July that the Ch­
inese 'seemed to be backing away' from involvement in a 
Cambodian negotiation. Bruce believed the Chinese leaders 
might have 'private doubts' about the ability of Sihanouk to 
control the Khmer Rouge. On the same day Peking suddenly 
recalled Huang Zhen who travelled home by way of Paris,
indicative perhaps of the furtherance of the Sino-French initia- 
32
tive. In a parallel but unexpected development, Kissinger
was informed on the same day that his China visit scheduled
for 6 August would now have to await Huang Zhen's consul- 
33
tations in Peking.
At this stage rival claims to supremacy within GRUNK 
appeared to be taking place between the factions in Peking 
and those in the interior. In Peking GRUNK declared on 12 
July that it was a government of national union 'par excellen­
ce'; Penn Nouth would return to Phnom Penh once the capi­
tal was 'liberated' where he would continue to lead the coun-
34
try as head of an actual cabinet. From the interior a state­
ment by Khieu Samphan, Hou Youn and Hu Nim on 13 July
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pronounced the CPNLAF ready to fight to the finish, asking
'puppet officers' to launch uprisings and unite with the
35
CPNLAF in the 'liberated zone' with or without arms.
In a move that seemed to close any possibility for direct
contact with Kissinger, Sihanouk announced on 13 July that
he would go to North Korea the moment Kissinger arrived 
36
in Peking. It was highly probable that the resistance in the 
interior had pressurised him to refuse any form of negotiat­
ion with the US. The prince said that any meeting with Ki­
ssinger would offer Nixon an excuse to tell Congress and 
the American people that negotiations were going on which 
would give Nixon leverage with Congress to continue the 
bombing after the 15 August deadline. On 16 July Sihanouk 
assailed those foreign powers which were still bent on resol­
ving the problem of Cambodia ’in conformity with their own
interests', interests evidently contrary to those of the Khmer 
37
people. FUNK and GRUNK, he continued, invited the’ 
powers concerned to renounce totally and forever, any invol­
vement in Cambodian affairs. On 17 July he repeated that he
was 'washing his hands of state affairs,' once Phnom Penh 
38
was 'liberated'.
Reflecting the reality of Khmer Rouge power, Sihanouk's 
pronouncements began to take an increasingly intransigent 
tone. These have added significance when seen against what 
the Hungarian news agency, Nepszabadsag. described on 15
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July as a 'rehabilitation campaign’ taking place in Peking. 
This was probably also a factor in the growing Chinese reluc­
tance to work with Washington. The 10th CCP Congress 
was about to be held and many foreign observers, notably 
those in the Soviet camp, were detecting signs of a funda­
mental struggle over both foreign and domestic policies in 
the Chinese leadership. Moscow on 15 July spoke of the
'internal strife' at every level and the 'continuing instability'
40
of the Chinese leadership. Despite speculation surround­
ing the congress and the National People's Congress, the 
appointments of the PRC Chairman, Defence Minister and
many important posts had remained unfilled, Moscow add- 
41
ed on 19 July. Peking's leaders were really attempting to 
conceal the intrigues of Zhongnanhai but the 'covert struggle' 
between hostile factions within the leadership's 'inner circle' 
were showing signs of emptying into an 'open struggle', it 
continued. One of the major victims of the Cultural Revolu­
tion, Vice-Premier Deng Xiaoping was moreover returning to
public life although he was at one time branded the 'Number 
42
One Capitalist1.
These developments exercised a profound impact on Kiss­
inger’s proposed visit to Peking. The date originally set for 
an official announcement of that visit had been 16 July. After 
Huang Zhen's recall on 11 July, Kissinger proposed to Han 
Xu, Deputy Chief of the Chinese Liaison Office, that an ann-
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43ouncement be made for 19 or 23 July. The question remain 
-ed in an impasse. In the context of the prevailing state of aff­
airs, this was perhaps understandable. On 18 July Kissinger 
interpreted the Chinese silence as their having abandoned the 
Cambodian initiative altogether. Han Xu on that day delivered 
a message to Kissinger which said in effect that Peking was
'no longer willing even to communicate the American nego-
44
tiating proposal to Sihanouk’. In what was construed as a 
volte-face Han Xu repeated the ’most extreme demands' of 
the Khmer Rouge, insisting that Washington accept them:
'The origin of the Cambodian question is clear to the 
US side. It is up to the doer to undo the knot. The key to 
the settlement of the question is held by the US, not by the 
others. If the US truly desires to settle the Cambodian ques­
tion. those above reasonable demands raised by the Cambo­
dian side should be acceptable to it. It is hoped that the US
side will give serious consideration to this and translate it 
45
into action.’
On 19 July 1973 the date on which Kissinger had suggest­
ed that his China visit be announced, the Chinese pointedly 
informed him that his 6 August visit was 'no longer conven­
ient'. The date suggested was '16 August', the day after the 
bombing halt Kissinger made Peking wait almost a week be­
fore sending his reply to Han Xu's note of 18 July. On 27
46
July Kissinger proposed a visit for 13-16 September. The 
visit only took place in November 1973.
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In a message to the Khmer nation dated 19 July Sihanouk 
47
renewed his attack. The US, he believed, was still seeking to 
pressurise GRUNK into a compromise with Phnom Penh thro­
ugh the agency of China, the Soviet Union and North Vietnam. 
Sihanouk was confident however of the solidarity of his Viet­
namese and Chinese allies. As for the Soviet Union, whatever 
the degree of its friendship with the US, it would never force 
patriotic Khmers to abandon their objective of expelling US 
’neo-colonialism’ completely from Khmer soil.
In the interim the growing confidence of the Khmer Rouge
was signalled on the occasion of a National Congress (19-21
July) in the interior under the chairmanship of Khieu Samph-
an, Vice-Premier, Minister of National Defence and Comman-
48
der-in-Chief of the CPNLAF. A statement released after 
the Congress emphasised that the Cambodian people 'could 
not remain inactive' in the face of repeated subversion and 
aggression by the US. The Khmer Rouge leadership made 
three demands: First, the US should cease its bombing and 
withdraw its troops and military personnel from Cambodia; 
Second, the fate of the Phnom Penh regime should be deci­
ded by the Cambodian people on their own; Third, FUNK 
and GRUNK should take control of Phnom Penh and of the 
leadership of the Khmer nation and that the nation would 
continue to intensify their struggle in all forms to bring about 
the end of US bombing and permit the people to settle their 
own problems 'without foreign interference'.
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A struggle of national liberation would be waged domes­
tically, the statement continued, while a policy of ’true peace 
and neutrality’ was aimed abroad at non-alignment. No for­
eign bases would be tolerated on Khmer soil. Relations with 
other countries would be conducted on the basis of 'non­
interference' in Cambodian internal affairs.'Unconditionar 
economic assistance firom all nations desiring to aid it would 
be accepted. Certain of ultimate victory, the Khmer Rouge 
were now in a position to dispense with the legitimacy 
Sihanouk gave them and indeed with the prince himself.
In a related development, nine days afterwards Premier
Zhou Enlai personally put the final touch into the scenario
in a speech on 28 July referring to the Cambodian National 
49
Congress. He extended China's firm support to the Cam­
bodian people's struggle. The US, he declared, 'must stop' 
its bombing and all other acts of military intervention, so 
that the Cambodian people could settle their own problems 
'free from foreign interference'. By the same token Zhou 
also underlined support for the Five-Point Declaration of 
Sihanouk of 23 March 1970 which remained a consistent 
principle of Chinese policy. By 28 July however the Prem­
ier's remarks suggested that the left had prevailed in the in­
terior since the eclipse of Sihanouk and the ascendancy of 
the radicals were taking their toll.
With the desertion of his putative Chinese partners, Kiss­
inger finally abandoned all hope. There was no point, in his
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view, negotiating on an issue when the other side 'clearly 
and from the outset leaves no room for negotiations'. By 
the end of July Kissinger too had come to the reluctant con­
clusion that the talks would have to be left to the Cambodi- 
50
an parties themselves.
These developments apart, Kissinger also observed that
it was after Congressional action that Sihanouk 'reversed 
51
himself. The spectacle of the US 'voluntarily abandoning' 
all commitments had changed the Cambodian perception of 
whichever complexion of events. Congress, he contends, was 
also culpable. In a letter to the Speaker of the House of Repre­
sentatives, Nixon on 3 August 1973 indicated his decision to 
conform to the views of the legislature and accept the 15 Aug­
ust bombing halt. But the President did not fail to draw to the 
Congress' attention the dangerous consequences of a vote
which in effect 'sapped the motivations which could have pro- 
52
mpted negotiations'. The passage of the Congressional act 
Nixon warned, would undermine the incentive to negotiate a 
settlement in Cambodia and 15 August risked marking the 
acceleration of what could be a 'regrettable development'.
Nixon's letter was followed by an affidavit on Cambodia 
by Secretary Rogers to the Supreme Court on 4 August. The 
cessation of all combat activities in Cambodia by US armed 
forces on and after 15 August 1973, had led to intensive plan­
ning being undertaken between representatives of the US and
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Cambodian Governments for the puipose of improving the
latter's self-defence capability through assistance programmes
53
approved by the Congress and the President.
Nixon’s letter and Roger's affidavit, released after a warn­
ing to Hanoi was said to have left a feeling of guardedness on 
the part of the legislature. In the last resort it urged them to 
support the responsibility, in the event of a probable collapse 
of the Phnom Penh regime and the deteriorating situation in 
Southeast Asia.
One last US initiative was nonetheless set in motion. It 
was launched not by Kissinger but by Senator Mike Mans­
field, Leader of the Democratic majority in the US Congress 
who had been scheduled to visit China in late July. In an in­
terview with the Baltimore Sun on 23 July 1973, Mansfield 
made clear that he was prepared to use the personal relation­
ship he had cultivated with Sihanouk to facilitate a meeting
54
between the prince and the National Security Adviser.
The Senator perceived, correctly it later proved, that Sihan­
ouk would probably refuse to see Kissinger before 15 Aug­
ust. This notwithstanding, he believed that Sihanouk was 
still trying to take advantage of the deadline. Only the appro­
bation of Congress could provide any change of attitude on 
the part of the US administration. Mansfield was willing to 
defer his China visit in an effort to maximise the prospects 
of this personal overture.
The Senator was aware that there had been a change in
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the Cambodian situation. If the prince had realistically pro­
posed to meet Nixon, it was aimed at an end to the conflict 
and at possible rapprochement with the US. Mansfield felt 
that the US Administration had begun - in the last six weeks 
- to understand that Sihanouk constituted the key to Ameri­
can retreat from Cambodia and the restoration of peace in 
his country. Nixon, Mansfield believed, could not have 
missed the opportunity to make clear to Huang Zhen in San 
Clemente on 6 July. Mansfield wondered in this 23 July 
interview, whether the President could have suggested an 
initiative then by Zhou Enlai on behalf of Sihanouk? After 
all Zhou alone had been undeniably predisposed to Sihan­
ouk and alone had the power to influence him, albeit within 
limits.
Simultaneously hopes for France's intervention in the Cam­
bodian dilemma were still being expressed to Ambassador 
Manac'h in Peking. On 23 July Jobert suggested in a message
that France should complete instead the reversal of the quest- 
55
ion by intervention. The issue could be solved through the 
'prudent' convergence of Paris and Peking and the dialogue 
should be placed on a more satisfactory level. Four days
56
later, on 27 July 1973 Jobert met Brezhnev in the Crimea.
The content of these talks is not known, but it is likely that 
Jobert was hoping to induce the Soviet leader to exert some 
influence on the North Vietnamese and probably also on the 
Americans, in settling the Cambodian war. By then it was
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too late. As we have seen, Kissinger made public on 27 July 
his announcement postponing his visit to China.
A few days before the bombing halt a last initiative eman­
ated from Sihanouk. In a telegramme dated 4 August from
Pyongyang, he said GRUNK would never tolerate 'any medd-
57
ling' in Cambodian affairs. In a marked change from this
position, the prince sent a message on 10 August to Senator
MiktMansfield offering Congress 'Peace with Honour' with
only two conditions: the complete and definitive halt to aerial
bombing and all direct and indirect US intervention in Cambo
58
-dia; and the end to all military aid to the Khmer Republic.
This was accompanied by a public telegramme addressed to 
all countries maintaining relations with the Lon Nol regime, 
urging them to close down their embassies, since his own 
government would ’unfailingly' be established in Phnom Pe­
nh in the 'not too distant future'. The Khmer people's forces, 
he warned, were already in Phnom Penh in accordance with 
the political programme issued by Khieu Samphan, Hou Youn 
and Hu Nim. On 12 August Sihanouk revealed that 'victory' 
was practically achieved since the Khmer Rouge remained in­
flexible in the position they had fixed 'once and for all' and
armed resistance would continue until the Lon Nol regime
59
was 'radically and irreversibly eradicated'. There was ab­
solutely no possibility for negotiations.
The limits imposed by '15 August 1973' were clear to 
Sihanouk. He pointed to two measures the US could take
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against the Khmer people: First, the introduction of mercen­
aries from Thailand and ’even army units from Saigon' start­
ing 16 August, and second, the Saigon air force might be on 
the alert to relieve the US air force with ’raids of genocide' in 
Cambodia starting from 15 August. The 'only' solution was 
first, the complete and final cessation of all military interven­
tion by the USA and its ’satellites'; second, complete elimin­
ation of the Khmer ’republic' and third, total, unconditional
and irreversible withdrawal of all US military personnel ser-
60
ving US 'imperialism' on Khmer territory.
And without Sihanouk, the US and the Chinese had no 
leverage either on the Khmer Rouge or even the Lon Nol 
forces. In an assessment on 4 August 1973 Kissinger sum­
med it all up accordingly:
'We have suffered a tragedy because of Watergate ...(in 
early April) we were going to bomb North Vietnam for a 
week, then go to Russia, then meet with Le Due Tho. The 
Congress has made it impossible ... the Chinese offered to 
act as intermediary. Now' the Chinese lose if the Khmer Rou­
ge win because Sihanouk loses ... The ideal situation for the 
Chinese is if the Khmer Rouge need Sihanouk and they can
61
manoeuvre between. But if the Khmer Rouge win anyway ...’ 
This was perhaps Kissinger's basic miscalculation. There 
was no room left for diplomacy.
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IV : II
HANOI & ITS ALLIES
Hanoi was watching all developments closely. The increase
in US military pressure, it pronounced on 4 July, was obvious
62
-ly closely related to 'recent domestic developments'. It was 
generally known, Hanoi continued, that the day Washington 
intensified its bombing in Cambodia was also the day Preside­
nt Nixon, in defiance of the US people's aspirations used his 
right of veto to reject the US Congressional bill barring all 
spending for US military activities in Indochina. Even if a po­
litical solution was not reached in Qjmbodia after 15 August, 
Hanoi warned that Nixon could still request Congressional 
assistance should further military action be required for a 
political solution to the Cambodian problem.
But there were other events in North Vietnam. According 
to a report dated 6 July 1973 party commissars and local
military commanders had 'recently met' to review achieve-
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ments and to discuss new tasks for the 'new situation'.
Also significant was Hanoi's indication to Le Monde on 7
July 1973 that the 4th Congress of the VWP might be con-
64
vened after an 'initial delay' of 5-12 months. (The 4th Con­
gress did not take place in the event until December 1976.)
As the first congress to be convened after the death of Ho Chi 
Minh in September 1969, it would be an 'historical event': to 
concern itself with redressing economic developments with a
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Three-Year Plan, reinforcement of national defence and the
formation of a 'New Socialist Man'. No change in the core
of the Hanoi leadership was envisaged however.
Most important of all was the official announcement made
on 2 July that Le Duan and Pham Van Dong were scheduled to
65
visit Moscow in the 'middle of July'. Following Brezhnev's 
visit to Washington (18-25 June) the Soviet leadership began 
to place more stress on detente and the DRV Party arajGovem- 
ment's visit (9-16 July) to the Soviet Union was seen by Mos­
cow in the context of the 'improvement of Soviet-US relations'. 
Both the US and the USSR, Moscow said, shared a 'special 
responsibility' for preventing another war since their relations
had become 'immeasurably more important than ever in the 
66
past'.
At the banquet for the North Vietnamese, Brezhnev pursued
this theme in his first public address delivered after his return
from Washington. His meeting on 10 July with Le Duan and
67
Pham Van Dong was characterised as a 'special one'. It occ­
urred at a time when the war was over and a 'new climate’ was 
being established worldwide with the trend toward peace and de­
tente 'increasingly gaining ground'. The war in Vietnam was not 
however a mere regional matter. Brezhnev saw it as profoundly 
affecting the interests of many states worldwide. Practical steps, 
he declared, should be taken not only towards political but also 
military detente as part of the construction of the 'edifice of
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peace' in Southeast Asia and on the Asian continent as a whole.
Although the 'victory' of the Vietnamese comrades had 
been consolidated in the 'important document' of the Paris 
Agreement, Brezhnev renewed his call for the 'advance' to 
'peaceful reunification'. The desire to impose one's rules 
on others, he stressed, was alien to socialist countries.Revo- 
lutions were not for export. Cooperation between the Soviet 
Union and North Vietnam was to be extended, but in the 
context of the new era of peace. The Soviet leader expressed 
solidarity with the PRG but observed that the close of the 
war gave further impetus for the establishment of coopera­
tion among all Asian states 'without exception'.
In the wider context Brezhnev described his meeting with 
the Hanoi leaders as being held at a 'turning point' both as 
regards the development of the situation in Southeast Asia 
and the international situation as a whole. He expressed int­
erest in the DRV and the USSR's 'joint work' which might 
raise Soviet-Vietnamese friendship to a 'new level' and ext­
end the scope of cooperation in all major fields. It could make 
an effective contribution to the strengthening of their 'comm­
on great revolutionary achievement', the world socialist sys­
tem. Future Soviet aid to Hanoi would therefore be directed 
towards 'fullscale' economic cooperation and the rehabilita­
tion of the war-devastated economy. Moscow would hence­
forth regard all economic and military aid given during the
68
war as 'assistance given free'.
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Hanoi had not however lost sight of its ultimate objective.
Le Duan on the same occasion insisted that the Vietnamese
people were fully resolved to continue the just struggle at the
69
'new stage' until its 'last brilliant victory'. Invoking a 
Vietnamese proverb, 'When you drink water, think of its 
source', Le Duan attributed the 'glorious victories' of the 
Vietnamese revolution to the CPSU, the Soviet Govern­
ment and people acting in the 'spirit of noble international­
ism'. There was no reference to the Chinese. While Brezh­
nev dwelt on the gains of peaceful coexistence, the North 
Vietnamese leader condemned the US by name for infring­
ing the Paris Agreement
The talks ended, none the less, on the lines envisaged by 
Brezhnev. The Joint Communique issued on 17 July 1973
granted new Soviet economic aid for North Vietnam's post- 
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war reconstruction. Hanoi for its part, pledged 'full resp­
ect and undeviating fulfilment' of the Paris ceasefire accords 
and both sides endorsed strict fulfilment of the Agreement 
on Laos. Soviet endorsement of Vietnamese views on Cam­
bodia was also evident in the Communique: a declaration of 
'solidarity' with the anti-government 'patriotic forces' but no 
public mention was made of the desirability of a ceasefire there.
Although high defence officials took part in the talks on 
both sides, including A.A.Grechko, USSR Minister of DefenL 
ce and Tran Sam, DRV Deputy Minister of National Defence, ,
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no new Soviet military aid to Hanoi was mentioned in the Com­
munique.
Between the lines, the declaration hinted at policy differen­
ces. The North Vietnamese gave no more than lukewarm endor­
sement for the Soviet policy of detente, and Moscow, on its 
part, gave modest support to Hanoi's goal of reunifying North 
and South Vietnam. While each lavished praise on the other for 
political and military achievements, the joint communique made 
clear that the main purpose of Le Duan and Pham Van Dong's 
visit was to arrange for postwar economic aid. Moscow would 
supply Hanoi with an assortment of industrial, agricultural and 
transportation equipment, consumer goods and foodstuffs need­
ed for reconstruction in 1974. At the same time Moscow expre­
ssed its readiness to restore facilities built with Soviet help rav­
aged by war and to assisjln building new industrial enterprises 
including hydroelectric power plants.
All this must be seen in the context of Sino-Soviet relations
and of a Kremlin report dated 13 July 1973 by leading Soviet
ideologue Mikhail Suslov made while Le Duan was still in 
71
Moscow. Suslov said the CPSU saw its 'internationalist 
duty' in the defence, development and affirmation of the 
Leninist doctrine of the Party. The CPSU, he declared had 
consistently fought for the 'political and ideological cohesion' 
of the international communist movement. Suslov's report 
was particularly sharp in its criticism of the Chinese, who 
were 'embarking on a course hostile to the CPSU, the soc­
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ialist community and the world communist movement', 
and were supporting 'all kinds of reactionary regimes and 
forces' with the aim of weakening the international positio­
ns of socialism. To counter this, Suslov pointedly remark­
ed, the twin policy of the CPSU and the Soviet state was to 
wage a 'determined ideological and political struggle' again­
st Mao and at the same time call for normal interstate relatio­
ns with the PRC.
At the conclusion of the North Vietnamese delegation's 
visit on 19 July, Moscow issued a scathing critique of Pek­
ing's 'negative attitude' towards peaceful settlement of the 
72
war. As we have seen earlier, 19 July was the date of the 
collapse of Kissinger's plan to visit Peking in August and 
also marked the opening of the national congress of the Kh­
mer Rouge in the interior (See p.248). 'Objective facts', Mos 
-cow said, had demonstrated that Peking had by no means 
given up its 'provocative activities' which were 'contrary' 
to the interests of the Indochinese people. The proof was 
that the Chinese leaders had stubbornly favoured the US 
military presence in Southeast Asia to keep up tension and 
conflict there.
It is conceivable that the Soviet objective at this stage was 
already to welcome the DRV as a member of COMECON 
(the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance or CMEA). 
Suslov on 13 July described the 'fraternal alliance of the 
socialist community' as the greatest achievement of the post
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-war period. It was in fact 'multiplying its efforts' to 
advance the 'economic integration' of the countries of the 
socialist camp. No effort was spared to strengthen further 
their equally fraternal political alliance. With reference to 
COMECON. Suslov said enormous longterm sources of 
the 'growth of socialist production' were to be found in the 
'international division of labour' and in the economic inte­
gration of the socialist countries.
With more direct relevance to Vietnam, Suslov added 
that the CPSU consistently pursued a policy of assistance 
to those fighting their national wars of liberation. At the 
present time however the 'resistance to international deten­
te' had still not been completely overcome. 'Hotbeds of 
tension’ still existed. In contrast to Brezhnev, Suslov said 
that the 'ideological struggle' between socialism and capital­
ism was 'particularly acute' and that there could be no peace­
ful coexistence.
Hanoi appeared at this stage to be taking Suslov's advice 
and was strengthening its ties with some members of the War­
saw Pact and COMECON. At the end of the Moscow talks 
Pham Van Dong visited Hungary, Poland and Rumania while 
Le Duan remained in the Soviet Union. Meanwhile Moscow 
was preparing for an eight-nation summit of Eastern European 
party leaders scheduled for 30-31 July in the Crimea. The Orea- 
nda Estate of Brezhnev was to be the seat of a 'friendly meeting/
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to discuss questions of ’further development and cooperation'
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among the countries and international problems. The meet­
ing called for 'vigilance' against the forces using relaxation of 
international tension to undermine the position of socialism.
The emphasis of the 31 July 1973 communique was to endorse 
Brezhnev's policy of accomodation with the West As far as 
Vietnam was concerned, the statement called for the adherence
'by all sides’ to the Vietnam ceasefire agreement and an indirect
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call for setdement in Cambodia as well. It was an endorse­
ment of Brezhnev's speech of 10 July welcoming the North 
Vietnamese.
In separate talks between Le Duan and Brezhnev in the Crim­
ea on 4 August, the 'further development' of relations between
the CPSU and the VWP and between the two governments was 
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discussed. Brezhnev also informed Le Duan about the results 
of the Warsaw Pact meeting of 30-31 July, whose communique, 
it was later revealed, had contained a passage expressing 'invar­
iable support' for the stand of the DRV and the PRG demanding
77
'strict observance' of the Paris Agreement by all parties.
While the North Vietnamese leaders were travelling in the
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, Deputy Minister of Foreign
Trade Ivan Grishin signed a separate agreement on 1 August
1973 in Moscow with Dang Quang Minh, the Ambassador of 
78
the PRG. The Soviet Union promised, according to this 
agreement, to provide the new Saigon with machinery and
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equipment, foodstuffs, medicines and consumer goods after 
the war had been ended and peace had been restored in Viet­
nam. The agreement was a manifestation of Soviet intent and 
preparedness to secure its influence in the South before other 
interested powers.
By the same token, Moscow's drive to expand its economic 
partnership with Hanoi was accelerated on 14 August at a meet­
ing between Pham Van Dong and Soviet Premier Alexei Kosy- 
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gin. Following this meeting fresh agreements were signed 
on postwar Soviet reconstruction aid for 1974-75. Moscow 
was to help in the development of coal and electric power indus­
tries, in road building and geological prospecting.
In Hanoi however the prominence given immediately after 
Le Duan's Moscow visit, to a resolution attributed to him, 
signified the ascendancy of his line. The Central Military 
Party Committee revealed on 17 July 1973 that a conferen­
ce had been held to discuss the implementation of the Polit-
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buro's resolution in the 'new phase'. The situation in the 
armed forces had in fact been assessed and a conference of 
commanders of various military regions affiliated with the 
General Staff, convened under the chairmanship of Vo Ngu­
yen Giap, Defence Minister to discuss the Politburo's reso­
lution and the 'talks of Comrade Le Duan'. The participants 
had 'unanimously expressed' absolute confidence in the Par­
ty’s line concerning the cadres' task to cooperate with the arm­
263
ed forces to implement the resolution. This is corroborated by 
a later military publication, The Anti-US Resistance War for 
National Salvation according to which the Standing Committ­
ee of the Interzone Party Committee and the Military Region
5 Party Committee met in July and August 1973 to 'prompt-
81
ly bring about a strong transformation’ in the situation.
While indications in Hanoi pointed to a possible renewal 
of conflict, the initiatives pursued in July and August 1973 
by Japan towards both North and South Vietnam suggested 
a desire for a stabilisation of the peace there.
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IV : III
JAPAN'S 'BLUEPRINT'
'In regard to reconstruction aid for Indochina, the US 
side has been informally requesting, from before, Japan's 
fulfilling a big role. It is said that the US side once again 
made a similar request at the US-Japan Economic Confer­
ence this time too. In the Joint Communique and in other 
documents, the expression used is 'Indochina aid'. How­
ever, the US side is especially strongly demanding the Jap­
anese side's aid for the reconstruction of South Vietnam, 
and the situation today is that Prime Minister Tanaka will 
be forced to present the Japanese side's basic plan for aid 
to South Vietnam to President Nixon.’
Nihon Keizai Shimbun.
22 July 1973*
* in DSJP. 24 July 1973, p.23.
The emergence of closer USSR-DRV relations and the break­
down of the US-China dialogue concerning Cambodia appeared 
to have no immediate impact on Japan's policy of restoring 
diplomatic relations with Hanoi. Early normalisation of such 
relations was deemed essential since the 'stabilisation' of the 
peace in Indochina was one dimension of Japan’s Southeast 
Asian diplomacy.
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Preliminary negotiations with North Vietnam had in fact
been proposed on 4 July 1973 for the second half of July when
the Tokyo Government made representations to Hanoi through 
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its Paris Embassy. 'Objective conditions' such as the signa­
ture of the 13 June communique, the reconvening of the US- 
DRV Joint Economic Commission and the Cambodian bomb­
ing halt scheduled for 15 August suggested to Tokyo that the 
prevailing situation in Indochina had stabilised to a certain 
degree. The time had come for establishing diplomatic rela­
tions with Hanoi.
Two outstanding problems remained. One was the recog­
nition of the PRG. Tokyo's continued reluctance to recognise 
it was construed by Hanoi as an obstacle to improved relat­
ions. Nguyen Van Hieii, the PRG's representative at the La 
Celle-St Cloud political talks condemned Japan's refusal to 
recognise his government on the grounds that it had 'no cap­
ital city' as a blatant excuse. However the entry into Japan 
of four key PRG officials for three weeks from 8 July was
taken as an expression of goodwill on the pan of the Tokyo 
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government.
The other problem was Hanoi's insistence on reparations 
and its continued refusal to accept Tokyo's position that pay­
ment of this nature had already been made to South Vietnam. 
The Japanese Foreign Ministry remained adamant that repa­
rations had been settled through the conclusion of the 1959 
agreement which bestowed US$39 million in Saigon. This
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question ultimately involved the settlement with the DRV of 
non-reimbursable economic cooperation. Where the transpor­
tation of US weapons to South Vietnam was concerned, no 
big problems would remain if the US strictly maintained the 
Paris Agreement's protocols and limited its transportation 
to the 'substitutes' permitted.
Despite these problems the Foreign Ministry had begun
by 9 July a fullscale inquiry into a plan for the extension of
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aid for the reconstruction of Indochina as a whole. It foc­
used on the form of aid to be extended, with the Ministry ex­
pressing preference for the 'bilateral formula' also favoured 
by Hanoi. The framework of such aid would include a con­
siderable amount of non-reimbursable funds deliberately 
formulated as a direct response to Hanoi's requests. The 
question of the separation of reparations from aid continued 
to plague Ohira’s ministry. The political aspects of this ques­
tion, it was hoped might be resolved by the extension of 
non-reimbursable funds which might be an adequate subs­
titute for reparations.
Japan in the meantime did not neglect its relations with 
South Vietnam. The Foreign Ministry announced on 13 July 
that a nine-member government mission headed by Motono 
Moriyuki would make a two-week tour of South Vietnam
(19-28 July) and Laos (29 July-3 August) to study Japan's 
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rehabilitation aid. The survey mission was to be conducted 
in parallel with the commencement of the Paris negotiations
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for the early settlement of diplomatic relations with North 
Vietnam. Consultations with the various agencies concerned - 
the Foreign and Finance ministries, MITI and the Economic 
Planning Agency (EPA) - would entail a study of South Viet­
nam's own reconstruction plans.
The formulation of Japan's policies however continued 
to rest on periodic consultations with Washington. Tanaka 
stressed on 12 July that he would take the opportunity of 
personally informing Nixon that Japan would contribute US 
$50 million through the UN in longterm aid to rehabilitate 
Vietnam in addition to bilateral assistance to the countries of 
Indochina, when the two leaders met in Washington at the 
end of July. At the 9th meeting of the Japan-US Joint Com­
mittee on Trade and Economic Affairs held in Tokyo on 
16-17 July, US Secretary of State William Rogers referred 
in his opening speech to the US-Japan alliance as having 
been a 'critical element' in the evolution of a more peaceful 
and cooperative Asia in which both nations had a vital inter­
est. He noted with enthusiasm Tanaka's call for a conferen­
ce of the Asia-Pacific nations adding that there was room
for Japan to assume a 'greater sense of responsibility' for
86
the promotion of peace and stability in Asia.
Rogers emphasised in particular the 'special significance' 
of the mutual commitments undertaken by China with Japan 
and the US, to renounce ambitions of hegemony in Asia
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and to 'resist attempts by others' to impose such hegemony. 
Peace in Indochina remained a great concern for the US and 
the reduced hostilities in the area, Rogers said, made it poss­
ible for Washington to turn its attention to the essential tasks 
of reconstruction and development Japan's continued close 
cooperation was much valued. Japanese economic assistance 
would be an essential ingredient in achieving 'peace and sta­
bility’ in the four Indochinese countries in the postwar era. 
Japan would be an 'essential participant' in the postwar re­
habilitation and development of Indochina through the form­
ation of an international aid donor's group advocated by the
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World Bank and the Asian Development Bank (ADB).
In this respect Rogers commended Japan for its 'leadership 
role' in building the ADB into a distinguished regional ins­
titution and said the US remained committed to multilateral 
economic assistance through international financial institu­
tions. World Bank President Robert McNamara, Rogers 
disclosed, had in fact responded to a request from Nguyen 
Van Thieu to investigate the possibility of establishing an 
aid consultative group for South Vietnam. We now know 
that after McNamara visited Japan in April, World Bank 
missions went to Vietnam in May and June (see p. 220). 
ADB President Inoue Shiro moreover was eager to let the 
ADB play a major role in postwar Indochina. The US there­
fore proposed to Congress a supplemental US$630.9 mill­
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ion programme for fiscal 73 for Indochina postwar recons­
truction, about half of which would be for commodity import 
programmes in South Vietnam and Cambodia. The balance 
would be for humanitarian assistance, reconstruction and
development and in the case of Cambodia and Laos, econo- 
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mic stabilisation.
At the Tokyo meeting opinions were exchanged on US- 
Japan relations with the aim of laying the groundwork for the 
impending summit talks between Tanaka and Nixon in Wash­
ington. The Joint Communique of 17 July 1973 reaffirmed 
that it was an important task for developed countries to assist 
in the economic and social development of developing count­
ries 'bilaterally and through multilateral financial organisa- 
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tions’. Japan urged the US to 'expand its aid particularly 
in the Asian area' and noted especially the importance of the 
proposed US contribution to the special funds as well as 
the proposed increase in the capital subscription of the ADB. 
It expressed its own intention to continue to expand both the 
'geographic and functional scope' of the Japanese aid prog­
ramme and to endeavour to improve the quality and amount
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of Japan's official development assistance. The commu­
nique also emphasised the 'recent developments' designed 
to bring peace throughout Indochina, hoping that an 'en­
during solution1 might 'soon be achieved there'.
As a result of the conference, economic relations betw­
een Japan and the US, Ohira said on 17 July, had entered a
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'new phase' in the global context. The question now was 
how to share the responsibility for the reconstruction of In­
dochina within the framework of the new pattern of inter­
national relations. During the talks with Ohira, Rogers re­
vealed that the amount of US aid to developing countries 
totalled US$7,400 million including US$3,300 million ear­
marked for government development aid for 1972. At the 
New International Round scheduled for the autumn, devel­
oping countries' benefits would be taken into consideration. 
The aim was to reach some agreement on an international curr­
ency reform by September 1973 when the World Bank's 
General Meeting would be held in Nairobi. A major role by 
the World Bank and the ADB in the reconstruction of Indo­
china was therefore.'desirable'. Economic aid to North Viet­
nam would be extended on condition that it abided by the 
Paris Agreement
Indochina reconstruction aid, a government source reveal­
ed on 21 July, would be taken up as one of the 'major agenda 
items' by Tanaka in his Washington talks with Nixon on 31 
July. It began to appear that Washington was particularly con­
cerned about aid to South Vietnam, since Saigon was demand­
ing aid amounting to US$800 million a year. The difference 
between this demand and US disbursements might have to be 
compensated by contributions from other aid donor nations, 
including Japan. It was speculated in some quarters that Jap- #
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an, which had thus far expressed the desire only to fulfil a
role supplementary to that of the US, might now make the
92
'second biggest contribution' after the US. Depending on 
Japan's commitment, the European nations would decide on 
their contributions. A definitive Japanese statement to this 
effect would be sought at the Tanaka-Nixon summit talks. 
While talks on US postwar economic assistance to Hanoi 
were continuing in Paris, detailed discussion on the recons­
truction of Indochina with emphasis on US-Japan coopera­
tion would be held in Tokyo on 23-24 July by US State and 
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AID officials.
For this reason Tokyo was pressing throughout the latter 
half of July for coordination among the various government 
agencies concerned, particularly Foreign Affairs and Finance. 
The Motono survey team, as we have seen, was already in 
South Vietnam from 19 July to study the feasibility of aid-By 
19 July the following principles were formulated in Tokyo:
1) The extension of aid would focus on US-Japan cooperation,
2) The aid recipients would be the four nations of Indochina -
North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos, 3) Aid
under the multilateral formula would be extended through the
UN, the ADB and the World Bank; the bilateral aid formula
would also be promoted individually between Japan and its 
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recipients. Washington's 'great expectation' for Japan's 
role in this respect was attributed in some quarters to the in­
difference of Congress towards the aid question. The US
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Senate for instance had reduced by half the US$740 million
requested in the fiscal 74 budget.
Japan's dialogue with North Vietnam in Paris was simul
-taneously showing signs of promise. Ohira revealed on 24
July 1973 that Hanoi had proposed 'two or three days ago'
to begin fullscale negotiations from 25 July in Paris at the
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two nations' embassies at the same time. The first round 
of negotiations would be held between the Japanese Minister 
in France, Tokuhisa Shigeru and the North Vietnamese Char­
ge d'Affaires, Nguyen Tran Lieu. Ohira appeared hopeful 
that these negotiations could be brought to a settlement 'by 
the autumn'. The agenda would focus on 1) the reparations 
problem, 2) the issue of Japanese economic aid to North Viet­
nam, 3) the question of the PRG. Tokyo's policy of offering 
economic aid to North Vietnam 'both with and without reim­
bursement' as distinct from reparations Ohira explained, was 
because Hanoi had ’no intention’ to claim reparations from
'Japan. The specific content of aid was expected to be discus-
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sed during fullscale negotiations.
Hanoi for its part stressed three demands in Paris on 25 
July: 1) An end to the transportation of weapons for the US 
forces in Japan to Vietnam and Cambodia, 2) Non-reimbur­
sable aid instead of reparations for the losses of World War
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n, 3) Recognition of the PRG. With reference to the first
point, Tokyo said the issue could be ’naturally dissolved’
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through the ceasefire in Vietnam and the stabilisation of the 
situation in Cambodia. While Tokyo was ready to advance 
non-reimbursable aid as demanded by Hanoi, recognition 
of the PRG was not immediately possible. 'No serious obs­
tacles' however were envisaged for the future.
The conclusion of the first session of the DRV-Japan 
talks in Paris on 26 July left Tanaka, Ohira and Nikaido 
ready to discuss the various aspects of Japan's Indochina 
policy in Washington. The extension of the aid programme 
was founded on three principles: 1) Aid to South Vietnam 
would be distinct and would operate on a different level 
because of the nature of Saigon's individual requests, 2) Aid 
after 1974 would be dependent on the deliberations of an 
aid-giving nations conference to be sponsored by the World 
Bank-ADB group; it was hoped that Japan would eventually 
extend aid on a bilateral basis to Indochina within the frame­
work outlined by the conference, 3) Tokyo would extend aid
to North Vietnam on a bilateral basis while maintaining a bal- 
0
ance between the amount of aid to be given to South Vietnam
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and that earmarked for the North.
Already it was envisaged that the first preliminary talks on 
these principles might begin 'as early as September' for the 
express purpose of establishing the aid-giving nations' confer­
ence. The World Bank and AID would officiate with Manila, 
the ADB's headquarters, named as a possible location for the
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talks. The World Bank and the ADB would act as the promoter 
and coordinator of aid for the postwar reconstruction of Indo­
china, in place of the US, inviting the participation of some 
20 countries beginning with the US and Japan and including 
France, West Germany and the Netherlands. The intention 
was to draw up a survey report in August prior to the aid 
conference in September 1973.
The ADB was also said on 26 July to have sent its own
survey team to South Vietnam in the interim and would use
its findings to create a 'blue-print' for reconstruction and
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development aid to South Vietnam 'far into the future'.
The results of the survey would lay the foundations of the 
proposed conference which would discuss: 1) The total 
amount of aid to be extended to South Vietnam in 1974, 
the share of aid to be borne by various nations, as well as 
that given by international organs, and 2) a 'longterm struc­
ture' for the extension of aid to the whole of Indochina in­
cluding Laos and Cambodia with the amounts of aid to be 
given to these nations. Both the World Bank and the ADB 
moreover expressly included North Vietnam as an aid-recip 
-ient although Hanoi was not a member of either institution.
For the South, Tanaka revealed on 27 July prior to his de­
parture for Washington that Japan was already implementing 
Viemam reconstruction aid and had disbursed Yen 500 million 
through an undisclosed international organ, having also agreed
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to an enormous capital subscription to the ADB. The in­
tention was for Japan itself to make 'unconditional' capital 
subscription in contrast to aid extended through the UN.
Tanaka's Washington visit (31 July-1 August) was intend­
ed to inaugurate a phase of Japan's summit diplomacy which 
would also take in Europe, the USSR and Southeast Asia. He 
hoped to promote a 'new triangular relationship' between 
Japan, the US and Europe as endorsed in the New Atlantic 
Charter and to initiate the 'fullest possible dialogue' between 
Tokyo and Washington. Tanaka would take the opportunity 
to invite Nixon to Japan in the spring of 1974 and would re­
schedule the US visit of Emperor Hirohito which Tokyo had 
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cancelled in late April. Tanaka wanted to demonstrate 
Japan's commitment to its increasing international role and 
responsibility, against the background of 'great changes' in 
the international environment in recent months. These inclu­
ded the normalisation of Japan-China relations, the cease­
fire in Vietnam and progress in US-China relations as well 
as the Nixon-Brezhnev summit.
Tanaka's discussions with fellow heads of government 
would explore the feasibility of a conference of Asian and 
Pacific nations including the US, China and the Soviet Uni­
on, on means of bolstering the peace settlement in Indochi­
na as endorsed by Rogers in Tokyo in mid-July. While the 
antiwar Constitution prevented Japan from accepting a mili-
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tary role in peacekeeping arrangements, the Premier said,
Tokyo would participate in economic cooperation and wou-
102
Id supply technology to developing countries.
During his Washington visit Tanaka said the task of crea­
ting a 'durable peace* for both the US and Japan was a 
'grand undertaking'. The US could not 'unilaterally' solve 
the scope of its problems worldwide but resolution might be 
possible through 'close collaboration' between Japan, the 
US and Europe. As a major industrial power Japan, Tanaka 
said, was prepared to contribute the full measure of its capa­
city to this common cause. Specifically bilateral issues betw­
een the US and Japan would be reviewed within a wider 
global perspective.
According to Nixon the Joint US-Japan Communique of 1 
August 1973 would support Tokyo's efforts to gain permanent
membership of the UN Security Council alongside the US, the
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Soviet Union, China, Britain and France. The communique 
expressed the 'strong hope' where Indochina was concerned 
that both nations would work towards a stable lasting peace 
through 'scrupulous implementation' of the Paris Agreement. 
They also reaffirmed their resolve to assist the rehabilitation 
of Indochina and pledged to continue to facilitate regional 
cooperation in Asia as an important contributing factor in se­
curing a 'lasting peace’ throughout that part of the world. 
Almost immediately Tokyo disclosed on 2 August that
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US$50 million had been set aside for these purposes in the
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fiscal 73 supplementary budget. The decision was made 
in line with a promise Tanaka had given Nixon in Washington. 
Japan however would extend aid to both North and South 
Vietnam despite the US' preference for Saigon to be the only 
recipient.
IV : IV 
THE OIL FACTOR
'We have wasted long years in war, now we should immed­
iately set our hands to reconstruction.'
Nguyen Van Thieu, 
20 May 1973.
At this point we must look at another aspect of the econo­
mic potential of Indochina. Vietnam was increasingly being 
viewed as a promising source of oil. Attention had been
drawn to the possible oil wealth of the South in a speech of
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20 May 1973 by Nguyen Van Thieu. Vietnam's abund­
ant natural resources, he said, were 'only partially exploited'. 
The RVN moreover, controlled the territory where those re­
sources were likely to be most abundant. Economic develop­
ment could not be allowed to wait until the gunfire had 'com­
pletely ceased' and must be prosecuted while South Vietnam's
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territorial security was still being maintained by arms. As 
the danger of the 'renewal of war' appeared to be receding, 
the RVN, Thieu declared, should be able to take more man­
power from security tasks to reconstruction tasks. This was 
perhaps a reference to the reduced level of hostilities on the 
ground and to the then ongoing Paris talks (17-23 May) in 
which a new ceasefire was being discussed.
Thieu simultaneously unveiled an eight-year reconstruct-
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ion programme designed to cover the years 1973-80. Dur 
-ing the first phase (1973-75) the Saigon Government would 
call for maximum assistance from foreign governments and 
international financial institutions. Foreign business circles 
would be encouraged to join forces with local entrepreneurs. 
An attractive and progressive investment law had been prom­
ulgated in April 1973 and all facilities would be accorded to 
foreign investors to ensure that rapid and largescale develop­
ment took place. Oil exploitation was a prominent part of 
the programme.
According to Nguyen Tien Hung, Thieu had originally
placed much emphasis on American economic support until
107
his visit to the US in early April 1973. Aid would grad­
ually be reduced from the level of more than US$1 billion 
in 1975 to US$100 million in 1980. But with no firm comm­
itments forthcoming from Nixon or the World Bank, Thieu 
was forced to reassess the situation: it was then that he sugg­
ested to Hung that the latter contribute to the economic recon-
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struction of the country. Arriving in Saigon in May 1973,
Hung was offered on 5 June the post of Special Assistant
for Economic Reconstruction 'coordinating reconstruction
108
aid and overall economic and financial policy'. On 7 June
Thieu signed the decree appointing Hung who was sent in
ambassadorial rank to Washington until mid-August where
109
he visited the State Department, AID and the Pentagon.
Dependent on imports for 90% of its oil consumption, 
Japan was preoccupied under the impact of diminishing glo­
bal energy reserves, with the need to ensure a stable supply 
of crude oil. MITI disclosed on 18 May that Japan was in the
process of drawing up a new oil policy which it expected to
110
finalise 'before the end of July*. Under this policy Jap­
an proposed to encourage the refining of oil locally by oil- 
producing countries and Third World developing nations. The 
prospect of oil reserves nearer home in Vietnam was thus of 
keen interest to Japan. The search for alternative energy re­
sources was also advocated by a government resources miss­
ion. It proposed on 19 June after a visit to the US, that Japan 
not rely unduly on the Middle East for its oil but develop
such resources 'outside OPEC' (Organisation of Petroleum 
111
Exporting Countries).
By mid-1973 Japanese firms were already moving to bid 
for concessions in the oil exploration area off South Vietnam. 
Saigon invited bids on 2 July from international oil companies 
for concessions to be awarded on the advice of its National
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Petroleum Commission (NPC). Kaiyo Oil for instance enter­
ed bids for three areas in conjunction with the US firms, Gulf,
112
Amoco and Amerada Hess. Depending on the bidding, 
the results were expected to be announced in mid-August, a 
reminder of developments concerning aid.
The Saigon Government was offering as much as 30 cont­
inental shelf mining areas, amounting to some 300,000 sq.km. 
off the Mekong Delta and would receive US$16.6 million as 
soon as the oil concession rights were awarded. Called 'signa­
ture commission', the money manifested the companies' com­
mitment to explore and exploit oil. Those awarded concessions 
would invest US$60 million in the search for oil over five years, 
an amount higher than the minimum of US$12 million fixed by 
the government for the bid. Beginning in 1974 the companies 
would earmark US$300,000 per year for the training of Viet­
namese specialists and personnel in the oil branch. Employment 
during the five-year period would comprise 90% Vietnamese 
manpower including 60% at managerial level.
The Saigon Government stood to gain some US$10 million 
once oil was found. According to the Oil Law it would also
receive 12.5% of the total volume of the oil extracted and 55%
113
of the income derived from its exploitation and production. 
Concession contracts were expected to be signed in August 
after which the search for oil would begin in February 1974. 
More bids would then follow.
'The snag was that Saigon's 'open-door' policy might easily
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provoke a violent reaction on the part of Hanoi. Thieu had obs­
erved in his speech of 20 May that the communists would 'seek 
by all means' to sabotage South Vietnam's economic advance. 
On 5 July Hanoi accused Saigon of 'selling out' the country's
natural resources to the petroleum organisations of foreign capi- 
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tal. Pointing to a 24 February 1971 statement of the PRG 
Foreign Ministry, Hanoi declared that all natural resources of 
South Vietnam belonged to its people through their 'only gener­
al and legal representative', the PRG. On 18 July Liberation 
Radio issued a further angry statement in response to an anno­
uncement by Saigon that eight exploration blocks had been
awarded off the coast of Vung Tau to firms including Esso,
115
Mobil and the Pecten Vietnam Company of Shell. On 20
July Liberation Press condemned the oil concessions as contra-
116
vening the letter and spirit of the Paris Agreement
The exploration of oil in South Vietnam was also related
to the military situation there. The new US Ambassador to
the RVN, Graham Martin, who arrived in July 1973, later
described the situation at the time as in a 'basic stalemate'
with the military initiative increasingly going to the South 
117Vietnamese forces. There had been a massive military 
supply before the accord in the 'Enhance Programme' desig­
ned to leave the ARVN forces equipped and prepared to ■ 
resist external aggression. US authorities had then conclud­
ed that Saigon would be successful here if Hanoi did not
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receive massive support from outside sources.
Hanoi was itself facing possible prospects for oil devel­
opment. The DR Vs attitude to any possible foreign partici­
pation in its own oil development appeared defensive in the 
extreme. On 22 June 1973 the General Geology Department
of the DRV was reported to have drawn up a new plan for
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fulfilling its military tasks in the 'new stage'. A conso­
lidation of self-defence units and the 'heightening' of vigil­
ance and 'combat readiness' was deemed essential. There 
was nevertheless, a possible precedent in the case of China. 
From 24 May to 17 June engineers of the Nippon Kokkan
Company had held talks with the relevant authorities in Chi-
119
na on the technicalities of laying oil pipelines. Although 
no concrete programme was agreed on, the possibility had 
arisen that Japan might export pipelines to China and might 
even participate in a fullscale project to help the Chinese est­
ablish a pipeline network from the Daqing oilfield to their 
inland refineries. And what Japan could achieve in China it 
might reasonably hope to do for North Vietnam as well. By 
the latter half of 1973 Japan was not merely exhibiting an 
interest in Vietnamese oil resources, but was positioning 
itself to act as a politically acceptable partner in oil explora­
tion for a future unified Vietnam.
The question of a stable supply of resources as we have 
seen, had been one of the issues of central concern at the 
Joint Japan-US Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs
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in Tokyo (16-17 July). Secretary Rogers stressed that the 
US understood the 'special concerns' which arose from Jap­
an's dependence on imported sources of energy and placed
a priority on the expansion and strengthening of cooperation
120
with Japan in energy matters. The final communique of
17 July affirmed the importance of a 'continuing and broad
exchange of views' by the US and Japan on the problem of
ensuring future supplies of petroleum, enriched uranium and 
121
other energy resources.
The challenge of natural resources as a 'new source of ten­
sion' was again referred to in the Nixon-Tanaka talks (31 July 
-1 August). Fearing that an energy crisis might see competition 
for dwindling supplies, both leaders agreed to examine an 
arrangement within the Organisation for Economic Coopera­
tion and Development (OECD) for 'sharing oil in times of 
emergency' and to expand the scope of cooperation for explo­
ring and exploiting energy resources and for research and de-
122
velopment of new energy sources.
Japanese business and industrial circles affirmed on 7 Aug­
ust that the Joint Communique of the Nixon-Tanaka talks had
123
provided the main impetus for an aid strategy for Indochina.
In specific response to requests from the 'local' side, an overall 
reconstruction aid and cooperation organ would be established 
to become the 'window' for formulating private-level plans foc­
using on the Keidanran (Federation of Economic Organisations). 
Largescale missions would be sent to North and South Vietnam,
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Cambodia and Laos possibly 'next spring'.
In this context Mitsui, a major Japanese trading concern, was 
reported on 23 June 1973 to have drafted a programme for the
124
construction of a gigantic industrial zone along Cam Ranh Bay. 
This was in response to a request by the Nguyen Van Thieu 
government in the autumn of 1972 for a 'blueprint' for a heavy 
chemical-industrial complex at the site of the former US supply 
base. Petroleum refining facilities with an initial production capa­
city of 100,000 banrels a day would form the nucleus of the pro­
ject, to be a part of Thieu's eight-year reconstruction programme.
Japan, the US and other nations were expected to contribute 
to an undisclosed cost of building the complex. Mitsui was 
drafting its plans with the cooperation of two Japanese cons­
truction companies, the Japan Industrial Location Centre and 
Nihon Koei. What was significant was that Mitsui's blueprint
for the complex was to be submitted to the South Vietnamese
125
Government in ’August 1973'.
By mid-August 1973 Japan's own fact-finding mission to
South Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos led by Motono Moriyuki
had returned to Tokyo. A statement on 13 August said the RVN
126
requested approximately US$62 million for aid in 1973. On 
the basis of its report Tokyo would hold the first coordinating 
meeting of the ministries concerned to formulate on 15 August 
a concrete aid programme. A supplementary budget would then 
be presented to an extraordinary Diet session scheduled for mid- 
October and the provision of aid might commence that month.
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It emerged at the 15 August meeting that the South Vietnam­
ese Government had asked for a total of US$124 million in for­
eign aid as 'urgent necessities' for the half year beginning July 
1973. While this would be studied at the coordination meeting, 
Tokyo expressed the desire to send an equivalent team to the 
DRV - with which it was still engaged in negotiations for diplo­
matic relations - and eventually to Cambodia following stabili­
sation of the situation there.
These developments might be understood in retrospect. 
According to Kissinger in March 1974, Japan suggested in 
August 1973 that the World Bank 'arrange a preliminary meet­
ing to exchange views on aid to the countries of Indochina' 
(Appendix III). Tokyo also proposed that 'member countries 
discuss the formation of a. loose Indochina consultative group 
for the areawide coordination, with subgroups for any of the 
four countries concerned which might request such a group.' 
This might conceivably explain why Japan's initiatives in 
Vietnam accelerated towards the middle of August 1973.
By mid-August 1973 the momentum generated by Japan's 
role in the stabilisation of Vietnam was clear. But Nixon's 
draining power from late April 1973 on account of Watergate 
and his consequent inability to enforce a stricter implementa­
tion of the ceasefire on the ground in South Vietnam would 
have more serious consequences later on in the year. Already
286
in mid-June when the new communique was renegotiated, the 
absence of new tougher clauses to prevent a further deteriora­
tion of the situation there gave no hope for optimism. In Cam­
bodia the failure to secure a ceasefire and the collapse of the 
negotiated settlement were ominous. These, together with the 
ascendancy of the radicals in the maquis augured badly for the 
future.
Mid-August 1973 thus marked a transition in the overall 
situation in Indochina in which the pattern of initiatives, 
both diplomatic and economic, and the involvement of out­
side powers would henceforth take a different form. The 
framework for peace would also become increasingly frag­
mented.
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CHAPTER V
THE TRANSITION 
MID-AUGUST - DECEMBER 1973
V : I
THE SINO-FRENCH INITIATIVE
After 15 August 1973 there was a discemable disinterest,
at least publicly, on the part of policy-makers on Cambodia.
The American outlook on Cambodia had been encapsulated
by Kissinger's statement on 23 August suggesting that Wash-
1
ington was backing away from further involvement there. The 
Cambodian negotiations, he said, 'inevitably with the end of 
American bombing' would depend more on the decision of the 
Cambodian parties than on American decisions. If Congress­
ional intent meant anything, it was that the US 'should not play
2
the principal role' in these activities. Outgoing US Ambassad­
or in Cambodia, Emory Swank, also said around the same time 
that the war was increasingly counterproductive for both sides 
but saw little prospect that it would end soon. US policy how­
ever was still directed towards ending the war ’as quickly as
3
possible' by negotiated settlement. But prospects remained 
gloomy.
China was still intent on pursuing its own diplomatic ini-
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datives. Premier Zhou Enlai had sent a message in August
1973 to the North Vietnamese leaders saying:
The Americans want to settle the Kampuchean question
and are prepared to talk with Sihanouk or a representative of
Sihanouk, at the same time wish representatives of FUNK
in the country would talk with Lon N o l... At present given
the American desire to pull out of Kampuchea, if one could
win over a number of people within Lon Nol’s ranks, that
4
would be advantageous.'
But Peking was preoccupied during the last week of Aug­
ust with the 10th Congress of the CCP (24-28 August 1973) 
which would exercise a profound effect on the Cambodian 
question. It is impossible to cover in this thesis all the com­
plexities surrounding the congress. One significant result of 
the congress was to substantially augment Peking's hitherto 
lukewarm support for the Khmer Rouge. The prominence of 
what was later known as the 'Gang of Four' began increasing­
ly to provide a platform of support for radical tendencies in the 
5
maquis. And the rise in influence of Hua Guofeng, then Vice-
Premier and Wang Dongxing, Mao's bodyguard, was also a
part of Chinese domestic politics.
After the summer of 1973 Kissinger knew that Cambodia
was doomed and that 'only a miracle' could save South Viet- 
6
nam. He believed he had 'convincing reason' to suggest that 
a 'significant event' in the ascendancy of the Gang of Four 
during the summer of 1973 was the collapse of the Cambodian
298
negotiations. The US' congressionally imposed decision humi­
liated Zhou who 'never recovered' his domestic position since
7
internal attacks on him in the interim had increased. Already 
on 29 August, the day after the congress, Kissinger said Qiao 
Guanhua who received David Bruce in Peking made 'no refer­
ence' to the Premier but pointedly emphasised Sino-American 
8
'differences' instead. During September Kissinger noted 
'confusing signals' in Peking's statements, the 'hitherto co­
herent and uniform line’ was missing, pointing to an internal
9
struggle that culminated in the 'Anti-Confucius' campaign.
The North Vietnamese too appeared concerned at this stage 
to have a clear picture of Peking's position. Two high-level 
North Vietnamese delegations which had held talks in Mos­
cow stopped over in Peking: Pham Van Dong arrived on 15 
August and Le Duan (who had stayed on in Moscow after
mid-July) arrived on 29 August - immediately after the CCP
10
Congress - accompanied by Hoang Van Hoan. 'Extensive 
but separate talks' with all parties concerned including Sihan­
ouk and Penn Nouth were described as having taken place.
By the beginning of September it was clear to all parties - 
Khmer and non-Khmer - that Sihanouk and his faction cons­
tituted the only conceivable barrier against the extension of 
radical influence in Cambodia. Every delay in the settlement 
of the Cambodian debacle might be exploited to the full by 
the most hardline forces by increasing their pressure on Ph­
nom Penh. Hanoi, as we have seen, had been well aware of
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this. Sihanouk however believed that the suspension of bomb­
ing might enable a reorganisation of forces inside the country. 
He said on 21 August that an overall offensive against Phnom 
Penh could be deferred until the dry season (December 1973 -
May 1974) began. His own reinstatement in a coalition gover-
11
nment was however 'deadlocked' as it was 'too late now'.
He warned a week later against any 'peace formula' originat­
ing outside Cambodia and quelled speculation about a meeting 
in Moscow being underway. Any contact with the 'so-called' 
Khmer Republic and the right of the Soviet Union, France or 
any other foreign country to meddle in Cambodian affairs was 
not recognised. The prince was emphatic that the stand of 
FUNK, GRUNK and the CPNLAF remained 'totally rigid
12
and unchanged' until the 'complete liberation'of Cambodia.
Despite Sihanouk's aversion to 'foreign meddling', it was 
now imperative that GRUNK secured some form of interna­
tional support. He embarked on such an initiative at the 4th 
Non-Aligned Conference in Algiers (5-9 September) and secu­
red the recognition of GRUNK as the 'sole, legal government' 
13
of Cambodia. Privately Sihanouk sent a note on 10 Septem­
ber to the UN Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim. This was a 
request that GRUNK's reinstatement to its seat at the UN be 
placed on the agenda of the next General Assembly session. 
We now know that the prince also secretly attempted to get 
Moscow on his side. According to Manac'h, at Sihanouk's
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initiative, a letter from Algiers dated 12 September 1973 was
addressed to the Soviet leaders Brezhnev, Kosygin and Pod- 
14
gomy. While its contents were not revealed, the letter was 
apparently a pale version of another sent three days later to 
President Georges Pompidou, who was then on a tour of Chi­
na (11-17 September) and this was duly delivered in Shanghai. 
Referring to the 9 September declaration of the Non-Aligned 
summit, Sihanouk appealed directly to France to 'contribute
directly' to end the war in Cambodia in the 'briefest delay poss-
15
ible' by recognising GRUNK.
The Franco-Chinese 'convergence' on Cambodia had been
gathering momentum in the interim. Ambassador Manac'h had
written from Peking on 17 August to Jobert suggesting the
16
Franco-Chinese plan be enlarged. The Khmer Rouge might
evolve to eventually replace Sihanouk's forces as the principal
focus of Chinese support and it was prudent, Manac'h sugg- 
/
ested, that the Elysee issue a public declaration of support for
GRUNK during Pompidou's state visit to China.
The French themselves were anxious to continue their role
in the resolution of the conflict. An attempt had been made in
early September to reach Sihanouk while he was in Algiers
through the French Ambassador there, Jean-Marie Soutou,
to ask the prince the conditions on which he considered a 
17
settlement possible. But Sihanouk could not be reached.
In Peking Manac'h continued to act as intermediary for 
Senator Mike Mansfield. In a letter of 6 September 1973, the
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senator assured Sihanouk that the executive echelon of the
US Government would be continually pressured to lend him 
18
its support. He also expressed the hope that the 'traces' of 
the conflict would soon be erased and that the prince might 
return to head a new government in Phnom Penh.
The state visit of Georges Pompidou to China (11-17 Sept 
-ember) provided an impetus for France's recognition of 
GRUNK. All public pronouncements throughout the visit 
were calculated to emphasise Franco-Chinese friendship; pri­
vately though it was Cambodia that took centre-stage. At a ban­
quet on 11 September in honour of Pompidou, Zhou Enlai 
stressed the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence; consider­
ing 'all countries' subject to aggression or threat entitled to
possess their own means of defence to safeguard their indep- 
19
endence. Pompidou chose to emphasise that both countries,
had worked in Asia 'each in the light of its friendships and
principles' for a solution to the Vietnamese conflict and hoped
for a ’correct application' of the Paris Agreement by all parties
concerned. Both countries also stood for the return of Cambo-
20
dia to the 'position and neutrality' held until the recent crisis.
Several gestures of goodwill by France towards Cambodia 
had also been attempted. Inaugurating Pompidou's China's 
visit, the fiysee announced on 11 September that its Ambassa­
dor to Phnom Penh, Louis Dauge, would shortly be posted to
21
Warsaw without any replacement. Pompidou also referred, 
in a meeting on 13 September with Zhou and Manac'h, to the
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fact that Nixon and Brezhnev had also been encouraged - in
Reykjavik and at Rambouillet - to believe that a solution to
22
Cambodia rested on the prince.
Chinese goodwill was not lacking either. During the same
meeting Zhou went to great lengths to persuade Paris to accord
GRUNK recognition and to play the role of mediator in the
conflict. The US particularly had to be persuaded to modify its
actions in Cambodia and France should immediately forestall
23
any Soviet initiative by establishing relations with GRUNK.
It was crucial there be no delay in France's moves since the 
Soviets might swifdy take up the challenge to fill the vacuum 
in Cambodia.
The Sino-French Communique of 14 September said the 
two sides had examined the situation in Asia 'especially in In­
dochina* and had expressed their hope that the Paris Agree­
ment's protocols would be scrupulously implemented. Both 
countries agreed that the Cambodian question be setded by
the Cambodian people themselves 'free from foreign interfer- 
24
ence'. The Chinese on their part pointedly reaffirmed that 
GRUNK under Sihanouk's leadership was the 'sole' legal gov­
ernment' of Cambodia and supported his Five-Point statement 
But the public declaration by France officially recognising 
GRUNK remained to be made. The delay, attributed on 16
September by Jobert to his having yet to receive an 'official
25
guarantee' to this effect, did not augur well.
Subsequent events also worked against any possibility 
of a settlement in Cambodia.
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V : II
JAPAN : NORMALISATION & AFTER
'For North Vietnam, which is heading for postwar recon­
struction, Japan's economic aid, which can be expected after 
the establishment of diplomatic relations, will be worthy of 
being welcomed as aid of low political colouring, different 
from the complex bargaining by the US, China and the Soviet 
Union .....'
Asahi Shimbun.
19 September 1973*
inDSJP, 21 September 1973, p.15.
Japan was aware that a new situation was emerging in 
Southeast Asia in the aftermath of the bombing halt in Cam­
bodia which made more pressing the stabilisation of Viet­
nam. Tokyo was unrelenting therefore in its pursuit of the 
Japan-North Vietnam normalisation talks in Paris. Accord­
ing to Tokuhisa Shigeru, the Japanese Minister in France, 
the second session of the talks on 14 August 1973, proceed­
ed in a 'favourable atmosphere’ and discussion had centred 
on 'substantial problems'. The aim was to establish diploma­
tic relations 'without any preconditions'. An agreement might 
be finalised after 'two or three more negotiations', and the
prospects indicated that they might be concluded 'by the 
26
autumn'.
304
The third session of the talks on 18 September broke new 
ground. In Tokyo Ohira on 19 September described the nego­
tiations as having reached 'substantial agreement' and that the 
documents were scheduled for signature in Paris by Japanese
Ambassador Nakayama Yoshihiro and the North Vietnamese
27
Charg£ d’Affaires, Vo Van Sun on 21 September 1973.
The exchange of documents would involve two items, one 
on the establishment of diplomatic relations and the other on 
the exchange of ambassadors, an announcement to which effect 
would be made simultaneously that day in Hanoi, Tokyo and 
Paris.
North Vietnam had given way on its three conditions: the
question of war reparations, the status of the PRG and the
transportation of US weapons from Japan to Vietnam. Ohira
referred to the fact that there had been 'no proposition'from
Hanoi on reparations during the course of negotiations. It was
widely believed that the reparations problem might be disposed
of through a 'political settlement' since Japan would now have
29
relations with.both North and South Vietnam. Tokyo was
considering solution of the problem by the implementation of
reimbursable and non-reimbursable economic cooperation
covering the whole of Vietnam. Ohira took the opportunity to
reaffirm in the same breath that Tokyo had 'no intention' of
recognising the PRG. According to Miyake Wasuke, Hanoi
had not referred to this problem throughout the course of the 
30
Paris negotiations.
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The normalisation of Japan-North Vietnam relations set
a new precedent Negotiations in the 'true meaning of the
word' would begin only after the formal establishment of
relations. The logic was that the settlement of 'outstanding'
problems' might henceforth be resolved through diplomatic 
31channels. The establishment of relations was in itself 
significant. Japan was not required to cease recognition of 
South Vietnam as the legal representative of Vietnam as a 
whole. The PRG was acknowledged as 'existing in some 
form or other' and might pose the ’biggest obstacle' only 
after the formalities ended.
Following the establishment of relations Tokyo would 
further extend Hanoi some US$20 million in economic assist­
ance as a kind of war reparations 'substitute' equal to Japan's
32
current fiscal 1973 grant-type economic aid given to Saigon. 
The Japanese Government had given the RVN US$39 millio- 
n in war reparations, for five years beginning in 1960 to cover 
the whole of Vietnam and had extended in addition yen trade 
credits valued at US$7.5 million. As mentioned earlier, the 
'Mongolian formula' utilised in February 1972 whereby Tok­
yo recognised Ulan Bator and extended non-rep ay able econo­
mic assistance instead of reparations, was being considered 
as a model for Hanoi. .
These principles were accompanied at the same time by 
another departure from normal practice. Tokyo made a commit­
ment to approve the use of Export-Import Bank funds for Nor-
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th Vietnam to expand trade between the two countries. The 
arrangement presupposed use of funds at a low interest rate 
which might be required when actual exports began. Trade was 
also to expand and Hanoi could opt for deferred payment or 
payment by installments. Loans were available from private 
Japanese banks or from Export-Import Bank funds. MITI also 
endorsed Tokyo-Hanoi relations on 21 September as beneficial 
and contributing to the development of Japan's relations with 
Indochina as well as Asia as a whole. The Japan-Vietnam 
Trading Association said trade between the two countries was 
about to enter a 'new phase' beginning with the visit of a gov­
ernment survey mission to the DRV to examine policies includ-
34
ing that of non-reimbursable aid.
The most significant development of Japanese-North Viet­
namese relations following the establishment of diplomatic 
relations on 21 September 1973 was oil development on the 
Tonkin Gulf. It was disclosed on 22 September that Hanoi had 
been requesting technical expertise from the Japan-Vietnam
Trading Association for the construction of heavy and light
35
industry including petrochemical plants. Extolling its own 
'abundant mineral resources' presumed to exist inland and in 
the Tonkin Gulf, Hanoi had also proposed talks for a formula 
for 'consigned processing'. Its 'flexible posture' extended 
to the possibility of a joint management formula and loans 
on deferred payment terms. Industrial circles in Japan also 
approved Japanese imports for development purposes.
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In an unprecedented statement, Nissho-Iwai and its trading 
partner Toyo Oil Development disclosed on 28 September that 
they had in fact reached agreement in principle on the develop­
ment of offshore oil with the DRV Government 'even before'
36
the formal establishment of relations. Contact had been
established with Hanoi on 6 September through a 'dummy' 
trading firm, Nikkyo Boeki, exclusively engaged in Japan- 
North Vietnam trade. It was revealed that the Tokyo visit in 
July of Nguyen Chanh of the DRV General Chemicals Bureau 
had focused on the 'bright prospects of oil' in the gulf. Hanoi 
had also expressed interest - prior to the establishment of relat­
ions - in the 'production sharing formula' considered an excep­
tional development since the two countries embraced different 
ideological systems. The concept necessitated a second survey 
mission to the DRV and a contract might be signed within a year.
On 11 October another Japanese concern, C.Itoh revealed
that it would dispatch its own survey mission to Hanoi on 17
October to hold talks amongst others, with the State Planning
Committee and the DRV Chamber of Commerce. A wide range
of problems including the international oil situation, general oil
development, concrete prospecting and the construction of oil
refineries would be discussed. 'Oil-connected persons' from
37
Hanoi might also be sent to Japan for a exchange of views.
C.Itoh disclosed that it had conducted negotiations with 
Hanoi since June 1973: a tentative draft plan had been sub­
mitted with estimates of costs ranging from concrete pro-
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cessing to production as well as the projected development 
of seabed oil-fields in the gulf. One proposal had enormous 
potential. The Tonkin Gulf development might make it possi­
ble to 'ascertain the structure and scale' of the continental 
shelf oilfields geophysically adjacent to the Chinese land 
mass in the South and East China seas. The prospect of the 
Tonkin Gulf oilfield evolving into a 'national project' was 
contemplated since Japan's national concern, the Petroleum 
Development Corporation (PDC) was taking it seriously.
The prospect of joint oil development with the Italian state 
oil concern, ENI, on this project was also envisaged.
The speed with which Japan established a diplomatic sett 
-lement with North Vietnam and the subsequent oil equation 
might be attributed to Ohira's desire to pursue developments 
with Kissinger in New York on 24 September. Although not 
reported, these deliberations were believed to affirm US-Jap­
an relations as the 'pivot' of Asia and the Pacific and covered 
38
China and Indochina. The possibility - already raised in late
April - of Richard Nixon becoming the first US President to
39
visit Japan was apparently also discussed. One indication of 
the degree of coordination reached between the US and Japan 
was implicit in Kissinger's proposed stopovers in Tokyo en 
route to and from Peking (23-26 October) later on for consul­
tations.
Kissinger's inaugural speech on 24 September 1973 as 
Secretary of State before the 28th session of the UN General
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Assembly gave great prominence to Japan. He made a renew­
ed request that Japan be made a permanent member of the Se- 
40
curity Council. Pointing to 'recent reductions' in tension, 
he said Indochina illustrated where 'differences remained': 
the 'uncertain peace' there had to be strengthened. The US, 
he said would strive for a peace whose stability rests 'not 
merely on a balance of forces' but on 'shared aspirations'.
Underpinning the ideas expressed in Kissinger's speech 
was an American commitment to a sound programme of bila­
teral and multilateral foreign aid, designed to also include 
Japan and South Vietnam. On 10 September Nixon describ­
ed his 'prime concern' about a 'central element' in America's
ability to work with its allies - for our purposes, Japan and
41
South Vietnam - to maintain peace and stability. On 14
September the world's major trading nations had launched
in Tokyo new multilateral trade negotiations which could
&
lead to a significant reduction in world trade barriers. In 
a later reference to this, Nixon on 31 October 1973 pointed 
to 'strong efforts' that must be made internationally to supp­
ort economic development, particularly in providing reason­
able amounts of new funds for international lending institu­
tio n s .^
These statements might be©H seen against a proposal by 
25 donor countries to authorise US$4.5 billion of new resour­
ces to AID at the Nairobi meeting of the World Bank (24-28 
September). If approved, the US share in the replenishment
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would drop accordingly from 40% to 33%. Of immediate con­
cern to the Bank and its lending programme was the imminent 
exhaustion by mid-1974 of the funds for its soft-loan subsidia­
ry, AID. Pressure from Congress had seen the US reducing its 
share of contributions. The annual aid programme of the Bank, 
its President Robert McNamara said, would surpass that of the 
US. Sharply critical of the 'rich countries’, he only mentioned
the US by name for deficiencies in their total aid for the less 
43
developed world. It was now imperative for the donor coun­
tries including Japan to develop an 'emergency plan' to bridge 
the gap since the US could not legally provide the funds in ad­
vance of Congressional approval.
Japan's own proposals for Indochina reconstruction in the 
form of a 'loose consortium arrangement’ had been taking 
shape since mid-August 1973. According to Miyake, now 
transferred to Geneva as First Secretary of the Mission for
International Organisations, he had himself periodically refer-
44
red from September 1973 to Paris. On 4 October Japan's 
perception of the economic development of Indochina within 
the framework of the Paris Agreement took the following 
form. 'Mutual cooperation' among the various Indochinese 
countries was envisaged within an 'overall development plan' 
for the peninsula to include, according to the Japan Economic 
Research and Consultative Council:
One, Aid to Indochina on the basis of a combination of 
the bilateral and multilateral formulas with China and the
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Soviet Union as donors; Two, an Indochina reconstruction 
fund established by the Tokyo government; Three, a recons­
truction conference hosted by Tokyo with two sessions: one 
of 'private circles' within Indochina including Thailand and 
the other, with the US, China and the Soviet Union; Four, 
Japan would establish a 'cooperation structure' with the Indo 
-Chinese countries concerned to avoid accusations of 'econo­
mic aggression' to promote private investment and trade;
Five, both the Japanese government and private enteiprises 
were to consolidate a formula to allow the dispatch of staff 
to the region to develop longterm aid plans; Six, Japan 
would promote foreign capital induction policies and appro­
ve investment legislation to facilitate economic development 
cooperation there; Seven, Japan would improve its trade 
balance with the Indochinese countries in view of the exist­
ing big deficit arising from the purchase, promotion and de-
45
velopment of imports and exports.
Two governmental missions would accordingly be dispat­
ched to South Vietnam and ASEAN: one to examine the pros­
pects for Tanaka's scheduled visit there in early 1974 (4-13
October) and another to inspect refugee relief facilities in
46
South Vietnam and Laos (30 September-8 October).
An informal conference in Paris on 16 October 1973 of 
Indochina aid donor nations followed. Attended by some 13 
nations including Japan, with representatives from thtfOrgan- 
isation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
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and the UN, it ended - against Tokyo's expectations - without
47
significant achievement Japan had proposed the extension 
of aid to North Vietnam as well as multilateral aid through an 
aid consultative group under the IBRD. Tokyo feared that 
such a group might have shifted in favour of an organ for the 
express purpose of extending aid to South Vietnam. Japan 
also intended to coordinate views on Indochina reconstruct­
ion aid and to organise an aid consultative or international 
creditors' consortium. Given the 'prevailing situation' in In­
dochina, the idea of the consortium was judged 'premature'
but the participants were agreeable to convening a future 
48
conference.
The form of aid continued to be debated in Paris. Encour­
aged by Thieu's 20 May economic plan and by the Motono 
Moriyuki mission, Tokyo had been keen to push budgetary 
appropriations for aid to the South at the next Diet session. 
The US and Japan favoured a multilateral formula under 
which international lending institutions would include the 
World Bank, the ADB and ECAFE (Economic Commission 
for Asia and the Far East). The other participants wanted 
China and the Soviet Union included and preferred to focus 
only on South Vietnam as an aid recipient
To avoid giving aid to 'one side alone' Tokyo stressed
that aid to Indochina should be implemented under the aus-
49pices of the Paris Agreement. After a 'transitional period' 
when Vietnamese reunification was achieved, aid might be
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administered to Vietnam as a recipient within the context of 
Indochina as a whole. Immediate relief and humanitarian aid 
was to be dispatched to the South pending the next aid donor 
meeting scheduled for the spring of 1974 (See Appendix ID). 
Aid to North Vietnam was unresolved; a mission might be sent 
there after a 'receiving structure' had been set up.
The difficulty with creating a viable aid-giving formula whe­
ther to North or South Vietnam was exacerbated by negative 
reactions elsewhere. In Hanoi the Japanese option generated 
considerable debate: Nhan Dan on 23 September 1973 criti­
cised the Tanaka government for being 'inconsistent' in con­
sidering the Saigon administration the 'sole legitimate admin-
50
istration' of South Vietnam. It accused Tokyo of failing to 
recognise that the Paris Agreement's protocols saw South 
Vietnam consisting of 'two administrations and two areas of 
control'. Hanoi's warning was accompanied by what appear­
ed to be the emergence of a hard line concerning the war in 
the South which could only dissipate any goodwill on the 
part of any aid donor.
V: III
THE SCENARIO CHANGES
By the third week of September 1973, Hanoi seemed to 
have embarked on two potentially incompatible strategies.
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One strategy, as we have seen, was exemplified by the DRV's 
opening of diplomatic relations with Japan in relation to econo­
mic and reconstruction aid which implied overall restraint towa­
rds the rest of Indochina. An alternative strategy, by contrast, 
emphasised Soviet aid, renewal of war, reunification of Viet­
nam and ultimate alignment with the Soviet bloc. Attention was 
correspondingly being given to tighter control of resources, 
especially oil, which would have an effect on the DRV’s naval 
strategy. The intensification of the war in the South was possi­
bly part of the latter strategy of renewing the war while empha­
sising the Soviet connection.
Le Duan's return to Hanoi from Moscow at the end of Aug­
ust witnessed increased contacts with the Soviet blocrvisits by 
the Vladivostok Party, then the CPSU Kommunist (1-8 Sept­
ember) and Bulgarian Agitprop delegations took place along­
side a vitriolic propaganda war unleashed by Moscow against 
Peking. Peking was accused of 'deviating' from Marxist-Len- 
inist theory and practice and of attempting to dominate South­
east Asia by setting up 'political and military arrangements'.
The anti-Chinese propaganda of the Soviets, according to
Enver Hoxha, Leader of the Albanian Communist Party, was
• already evident at the Non-Aligned conference in Algiers (5-9
September) where Moscow was preparing to operate through
Fidel Castro, Premier of the Cuban Revolutionary Government
51
who attacked both China and Albania. An anti-Chinese offen 
-sive was visible during the Hanoi visit (12-17 September) of
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Fidel Castro, when a 'complete identity of views' on all ques­
tions was reached. In his first official visit to Hanoi, Castro 
reaffirmed Cuba's 'continued and wholehearted support' for 
Vietnam in national reconstruction as well as in the struggle to
make the 'other side’ implement the Paris Agreement 'scrupu- 
52
lously'. Castro's visit to the 'liberated zone' of South Viet­
nam was a 'political event' attesting to the 'unshakeable milita­
nt solidarity' between the South Vietnamese and Cuban peoples 
Both the Cubans and the North Vietnamese emphasised the 
'restoration of unity' among socialist countries within the inter­
national communist movement and the Joint Communique of
18 September 1973 pledged to make 'increasing contributions' 
53
to its cause.
Castro's visit to Hanoi and the emphasis on tightening 
relations with the Soviet bloc take on increased significance 
when seen against developments in B-2 where the war was 
being renewed. After Le Duan's return from Moscow a con­
ference of military cadres from all over B-2 met in September
1973 to 'disseminate resolution 21 and organise its implemen 
54
-tation’. The gravity of the conference, according to Tran 
Van Tra, was demonstrated by an important assessment of 
the enemy's strength 'relative to B-2’s' and what later emer­
ged as COSVN Resolution 12 became the basis upon which 
Tra approved B-2's operational plan for the 1973-74 dry sea­
son. In this connection we know that COSVN held its 12th 
conference in September 1973 following the meeting in July
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and August of the Standing Committee of the Interzone Party 
and the Military Region 5 Party Committee which agreed to
55
promptly bring about a ’strong transformation' of the situation.
One manifestation of this strategy was apparent in Saigon's
charge on 20 September that Hanoi was making 'intensive war-
56
like preparations' to reopen hostilities in the South. A note 
was simultaneously sent to the participants of the Paris confer­
ence appealing to them to stop Hanoi's actions. For the first 
time after the ceasefire the communists on 22 September open­
ed artillery fire on Le Minh base 37 km south of Pleiku. An 
assault on the base by some 3000 troops followed on 22-23 
September. As Le Minh guarded an infiltration corridor from 
Cambodia, the move appeared designed to facilitate the flow 
of arms and troops into South Vietnam's Pleiku and Kontum 
provinces. Saigon construed the seizure of Le Minh as a 'pre­
meditated act' aimed at renewing the war: the troops belonged
to the PAVN's 320th division which was familiar with the
57
terrain having previousieusly conducted campaigns there.
While we cannot know why the PAVN chose this moment 
to strike, 23 September was marked in Hanoi as the 28th anni­
versary of South Vietnam's resistance war against French col­
onialism. On the occasion Ouan Doi Nhan Dan urged the 'in­
tensification of the struggle in the new phase' and called on
the North to 'coordinate' its efforts with the South in comple- 
58
ting the revolution. The situation there, Nhan Dan added,
had undergone 'basic changes' since 'we are mightier than the
59
counterrevolutionary forces'.
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Condemned as a 'deliberate act' on 1 October by Nguyen
Van Thieu speaking in Pleiku, the Le Minh attack testified
to a general offensive to be launched by Hanoi in the 'next
two to three months' and was closely related to a major recru-
60
iting drive in the 'new stage' of the revolution. Cao Van 
Vien saw Le Minh as the beginning of an extensive commu­
nist campaign - embarked upon in late 1973 and to continue
unabated into 1974 - against the RVN's remote outposts and 
61
bases. Vien criticised Thieu's instructions forbidding eva­
cuation of the bases as tantamount to sacrificing a substantial 
number of troops which could have been successfully deploy­
ed elsewhere.
Saigon also saw Le Minh as a pretext by the Viet Cong to
renew the war and compel the South to supply its troops since
Hanoi, already suffering food shortages, could not possibly 
62
supply 300,000 troops. The assault was also set in the con­
text of many serious violations by Hanoi of the Paris Agree­
ment, including the entry of the Chinese ship, 'Hongqi' into 
Cua Viet port with 'illegal reinforcements' and the transform­
ation of twelve airfields under temporary communist control 
63
into air bases.
But Le Minh had greater ramifications for Indochina as a 
whole. By now any military distraction in Vietnam was view 
-ed with equal suspicion in Cambodia since the bombing halt 
made the threat of any offensive, however small, very real.
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Le Minh thus gave Cambodia cause for concern. Renewing
its 6-point peace proposal of 6 July, Phnom Penh appealed to
the US on 24 September 1973 to increase its military aid to
Cambodia by US$1 million a day, the amount Washington used 
64to spend on bombing. By leaving the Khmer Republic to 
fight the enemy alone, the US, Phnom Penh claimed, 'gained' 
about US$30 million a month after 15 August. Lon Nol's 
speech on 25 September in honour of General John Vogt de­
clared Cambodia was facing 'intensified aggression' from the 
65
Vietnamese.
The US Embassy’s response on 24 September said that it
did not 'as a matter of policy' discuss individual requests. The
two governments were in 'constant dialogue' on military and
economic assistance so that programmes would be responsive
66
to 'changing needs and situations'.
Additional arms aid could be found either by juggling funds 
in the US military aid programme or through a Presidential re­
quest to Congress for a supplemental appropriation. The Ad­
ministration as we have seen, had asked for US$167 million 
in military aid for Cambodia in fiscal 74 beginning on July 1. 
This figure, proposed in the autumn of 1972 was considered 
'unrealistic' by the Embassy. The statement was significant sin­
ce it was made at a time when a decision on the amount of Cam­
bodia aid for fiscal 74 was awaiting a meeting of a House-Senate
67
conference committee tentatively acheduled for mid-October.
In New York for the UN General Assembly, Secretary Kiss-
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inger on 4 October assured Cambodian Foreign Minister Long
Boret of continued American support, reiterating that he had no
68
plans to meet Sihanouk. The possibility of discussions with 
Chinese leaders to bring the Cambodian problem to an end was 
not apparently ruled out. On 3 October Nixon officially announ­
ced that Kissinger would be making another visit to Peking from
69
26-29 October with stops in Tokyo both ways. There would 
be a chance for Kissinger to discuss international issues with 
Zhou Enlai, the first opportunity to do so after the 10th CCP 
Congress. In Washington it was hoped that Zhou's policy of 
improvement of relations with the US might have survived any 
domestic challenges that could have been raised against i t  
At this point Kissinger detected a 'basic (Chinese) indiffer­
ence’ on Cambodia. In conversation with Kissinger on 3 Oct­
ober, Qiao Guanhua in New York said: 'whether Cambodia 
turns red, pink, black, white or what, what difference will
this make in the end for world history? The best way out is
70
for neither of us to get involved in Cambodia.' Qiao did 
not stress Chinese interests as being different but emphasis 
-ed pointedly that 'our circumstances are not the same'. Con­
sidering the overall situation, the Cambodian issue was 'very 
definitely a side issue', Qiao added. These remarks led Kiss­
inger to believe that Peking had no preference about the out­
come in Indochina.
The changed circumstances concerning Cambodia appear­
ed to be reverberating in several capitals at around the same
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time. In Peking Ambassador Manac'h, who was preparing to
leave his posting on 2 October, received an urgent message
from Sihanouk on 27 September requesting France to make a
71
'little compensation* by recognising GRUNK. The prince 
followed this up by a note on 28 September to Secretary Gen­
eral Waldheim to consider UN recognition of GRUNK; Man- 
ac’h on the same day asked Jobert to establish relations with 
GRUNK.
Moscow too appeared aware of the changed circumstances.
In a remarkable development, the Soviet Union on 9 October
informed Sihanouk through its Ambassador in Peking Vassili
Tolstikov that Moscow would 'cooperate' with GRUNK in
72
future and give it 'all necessary support'. The note pointedly 
referred to Sihanouk as 'Head of State' and called his govern­
ment the 'sole, legal representative of Cambodia'. The Soviet 
note of 9 October however fell short of giving the prince's 
government diplomatic recognition and of breaking relations 
with Lon Nol. The Soviet initiative was itself significant: repre­
senting an important opportunity for Moscow to make up for 
lost ground in its attempts to upstage Chinese moves in Cam­
bodia and elsewhere in Southeast Asia. More immediately, 
Soviet support now might have a positive effect on the immin­
ent debate in the UN on whether GRUNK might be reinstalled.
One other consideration merits attention. The Soviet initia­
tive was made during Japanese Premier Tanaka's Moscow 
visit (7-10 October). In his speech of welcome Brezhnev en-
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couraged Tanaka to cooperate with the Soviet Union in the
solution of 'many an international problem' in the interests
of consolidating peace and security in Asia and throughout 
73
the world. This was possibly an inducement to Japan to 
support a Soviet-proposed Asian Collective Security System 
as well as an open bid to wean Japan from close cooperation 
with China. On Tokyo's part its proposals in early October 
concerning Indochina - made immediately prior to Tanaka's 
Moscow visit - suggest that Japan was looking for simultan­
eous improvement of relations with Moscow to improve rela­
tions with Hanoi in that context.
Events elsewhere had by then taken a drastic turn which 
would have repercussions on Cambodia. The Middle East War 
of 6 October 1973 had broken out Kissinger refers to the inter­
val of 9-10 October as the the 'tide turns ominously' and that
■ ■  ..................... ............................. 74.................................
of 15-16 October as the 'tide turns again'. By 24 October
75
there was a nuclear alert with several days of acute crisis.
While we cannot know how this affects the scenario the over­
all situation changes henceforth in a very disruptive way. On
24 October Kissinger postponed his visit to China to 10-13 
76
November 1973.
In Thailand the unfolding at the same time of the crisis on
6 October which led to the overthrow of Thanom Kittikachom
77
was another factor making for disruption in Indochina. 
Sihanouk made a personal appeal to Mike Mansfield; in a 
telegramme of 14 October he called on Nixon to terminate the
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war in Cambodia: FUNK and GRUNK would immediately 
establish diplomatic relations with the US and guarantee free­
dom of departure for Lon Nol; a general amnesty would be 
granted to those who cooperated with the US and remaining 
himself only as 'titular head' of Cambodia, Sihanouk would 
no longer exercise any political power. His proposed govern­
ment would include Penn Nouth as Premier, Khieu Samphan
as Deputv Premier and Defence Minister and Hu Nim as Infor-
78
mation Minister.
A gesture of goodwill was also made by the US : on 15 Oct­
ober Huang Zhen brought Kissinger a message from Zhou 
Enlai that Sihanouk's mother was ill in Phnom Penh and
arrangements were made the next day for the Queen to be
79
flown to China. This notwithstanding, Sihanouk stressed
again on 17 October that he would not meet Kissinger who
80
was scheduled to visit China on 23-26 October.
But the latter preferred to deal with the Chinese anyway. 
Prior to his trip to Moscow, Kissinger on 19 October met
81
Huang Zhen in Washington, an event he ’put to good use'.
While Kissinger was in Moscow (20-22 October), the Soviet
Union was reported on 21 October to be reducing the staff
at its Phnom Penh embassy to three low level aides with the
82
rest scheduled to leave on 24 October. This looked like a 
furtherance of Soviet initiatives of 9 October.
The effort to restore the 'lawful rights' of GRUNK in the
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UN gathered momentum nevertheless. On 11 October a joint 
letter by some 31 countries including Albania, Algeria, China, 
Romania and Yugoslavia requested the restoration of the Cam­
bodian seat to GRUNK be put on the next agenda of the Gen- 
83
eral Assembly. On 16 October Chinese Ambassador Huang
Hua emphasised that the Lon Nol government's 'unlawful
usurpation' of Cambodia's seat in the UN was a 'complete vio-
84
lation' of the UN Charter. The General Assembly however
decided on 17 October (by a vote of 69:24 with 29 abstensions)
85
to discuss GRUNK's restoration to the UN and on 20 Octo­
ber Sihanouk announced the intention to reorganise his govem-
ment-in-exile so that all cabinet members except those in the
86Foreign Ministry would come from the resistance.
But developments in and concerning Cambodia appeared 
increasingly to be determined by events in Vietnam where the 
perception of war in the last quarter of 1973 had undergone 
considerable change.
To Hanoi, October 1973, according to Van Tien Dung,
Chief of Staff of the PAVN, marked a 'critical turning point!
The 21st plenum of the Party Central Committee met then
and called for the 'coordination of the political and military
87
struggle with diplomacy'. The road for the South would 
be that of 'revolutionary violence' in which event the return 
of largescale war would see 'complete victory' being sought.
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If the 'enemy' continued not to implement the Paris Agree­
ment and pursued the policy of Vietnamisation, there was 
'no other course' but to conduct revolutionary warfare, des­
troy the enemy and 'liberate the South’.
The Anti-US Resistance War describes the event as 'one
of the Party's historically significant plenums' which was
88
'meticulously prepared' by the politburo in October 1973.
A major decision was made to complete the revolution in the 
South after a 'strong transformation' of the situation there 
was brought about: from the victories of the latter part of 
1973 and in 1974 to the general offensive and uprising of 
the spring of 1975. The meeting 'unanimously agreed' with 
the June 1973 resolution (See p. 193). Moreover, the revo­
lution in the neighbouring countries, Laos and Cambodia, 
was 'actively helped’ by the resolution to 'continue to win 
victories'. The formation of the strategic corps 'quan doan'
was inaugurated on 24 October 1973 as it was now necess-
89
ary to reorganise one large campaign after another.
As a corollary to the hardening of the line on the South, 
attention was also being given in the DRV to naval defence 
and the protection of Hanoi's increasingly vital oil interests. 
During the period when the Japanese oil option was being ex­
plored, Le Duan and Van Tien Dung paid a visit on 18 Octo­
ber to the DRV's naval units. Emphasising the 'extremely 
important role' of the naval forces in meeting the 'immediate 
and longterm demands' of national defence and reconstruct-
325
ion, Le Duan said it was necessary to achieve 'close combat
coordination’ with other armed services. The naval forces
were to make a 'worthy contribution' to the development of
maritime navigation and the exploration of the 'abundant and
90
endless resources of our seas'. It was revealed on 23 Octo­
ber that a naval emulation campaign ranging from coastguard
91
battalions to radar stations and shipyards had been launched. 
The need for discipline in the armed forces, Ouan Giai Phong 
stressed on 22 October, 'must be stronger than before' to 
meet 'all requirements' in the future to 'ensure victory'. A 
visit to the army revealed on 30 October by Le Duan accom­
panied by Van Tien Dung and Song Hao, Deputy-Secretary 
of the Central Military Party Committee and Head of the 
PAVN General Political Department followed. Army cadres
were urged to develop a 'powerful people's army' to 'crush
................  93........................................................................
all acts of war'.
By the third week of October North Vietnam, according
to US intelligence, had moved since the ceasefire more than
70,000 fighting men, 400 tanks and more than 200 artillery
pieces into South Vietnam. The PAVN moved 15 anti-aircraft
artillery regiments to the South having nearly completed a
new all-weather highway south to Tay Ninh while rebuilding
94
12 airfields along the hilly perimeter west of the country. 
These improvements gave North Vietnam the 'greatest attack 
potential' since the March 1972 offensive. The difference 
now was that the DRV did not necessarily face heavy oppo­
sition from US airpower.
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Parallel with these developments, the DRV's ties with
the Soviet bloc were strengthened. Pham Van Dong with
Nguyen Duy Trinh embarked in the meantime on visits to
East Germany, Czechosolvakia and Albania (16 October-6
November) in a delegation that included state planning and
defence specialists. The presence of Tran Sam, Vice-Minister
of National Defence suggested that the visits might have had 
95a military element. In East Berlin Dong secured the provi­
sion of military assist ance together with economic aid arrange­
ments. Prague took the lead among the central European coun­
tries in its cancellation of debts owed by Hanoi for aid given 
during the war. In Tirana a joint statement was signed mark­
ing a 'new contribution' to the strengthening of 'fraternal
friendship' with two agreements on economic assistance and 
96
on trade and payments.
Returning to Moscow on 2-3 November, Pham Van Dong,
in an exchange of views with Kosygin, discussed measures
to ensure the strict implementation of the Paris Agreement and
97
international issues of 'mutual interest’. The Soviet side re­
mained committed to give ’effective assistance' and support 
to the DRV in its efforts for the 'socialist reconstruction' of 
its economy and for the widening of Soviet-Vietnamese coop­
eration. There was much press speculation at the time about a
98
possible visit by Brezhnev to Hanoi.
By the first fortnight of November however a different scena­
rio in Indochina with several strands of action had emerged.
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V : IV
CAMBODIA: ’SIDE-ISSUE’
Cambodia by contrast bore the brunt of these onslaughts.
Kissinger, as we have seen, was obliged on 24 October to
delay his China visit to 10-13 November. This interval was
exploited to the full by the insurgents. On 28 October Khieu
Samphan appealed to compatriots, cadres and combattants of
the CPNLAF for a 'more powerful offensive' in the 1973-74 
99
dry season. Attacks on all domains surrounding Phnom 
Penh, in the few provincial capitals and on communication 
lines 'under temporary enemy control' were thus intensified 
resulting in the fall on 4 and 7 November of two strategic 
towns, Tram Khnar and Srang. In a move that appeared de­
signed to forestall Kissinger's Peking visit, a communique 
was issued in Peking on 9 November to transfer GRUNK’s 
ministries still abroad to Cambodian soil where they would 
exercise 'full authority'. Invoking the 23 March 1970 state­
ment which had been reaffirmed by the National Congress of 
21 July 1973, the communique warned that the struggle of
the Cambodian people had reached its 'ultimate phase' and
100
would lead to 'ultimate victory'.
The foundation simultaneously in Tokyo on 9 November
of a Japan-Cambodia Association suggested an initiative to ex-
101
pand GRUNK's recognition. Chairman Sasaki Kozo and
328
Director-General Sakamoto Tokumatsu of the Association were
assisted by 'advisors' including Saionji Kinkazu, Kuroda Hisao
and Fujiyama Aiichiro, eminent friends of Peking. Although
not a Japanese government move, the presence of Chen Zhu,
Ambassador to Japan implied Chinese support for the creation
of a pro-GRUNK lobby in Japan.
Peking moreover hosted a banquet on 8 November for
Ieng Sary, Special Envoy from the Interior before he left 
102
for the 'liberated zone'. A preliminary visit by Ieng Sary
to Hanoi (9-13 November) reflected a strong military element.
The delegation included Duong Sam Ol, Minister of Military
Equipment and Armaments and Thioun Prasith, Minister in
Charge of 'Coordination of Efforts and Struggle for the Nati-
103
onal Liberation of Cambodia'. No communique however 
was issued after talks with Pham Van Dong and Nguyen Co 
Thach, in stark contrast to Dong's own talks in Moscow bare­
ly a week earlier.
Meanwhile in a visit to the 'liberated zone' of Sam Neua in 
Laos, revealed only after his return on 7 November, Le Duan 
underlined the 'utmost importance' Hanoi attached to the pro­
motion of security, suggesting the need for a friendly presence
104
beyond Vietnam's western frontier. This could be linked to 
the imminent installation of GRUNK on Cambodian soil which 
may have propelled the Vietnamese decision to form a security 
corridor with Laos. Le Duan was determined on the basis of 
'equality and mutual interests' not to allow 'any other country'
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to use 'either country' as a springboard for intervention and 
aggression against the other. The intention too was probably 
to isolate Cambodia from the rest of Indochina and to establish 
Hanoi's defence interests as compatible with Laos'.
With Soviet backing and the allegiance of the Pathet Lao 
secured, by early November 1973 military activity both in the 
North and the South took on a new emphasis and scale. An 
offensive had already begun in B-2, the 'all-encompassing 
battlefield’with the largest enemy forces and many important 
strategic and campaign objectives, which affected the general 
situation. Tran Van Tra began the 1973-74 dry season offen­
sive by ensuring that the transportation corridor was 'unimpe- 
105
ded and safe1. The 'most savage battle' since the ceasefire 
followed. Bu Bong and Bu Prang, outposts near the Cambo­
dian border were taken on 4 November. Two days later Dak 
Song fell. On 7 November the Viet Cong attacked Bien Hoa 
base, the largest air base in the country and the location of one 
of the ICCS units. As retaliation the RVN military command 
bombed two areas near the Cambodian border Loc Ninh and 
Bo Due, in the 'largest air strike' since the ceasefire. The battle 
for control of South Vietnam's border with Cambodia in the 
Central Highlands intensified to such an extent by mid-Novem 
-ber that a South Vietnamese divisional commander remarked 
on 21 November that Thieu's forces would require American
arms, fuel and both tactical and strategic air support if the com-
106
munists staged a major offensive in the next few months.
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In the interim Kissinger's visit to Peking (10-13 Novem­
ber) affirmed the 'basic indifference' over Cambodia which
could not be discussed 'except within the context of all Indo- 
107
china'. An entire session was devoted to it 'later on' dur­
ing the visit This was not elaborated upon, but Zhou Enlai 
we are told 'did not return to the subject' except to tell Kiss­
inger that his conversations with North Vietnamese leaders 
indicated that they had 'no intention' of launching a major 
offensive now.
Six years later Hanoi's interpretation of Kissinger’s Pek­
ing visit described the two sides as having issued a statement 
which said:
'In the particularly serious situation at present, it is neces­
sary for China and the US to hold frequent contacts at com­
petent level to exchange views on matters of mutual interest 
In fact these were common efforts made by the Chinese 
rulers and the US in order to hinder the struggle of the armed 
forces in South Vietnam. The Peking rulers even advised the
US 'not to allow yourselves to be defeated in Vietnam and
108
not to pull your forces from Southeast Asia'.'
The Joint Communique of 14 November 1973 did provide
'frequent contact' between the US and China at authoritative
levels in both Washington and Peking and the widening in
scope of the Liaison Offices in each others' capitals to include
109
consular, trade and information services, It also noted that
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international relations were in a period of 'intense change' 
and reaffirmed that 'disputes between states' should be settled 
without resorting to force or threat of force. The Soviet threat 
was dispelled by the phrase that 'neither side should seek hege­
mony in Asia or the Pacific or elsewhere and that both sides 
opposed attempts by anyone else to establish such hegemony’.
Cambodia was not directly referred to in the communique 
and Kissinger's discussions with Zhou appeared to confirm 
Sihanouk’s worst fears that Cambodia was placed on the back- 
bumer. One particular phrase stressed in the communique was 
that 'in order to exchange views and while not negotiating on
behalf of 'third parties', it was important to engage in 'concre-
110
te consultations on issues of mutual concern'. Kissinger 
described the US position as not being opposed to the prince: 
'If he could return to Cambodia in a position of real independ­
ence for himself, we would be very interested in him as a lead­
er. We are not interested in him if he is a captive of one partic­
ular faction that is simply using him for a very brief period of
111
time in order to gain international recognition.'
After Kissinger's departure from China - the prince disclo­
sed on 16 November that the transfer of GRUNK ministers to
the interior was a tactical move designed to bolster intemation-
112
al support for GRUNK. It was also calculated to coincide 
with the General Assembly debate due to begin in early Decern 
-ber. Denying that there was a struggle for power, Sihanouk 
claimed that on his insistence the resistance leaders had accept­
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ed the transfer on 9 November so that forces hostile to GRUNK 
could no lo&r treat it as a 'govemment-in -exile*. The elimina­
tion of the 'external part' of GRUNK would strongly reinforce 
its international and national position at a time when the UN de­
bate on Cambodia's representation was about to take place. A 
telegramme on 3 December to Khieu Samphan approved the 
nomination of new ministers of GRUNK inside Cambodia and 
the composition of the FUNK Committee. The ministerial port­
folios included Prince Norodom Phurissara, Minister of Justice, 
Thiounn Thioeunn, Minister of Public Health, Toch Phoeun, 
Minister of Public Works, Telecommunications and Reconstru­
ction Chou Chet, Minister of Religious and Social Affairs and
113
Mrs. Ieng Thirith, Minister of People's Education and Youth.
On 4 December China, Algeria, Yugoslavia and some 30 
other nations opened a drive at the UN General Assembly to 
expel the Lon Nol Government and to seat GRUNK. The Chin­
ese remained intent - at the risk of defeat - on pressing for recog­
nition of Sihanouk as sole legitimate representative of Cambodia. 
The US Representative W.Tapley Bennet, Jr., maintained on 5 
December that the Cambodian resolution was'particularly nota­
ble' for its one-sidedness and failure to take account of the 'real
situation' in Cambodia. Calling it 'simplistic' and 'totally unacc-
114
eptable', he said it might set a precedent for other nations. 
Opposing the campaign were the Asian neighbours of Cambo­
dia including Japan, who along with the US attacked the move 
as a dangerous precedent of 'interference' in Cambodian internal
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affairs. The Soviet Union and its supporters were conspicuously 
silent in the debate, making no effort to support the claims of Sih­
anouk despite its move to recognise GRUNK in early October.
A move developed in the event among the non-committed count­
ries to defer the decision until the following year which the Ass-
115
embly adopted by a rollcall vote of 53:50 with 21 abstensions.
Having failed to secure GRUNK's recognition at the UN,
another attempt to consolidate its legitimacy surfaced in Paris
where a Cambodian Solidarity Conference opened on 12 Dec- 
116
ember. The stated aim was to deprive Washington of further 
means to violate the spirit and letter of Article 20 and to isolate 
to the maximum, Lon Nol's influence in the international arena. 
Sihanouk's message to the conference invoked the said article 
as perpetuating the continued state of war in Cambodia, caused 
'essentially' by foreign interference. Despite the prince's empha­
sis on previous proposals already made known, the heightening 
of the offensive on the ground was simultaneously being inten­
sified.
The fall of Vihear Suor on 30 November was an inauspicious 
beginning of the dry season which was expected to bring a renew 
-ed push by the Khmer Rouge to strangle Phnom Penh. Vihear 
Suor stood astride an infiltration route leading to the eastern bank 
of the Mekong opposite Phnom Penh which under intense insur­
gency pressure had been surrounded for almost three months.
Hu Nim, Minister of Propaganda and Information revealed that 
the CPNLAF had begun opening more important fronts beginni­
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ng in December and by 23 December had gained enough strength
117
to be able to shell various enemy positions inside the capital.
The December offensive was described as the 'biggest push1 the
insurgents had made and was the 'first real concerted attempt’ to
118
penetrate into the capital. It was bigger in terms of offensives 
than those of the previous summer; attributed possibly to the fact 
that 'at the end of 1973' the Party in the maquis 'finally asserted 
full control' of the Front's miltary command structure, and poli­
tical commissars were assigned to assist and instruct officers
119
down to company level throughout most of the country.
The deteriorating military situation notwithstanding, Tokyo in 
the last quarter of 1973 continued to forge closer ties in Vietnam.
V : V
TOKYO & HANOI: THE OIL CONNECTION
Like other industrial democracies affected by the Arab-Israe- • 
li War, Japan was profoundly shaken by the oil 'shokku' from 
mid-October 1973 onwards. On 16 October in a sudden and 
unprecedented move - without consultation with consumer nat­
ions - six OPEC Gulf states unilaterally raised the posted price 
of oil by 70%. The imminent oil crisis saw Hanoi responding 
to the Petroleum Development Corporation's (PDC) call to send 
'oil-connected persons' to Japan. On 17 October it confirmed 
the visit from 26 October by Hoang Quoc Viet, Chairman of
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the Fatherland Front, the first senior DRV official to go to Jap-
120
an in the wake of diplomatic relations. On 24 October Nis- 
sho-Iwai announced the dispatch of their second survey miss­
ion to the DRV and disclosed that Hanoi - in a radical departure
from standard practice - had also accepted oil development with
121
Japan on the basis of a joint venture. This was a welcome 
development from the 'production sharing formula' indicated 
earlier which marked a contradiction in terms of state ownership, 
Also President of the Vietnam General Federation of Trade 
Unions, Hoang Quoc Viet’s visit to Japan (30 October-10 Nov­
ember) came at a critical juncture when Japan was reeling from 
the oil shock. It preceded Kissinger's visit to Tokyo by 4 days. 
Viet was in Japan, not as a guest of the government, but at the 
invitation of six organisations including the JSP, JCP, SOHYO 
(Japanese Federation of Trade Unions). As leader of the first 
North Vietnamese political delegation to Japan, Viet used the 
occasion to encourage 'greater contact' between Tokyo and 
Hanoi. The establishment of diplomatic ties was only a 'nom­
inal beginning'; he reminded his hosts throughout his visit that 
the DRV hoped for a reasonable settlement of 'some problems'
including Japanese recognition of the PRG and the question of 
122
reparations. Bilateral aid was to be based on the principles 
of equality and reciprocity.
Viet gave particular emphasis to the fact that Japan might 
turn to North Vietnam to secure oil reserves 'much nearer 
home’. Embroiled in war the DRV's resources had remained
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untapped and Japan could offer oil technology and develop- 
123
ment in return. Hanoi saw Japanese economic cooperati­
on as 'unconditional*. North Vietnam's basic goal was to lay 
its economic foundations by 1975 to begin a new plan for 
1976-78 which necessitated foreign aid.
Several important developments coincided with Viet's 
Tokyo visit. On 6 November it was disclosed that agreed 
memoranda had been exchanged between Hanoi and two 
Japanese oil companies. Oil development of the Tonkin Gulf 
might begin with the decision by the Daiichi Hypothec Bank, 
including the Kawasaki, Furukawa and C.Itoh groups with
ENI, the Italian State oil enterprise, to respond to such a re- 
124
quest from Hanoi.
Oil development might also consequently become crucial 
both for the industrial reconstruction of Vietnam and for the 
diversification of Japan's oil supplies. Japanese cooperation 
with ENI was based on the latter's 'close connection’with 
China and North Vietnam. The possibility of a new phase of 
joint oil development between Tokyo, Peking and Hanoi on 
contiguous areas of the continental shelf was envisaged.
At the same time Toyo Oil was ready on 7 November to 
embark on exploration of oil fields in the Tonkin Gulf. Des­
cribed as its 'first independent project’ the intention was to
125
settle negotiations with Hanoi formally within the year.
Toyo Oil's biggest shareholder, Nissho-Iwai, as we have 
seen had participated in talks with Hanoi since 1972 and had
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'especially good connections' with North Vietnam. Deposits 
in the gulf adjacent to the East China Sea were estimated to 
be 'greater than those of the North Sea': Toyo Oil and Nis- 
sho-Iwai were scheduled shortly to sound out China's int­
entions since the area to be developed was adjacent to Hai-
126
nan Island and stood at the entrance to the Tonkin Gulf.
The disclosure by Fuyo Oil on 9 November that it had also
been negotiating with the Compagnie Fran^aise des Petroles
to explore South China Sea development was another posi- 
127
tive development.
Hoang Quoc Viet's Tokyo visit culminated in an unprece­
dented meeting with Ohira on 9 November when the latter
affirmed Japan's commitment to contribute to Vietnamese 
128
reconstruction. Despite the destabilising forces mention­
ed earlier there was no change in Japanese strategy on Viet­
nam.
After Peking Kissinger visited Tokyo (14-16 November) 
where he found the oil crisis shaking Japan 'to its core'. By 
November 1973 Tokyo's leaders were beginning to feel that 
their national interest and indeed survival, might require them 
to dissociate from US policy in the Middle East. The overwhel­
ming majority of the Japanese cabinet, according to Kissinger,
favoured some dissociation from Washington: Foreign Minister
129
Ohira alone stood for solidarity with the US.
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Little was divulged about Kissinger’s Tokyo visit but the 
Japanese press said it stressed the necessity of a policy chan­
ge on Japan's part in both the short and longrange fields inclu­
ding: 1) The shelving of the 'Archipelago Remodelling Plan' 
outlined by Premier Tanaka, 2) The shifting of industrial poli­
cy centreing on heavy and chemical industry, 3) The diversi­
fication of channels for securing resources which focused ex­
tensively on the Middle East and the expansion of the develop­
ment of Japan's own independent supply channels which were
not dependent on the 'majors’ (international oil capital) as a 
130
national policy.
Indochina reconstruction had been discussed, according 
to Kissinger, at 'an initial meeting' held at the World Bank's 
Paris office in October 1973 to exchange views on aid when 
the US supported the Bank's efforts and the Japanese propo­
sal (See Appendix III). A second mission sent to Vietnam 
in November 1973 by the Bank subsequently proposed a 
'follow-on' meeting be held in February 1974 to discuss the 
formation of the Indochina consultative group. However the 
'reactions of the participating countries' to the energy crisis 
and to the Congressional decision on the AID replenishment 
led the Bank to postpone the meeting until late spring.
Indochina aid was probably discussed in this context dur­
ing Kissinger's Tokyo visit. On 17 November - the day after 
Kissinger's departure - US Ambassador to Japan, Robert 
Ingersoll (who was recommended by Kissinger to be nomin-
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ated Deputy Secretary for East Asia and the Pacific on 12 Oct-
131
ober) was recalled by Nixon. Having performed his role 
as Ambassador to Japan since 1972 'with great distinction', 
the choice of Ingersoll, Kissinger said, personified the impor­
tance the US attached 'in our Asian policy' to the special role 
of Japan. As we shall see, Ingersoll would subsequently play 
a 'very crucial role' in the formulation and conduct of US for­
eign policy.
By this time the US perception of events in Indochina had 
undergone considerable change. The American commitment 
to postwar reconstruction in Indochina was ultimately related 
to assurances that aid given would be used constructively. On 
27 November 1973 however the Foreign Assistance Act of 
1961 was amended by the following passage:
'The President is authorised to furnish, on such terms and 
conditions as he may determine, assistance for relief and re­
construction of South Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos includ­
ing especially humanitarian assistance to refugees, civil war 
casualties and other persons disadvantaged by hostilities or 
conditions related to those hostilities in South Vietnam, Cam­
bodia and Laos. No assistance shall be furnished under this 
section to South Vietnam unless the President receives assu­
rances satisfactory to him that no assistance furnished under 
this part and no local currencies generated as a result of ass­
istance furnished under this part, will be used for support of
police, or prison construction and administration within South 
132
Vietnam.'
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There was another clause on the prohibition of assistan­
ce to North Vietnam, stressing that 'notwithstanding any 
other provision of law, no funds authorised by this Act 
shall be expended to aid, or assistance in the reconstruction
of the DRV unless by an Act of Congress assistance to
133
North Vietnam is specifically authorised'.
Where Indochina Postwar Reconstruction was concerned, 
the Senate Bill amended the Foreign Assistance Act by add­
ing a new 'part V' authorising rehabilitation and reconstruct­
ion in South Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos of which not less 
than US$10 million was to support humanitarian programmes.
Coupled with these moves the hardening of Hanoi's posi­
tion appeared at the end of November to have been enhanced. 
Promising Japanese-North Vietnamese relations received a 
sudden setback on 30 November. Kvodo reported indications 
from Hanoi suggesting all oil proposals had been suspended. 
North Vietnam could not accept the Japanese PDC’s partici­
pation in oil development until 'unresolved diplomatic prob-
bems' were settled, including the PRG's recognition and 
134
reparations.
The toughening of Hanoi's stance was evident in the South
as well. Saigon on 30 November spoke of the need to create
an 'economic blockade' since the communists appeared ready
at the end of the rainy season to create a strength greater than
135
what they possessed prior to the summer. What was descri­
bed as the 'fiercest fighting since January 1973' ensued with
3 4 1
the Viet Cong taking the initiative in much of the escalation.
The attack on Kien Due on 4 December was the first frontal
assault by the communists on a district capital and the largest
battle since the ceasefire. Its seizure saw the Viet Cong poised
to move towards Gia Nghia, the provincial capital of Quang
Due. On 6 December the Viet Cong threatened the Saigon
Administration with 'new lessons' if its 'punitive blows' in
Chu Nghe, Thanh Due, Bien Hoa, Dong Du, Bu Bong, Tuy
Due and Nha Be would not compel the 'Thieu clique' to act 
136
properly. It was alleged in Saigon on 12 December that
Hanoi's General Hoang Van Thai had personally commanded
the attack in Quang Due indicating that military strategy in the
137
South was directed by North Vietnam.
Judged to have 'developed and matured' in combat and
campaigns with 'good results', B-2 was conferred a 'new
138
strategic status' in mid-December 1973. The decision 
was also reached of a plan to gain the initiative by 'tying 
their hands and feet' to deflect the enemy and force it to be 
concerned with the defence of Saigon and thus prevent it 
from attacking Loc Ninh.
These disruptive influences at the end of 1973 would set 
the stage for a new scenario in 1974 where different forces 
would come into play. And where the economic framework 
for the stabilisation of Indochina would be tied to wider 
global designs and influences.
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CHAPTER VI
THE LIMITS TO STABILITY 
DECEMBER 1973 - AUGUST 1974
'Although the Nixon Administration's limited achieve­
ments in the diplomatic sphere and its policy of detente have 
brought the USA some immediate advantages, they have also 
created many new contradictions. At a time when the USA 
remains bogged down in Southeast Asia, Japan and many 
other powers have jumped in to compete fiercely with the 
USA for influence, transforming this zone into a focus of 
competing interests.'
NHAN DAN 
1 January 1974*
'Among the major powers involved in Asia - the People's 
Republic of China, Japan, the Soviet Union and the United 
States - there is increasing recognition that each has legitimate 
interests in the area and a responsibility commensurate with 
its strength to see that a quadrilateral relationship contributes 
to stability rather than chaos.'
Robert Ingersoll 
27 March 1974
Hanoi Home Service. 1 January 1974. SWB/FE/4490/A3/2. 
Stability and Change in East Asia, Address by the Assist-
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ant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, in DSB. 15 
April 1974, p.393.
VI: I
RECONSTRUCTION VERSUS CONFLICT 
DECEMBER 1973 - JANUARY 1974
The escalation in South Vietnam towards virtual fullscale 
war forced the convening of another session on 20 December 
1973 of the Paris talks between Kissinger and Le Due Tho. 
Both Hanoi and Saigon had called attention in the interim to 
the increased fighting and warned that largescale war might 
again break out but it was not clear why Kissinger and Tho 
agreed to another meeting. Neither side had suggested the 
Paris Agreement be renegotiated nor were they prepared to 
take new steps to put the accord into effect.
The circumstances leading to the meeting however might 
be examined. On 11 December Pham Van Dong made an un­
expected initiative towards Tokyo for 'improved relations' 
urging the Japanese Government to clear a 'number of obsta­
cles' standing in the way of the furtherance of relations betw-
1
een the two countries which had yet to become 'normal'.
The timing of the request was significant, coming a mere,l 1
353
days after the unexpected suspension by Hanoi of Japanese 
participation in oil development described earlier (See p.341).
In the context of detente, the Jackson-Vanik Amendment was 
being approved in Washington the same day. It is not the 
purpose of this thesis to pursue that development but the 
amendment probably left some effect on US attempts to in­
fluence Hanoi through Moscow. Writing in 1988 Nixon said, 
'In 1973, Congress passed the Jackson-Vanik amendment 
that blocked the granting of most-favoured nation trading 
status to the Soviet Union until its citizens were allowed to
emigrate freely. As a result, the most important positive
2
incentive for Soviet restraint was revoked.'
Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko however suggest­
ed in 1989 that 'many initiatives' which would have smoothed 
Soviet-US relations were 'deliberately slowed do.wn' by end­
less new conditions connected with the question of emigration:
a 'pathetic example' of which was the Jackson-Vanik Amend- 
3
ment. 'In effect', Gromyko continued, 'it froze Soviet -US
trade by linking it to Soviet policy on Jewish emigration.'
It would appear that the US sought to keep the connection
through Moscow to pressure Hanoi. On 13 December the VNA
officially announced that Kissinger and Tho would meet in 
4
Paris on 20 December. In Washington Soviet Ambassador
Anatoly Dobrynin on 13 December met privately with Nixon,
5
described by Kissinger as 'an extraordinary event'.
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Saigon disclosed on 14 December that it had been inform­
ed 'in advance' of the Paris meeting, arranged owing to the
6
'critical situation' in the South. Its Foreign Minister Vuong 
Van Bac, who replaced Tran Van Lam on 9 July 1973, was 
in Europe but it was not known if he would attend the meet­
ing the content of which would be made known to the RVN 
if it concerned the latter.
Speculation was rife that the talks had been arranged thro­
ugh 'mutual consultation’; Le Due Tho's arrival in Paris on
17 December however suggested that they had been proposed
7
'at the request' of the US side. Soviet sources were reported 
on 21 December to have said that Moscow played an import­
ant 'behind-the-scenes' role in arranging the meeting since
both Hanoi and the NLF were becoming 'increasingly restive 
8
and impatient'. The Soviet press had lately given more attent­
ion, it is true, to the deteriorating military situation, warning
of the danger of renewed fullscale conflict unless steps were
9
taken to bolster the ceasefire agreement. It might be noted at 
the same time that the Hanoi visit from 19 December of a Sup­
reme Soviet delegation was described as a 'new manifestation
of the friendship and revolutionary solidarity that had increas-
10
ingly developed' between the two peoples.
Very little is known of the talks. The main item was appar­
ently an exchange of charges about the failure to put the cease­
fire agreement into effect. Hanoi blamed the US for the lack of
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a political settlement between the South Vietnamese and the PRG. 
Le Due Tho however rejected charges on 21 December that Indo­
china had been sacrificed to the interests of accomodation betw­
een the Soviet Union and the US. The improvement of relations,
11
he said, had not had 'any influence on our struggle'. Alluding 
to charges by Hanoi and the NLF that the US had introduced up 
to 20,000 military advisers under civilian cover in South Vietnam 
in the guise of the Paris Agreement, Tho said that as long as the 
US continued its 'military interference’ in the US, and used the 
Saigon regime for its 'neo-colonialist policies', the situation 
would remain tense and the US involvement would deepen.
In his memoirs, Kissinger's only reference to the talks - his 
last meeting with Tho - was to remark that the latter 'grew un­
bearably more insolent' as America’s domestic divisions gradu­
ally opened up new and decisive strategic opportunities for Han- 
12
oi. The Joint Statement of 20 December 1973 only disclosed
that both sides 'exchanged views' on matters of mutual interest *
in the context of the current situation and would maintain 'this
13
channel' for further discussions as warranted by events.
At a news conference on 3 January 1974 Kissinger said
Tho and himself had 'an agreement’ not to discuss the subs- 
14
tance of the talks. The meeting, he said, revolved around 
a 'general review' of the situation in Vietnam with particular 
emphasis on measures that might be taken to ease i t  Both 
parties were currently studying the situation and would be
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’in touch' with each other in the next few weeks. The thrust 
of the talks, Kissinger revealed, concerned ways to alleviate 
the situation and not particular responses that might be made 
to 'this or that move'. Regarding the possibility of a North 
Vietnamese offensive, on narrow balance, he expected Han­
oi to recognise that 'nobody's interest' would be served by 
an offensive in Vietnam.
It was suggested in early January that Le Due Tho had 
hoped at the talks to effect an exchange promising military 
restraint in the South in return for a US pledge on reconstru­
ction aid and pressure on Thieu to wind down his military 
operations against the NLF. Kissinger apparently refused to 
cooperate and interpreted Hanoi's wish to clinch an agree­
ment as a sign of weakness. He was said to have made three 
demands: One that Hanoi Call off its expected military offen­
sive in the South; Two, for an accounting of US POWs still
missing in action throughout Indochina; Three, for a strict
15
observance of the Paris Agreement, especially Article 20.
In this context Kissinger's reference on 27 December
1973 to the Nixon Doctrine was significant. The doctrine,
Kissinger said, laid the basis for a fundamental realignment 
16
of the postwar period. In the first phase, this meant the 
reduction of many of the US' overextended commitments. 
The Paris Agreement permitted a disengagement of Ameri­
can forces to leave the resolution of its political future to
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negotiations among the Vietnamese parties and permit an 
'evolution' that was to be the responsibility of those concer­
ned. Increasingly the US-designed framework of peace for 
Vietnam was to be tied to the economic system created in the 
immediate postwar period. This would have as its basis a 
'sense of participation' by all nations in an 'architectural de­
sign' that would require the commitment of succeeding ad­
ministrations.
Japan was a crucial part of this design. Despite the 'tempor­
ary aberration' created by the energy crisis, Tokyo, Kissinger 
said, was developing a new and mature partnership with the 
US which entitled it to 'full consideration' as an equal partner 
worldwide.
What is clear in the wake of the Paris talks was that Hanoi 
had not altogether abandoned the option of reconstruction aid 
from either the US or Japan. In a significant development, Tok­
yo revealed on 22 December that Hanoi had made an agreement
in principle to accept Japan's cooperation in the development of
17
oil resources in the Tonkin Gulf. For the first time Hanoi ask­
ed for Japanese economic cooperation in largescale reconstruct­
ion and development. The request, it was disclosed on 24 Dec­
ember, had been made through the Japan Institute for Scientific
and Technological Exchange, a non-governmental organisation
18
formed in May 1973 with an estimated 50 Japanese firms. In 
return Hanoi assured Tokyo of a stable supply of raw materials
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'including oil'. The Institute would subsequently call on the 
Japanese Government and industrial circles to map out specific 
plans for the extension of such economic cooperation. A fact­
finding mission would also be sent in mid-January 1974 to ex­
plore further projects for private agreements in the DRV. Altho­
ugh 'technical and industrial development' implied for Hanoi 
heavy industry, the budding of a petrochemical plant as well as
the 'joint development' of oilfields, oil sands and shales were 
19
also envisaged.
There was a distinction on North Vietnam's part however 
between Japanese government and private applications. To dis­
courage competition, Hanoi on 22 December expressed its pre­
ference for the PDC to act as collective representative for priv­
ate enteiprise while the project might also be handled on a gov-
20
emment-to-govemment basis. The idea of immediate govern­
ment intervention on behalf of private firms was dispelled by a
21
report in Nikkan Kogvo on 26 December 1973. It described 
Toyo Oil, Nikkyo Boeki and Japan Oil Engineering as expect­
ing on 17 December to evolve a development formula, select­
ion of a mining area and a development schedule to conclude
22
negotiations with Hanoi on an oilfield 'within the year'.
General consensus was also reached on the adoption of the pro­
duction-sharing formula. On 25 December final agreement was 
reached by Toyo Oil, expected to become the sole developer of 
resources in the Gulf. The project was to be undertaken under 
a 'production-sharing formula' with surveys on the deposits be-
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23
ginning 'early in 1974'.
Hanoi's initiatives with Japan raised problems with China. 
Six days after the conclusion of the Kissinger-Tho talks, Hanoi 
appeared intent on largescale reconstruction and production-shar 
-ing under which consultations with Peking were necessary. On 
26 December Hanoi proposed talks with Peking to 'officially de­
marcate' their common boundaiy in the Tonkin Gulf (Bac-Bo)
so that the DRV might use its part of territory for 'national 
24
reconstruction'.
This proposal came at an interesting point It was preceded
by a visit to Hanoi - first mentioned on 26 December - by An
Bingsheng, Secretary of Guangxi province who called on
Hoang Quoc Viet (who visited Japan in November 1973) in
his capacity as President of the Vietnam-China Friendship 
25
Association. The Guangxi delegation then visited Ninh 
Binh province (27-29 December) and the Viet Bac Autonom­
ous Region (2-5 January) where military figures like Major- 
General Chu Van Tan, featured prominently. A meeting was 
held in Hanoi on 6 January 1974 to welcome the Chinese 
delegation.
Although not known at the time, Hanoi consequently expl­
ained in 1979 that the Chinese had been 'increasing their acts 
of provocation and territorial encroachment' in the northern
provinces from 1973 onwards, in an attempt to 'weaken Nor-
26
th Vietnamese efforts at total liberation of South Vietnam'.
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China, it was also alleged, prevented the DRV from exploiting 
its natural resources which hindered its own economic rehabi­
litation and development programme.
According to the Vietnamese, Chinese Ambassador Wang 
Youping on 18 January 1974, informed DRV Vice-Minister of
Foreign Affairs, Hoang Van Tien, of Peking's agreement to
27
begin talks on the Tonkin Gulf. Before official delineation
of the gulf, Wang suggested that neither party permit a 'third
country' to conduct surveys or prospecting work there since
such operations were detrimental to the economic develop-
28
ment and military security of both countries. Hanoi later
accused Peking of allowing foreign firms, without its concur-
29
rence, to explore seas under Vietnamese sovereignty.
GLOSSARY OF ISLAND AND PLACE NAMES
VIETNAMESE CHINESE
Paracels 
Spratlys 
Gulf of Tonkin
Hoang Sa 
(Yellow Sands)
Truong Sa 
(Central Sands)
Vinh Bac-Bo
Xisha 
(Western Sands)
Nansha 
(Southern Sands)
Beibu Wan
The Chinese interpretation proved contrary. According to 
Peking, the Tonkin Gulf (Beibu Wan) had 'never been divid-
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ed'. Hanoi however apparently drew a dividing line close 
to Hainan Island to occupy two-thirds of the area. The Chin­
ese therefore suggested 'more than once' that the two sides 
settle the division of the gulf on a 'fair and reasonable basis’ 
taking the opportunity to stake their claim on some islands 
regarded as Chinese territory ’from a historical point of view' 
One Vietnamese Vice-Minister, Peking charged, affirmed the­
se islands as Chinese territory on 15 June 1956; Peking then 
issued its own declaration on 4 September 1958 claining 
Taiwan and its surrounding islands, the Penghu, Dongsha,
Xisha, Zhongsha and Nansha’, which was supported by Pre-
31
mier Pham Van Dong ten days later.
By this time developments in South Vietnam also caused 
the Chinese some anxiety. As we have seen earlier, Japan 
witnessed severe reverberations oh account of the October 
1973 Arab-Israeli war. In South Vietnam the effects were no 
less severe, as Ambassador Graham Martin revealed in an 
interview with the BBC in 1977:
'Two things cam e in the fall of 1973. First was the
Arab-Israel war when the American stockpiles were severely 
drawn down and with the absence of appropriations which 
would quickly replace those stockpiles in Europe and in the 
US. Then the pressures on the American military establish­
ment to reach every conceivable source of supply or places 
where they could cut back. Then the rationale began that the
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South Vietnamese were being too profligate, for example in 
the expenditure of ammunition - although some military peo­
ple in whose confidence I have every reason to rely, have 
estimated that a South Vietnamese division, for example, 
was expending ten per cent of the ammunition under active 
combat conditions that an American division would have 
expended in a static or non-active hostilities sort of situation.
The second thing was the increasingly effective propagan­
da campaign being waged in the US without effective count­
er from the Executive Branch, which led to Congressional 
reductions in the monies appropriated for military support to 
South Vietnam at the very time that the prices for the items 
were being vastly escalated. Now the combination of these 
brought about what the military logisticians have estimated to 
be an eighty per cent reduction in effective military aid, with­
out any knowledge or forewarning to the South Vietnamese
32
that this would take place.'
Since oil was critical to fight the continuing war, Saigon
in desperation, placed great hope on oil exploitation. According
to Cao Van Vien, 'among other financial resources', oil, it was
believed, might supplement military aid or eventually replace it 
33
altogether. The Viet Cong were quick to seize the opportuni­
ties this situation presented. In their most successful act of econ­
omic sabotage the Viet Cong on 3 December 1973 had fired 50 
rounds of rockets into Nha Be petroleum depot, the largest gaso­
line storage area destroying half the nation's stocks. A series of
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austerity measures to conserve energy were thus introduced. 
The situation was temporarily relieved on 12 December how­
ever when a US Defence Department statement said the natio­
n's war reserves of oil in the Pacific would supply South Viet-
34
nam and Cambodia with their daily 'minimum requirments'. 
On 2 January 1974 however, the Department of Defence App­
ropriations Act placed a ceiling of US$1,126 million on US 
military aid to South Vietnam and Laos and banned the ship­
ment of petroleum fuels from continental USA to Southeast
35
Asia for use by foreign forces. At the same time Congress 
expressed the growing American reluctance to further should­
er the defence commitment to South Vietnam by suggesting 
a deadly cutoff in oil to that nation. In his interview mention­
ed above, Martin recalled that from his position in Saigon, the 
'first cable' referring to this was in December 1973 when 'the 
process had already begun' as a result of the pressures on the 
Pentagon from the diversion of stocks into the Middle East. 
But he also emphasised that the beginnings of the pressures 
of Watergate from the autumn of 1973 which escalated throu­
ghout 1974 until Nixon's departure in August, 'did not lead
to a great concentration of either thought or effort in the Exec-
36
utive Branch of the US on Vietnam'.
The tendency by early 1974 to abandon Saigon to its own 
initiatives forced the RVN to pursue its oil strategy with some 
vigour. Foreign Minister Vuong Van Bac's visits to Saudi 
Arabia in December 1973 and Japan (8-10 January) were
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37
steps in this direction. Economic cooperation and the 'con­
tinuous extension' of aid for 1973-74 were discussed when 
Bac called on Ohira in Tokyo. An attempt was made to aug­
ment the trend of Japanese economic activities in South Viet­
nam by the pledge that private Japanese capital might make
38
a 'more positive advance' from 1 January 1974. Oil devel­
opment was part of this equation. A member of the National 
Petroleum Commmission (NPC), Bac himself participated in 
formulating the draft Petroleum Law. Despite Japan's unsucc­
essful bidding in July 1973, Bac assured Ohira that the gener­
al outlook for oil development in South Vietnam was good. 
Although consumption had increased, the oil crisis did not 
apparently affect South Vietnam since the greater danger was 
the depletion of Saigon's currency reserves pushing up im­
port costs.
Under a Premier's decree dated 5 January 1974, Saigon 
established its National Energy Commission (NEC) with rep­
resentatives from the Atomic Energy Agency, the National Pe-
39
troleum Commission and the National Mekong Commission. 
Designed to research into sources of energy 'under all forms', 
the NEC would promote their exploitation and consumption: 
to present to the RVN government projects on the expansion 
and improvement of energy usage. This was a logical step 
following the granting of concessions to international consor­
tia in mid-July 1973 and the move on 6 September to consoli-
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date Saigon's authority over the Spratly Islands - administered
by Phuoc Tuy province - when an executive order was passed
by the Ministry of the Interior to deploy RVN units to occupy 
40
them.
These developments and their probable effects on territorial 
claims disturbed the Chinese. Referring to the 6 September 1973 
edict, Peking on 11 January 1974 accused Saigon of incorporat­
ing 'more than ten' of China's Nansha Islands under Phuoc Tuy
province and of intensifying since 1973 its attempts at permanent
41
seizure of China's Sprady archipelago. Saigon's initial response
on 12 January alleged the Spradys fell 'completely' under RVN
sovereignty, affirmed at the San Francisco peace conference of
14 January 1951 when Japan relinquished all territories captured
42
by force during World War II. On 14 January however Saigon 
conceded that although the question of sovereignty was 'some­
times' raised by 'other nations’ over the Paracels and Spratlys,
the issue had been shelved since 'no nation or government' could
43
furnish data proving sovereignty over either. The RVN Navy 
besides regularly defended these islands and exploited their • 
resources.
The result of these exchanges was nothing less than catastro­
phic. Peking accused Saigon of armed occupation since 15 Jan­
uary of its islands with cutters, 2,800 ton vessels of World War 
44
II vintage. Following reprisals by both sides in succeeding 
days, an 'invasion' of the islands and a sea battle ensued on 19 
January in the area of the Paracels between the RVN and Chinese
366
navies. In a final devastating attack after an amphibious landing,
Chinese MIGs on 20 January 1974 bombed a chain of three
islands in the archipelago Peking issued on the same day a strong
reinstatement of its claims: emphasising pointedly that the 'under-
45
sea resources’ in the Paracels' vicinity belonged to China.
Neither the South Vietnamese Navy, trained and equipped
for coastal and river combat nor the Air Force, designed for
shortrange support of ground troops, could do anything to stop
the Chinese. Saigon refused to concede defeat and compared
Chinese 'aggression* against the Paracels on 20 January to its
annexation of Tibet in 1956. A protest was made on the same
day to the UN Security Council demanding the convening of
an urgent meeting and an appeal was simultaneously made to 
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the Secretary General.
Within South Vietnam a diplomatic campaign was mounted 
to seek world support against Chinese occupation of the Para­
cels. A Kvodo report on 21 January 1974 referred to pressure 
from the US - with a view to improved relations with China -
on Saigon to 'concede defeat' so that no further action was tak- 
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en. Speculation in Saigon however suggested that US Amb­
assador Graham Martin refused South Vietnamese requests for
48
help from the Seventh Fleet. Conflicting claims from the 
State and Defence Departments said alternatively that the Seven­
th Fleet had been cautioned not to get involved in the fighting 
between South Vietnam and China.
On 25 January 1974 South Vietnam suddenly relinquished
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its efforts to air its protest against China in the Security Coun­
cil. A letter from the RVN, released by the President of the 
Council, said Saigon saw no hope of constructive debate since
it could not muster the votes because of opposition from China
49
who had veto power in the Council. In Saigon a statement
from Vuong Van Bac on 26 January said the RVN was not
seeking war with China 'or any other country' and denied his
50
government had asked for the Seventh Fleet's intervention.
Bac also proposed that Saigon and Hanoi establish diplomatic 
relations 'in a new effort to break the deadlock' and to explore 
all paths susceptible to lead to peace. It was made in the hope 
that the two sides could discuss 'all measures' aimed at reduc­
ing tension in South Vietnam as well as at defending the 'long 
-range interests' of the Vietnamese nation. Citing Section 15C 
of the Paris Agreement as the basis of his offer to Hanoi, Bac
suggested both Vietnams start prompt negotiations; he was
51
ready to meet his North Vietnamese counterpart.
These reversals by Saigon might be understood in retrospect 
against the wider shifts of American policy towards Vietnam 
which became more clearly evident by early 1974.
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VI : II
THE OVEREXTENDED COMMITMENT 
JANUARY - APRIL 1974
'No treaty, no commitment, no alliance is immutable.
Times and circumstances change. Thus, while maintaining 
our commitments, we have sought to adjust our responsibi­
lities with our role in keeping with changing conditions in 
the region.’
Robert Ingersoll 
3 April 1974*
United States Defence Commitments in Asia, Statement by 
Robert Ingersoll on 3 April 1974, in DSB. 29 April 1974, p.473.
By the beginning of 1974 the terms of debate in Washing­
ton about the nature of the war in Vietnam appreciated that 
neither Hanoi, the Viet Cong nor Saigon were in a position to 
make sufficient concessions to bring about a political settle­
ment that year. No distinct momentum in favour of either of 
these parties could be established. US administration strategy 
for dealing with this situation broadly embraced two aspects.
The first priority was to continue strengthening South Viet 
-nam's military capability. The Nixon Administration was 
moving ahead with plans to ask Congress for increased arms
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aid to Saigon during the current fiscal year. Nixon, Kissinger
and Defence Secretary James Schlesinger were known to
have approved the general planning but had not as yet reachr
ed a decision on the total aid package or on how it might be
presented to Congress. Developments of summer 1973 had
hastened arms aid planning and between October and Novem
-ber, new US Ambassador to the RVN, Graham Martin had
apparently sent Washington 'Saigon's want list' for military
items totalling more than US$1 billion. This was followed
52
by a cable to Nixon himself.
Doubts were raised in the Pentagon about the timing and 
the legality of such a request to Congress in the opening mon­
ths of 1974. Opinion polarised roughly into two groups: One 
group led by Ambassador Martin - described as the 'prime 
mover' in the campaign was supported by staff in the Natio­
nal Security Council; Another group consisted of key elem­
ents in the Pentagon and the State Department who intended 
to keep total arms aid down to US$400 million. The debate 
was exacerbated by a disclosure on 27 January by the US 
Embassy in Saigon that Washington had provided South Viet­
nam with approximately US$284.7 million worth of weapons
53
and ammunition since the signature of the Paris Agreement.
Another aspect of US strategy in Vietnam was to keep alive 
the threat of renewed American intervention. On 10 January 
1974 Schlesinger said that a North Vietnamese invasion of the 
South would necessitate a rapid decision by Nixon whether
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to recommend a reintroduction of American aiipower. Bar­
ring a 'high likelihood' of an increase of hostilities in South 
Vietnam, the probability of all-out invasion by the North was 
'relatively constrained' since Hanoi might not discount the 
probability of aerial bombardment if they did invade. Apart 
from the threat of bombing the recapture of Le Minh, overrun 
by the communists in September 1973, by Thieu's forces on 
14 January 1974 was a boost for the ARVN.
Against this background, Hanoi made a little-publicised 
gesture to the US. To mark the first anniversary of the Paris 
Agreement, Hanoi on 17 January issued a document which 
requested the setting up of diplomatic relations with the US 
'subject to certain conditions'. The 15,000-word document 
reviewed by Ngo Dien, Assistant to Foreign Minister Nguyen 
Duy Trinh, emphasised that Hanoi would consider the 'norm 
-alisation of relations' with the US if Washington disengaged 
completely from South Vietnam and 'fulfilled its obligations' 
to reconstruct North Vietnam. The expression 'normalisation' 
represented a major departure. It was also significant that Ha­
noi’s call came a month after the Paris talks when no official 
communique had been issued. The document was said to dis­
cuss: One, two opposing policies in the implementation of the 
Paris Agreement; Two, the implementation of the accord in
Vietnam in the past year; Three, urgent problems of the move
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-ment to maintain and consolidate lasting peace in Vietnam. 
But there was no public response from the US.
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At this point we need to look again at US policy. On 8 Jan 
-uary 1974 former Ambassador to Japan, Robert Ingersoll 
assumed the post of Assistant Secretary of State for East 
Asian and Pacific Affairs. Pledging to contribute to US dipl­
omacy with reference to the 'Kissinger structure', Ingersoll
was scheduled to embark on a visit ffom 16 January to the
56
14 nations under his charge 'including China and Japan'.
One aspect of his visit merits attention. It was speculated
by the Japanese press that China was to have been his first 
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stop. Nothing else has been revealed. Had this been the 
case, Ingersoll's arrival in China would have coincided with 
Hanoi's 17 January proposal. He would also have been in 
China ffom 17 to 21 January, at the height of the Paracels 
incident. We know that he proceeded to Japan (21-25 Janu­
ary) where his discussions with Ohira centred on the resolu­
tion of the oil crisis. The role of Japan in the security of the
region and an exchange of views on the Southeast Asian situ- 
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ation was also made.
In Washington at this point, Deputy Secretary of State
Kenneth Rush on 21 January said that the US 'must expect
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and accept change' in Asia. Japan was the US' 'major 
partner' in this endeavour. US policies in Asia had two basic 
and mutually reinforcing purposes: to build a network of mut­
ual understanding and mutual restraint among the major pow­
ers in Asia: Japan, China, the Soviet Union and the US; and 
to pursue with the smaller nations of Asia, the Nixon Doc-
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trine's goal of 'shared responsiilities and shared burdens' for
development and defence.
The consequences of these pronouncments were already
felt in Tokyo. Significantly, after Ingersoll's visit, Ohira on
28 January hardened his stance towards Hanoi by repeating
that Japan would continue to recognise the RVN as the 'sole
legitimate government of Vietnam'; Japanese aid would be
extended categorically through the Thieu administration to
6°
the 'whole of Vietnam'. A deadlock in Japan-DRV relati­
ons was increasingly evident from this time until April 1974.
Ingersoll continued his tour with visits to Saigon (3-5 Feb 
-ruary) and Phnom Penh (5 February) which were castigated 
by Liberation Radio as being contrived to 'bolster* the Thieu
regime and the Lon Nol 'clique' to implement the Nixon Doc 
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-trine. The content of Ingersoll's talks with Premier Tran 
Thien Khiem and Vuong Van Bac in Saigon were not divul­
ged. In a later reference to his visit there Ingersoll said the 
Paris Agreement established a 'potentially workable frame­
work' for a political solution to the conflict. The US would 
also continue to provide the RVN with 'needed military and
economic assistance' as allowed under the accord, since
62
the Saigon government was 'vigorous and viable'.
Ingersoll's Saigon visit takes on a new significance in 
the light of subsequent relevations. It had been preceded, 
according to Hanoi in 1982, by a 'secret telegramme' dated 
2 February 1974 later discovered in the Foreign Ministry
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archives following the ’liberation' of Saigon in 1975.
The telegramme, Hanoi continued, ffom South Vietnamese 
Ambassador in Washington, Tran Kim Phuong to Vuong 
Van Bac said Kissinger saw the Paracels incident as a 
'marginal problem' even an 'inconvenience' within the 
framework of joint efforts by the US and China to 'contain' 
North Vietnam. Washington had urged a spirit of comprom­
ise, promising Saigon military assistance against North Viet­
nam but not against China. Hanoi also disclosed that 'conver 
-sations between the then Secretary of State Arthur Hummel 
and members of the National Security Council' suggested 
Kissinger wanted to 'minimise' the effects of the incident, to
concentrate instead on the 'sole problem’ of stepping up mili- 
64tary aid to the RVN. Kissinger, together with 'J.William 
Fulbright, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Commi­
ttee and Congressman Rog (Rogers) Morton, Chairman of 
the House Foreign Affairs Committee', pressured Saigon to 
desist from possible war with China. Overall, both the US 
and China appeared determined to cement their new alliance 
at the expense of their respective allies.
Nothing daunted, Saigon continued throughout Ingersoll's 
visit to stake a claim on the islands. A semi-official newspaper, 
Dan Chu. on 2 February reported that consultations had been 
convened among representatives of the RVN, Taiwan and the 
Philippines for a peaceful solution to the dispute, pledging to
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’unite forces' when necessary, against armed intervention by 
65
China. On the same day the RVN also landed reinforcements
- without incident - on the Spratlys; pointedly denying on 4
February that there was an anti-China military alliance formed
collectively by itself, Taiwan and the Philippines over the isla- 
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nds. Although a Chinese Foreign Ministry statement simul­
taneously warned South Vietnam against 'any pretext' for 
infringements on Chinese territory, the event passed without 
incident. What followed was an RVN statement on 5 Februa­
ry reasserting sovereignty over the islands with intent to 're­
capture all islands' of the Paracel and Spratly archipelagoes
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even if it meant war with 'China, Taiwan or the Philippines'. 
The Paracels have remained however in Chinese hands.
Linked to the question of bolstering South Vietnam's
survival was US assistance in its postwar reconstruction.
A private delegation including Elbridge Durbrow, former
US Ambassador to South Vietnam (1957-61) visited Saigon
(14-23 February). Invited by the private Vietnam Foreign
Relations Council formed to attract foreign investment, South
Vietnam, the delegation said, stood on the 'threshold of via-
68
bility' and was 'truly capable' of going it alone.
In Saigon the decision was made on 13 February by the
Council of Ministers to go ahead with oil drilling operations
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and to authorise the extraction of oil bids. Khuong Huu
375
Dieu, Director-General of the Industrial Development Bank
of Vietnam said the next day that major drilling companies
were expected to begin work on the South Vietnamese con-
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tinental shelf in July 1974. Described as the ’most promis­
ing source' of South Vietnam's future industrialisation, con­
tinental shelf oil outwitted the country’s limited coal and 
charcoal resources; hydroelectric power by contrast requir­
ed large investment capital which could only be realised 
through 'friendly countries' aid'. A decision was made on
21 February to open bids for oil exploration and exploita-
71
tion of 33 blocks of the continental shelf. Only count­
ries selected by the National Petroleum Commission for 
their 'financial, technical and marketing competence' could 
submit proposals to obtain exploration concessions 'with­
in 30 days' (by 29 March 1974) of receiving the relevant 
documents. Concessions were also reserved for future bids 
by companies 'expected to contest for new blocks' from 
Australia, Japan, West Germany and the USA. The exploi­
tation of oil was anticipated to begin in earnest by the end 
of 1974.
The confirmation in early 1974 of oil on the South Viet­
namese continental shelf was critical. On government orders, 
according to Cao Van Vien, the JGS secretly worked out a 
plan - implemented unannounced during 1974 - to trim the
total strength of the armed forces to 1 million, since the pro-
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blem of maintaining full strength had proven difficult. An
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initial 4,000 servicemen were released allowing them to be 
earmarked for transfer to jobs in the civilian sector so that 
by the end of 1974 the total strength of the armed forces 
would drop from 1,100,000 to 996,000.
This move proved to be timely. In Washington the percep 
-tion of the war in Vietnam appeared in the interim to have 
undergone considerable change.
By 25 February 1974 the American involvement in South
Vietnam was described as having descended from a peak of
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warfare to a high plateau of substantial support. Large num 
-bers of American citizens were reported to have become integ 
-ral parts of the South Vietnamese supply, transport and intelli­
gence systems, including not only Vietnam-based technicians 
but also 'Pentagon-based' generals to periodically ascertain the 
needs of the RVN. The total budgeted cost of military aid to 
South Vietnam was US$813 million in fiscal 1974 with the 
Pentagon asking Congress for US$1.45 billion in 1975 with 
most of the increase probably going for ammunition which the 
South Vietnamese forces had expended at a high rate. The real 
costs of military support were estimated to be higher since some 
of the aid went in through economic programmes for the Thieu 
Government's defence budget.
A special Congressional study mission was touring the RVN 
(25-28 February) at the time whose main purpose - according to 
Peter H.B.Frelinghuysen (Republican, New Jersey) in a later 
report dated 24 May 1974 to the House Foreign Affairs Commi-
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ttee - was to present the case for a ’reasonable level of military
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and economic assistance' to South Vietnam. The process of 
'Vietnamisation' was virtually complete, he said, and the 'recent 
success' of ARVN forces in carrying out this responsibility with 
-out US assistance led to a new attitude of self -reliance: The 
'beleaguered' RVN government could thus make the transition 
to 'economic self-sufficiency'.
Current North Vietnamese strategy was however related to 
their political struggle as the ceasefire was 'relatively unreward­
ing*. Militarily, Frelinghuysen warned, Hanoi had strengthened 
its position in the South since the ceasefire.The situation remain 
-ed threatening since a major North Vietnamese objective was to 
develop a secure base of operations along the western border of 
South Vietnam.
A 'fullscale assault’ by North Vietnam was not however
imminent. Although the DRV had stockpiled sufficient ordna
-nee for one year of fighting at current levels, it was question
-able whether Hanoi could sustain it over the longterm since
it faced 'uncertainty' over the level of Soviet and Chinese
support. Hanoi would continue to blunt the RVN through
selected attacks to prepare for a possible assault within two 
75
or more years.
The general morale of ARVN and the current effective­
ness of the RVN - particularly in the recapture of Le Minh 
on 14 January 1974 - were considered major deterrents to a 
fullscale offensive from the North. The report suggested
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maintaining a 'reasonable military balance' since 'if supplies 
of equipment and ammunition are excessive we run the ob­
vious risk of stimulating an equivalent move by its allies'.
If however 'less is done than is reasonable' then this could
contribute not towards peace in Vietnam but to the likelihood 
76
of renewed hostilities.
Despite the guarded optimism of the report a statement on
28 February by the Defence Department warned that North
Vietnam had stockpiled more than 150,000 tons of military
supplies in South Vietnam since January 1973 and that the
strength of the communist forces had increased from 140,000 
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then to 185,000.
In South Vietnam some changes were also made in antici­
pation of future contingencies. The RVN witnessed a shuffle 
of senior officers in March 1974, according to Vien, and a 
'contingency plan' was also worked out joindy with the US 
DAO (Defence Attache Office) in a top secret arrangement
whereby the US agreed to provide South Vietnam's armed
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forces with appropriate support when required. A system 
of hot lines had been established between the US Support 
Command at Nakhon Phanom in Thailand and the JGS in 
which the latter's Air Force Headquarters and all four corps 
commanders were also given direct access to the system.
This probably also explains why the costs of military 
and economic aid programmes in Southeast Asia which had 
dropped sharply with the withdrawal of US forces from Sou­
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th Vietnam, began in March 1974 to rise sharply again. Attri­
buting the increase to inflation, the Administration proposed 
in early March to give South Vietnam about US $2.4 billion
in such aid in the fiscal year beginning 1 July 1974, a 65%
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increase from the level of the previous year.
The situation was not without controversy. A report relea­
sed on 6 March by the General Accounting Office came, amid 
charges that the Pentagon had hidden from Congress the total 
amount of support given to Saigon. The Defence Department, 
it said, had 'not reflected the entire value of contracts' for the 
Saigon Government. The Pentagon had underestimated, acc­
ording to a 1972 report, the amount of 1971 aid to Saigon by
some US$400 million which was more than a quarter of the 
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total.
In his annual defence posture statement presented to Con­
gress at the beginning of March 1974, Defence Secretary 
Schlesinger offered three reasons for the proposed increase 
in military aid to South Vietnam:
- South Vietnamese military consumption had increased 
beyond anticipated levels because of the ongoing ceasefire;
- 'Far fewer* military aid funds from previous years were 
available to meet current South Vietnamese requirements;
- In terms of replacement material the US was actually be­
hind and 'greater efforts' had to be made in the next fiscal
81
year.
It was also revealed that much' of the economic aid pack-
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age to South Vietnam - officially known as ’Postwar Recon­
struction Assistance' - would be used to finance imports since 
Saigon's foreign reserves were in decline. In a reversal of the 
situation outlined in January, the US would now finance 'all 
South Vietnamese imports' of petroleum products for both 
the military and civilian uses.
Criticism of American attempts to shore up the Thieu 
regime had intensified in mid-March 1974. The proposed 
increase in military aid for South Vietnam was becoming one 
of the most controversial items of the Pentagon's request for 
US$6.2 billion in additional funds for the current fiscal year. 
The Defence Department warned on 18 March that without 
some immediate budgetary help from Congress it would
'run short' of funds by mid-April to support the military
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operations of the South Vietnamese armed forces. By 19
March concerted opposition to the Administration's request
for a US$474 million emergency increase in military aid to
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the RVN had begun to gain momentum in the Senate.
Senator Edward Kennedy (Democrat; Massachusetts), co­
sponsor of a Senate Amendment to block Administration eff­
orts to raise military aid to South Vietnam, had written to Kiss­
inger on 13 March 1974. The letter, made public on 17 March,
was directed at a telegramme allegedly sent from Saigon by
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Ambassador Martin on 6 March to the State Department. 
Kennedy accused Martin of ignoring the concerns of Congre­
ss over the level of US involvement in the political and milit­
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ary confrontations of Indochina. He also asked Kissinger to 
explain the continued US military and economic aid to South 
Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos.
On 31 March Kennedy released a letter dated 25 March 
1974 from Kissinger responding to the Senator's queries on 
Indochina policy issues 'enclosing comment on nine specific 
issues' (Appendix III). The US, Kissinger said, had commit­
ted itself 'politically and morally' by signing the Paris Agree­
ment, to giving longterm military and economic aid to South 
Vietnam. There were two basic themes in US Indochina poli­
cy, he explained, that a secure peace in Indochina was an 'im­
portant element' in US efforts to achieve a worldwide struc­
ture of peace and vice versa; and to discourage the takeover 
of various parts of Indochina by force. Although the US had 
'no bilateral written commitment' to the RVN, under the 
accord, Washington committed itself to 'strengthening the 
conditions which made the ceasefire possible'and to the goal 
of the South Vietnamese people's right to self-determination. 
The US would continue with these commitments to provide 
the RVN with the 'means necessary' for its self-defence and 
its economic viability.
Kissinger's letter seemed to Kennedy to propound a 'new 
rationalisation' for the continued US heavy involvement in 
Indochina. Criticising the policy as 'contrary to the new dir­
ections' set by Congress in 1973, Kennedy on 2 April made 
public the confidential telegramme sent by Martin on 6 March
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1974 to Kissinger. In this the Ambassador suggested that
Kennedy not be given 'the tactical advantage of an honest
and detailed answer' to questions he had raised about US 
85
policy in Indochina.
Of direct relevance to Vietnam was Kissinger's referen­
ce in his 25 March letter to a 'follow-on meeting' proposed 
in November 1973 for February 1974 to discuss the forma­
tion of the Indochina consultative group. The 'reactions of 
the participating countries to the energy crisis’ and to the 
Congressional decision on AID replenishment, led, he said, 
to the postponement of the meeting till late spring.
This might be linked to a report on 13 March 1974 which
mentioned a delay in the implementation of an IBRD plan
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for an aid consortium to all four Indochinese countries.
The proposal, sponsored jointly by the World Bank and the 
ADB, and strongly backed by the US and Japan, originated 
in a request from President Thieu to the World Bank (See p. 
119). Japan suggested that the consortium be enlarged to in­
clude all Indochina. We now know that the World Bank had 
notified the countries concerned that it was cancelling the 
meeting - originally scheduled for Paris in February - becau­
se the timing was 'not propitious'. Another meeting was ten­
tatively set for 'May or June' 1974.
The postponement of the consortium arrangement was 
linked to the economic turmoil caused by the energy crisis 
which 'compelled' all donor-nations to review their aid
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policies with greater emphasis on spending funds at home. 
Reservations among 'some countries' had also been expres 
-sed about the World Bank 'performing any function' that 
might benefit the Thieu government. Japan dispelled these 
reservations about World Bank assistance to Saigon by To­
kyo’s suggestion that 'subgroups' be formed so that aid- 
donor countries might assist 'only nations they favoured'. 
This compromise did not suppress the doubts of some don- 
or-states; the Scandinavian nations being 'particularly scep­
tical' and Sweden's sympathy towards the North Vietnam- 
87 .
ese noted. Most donor-nations had planned to assist all In­
dochinese countries but discussions were held in abeyance 
because of the continued fighting in South Vietnam.
The future of the consortium now uncertain, Hanoi con­
tinued nevertheless to stress its preference for aid on a bila­
teral basis. As we shall see later, Pham Van Dong's visit to 
Sweden in mid-April 1974 was a step in this direction.
The delay might also be understood against the failure of 
the Nixon Administration to appoint, since Ingersoll's dep­
arture in December 1973, a new Ambassador to Tokyo. A 
disclosure on 14 March said that in an 'unexpected move',
Japan's Ambassador to Washington 'recently' called on Ing-
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ersoll to express Tokyo's anxieties about the vacant post. 
About ten days later, prior to Kissinger's Moscow visit (24 
-28 March) James Hodgson, the Lockheed Vice-President 
was named the new ambassador. Hodgson was not how-
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ever approved by the Senate until 18 June and was eventu­
ally scheduled to arrive in Tokyo to take up his post on 15 
89
July 1974.
It is significant that Kissinger sent his letter to Kennedy - 
on 25 March 1974 - while he was en route to Moscow. On a 
wider level, the US commitment to Vietnam and the postpone­
ment of the aid consortium meeting might be examined against 
the background of the change in the state of international com­
munist relations in the first quarter of 1974.
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V I: III
INTER-COMMUNIST RELATIONS
A part of US strategy during this period was to continue 
to seek M oscow and Peking's support to restrain Hanoi. Ki­
ssinger sought to show the connection between keeping the 
pressure on in Vietnam while improving relations w^ ith Han­
oi's two allies, who might limit their arms shipments to it, 
an extension of policy enacted from m id-1973 onwards.
Sino-Soviet relations had been marred in one of the most 
dramatic incidents in recent months by the Marchenko affair.
Five Soviet citizens including three diplomats-were expelled
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from China on 19 January on espionage charges.
On the level o f US-Soviet relations Foreign Minister An­
drei Gromyko was scheduled to arrive in Washington on 3 
February 1974 for the first Soviet-American talks in nearly 
eight months. Although the Gromyko-Kissinger talks o f 4- 
5 February were said to have focused on the Middle East
and Soviet-American relations, they also covered 'areas of
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mutual interest' including possibly, Vietnam.
In this connection, Ingersoll, who visited Saigon at this 
juncture (3-5 February) referred on 27 March to the 'other 
major powers' directly or indirectly involved in the Vietnam 
conflict being obligated to uphold the provisions o f the Paris 
Agreement. The USSR and China remained 'basically corn- 
mined’ to the evolution of peace in Vietnam within the Agree­
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ment's framework, and had urged restraint on Hanoi's part. 
Ingersoll continued to believe that Hanoi's perception of the 
importance Moscow and Peking attached to their relations with 
Washington would inhibit renewed Vietnamese largescale off­
ensive action.
During the third week of March Hanoi was simultaneously
strengthening ties with the communist bloc while seeking aid
from both socialist and non-socialist countries: Pham Van Dong
and Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh left on a tour of Cuba,
Hungary, Algeria, Yugoslavia and Sweden (18 March-16 April).
The delegation included specialists from agriculture, science and
technology as well as military affairs suggesting that questions
93
relating to these matters might have been prominent.
Dong visited Moscow (19-22 March) prior to Kissinger's 
visit during which Moscow broadcast a scathing attack on Pek­
ing's attempts to prevent Soviet-Japanese cooperation. 'Recent 
events', Moscow said on 19 March, had shown that Peking 
leaders could not tolerate the 'steady development of economic, 
political and cultural relations' between the Soviet Union and
Japan and were 'frantically trying to complicate' the relations
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between the two countries. 'Facts had shown, Moscow con­
tinued, that Peking was 'openly trying’ to ignore the rights of 
Japan which was 'determined to establish relations with the 
Soviet Union and other countries'; a reference perhaps to the 
deadlock in DRV-Japan relations. On the same day Moscow
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accused Saigon of 'deliberately creating tension' in the South 
and 'of slandering the PRG' to distract attention from its econ­
omic difficulties. It also broadcast a news item that the US in-
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tended to increase military aid to South Vietnam.
In Moscow Dong's visit affirmed on 20 March the 'unsw­
erving solidarity' of the Soviet Union with the efforts of the 
DRV and the PRG to ensure the 'scrupulous and complete 
implementation' of the Paris Agreement on a 'just settlement
of the internal problems of South Vietnam and the establish-
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ment of a durable peace there. 'Comprehensive Soviet-Viet 
-namese cooperation' and several other problems of mutual 
interest were also discussed. Kosygin had expressed support 
for the policy mapped out by the VWP aimed at 'speedy recon­
struction of the economy and the construction of a 'material 
and technical basis' for socialism in the DRV.
But Hanoi had not relinquished its hopes for 'uncondition­
al aid! On 24 March 1974 the day Kissinger arrived in Moscow
Nhan Dan said the USA 'cannot evade its heavy responsibility'
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and must 'seriously implement’ Article 21. Only thus would 
it be able to create 'favourable conditions' for the establishment 
of 'new, equal and mutually beneficial relations' between the 
DRV and the USA. While denying that Hanoi wanted US fin­
ancial aid in exchange for a promise not to launch or support 
largescale military offensives in South Vietnam, Cambodia and 
Laos, Nhan Dan on 27 March alluded to the possible normalis­
ation of relations which it said were aimed at Article 21 which
98
called for 'unconditional aid'.
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In Moscow (24-28 March) Kissinger's talks focused on 
the Middle East, trade, the mutual reduction of forces in 
Europe, and on plans for Nixon's visit to the Soviet Union 
in June. Official statements on these talks gave no indication 
that Vietnam had been dealt with in their discussions. TASS 
reported the opening of talks on 25 March between Brezhnev 
and Kissinger and said the latter had come to continue an ex­
change of views on a 'wide range of questions of mutual int-
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erest’ in connection with the Nixon visit. Kissinger, it con­
tinued, expected 'definite progress' to be achieved on a num­
ber of 'important questions'.
On 31 March after Kissinger's departure, TASS issued
the sharpest attack on the US and demanded that it halted
'violations of the ban contained in the ceasefire agreement,
on shipments and armaments, munitions and other material’ 
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into South Vietnam. The Soviet stand carried the force 
almost of a government pronouncement and endorsed the 
North Vietnamese note of 22 March 1974 to the participants 
of the Paris Conference to end US violations of the Agree­
ment.
The TASS statement which suggested stronger Soviet 
backing for Hanoi after Kissinger's visit might be juxtaposed 
against recent developments in Vietnam. The Military Comm­
ission of the Party Central Committee had met in Hanoi in Mar 
-ch 1974. Implementing the resolution of the 21st plenum, it 
assessed the situation to set forth the DRV's military position
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101
for the 'next few years'. It emphasised 'inflicting an import 
-ant defeat on the enemy's pacification and encroachment plans'. 
'Conditions and opportunities' were discussed for bringing 
about a revolutionary high tide to win the 'greatest possible 
victory' for the revolution.
In the interim a high-level decision concerning the struggle 
in B-2 had also been made. In the spring of 1974 'after the 
new year of the Tiger', according to Van Tien Dung, a high- 
level conference of military cadres met at 33 Pham Ngu Lao 
Street in Hanoi. The deliberations focused on the resolution 
of the 21st Conference of the Party Central Committee to diss­
eminate the March 1974 Resolution which 'had been approve- 
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d' by the Politburo. At the conference representatives from 
'all battlefields, all services and branches, all corps and divis­
ions, and all agencies of the General Command' were present. 
Le Duan and Le Due Tho called on the conference to present 
the resolution of the 21st conference with instructions from the 
party and the state to the 'whole army to advance’.
The consensus reached might suggest a triumph for Le Duan 
whose address to the Trade Union Congress on 11 February
lamented that the 'objectives' of the Southern revolution had
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'yet to be attained' since the country was not reunified. In­
voking the 'Three Revolutions' to build the North speedily to 
take it to socialism and closely coordinate the economy and de­
fence, Le Duan urged the 'completion' of the revolutionary stru-
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ggle in the South. The 'ultimate reunification' of Vietnam and 
the fulfilment of 'internationalist obligations' toward the Lao 
and Khmer revolutions were also proposed.
Reconstruction had also been emphasised in Hanoi at the 
beginning of February. Le Thanh Nghi's address at a session 
of the National Assembly (4-9 February) praised postwar re­
construction achieved in 1973 and suggested closer economic, 
scientific and technical cooperation with socialist countries to
expand foreign trade and economic and technical relations with 
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other countries. At the same session Pham Van Dong made
what appeared to be a self-criticism with regard to the 'many
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current tasks' that had 'not yet been properly carried out'.
As we have seen earlier, Dong subsequently headed a delega­
tion from mid-March onwards to secure aid from various quar­
ters. During his absence DRV Government changes in early 
April appeared to emphasise the strategy of renewing the war.
It was made public on 2 April 1974 that a National Assem­
bly Standing Committee reshuffle had 'recently' taken place 
in Hanoi involving ministerial changes which suggested a
106
downgrading of reconstruction and the Japanese initiative.
The replacement of Nguyen Con by Le Thanh Nghi, concur­
rently to assume the post of Chairman of the State Planning 
Commission while retaining his Vice-Premiership and posit­
ion in the politburo might possibly be linked to this develop­
ment. Dinh Due Thien who had been in charge of logistics in 
the South ceased to hold the Machinery and Metallurgy portfo-
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lios to assume a 'new post'. Dang Thi's assumption of the 
post of Chairman of the National Reunification Committee 
might have emphasised an initiative in this direction.
In this respect what seemed to be a 'self-criticism' - reveal­
ed on 11 April - by Hoang Van Hoan, identified with the Japan­
ese option, might also have been significant. The Party's line
and policy had 'not been properly implemented', he said, conce-
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ding that it was 'necessary first to criticise ourselves'. Hoan 
now acknowledged that the tasks for the North in 1974 and 1975 
were to 'heighten vigilance' to achieve 'independence and demo­
cracy' in the South.
Hoan’s 'self-criticism' and the de-emphasising of the Japan­
ese initiative might have had some bearing on the announcement •
on 9 April which made it clear that the Japanese offer of non-re-
108
imbursable aid to the DRV would be seriously delayed. Han­
oi had apparently not responded to Tokyo's decision to carry over 
the appropriation of Yen 5 billion in the 1973 fiscal budget to fis­
cal 1974 which remained outstanding. Nor was there a reply to a 
Japanese request for a North Vietnamese plan for the utilisation 
of the aid. Actual contact between the two governments as we 
have seen, had made little progress since early January hinder­
ing economic cooperation, planned for instance, for the Tonkin 
Gulf. In this connection the deadlock in Japanese-North Vietnam­
ese relations might have had some impact on the delay of the con­
sortium arrangement. Given these circumstances it was hardly 
surprising that by mid-April serious doubts had arisen about any
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prospects for the opening of the Japanese Embassy in Hanoi.
By this time events in North Vietnam which would have a
direct bearing on the South were taking place. The opening
of the provincial local armed forces conferences on 4 April
and the Central Military Emulation Campaign on 14 April con
-sidered the 'building of powerful armed forces for combat'
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the most basic task. The consequences for the South were 
dominated by the fall of Tong Le Chan on 12 April 1974 after 
a 4*11-day siege, with similar incidents in Chi Linh, Due Hue 
Kontum and Pleiku. These were not sporadic incidents but to­
gether formed a coherent pattern as the last preparatory stage 
before the full onslaught of an offensive. A military cadres 
conference held in Hanoi on 27 April, presided over by Ton 
Due Thang, Le Duan, Van Tien Dung and Song Hao describ­
ed the revolutionary offensive to ’fulfil all missions’ entrusted
by the Party, State and the people 'no matter what the circum- 
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stance'. The 'new situation' was endorsed by Ouan Doi
Nhan Dan the following day when it said the 'entire army'
had 'surged forward', determined to lead the national revo- 
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lution to 'final victory1.
In Cambodia too the first quarter of 1974 witnessed some 
ominous trends. By this time the Party's domination of the 
apparatus of FUNK was almost complete. The Khmer Rouge's 
growing strength was also causing greater strain in its relation-
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ship with Hanoi and differences with Vietnam were addressed
113
for the first time in late 1973 by the CPK. Nor were Hanoi's
attempts to create a Khmer equivalent of the VWP by the end of 
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1973 welcome. The 'internecine antagonisms' that subseque-
115
ntly erupted saw Khmer Rouge militias 'fighting one another'.
Pol Pot's accession to the twin posts of Party Secretary and
Chairman of the Party Military Committee 'at least in 1973'
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could have contributed to a hardening of policy. Early in
1974 defections by Hanoi-trained Khmer veterans to the Lon 
Nol regime confirmed that the Vietnamese had left the area aft­
er the Paris Agreement By 1974 the killings had become so 
widespread that personnel changes had to be made in all zones.
Simultaneously a policy that 'Sihanouk must be put aside' sur-
117
faced in February-March 1974.
By 1974 preparations were also made for imminent victory
- a long-standing plan in favour of the evacuation of Phnom
Penh - had been made. Hou Youn, according to Kieman was
opposed to evacuation but Khieu Samphan was in favour of it
118since the plan was to 'dry up the people from the enemy'.
To seek Hanoi's ostensible support of its policies, Pol Pot
sent Le Due Tho a letter dated 4 March 1974 underlining the
Khmer Rouge's allegiance to Hanoi 'under whatever circum- 
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stances’.
In an initiative aimed probably at more pressing military 
issues, Khieu Samphan at the end of March visited Hanoi 
and Peking in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the
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CPNLAF. It is significant that prior to his visit AKI on 22 
March stressed that any suggestion of North Vietnamese-Viet 
Cong assistance within the ranks of the CPNLAF was a 'bla­
tant slander' since the latter had waged a 'people's war' from
the 'very beginning’ without reliance from any foreign coun- 
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try. In Hanoi (28 March-1 April) Truong Chinh's speech
of welcome on 29 March paid tribute to the Cambodian revo­
lution growing 'more powerful than ever before' but hinted 
that 'no insidious scheme' could prevent the Vietnamese peo­
ple from fulfilling their 'internationalist duty' to the Cambod­
ian people since the peoples of Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos
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would 'together' win complete victory. Khieu Samphan 
was determined however to chart the Khmer Rouge's own 
course and stressed its autonomy because of international re­
cognition and the 'military, political and diplomatic' victories 
including the support of some 60 countries. We might note 
that the TASS statement of 31 March came between Khieu 
Samphan's Hanoi and Peking visits.
In contrast his visit to Peking (1-4 April) indicated that 
the Chinese now preferred to improve their standing with . 
the insurgent leaders as Khieu Samphan was accorded the 
honours due to a head of state. Whereas the prince had prev­
iously commanded Zhou Enlai's support - as late as 28 Feb­
ruary 1974 the premier had suggested to Sihanouk that a corn-
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promise be reached with Lon Nol - by April the increased 
influence of the swing in favour of the radicals already had
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an impact on Peking's Cambodia policy. On 1 April Zhou
acknowledged Khieu Samphan's position in his speech of
welcome as endorsing the Cambodian people's 'just cause'
which also enjoyed 'abundant support' as their 'sole legal
government; terms of reference previously reserved for the 
123
prince. Khmer Rouge dominance of the resistance was
officially acknowledged on 2 April by Mao's meeting with
Khieu Samphan,a move which put him on par with Sihan- 
124
ouk.
The reverses in Vietnam and Cambodia which constituted 
a threat to the potential stability of the Indochinese peninsula 
were recognised. An exacerbated effort in the second quarter of 
1974 to prolong the existence of South Vietnam attempted^to 
forestall further destabilisation.
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VI: IV
JAPAN’S CONTINUING STRATEGY 
APRIL - AUGUST 1974
One last attempt was made to shore up the Thieu regime. 
The survival of South Vietnam, a major part of Nixon and 
Kissinger’s strategy involving the bolstering of its stability 
and viability, was given a boost midyear.
Aid to Indochina. Nixon said on 24 April, was an 'area
of acute and continuing concern'. In a statement to Congress
he requested the appropriation of US$939.8 million to assist
South Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos 'to shift their economies
from war to peace' and to accelerate the reconstitution of 
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their societies. This 'modest increase' would now permit 
the development of viable, self-supporting economies with 
lower requirements for assistance within a few years. The 
challenges South Vietnam faced 'this year and next' included 
the need to meet the much higher costs of 'critical resources' 
caused by worldwide inflation as well as support for the mili­
tary forces. The country had sharply reduced the consumpti­
on of imports, especially petroleum, but it could not recons­
truct its economy 'alone'.
The Administration appeared at the same time to be runn­
ing into difficulties on its proposed military aid programmes 
for South Vietnam. The House Armed Services Committee
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voted on 4 April to cut the US$1.6 billion ceiling requested
by the Administration to US$1.4 billion and further reduct-
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ions seemed likely in the Senate. In May 1974 the propo­
sed accounting procedure that would allow the Defence Dep­
artment to give South Vietnam US$266 million more in mili­
tary aid was again questioned in Washington. The General 
Accounting Office (GAO), the watchdog of Congress, rais­
ed questions on 5 May about its legality: particularly whether 
the accounting change would not put the Defence Department
in the position of violating a spending ceiling in an earlier fis- 
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cal year. Senator Kennedy used the GAO arguments in
the event and the vote on 7 May on the Kennedy Amendment
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was 43:38, a serious setback to US foreign policy. The 
Defence Department would be held in the current fiscal year 
to the US$1,126 billion ceiling on military aid to South Viet­
nam and additional funds for this would be prevented
The situation was compounded by a ’discovery’ revealed 
on 8 May that the Defence Department had been building a 
US$1 billion stockpile of weapons for South Korea, South 
Vietnam and Thailand. This stockpile, the Pentagon argued, 
did not constitute a 'hidden programme' and was listed under 
'support for other nations' totalling US$2.2 billion in the
new budget under which military aid for South Vietnam was 
129
provided.
Two Congressional missions had been dispatched to South 
Vietnam in 1974 to undertake reviews of current conditions in
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Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos as they related to policies and
programmes of economic and military assistance. The report
dated 25 July 1974 by one mission (15 April-10 May) sent by
the House Foreign Affairs Committee stressed that US aid be
'continued at present or increased levels' as long as the 'current
130
level of hostilities' continued in the South. If hostilities did 
not increase, the Saigon Government could devote more resour­
ces to reconstruction and development to improve its chances 
of 'winning' this phase of the war.
The political position of the RVN had been 'strengthened', 
it added, since the ceasefire as a result of political support and 
economic and military assistance provided by the US. It was 
'unlikely' that North Vietnam could win a military victory. An 
economic spurt must therefore be related to the security situat­
ion which would require that hostilities be considerably reduc­
ed from current levels. Among the report's conclusions was 
that a 'reasonable amount of economic recovery and growth' 
be funded in Vietnam for substantially less than was being re­
quested for Fiscal 75. The Overseas Private Investment Corpo­
ration (OPIC) might guarantee some US private investment in 
South Vietnam but with a ceiling on individual investments.
Success, the report continued, now depended on external 
assistance and economic self-sufficiency for South Vietnam. 
Optimism based on the discovery of oil there however was 
'highly speculative'. Even if oil was found, at least 'five years' 
could elapse before petroleum exports became a significant for­
eign exchange earner.
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The key issue by mid-1974 was whether the Administra­
tion's economic aid request of US$750 million for fiscal 75 
would accomplish Ambassador Martin’s predicted 'takeoff by 
the South Vietnamese economy and eventual US extrication. A 
report dated 5 August 1974 by the other mission to Indochina 
undertaken by Richard Moose and Charles Meissner (12 May- 
4 June 1974) for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee criti­
cised the US Embassy in Saigon for 'adhering too closely' to
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the official line of the S aigon Government.
It was difficult to reach any other conclusion that the fis­
cal 75 programmes were a continuation of past aid strategy 
supporting the Vietnamese economy with massive flows of 
outside resources in order to fill fiscal and trade deficits. Un­
less the 'big powers' applied strong pressure, the South Viet­
namese Government and the communists would fail to reach 
political settlement. The present military confrontation seemed 
'likely to continue' with the South Vietnamese 'unable to exp­
el' the North Vietnamese from the South and the communists 
unable to acquire the 'decisive edge’ required to defeat the 
South militarily.
To sustain South Vietnam's survival, the option of aid, 
reconstruction and investment, exemplified by the continuing 
Japanese role in 'buying off Hanoi from further interest in 
attacking the South, was resurrected.
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Against previous expectations, Japan in mid-1974 cont­
inued to carve an economically viable role in South Vietnam. 
On 23 April a private survey group led by the Japan Indust­
rial Location Centre was described in Saigon as having 're- 
cendy completed' its basic surveys for the construction of a
largescale petrochemical industrial complex along Cam Ranh 
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Bay. The entire bay area was potentially visualised by the 
Cam Ranh Industrial Development Survey Mission to be the 
'only largescale chemical industrial complex' in Southeast 
Asia to include a petrochemical complex, port facilities, for­
estry and agricultural development. To make a large contrib­
ution to the economic future of Vietnam 'after the advent of
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peace', the planned development was targeted at 1980.
In the interim Marine Oil of Japan was described on 17
May as 'most likely' to participate in the international bidding 
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of the Mekong Delta. Although the mining areas were 
smaller in scale than those offered in July 1973, the low sul­
phur content and proximity to Japan of the mining areas 
made the bidding attractive. A fortnight later, four groups, 
mostly American, including Mobil, obtained petroleum con­
cessions on nine blocks on the Vietnamese continental 
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shelf. The signature bonus to be paid by the winning 
companies to the Saigon Government would total almost 
35 millon Vietnamese piastres, double the amount of the 
first phase.
The overtures made by Saigon in January towards Tokyo
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were revived. Newly-arrived South Vietnamese Ambassador 
to Japan, Nguyen Trieu Dan said on 29 May that Saigon wou­
ld welcome investments by Japanese private investors and en- 
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terprises. Joint venture projects with limited capital were 
singled out to realise quick profits. Dan also referred to a surv­
ey that was being conducted about the conditions under which 
the RVN could develop and export oil from the Mekong Delta.
In this connection the South Vietnamese Minister of Comm­
erce and Industry, Nguyen Due Cuong on 4 June announced
that oil exploration had reached a point to warrant drilling the
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'first three wells’ before the end of the year. Saigon was 
said to have collected over US$50 million as signature bonus 
in 1973 with US$130 million invested in oil exploration and a 
further US$700,000 reserved for personnel training. Although 
the presence of oil could not be ascertained until drilling actua­
lly began, an oil refinery could be built during the 2 to 3 years 
of exploration.
Japan’s interests in South Vietnam were paralleled by 
what appeared in the North to be an element of competition 
between Japan and the Soviet Union. The General Geology 
Department Department revealed on 24 April that Hanoi's 
first exploratory step towards oil drilling was made in the 
context of Soviet interests in the Tonkin Gulf where 4 rigs 
had been erected for the drilling of some 5,000 m of explora-
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tory boreholes. A Soviet economic delegation including
geologists had been described at the time as visiting the DRV
139
before leaving on 26 April for Laos.
After the deadlock in Japan-DRV relations during the
first quarter of 1974, it was disclosed on 1 May that four
North Vietnamese officials would make a one-week visit to
Japan mid-month at the invitation of an all-party Dietmen's
group. This proposal might be seen in the light of a revision
of Japan’s Southeast Asian policy,'proposed in Tokyo on 2
May 1974 and said to have been prompted by Tanaka him- 
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self. Assailed by anti-Japanese demonstrators during his 
recent Southeast Asian tour at the beginning of the year, Ta­
naka had apparently urged that a new policy be drawn up by 
the Foreign and Finance Ministries and MITI to lay 'major 
emphasis' on Tokyo's 'quantitative improvement’ of econo­
mic cooperation with Southeast Asia.
But issues that blocked Tokyo-Hanoi relations remained 
outstanding. The Tokyo visit (17-23 May) of Tran Danh Tuy- 
en, Minister of Materials might have urged Japan to take the 
lead to 'remove obstacles' to the exchange of ambassadors be­
tween the two countries; yet Hanoi's conditions for the 'com­
plete normalisation' of relations still demanded the recognition
141
of the PRG and reparations.
Other exchanges seemed promising. The Hanoi visit of a 
group of Japanese scientists (25 May-1 June) resulted in the
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signature of a Japan-North Vietnam Cooperation Agreement 
with the Japan Institute for Scientific and Technical Exchange; 
The idea of Memorandum Trade surfaced again with the dis­
closure that the Japan-Vietnam Trading Association had plans
142
to have an office established in Hanoi on a permanent basis.
On 30 May a report in the Japanese press expressed confiden­
ce that Toyo Oil might constitute 'the main force' in oil devel­
opment of the Tonkin Gulf despite what seemed to be suspen- 
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sion of the project.
These developments might be understood against events
in Washington which appeared intent on isolating North Viet
-nam. The House of Representatives approved on 3 June a
'sense of Congress' resolution stating that the US should
provide no aid, trade or diplomatic recognition to North
Vietnam until it 'cooperated fully' in accounting for those
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missing in action (MIA's)* Kissinger continued on 4 and 
7 June to lobby for foreign assistance to South Vietnam: plac­
ing these programmes within the context of America's 'larger
foreisn policy purposes' and the global situation on which it
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must pursue its national interests. Progress made in a con­
certed international effort to propel the present equilibrium in 
Vietnam towards its resolution was 'only a beginning' and 
would be sacrificed if the US failed to persevere. The US, 
Kissinger emphasised, could not 'alone persevere' in the face
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of continuing obstacles to peace: The strong participation of 
the US 'together with other nations’ and the assistance prog­
rammes were 'crucial vehicles' for this exercise. Failure to
sustain these would have a 'corrosive effect' on interests 'be- 
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yond its confines'.
US objectives in economic assistance were aimed, by stim­
ulating reconstruction and development, at a 'self-sustaining' 
South Vietnamese economy.Washington sought only to provide 
its ally with the minimum required in military assistance to deter 
a renewed North Vietnamese offensive. The achievements of re­
cent years, Kissinger warned, might hinge on sums that were
small in proportion to the total effort that had been made. Hence
147
the Administration's request for US$750 million.
Thieu had warned in the interim on 6 June that unless the
US shoulder its responsibilities, Saigon would be at the point
of surrender to the communists. The RVN had suffered a
loss in the economic field because the 'present international
148
background' differed from that in the past. Faced with 
'internal difficulties' its US ally had been forced to adapt 
its present policy 'without any alternative'. Economic aid 
from France and Japan, the only weapon with which Saigon 
could build up its economy, was 'only symbolic and negli­
gible'.
By mid-June moves in Washington were to have a direct 
impact on Japan's stabilising initiatives in Vietnam. The US- 
Japan dialogue was given a boost in an announcement by Nix-
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on in Salzburg on 11 June nominating Robert Ingersoll to the
149
post of Deputy Secretary of State. In a position second 
only to Kissinger, Ingersoll would replace Kenneth Rush who 
had recently become an advisor on economic policy to Nixon.
On 13 June Ingersoll referred to the two major goals of 
US policy defined in the Nixon Doctrine on East Asia as the 
'reduction of tension' among the major powers involved in 
the region and a condition of 'peaceful evolutionary develop­
ment' among smaller nations in which they were to 'provide
150
increasingly' for their own economic and defence needs.
In his accompanying request for economic and security assis­
tance funds to East Asia for fiscal 75, Ingersoll repeated Kis­
singer's arguments advanced a week earlier. South Vietnam, 
he said, was in a deepening economic crisis 'not of its own 
making'. The crisis, perpetuated by continued North Vietnam­
ese military build-up, was exacerbated by the sharp decline in 
real terms of the value of US economic assistance and by the 
impact of US troop withdrawals. The RVN, he said, must 
look 'to others' for the wherewithal to reverse this economic 
deterioration and begin the reconstruction and development 
efforts necessary for movement toward economic viability 
and self-sufficiency. The country, Ingersoll added, was 
'stronger militarily and politically' than ever before and had 
'excellent longrange prospects' for economic self-sufficien­
cy. Good prospects of 'major oil discoveries' gave it the poss
-ibility of an economic takeoff comparable to that of South 
151
Korea and Taiwan.
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These remarks might be examined against Kissinger's re­
ference on 18-19 June to the need to give Japan a sense of
152
belonging to a structure 'larger than itself. The appoint­
ment at the same time of James Hodgson on 18 June as the 
new US Ambassador to Japan finally dispelled the prevailing 
uncertainty over the Administration's commitment to Tokyo.
These developments appeared to exert some influence on 
Japan's proposed economic cooperation in the second half of 
1974 with both North and South Vietnam. The Japanese Con­
struction Industry was reported on 27 June to be conducting
153
surveys from a 'post-Vietnam perspective*. In South Viet­
nam, the 'Mekong Project’ was to be revived by the Economic 
Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) with economic 
and technical cooperation of Japan; a team would be dispatched 
in the spring of 1975 to establish contacts and conduct arrange­
ments. On 11 July five Japanese trading companies including 
Ito-Chu, Mitsui-Bussan and Sumitomo, were awarded cont­
racts by the Saigon government for supplying housing mater-
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ials for the reconstruction of South Vietnam. This was part 
of the non-reimbursable aid amounting to a total of Yen 13 bil­
lion based on an official note exchanged in March between the 
Tokyo and Saigon governments. In Tokyo Nikkan Kogvo dis­
closed on 23 July that the Japanese Foreign Ministry was set to
reexamine and redefine economic aid to developing countries
155
when compiling the next fiscal year's budget. Aid consid­
ered henceforth would be categorised between those develop-
409
mg countries with resources 'such as oil' and those without.
A plan for South Vietnam's rehabilitation and development
was released on 31 July by the Overseas Construction Coop-
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eration Association (OCCA). Based on the Lillienthal re­
port by the former Tennesse Valley Authority (TVA) and an 
earlier Four-Year Plan (1973-76) by both the US and the RVN 
Governments, the objectives for the Mekong Project included: 
Japanese economic aid to South Vietnam, the expansion of Can 
Tho, Saigon and Danang power stations, the restoration of brid­
ges and the construction of a dam. News reports on 2 August 
said that Japan had decided to extend US$35 million to the three 
Indochinese countries as emergency non-reimbursable grants
from its 1974 budget of which US$25 million would be allocat-
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ed to South Vietnam alone. Interest in establishing a Japanese
Chamber of Commerce and Industry was expressed on 8 August
by some 30 Japanese enterprises in Saigon to 'promote invest-
158
ments in an orderly manner'.
Japan's moves apart, South Vietnam was itself intent on
bolstering its own economic viability and survival. The Exec
-utive Director of the National Petroleum Commission, Tran
Van Khoi, on 23 June saw oil as the 'light at the end of the 
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tunnel'. Efforts had been intensified in the interim tow­
ards the legitimation of its petroleum reserves in view of the 
imminent convening of the Third Law of the Sea Conference 
(20 June-29 August) in Caracas, Venezuela. The conference 
hoped to produce a draft treaty to establish limits and zones
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of control of resources on the continental shelf off some 140 
countries. Both North and South Vietnam had been invited; 
Hanoi refused to attend as the PRG was not invited and only 
Saigon was represented.
In his statement to the conference on 25 June 1974, Forei­
gn Minister Vuong Van Bac declared unequivocally that the
RVN was the 'only delegation' to defend the 'legitimate rights'
160
of the Vietnamese people. Invoking its law dated 1 Decem­
ber 1970, the RVN, Bac said, was moving towards 'rational 
exploitation' of the natural resources of its adjacent seabeds to 
ascertain the possibility and location of mineral resources. Its 
biddings held in 1973 and 1974 had granted petroleum explora­
tion and exploitation concessions within the continental shelf to 
companies of high technological capability. Castigating Hanoi 
for 'remaining silent' while the Chinese seized the Paracels,
Bac reaffirmed the proclamation of 7 September 1967 and con-., 
sidered 'null and void' all concessions granted by 'any other 
country' which transgressed the RVN continental shelf.
Bac's statement might be understood in the context of the
signature in Saigon on 27 June of exploration contracts by 11 
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firms. The RVN was planning to begin prospecting within 
the next three months and could receive US$34 million in 
royalties.
More vital was Saigon's perception of events in Washington. 
It had become increasingly evident by early July 1974 that US 
military aid to South Vietnam would probably be limited by
411
Congressional budget cuts largely to ammunition, petroleum 
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and spare parts. The State and Defence Departments were 
reported to have discussed with the US Embassy in Saigon a 
sharp curtailment in planned military aid to South Vietnam for 
the fiscal year beginning 1 July 1974. Defence Department 
planners were assuming that Congress would authorise US 
$900 million to US$1 billion in military aid to the RVN which 
would 'just about' meet its requirements. On the basis of the 
current level of military activity nearly US$500 million had 
been budgeted for ammunition alone. The anticipated Congres 
-sional cuts would leave little for planned new equipment for 
the South Vietnamese forces: US$900 million was described 
as 'insufficient' to finance a one-for-one replacement of wea­
pons losses by Saigon. In April Thieu had sent Cao Van Vien 
to the US to seek support for South Vietnam’s aid request
where the latter had been assured of support from the Defence 
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Department. In May Nguyen Tien Hung was sent to Wash­
ington to assess the economic and military situation and had
164
unsuccessfully appealed on 15 May to Edward Kennedy.
According to Vien, the much-reduced appropriation for
fiscal 75 only met 'half of Saigon's austere requirements.
After a deduction of US$46 million for USDAO (Defence
Attache Office) operations there remained US$654 million 
165
for direct support. In view of these meagre aid funds, 
the air force was compelled to inactivate aircraft and reduce 
operations, helilift was down 70% affecting troop reinforce­
412
ment and supply, regular airlift was down 50% affecting 
the mobility of general reserve units, naval activities were 
reduced by half and river activities by 72%. As a result,
'not a single plane, ship or boat was replaced after the cease 
-fire' Vien said and only 70% of the most critical ammuni­
tion could be replaced. After austerity measures were taken 
in 1974 the consumption of diesel fuel and gasoline decrea­
sed 30% as compared with 1973. Without supplemental aid
the RVN’s armed forces, Vien warned, would run out of 
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fuel by mid-May 1975. Already the monthly consumption
rate for the first eight months of fiscal 1975 (July 1974-Feb-
ruary 1975) amounted to only 27% of the preceasefire rate.
No replacements would be possible for fiscal 1975 because
most of the budget was needed for operational and mainten-
167
ance requirements 'more essential' to the war effort.
This desperate situation explains why oil production was
correspondingly accelerated.Saigon announced on 5 August
that the Kaiyo Oil Co and Mobil Oil Corporation would 'short
-ly' conduct seismic tests to tap oil deposits in two new con-
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cessions off the coast of South Vietnam. Kaiyo Oil report 
-ed on 18 August that it would confirm the existence of petro­
leum gas after the results of the analysis were clarified; the
first trial drilling was expected to be carried out in October
169
1974 and in the spring of 1975. The first oil drilling opera
413
-tion on the continental shelf would begin on 17 August on
Con Son Island, with a semi-floating rig of the Pecten Viet-
170
nam Co., a subsidiary of Shell. . A press statement issued
on 25 August by RVN Minister of Commerce and Industry
Nguyen Due Cuong affirmed that a layer of'oil-bearing rock'
1,400 m below the seabed had been struck to contain 'medium
crude' oil of good qualitv which was being checked for 'comm- 
171 '
ercial exploitation’. Although Cuong hoped the discovery 
would encourage foreign investment, Tran Van Khoi of the Na­
tional Petroleum Commission expressed caution since it would 
take several years before production could begin and the volume
was likely to be considerably smaller than that in the Middle 
172
East.
In the interim South Vietnam had expected the Law of the
Sea Conference in Caracas, ending on 29 August, to produce
the framework of a new world treaty to deal with fishing and
navigational rights, the ownership and sharing of oil, gas and
mineral resources in coastal waters and ocean pollution. The
absence of clearcut measures apparently led to compromise at
ministerial level to control exploitation of the seas between 
173
rich and poor nations.
But it was too late.
In the interim developments in Washington had reached an 
impasse. Testifying desperately on 24 July 1974 before the 
Subcommittee on Foreign Operations of the Senate Approp-
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nations Committee, Kissinger again emphasised the ’urgent
and fundamental importance' of the foreign assistance prog-
174
ramme to the entire range of US foreign policy concerns.
A six-year projection, he revealed, reflecting expectation of a 
gradually declining US role in Indochina had been submitted 
to Congress. The present request of US$750 million in assist­
ance to the RVN was thus essential to make this transition.
Ambassador Graham Martin in his testimony to the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee on 25 July argued that if the 
'full amount' of economic assistance was appropriated by Con­
gress, 'in a very few years' the US would be able to regard its
175
Vietnam involvement as closed. The RVN would be left 
'economically viable', militarily capable of defending itself with , 
its own manpower against both external aggression and externa­
lly supported internal subversion. If the requested level was not 
forthcoming, he warned that it would take the US 'longer' to 
achieve that goal. The appropriate level of economic aid to South 
Vietnam for fiscal 1975, Martin said was 'three-fourths the amou 
-nt of economic aid furnished this year to North Vietnam by 
China and the Soviet bloc.
The Saigon Administration he believed, could continue 
to handle the military threat 'on their own' provided the US 
continued to replace military supplies on the permitted one- 
to-one basis. 'New aid' he stressed, would be channelled 
'more than ever before' into development and investment 
projects. Although the past decade had seen US assistance
415
concentrating on a stabilisation effort, greater emphasis for 
1975 and 1976 would be placed on longrange reconstruction 
and development programmes. The RVN would need no 
more than 'nominal amounts' of US aid by the end of the 
decade if the amount of assistance envisaged by Kissinger 
was provided.
The last week of July had also seen Thieu in desperation, 
dispatch Nguyen Tien Hung to Washington to review the 
economic situation and to expedite the shipment of F-5E air­
craft. Hung had worked with AID to seek additional funds
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for 1974 imports and reconstruction. The campaign to im­
peach Nixon was however gathering steam; Congress had 'no 
time or inclination to deal with any other issue, let alone aid 
for for South Vietnam'. There was no aid vote for Vietnam 
and the money came from a continuous resolution from the 
previous year's level of US$395 million. Robert McNamara, 
President of the World Bank was 'non-committal' when app­
roached and expressed difficulties to get Congress to increase
177
funds for the Bank and the AID.
More forebodings laid ahead. On 5 August Nixon signed a 
US$22.2 billion military procurement bill that authorised US 
$1 billion in military assistance to South Vietnam for fiscal 75. 
On 6 August the House of Representatives reduced military 
aid to South Vietnam by a vote of 233:157 to US$700 mill­
ion, down US$300 million from the US$1 billion requested
178
by the House Appropriation Committee. The original Pen­
416
tagon request had been US$1.6 billion.
By this time the trauma of Watergate which had escalated
throughout the summer of 1974 demanded no less than Nixon 
179
resign. He was replaced by Gerald Ford on 9 August 1974 
who indicated that the foreign policy machinery would be kept 
intact; Kissinger would remain Secretary of State while retaining 
his other role as National Security Adviser. Appearing before 
Congress on 12 August, Ford indicated that he would work to 
avoid a military takeover of South Vietnam and direct US mili­
tary involvement and was ready to strive for a restoration of Con
-gressional cuts in military aid and would convince the Senate to
180
restore the cut by the House.
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee however voted on 
13 August to cut the Nixon Administration's economic aid re­
quest for Indochina from US$940 million to about US$550 mi­
llion. In the process aid to Saigon was reduced from US$750
181
million to US$420 million. Congress also put language in 
the bill to place an overall ceiling of US$1.28 billion on all aid 
to South Vietnam and lowered the restriction on American civi­
lians working there from 5,200 to 3,000. It called on the Ford 
Administration to urge China and the Soviet Union to reduce 
military aid to all parties in Indochina to restore the ceasefire 
agreement Kissinger's reaction quoted at the time raised fears 
that Hanoi might use the period of transition in Washington to 
test American resolve. And he was right.
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In B-2 COSVN and the Regional Military Party Commission
were evaluating the ’changed situation'. The July 1974 COSVN
conference, according to Tran Van Tra, emphasised 'winning a
decisive victory' in 1975-76 'in keeping with COSVN Resolu- 
182
tion 21'. By this time the disaffection between B-2 and the 
General Staff, expressed in mid-May 1973 had been resolved.
The Regional Command now officially decreed the formation 
of the corps for B-2 as a 'positive preparatory step' to meet the 
demands of the situation. The resolution also gave specific guid­
ance to the battlefields to 'take advantage of time to strengthen
forces, material resources' and to ensure that the Mekong Delta
183
underwent a 'clear transformation' in their favour. We now
know that on 20 July 1974 the 4th Quan Doan consisting of fight-
184
ing units was formed in eastern Nam-Bo.
The result of these manoeuvres was probably the beginning
of a 'test of strength' by the PAVN. A sudden spurt of fighting
on 18 July with the opening of a PAVN offensive on an area
south of Danang, South Vietnam's second city, resulted in the
'heaviest 24-hour period' of fighting in South Vietnam since the
185
signature of the Paris Agreement. The campaign seemed to 
be preparing a drive throughout the last half of July against Duc- 
Duc,Thuong-Duc, Que-Son, Quang Ngai and Nghia Hanh to be 
closer to Danang and be within striking distance of Route 1, the 
vital North-South link that ran the length of the country. Simultan­
eously in the south, the communists opened up the Ben Cat front 
to move closer to the capital and threaten Route 13. In retrospect
418
these were moves preliminary to any firmer military decisions to
186
be taken later on in October 1974 and in January 1975.
The war had entered its final phase. With reference to a plan
to liberate the South, Le Duan on 21 July 1974 observed that the
’present opportunity is the most favourable' as any delay could
187
make it 'very complicated'. A directive of the politburo and 
the Military Commission of the Party Central Committee accord­
ingly instructed the General Staff to make 'all-round preparations 
for that strategic plan.
Closer ties with the Soviet bloc were also evident from mid- 
July. In a commentary on Indochina during the visit of Hoang 
Quoc Viet, Chairman of the Vietnam Federation of Trade Uni­
ons, Moscow on 14 July said the US-Soviet summit (27 June 
-2 July) was bound to promote a 'lasting peace' and a 'just
solution' to the problems of South Vietnam, Cambodia and 
188
Laos. As a result of the summit, the 'forces of aggress­
ion and reaction' which had obstructed the realisation of peace 
and national concord in Indochina aimed at rekindling war in 
the region had become 'increasingly isolated'.
Almost immediately afterwards Le Thanh Nghi, politburo 
member and Chairman of the State Planning Commission, 
together with its Vice-Chairman, Le Khac, embarked on a vis­
it to Bulgaria (9-13 July), East Germany (13-17 July), Hung­
ary (17-20 July) and the Soviet Union (20-31 July) in search 
of an 'expansion of bilateral economic cooperation, the imple­
mentation of economic agreements and the coordination of
4 1 9
plans for the next Five-Year Plan'. Attempts were made dur­
ing Nghi's Moscow visit to expand 'solid friendship and fra­
ternal cooperation' with a meeting of the Soviet-Vietnamese
Commission of Economic, Scientific and Technical Coopera- 
189
non held on 22 July. Soviet aid to Vietnam in 1975 as 
well as the 'expansion of economic relations and trade' cov­
ering 1976-80 were discussed.
With reference to the Soviets and the Chinese, Ambassad­
or Martin believed that they concluded in the 'early months of 
the summer of 1974' and certainly acted on this in the autumn 
after the departure of Nixon, that the effectiveness of the pro­
paganda campaign being waged in Congress to reduce or eli­
minate appropriations to South Vietnam would make US
190
support of South Vietnam increasingly ineffective. They 
also made the 'calculated decision’ that if the US was going 
to let South Vietnam 'go by default', they were likely to be 
credited by the North Vietnamese for having assisted them 
in this. Supplies to Hanoi, Martin continued, thus took on 
astronomical proportions.
We know know that in August and September 1974, the 
Regional Staff, according to Tran Van Tra, drafted an opera­
tional plan for the 1974-75 dry season that foresaw the win-
191
ning of a decisive victory within the 'next few years'.
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EPILOGUE
The resignation of Richard Nixon and the political and 
military consequences in Vietnam and Cambodia arising as 
a direct result of the erosion of executive authority in the US, 
have been the subject of much comprehensive study else­
where. The focus of much of the writing has been on the 
'final collapse' of Phnom Penh and Saigon in April 1975.
To bring this study to a close however the economic di­
mension of the Paris Agreement, particularly the continuing 
Japanese role so central to it in Vietnam, needsto be examin­
ed right up to the fall of Saigon on 30 April 1975.
In America Nixon’s resignation saw any last will to fight
the war go with him. To assure Thieu of continuity in US
foreign policy, Ford in a letter of 9 August 1974 stressed
1
its 'essential bipartisan nature'. US aid and 'increasing aid' 
from other donor countries, he promised, would be rapidly 
and effectively utilised to bring the South Vietnamese econ­
omy to a 'self-sustaining level' in the next few years.
By early September however the effects of reduced Amer­
ican aid to South Vietnam were being felt. With no ammuni­
tion to waste, isolated outposts were being abandoned and a 
real change in military strategy had to be made. Thieu there­
fore requested to meet personally with Ford but received no 
reply. To make his case, Foreign Minister Vuong Van Bac was 
dispatched to Washington with a letter dated 19 September
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1974. Ford avoided making any specific commitment at the
time other than general expressions of continued support in
a 'partnership' with South Vietnam.
This was later expressed in Deputy Secretary of Defence,
William Clements' visit to Saigon in early October which
revealed that the reduced level of military aid approved by
Congress had left the RVN with a 'strictly get-by situation’.
In the event of a North Vietnamese offensive, the 'option'
of a return of US air and naval forces would 'have to be 
3
considered'. His return to Washington resulted in a 'strong 
possibility', emerging on 8 October, that the Ford Adminis­
tration might ask Congress early in 1975 for additional mili-
4
-tairy aid for South Vietnam.
Approving a defence bill, on 9 October Ford affirmed
that it might be necessary to approach Congress 'early next
year' to work out some solutions to meet critical needs
5
which could arise in South Vietnam. On 24 October 1974
Ford wrote secretly to Thieu assuring him that there had
been no change in US policy towards Vietnam and that his
administration would make every effort to provide assistance 
6
needed.
Saigon had turned in the interim to Japan. On 21 September 
Deputy Premier Tran Van Don, in charge of national develop­
ment programmes, left for Tokyo to discuss aid with the Japanese 
7
government. Commenting on the event, Liberation Radio accused
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the US of now trying to get 'other countries' to invest in South
8
Vietnam to alleviate its own economic burden there.
The change in the US Presidency had no effect however on the 
Japanese commitment to stabilising Vietnam. A Japanese Cham­
ber of Commerce was established in Saigon on 9 September and 
the visit of a seven-member government delegation, led by
Omori Seiichi, Deputy Director-General for Asian Affairs at
9
the Foreign Ministry began the same day. The purpose of the
4ovisit was^make surveys of possible Japanese emergency non­
reimbursable aid.
Japan's latent moves also included North Vietnam. The 
Overseas Construction Cooperation Association (OCCA) was 
reported on 27 June to have started preparations for the exch­
ange of technology with North Vietnam as part of its operation-
10
al plan for the current fiscal year. Tokyo's financial circles 
also expressed interest in Hanoi. One unprecedented develop­
ment was Mitsui Bank's intention on 28 June to contact Hanoi
at the beginning of July for an exchange of opinion with the
11
Vietnam Foreign Trade Bank. The first Japanese bank to est­
ablish corresponding relations with its Hanoi counterpart, Mit­
sui Bank had apparently concluded its contract in 1961: It re­
vealed that its share of foreign exchange transactions between 
Japan and the DRV was approximately 50%. On 1 July Sanwa 
Bank disclosed that it had in fact proposed direct negotiations 
with the Vietnam Foreign Trade Bank 'even before the signat­
ure of the Paris Agreement' and had 'recently' received an invi-
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tation to visit Hanoi at the end of July. Both banks had pro­
jects for the postwar reconstruction of Vietnam.
Where diplomacy was concerned, Tokyo had earlier announ 
-ced that Japan would send three officials, two of whom were 
from its embassy in Vientiane, to Hanoi on 24 August 1974
for talks on the establishment of a Japanese Embassy there
13
'by the end of the year'. First Secretary Imagawa Yukio
was scheduled to be appointed Charg£ d'Affaires in Hanoi
14
when the embassy opened. In the event these talks remained
deadlocked over the question of Japanese recognition of the
15
PRG and Hanoi’s demand of reparations from Tokyo. But at 
the end of September two members of the Viet Cong were per­
mitted entry into Japan, to attend the 20th anniversary of the
16
Japan-North Vietnam Friendship Association.
Tokyo and Hanoi observed the first anniversary of diplo­
matic relations with slim chances of exchanging ambassadors. 
The lack of progress here might be linked to events elsewhere. 
On 4 September, new US Ambassador to Japan, James 
Hodgson, advocated the continuation of a close US-Japan 
partnership in Asia for the easing of tension. To 'stabilise' 
the international political and economic environment, both 
countries, he said, should share the responsibility for solv­
ing resources and energy as well as international trade and 
17
currency problems. In New York, the US-Japan talks of 
27 September 1974, the first to be held since Kimura Toshio
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assumed the post of Foreign Minister in July, also endorsed 
this principle. At the UN General Assembly too, Kissinger, 
Ingersoll and Kimura seemed intent on avoiding 'any con­
frontation whatsoever in reconstructing the international eco- 
18
nomic order'.
The effects of the energy crisis continued unabated in 
the industrialised democracies. Aid to developing countries 
were henceforth more likely to be channelled through inter­
national organs. In early September ADB President Inoue
Shiro said the oil deficits suffered by advanced nations would
19
curtail their ability to supply aid. The sharply worsening 
international capital market also meant that aid organs would 
have difficulties procuring funds. The IMF and World Bank 
General Meeting held in Washington (30 September-4 Oct­
ober) saw Ohira, now Finance Minister, concurring that oil,
inflation and aid to developing countries were now issues of 
20
global concern.
These problems notwithstanding, an attempt was made in
mid-October 1974 to resurrect the aid consortium arrangement
for Indochina. Hanoi denounced it on 14 October as a 'last-
-ditch attempt' to provide multilateral aid to Saigon. The USA,
it said, was 'pressing the World Bank and a number of other
countries' to hold a conference in Paris to carry out the 'so-
called' plan for multilateral aid to the Thieu administration un-
21
der the guise of humanitarian aid.
The second preparatory conference held in Paris in Octo-
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ber ended however without any agreement. As in mid-March 
1974, the Scandinavian countries, Norway, Sweden and Den-
22
mark were insistent that no aid be given to 'despotic regimes'. 
The advanced nations thus decided to form an aid 'consulta­
tive group' for each of the four Indochinese countries, begin­
ning with Laos where the situation appeared the least complex. 
An informal meeting was scheduled for Paris in January 1975, 
to be attended by representatives from some 15 nations. The 
World Bank was expected to present a report on the situation in 
Laos on which consultations would be held on how to push aid 
there. Japan had already extended aid for the construction of the 
Nam Gum Dam in Laos and to the Foreign Exchange Stabilisa­
tion Fund for the stabilisation of the Lao currency. Following 
the Lao example, a consultative group would be formed for 
South Vietnam in which Japan was expected to make a greater 
contribution in view of the dwindling aid from the US. North 
Vietnam, despite its protests, was being appeased by promised 
offers of Japanese aid on a bilateral basis. But this could not be
effected without the establishment of the Japanese Embassy 
23
in Hanoi. Although 'special missions' from both Saigon and 
Hanoi were expected in Paris in November to discuss details 
of aid from France - which had previously given aid amount­
ing to US$20 million for each country - neither had worked
24
out precise requests for aid priorities.
We now know that the Keidanren sent its Standing Direc­
tor, Senga Tetsuya, to Hanoi in October 1974 to hold talks
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for the first time with government leaders including Dang
25
Viet Chau, North Vietnamese Minister of Finance. Senga, 
who visited South Vietnam at the beginning of 1973 (See p. 
77), had been invited by the DRV Government, anxious to 
implement its Two-Year Reconstruction Plan for 1974-5 to 
be followed by its Five-Year Plan in 1976. The Keidanren, 
expecting to cooperate with North Vietnam in the economic 
development of heavy industry, had started in Japan 'adjust­
ment operations with related industry circles' regarding the 
arrangements for the projects. Japan-DRV economic coopera­
tion however was to be closely connected to the establishment 
of the Japanese Embassy in Hanoi and Senga would visit the
DRV capital again in the spring of 1975 since this level of
26
dialogue between two different systems was exceptional.
Hanoi's exchanges with Tokyo continued in the interim. 
Dao Trung, Director-General of the VNA visited Tokyo (18- 
24 October) at the invitation of Kvodo: The Japanese Federat­
ion of Trade Unions, SOHYO. made plans to build a hall in 
Hon Gay as a token of friendship between Japanese and Viet­
namese workers; and in mid-November the OCCA proposed
to dispatch a mission to Hanoi in the spring of 1975 for cons- 
27
truction activities.
The uncertain situation in South Vietnam in November 
did not deter Hazama Gumi, Japan's construction industry, 
inaugurating its subsidiary there, Vietnam Hazama. It form­
ulated at the same time a policy for the extension of techni­
439
28
cal cooperation with North Vietnam. Japan's trade with
North Vietnam in 1974 was reported at the end of the year
to have reached almost three times the volume of 1973 and
Hanoi was requesting the extension of long-term, low inter-
29
est loans for exports through the deferred payment system.
By early January 1975 it appeared likely that Export-Import
Bank loans to the DRV might be extended for the export of
30
a fertiliser plant by Hitachi Shipbuilding.
These moves might be seen against Ford's visit to Tokyo
(18-22 November) which gave renewed emphasis to the US-
Japan alliance. A 'common resolve' to encourage diplomatic
and political rather than military solutions to world problems 
31
was urged. The Joint Communique of 20 November 1974 
said the discussions between Ford and Tanaka encouraged the 
development of conditions irl the Asia Pacific to facilitate 
peaceful settlement of 'outstanding issues' by the parties 
most concerned, reduce international tensions, promote the 
sustained and orderly growth of developing countries and 
encourage constructive relationships among the countries of 
the area. Both countries would also 'intensify efforts' to pro­
mote close cooperation among the industrialised democra­
cies while carrying out 'dialogue and exchanges' with coun-
32
tries of 'different social systems'.
The resignation of Tanaka Kakuei on 26 November 1974 
as a result of the Lockheed scandal saw the accession of Miki
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Takeo as Premier, Miyazawa Kiichi became the new Foreign
Minister. There was no apparent change however in Tokyo's
interests in Vietnam. The visit to Saigon, at the invitation of
the South Vietnamese government, of former Premier Kishi
Nobusuke for talks (15-19 December) with Thieu and Premier
33
Tran Thien Khiem, was a symbol of such continuity.
But by year's end the military situation in South Vietnam 
had taken a turn for the worse: events in B-2 reached a decis­
ive stage. At the 'beginning of October' 1974, Tran Van Tra 
later revealed, COS VN approved the operational plan drafted 
in August-September to 'unanimously' win a decisive victory 
and complete the national democratic revolution in 1975-6:
1975 would be the 'pivotal year’ and the war would be 'vic-
34
toriously concluded' in 1976. Deputy Secretary of COSVN,
Nguyen Van Linh said the Thieu regime was in a state of
'serious decline ... (as) our attacks are becoming increasingly 
35
strong'. Moreover the Hanoi visit of General U. Kulikov,
CGS of the Soviet Armed Forces (21-27 December) according
to General Vo Nguyen Giap, encouraged the 'advance towards
36
still bigger victories' in the 'new stage' of the revolution.
The launching of the offensive early in 1975 appeared not 
to impose any constraints on Japanese initiatives in Vietnam. 
These were accelerated instead. But now Hanoi took centre- 
stage. The Foreign Ministry in Tokyo announced on 6 March 
that Japan would open an embassy in Hanoi on 1 April 1975. 
Imagawa Yulrio, First Secretary at the Lao mission would go
4 4 1
37
to Hanoi in late March as Charge d'Affaires. The DRV 
would also consult Tokyo about the opening of its embassy 
there. The issue of war reparations was to be settled by a 
Japanese grant of Yen 5,000 million as an 'immediate step’ 
towards future joint economic cooperation.
Other Japanese interests in North Vietnam were also mak­
ing progress. A trade delegation from Sumitomo was reported
on the same day to have concluded talks in Hanoi on finance
38
and commercial banking. In the first such exchange since
mid-1974 an eight-member DRV economic delegation left
Hanoi on 18 March for Tokyo: Tran Van Thanh, Head of the
Foreign Ministry's Asian Bureau was expected to confer on
details of the proposed Yen 5,000 million aid programme as
non-reimbursable economic cooperation and to exchange
39
views on 'other operational questions'.
The fall of Ban Me Thuot on 13 March 1975 signalled the 
beginning of the end. The interval between this date and 4 
April, which saw 'newly-liberated' areas added to one anoth­
er in the South, deserves a closer examination. In Tokyo the 
Foreign Ministry expressed its anxiety in mid-March that the 
military situation could shake the very foundations of Japan's
policy towards Indochina and force a re-evaluation of its re-
40
construction aid to both North and South Vietnam. It might 
also postpone the mutual establishment of the Japanese and 
North Vietnamese embassies in the two capitals.
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Japan grew increasingly concerned. The amount of its aid
to South Vietnam in 1973 (Yen 5,000 million) had increased
in 1974 to Yen 7,000 million. As late as 27 March 1975 the
Cabinet approved another Yen 9,000 million for the RVN
41
by diverting budgetary funds. On 28 March letters were
exchanged in Saigon between Japan and the RVN with strict
emphasis that the amount be used solely for the 'stabilisation'
42
of the people’s livelihood. For North Vietnam the Foreign 
Ministry simultaneously announced on 27 March that its non­
reimbursable economic cooperation with Hanoi would not be
settled until April in view of the worsening military situation 
43
in the South. These moves suggested that it was unlikely 
that the Japanese Embassy in Hanoi could open on 1 April.
Developments were now critical. On 1 April at an Upper 
House Cabinet meeting, Foreign Minister Miyazawa said the 
only way to settle the Vietnam problem was a 'return to the 
starting point’ of the Paris Agreement; 'outside forces' should 
refrain from extending any additional aid. But he was adam­
ant about sending embassy staff to Hanoi 'within one or two 
44
weeks’. Miyazawa's remarks might be understood against
the disclosure within government circles on 2 April that if
Japan opened its embassy in North Vietnam and exchanged
ambassadors 'at an early date', Tokyo might help stabilise
the situation in South Vietnam and provide channels for 
45
peace operations. The rationale was that moves in Congress 
suggested opposition to renewed US military intervention.
443
And as the US did not have diplomatic relations with Hanoi, 
a peaceful solution, Tokyo reasoned, might be reached thro­
ugh China, the Soviet Union and North Vietnam. The open­
ing of the Japanese Embassy in Hanoi might thus enable Tok­
yo to fulfil its role for the 'stabilisation1 of Asia. The mission 
could probably open once the Nguyen Van Thanh mission, 
then still visiting Tokyo, had negotiated the Yen 5,000 mill­
ion non-reimbursable aid. Two staff members including Ima- 
gawa, would then be sent to Hanoi 'around the middle of the 
month' to precede the exchange of ambassadors.
Where South Vietnam was concerned, on 4 April Tokyo 
would dispatch to Saigon, Nakayama Yoshihiro, former Amb­
assador to France and to South Vietnam, for a firsthand assess­
ment of the situation there. He would return to Tokyo a week 
later to enable the Foreign Ministry to formulate a new policy 
towards Indochina. On the same day Hitomi Hiroshi was nam­
ed Japan's new Ambassador to South Vietnam, to take up
46
his post on 10 April 1975.
However, by 4 April the Japan-DRV talks in Tokyo broke 
down. Foreign Minister Miyazawa candidly admitted that the 
agreement for economic aid had collapsed. A shift in Tokyo's 
relations with Vietnam was now discemable.
The Tokyo government decided on 5 April to donate a sum 
of Yen 600 million to the Indochina Operation Group (IOG) 
of the International Red Cross, for refugee relief. The IOG's 
activities covered the whole of Indochina and donations by
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the Japanese Government would also be distributed to areas
controlled by the PRG. A formal decision to this effect would
47
be made at a Cabinet meeting on 8 April. The date would
coincide with the release, in Saigon, of an interim report
from Nakayama, based on talks with Thieu and senior
leaders, to lay the groundwork for Miyazawa's talks with
48
Kissinger in Washington due on 10 April.
Nakayama's report said Thieu was having a difficult 
time attempting to establish a new Cabinet and that there 
were no foundations for any optimism for the future. But 
the immediate situation in the South was still 'fluid' and 
Japan might expedite operations to increase contacts with 
the North: Imagawa Yukio, currently in Tokyo, would re­
turn to Laos by 10 April and then go to Hanoi 'within a 
49
week'.
By now a turning point seemed to have been reached in
Japanese policy on Vietnam. On 10 April 1975 Tokyo made
an announcement to shelve 'for an indefinite period' the Yen
9,000 million loan to South Vietnam 'out of deference' to
50
the DRV mission with whom talks had failed. Miyazawa 
embarked on his Washington visit the same day. Ostensibly 
seeking a reaffirmation of the US’ commitment to defend 
Japan including a pledge to maintain the 'nuclear umbrella', 
the talks exposed the rift between the two allies with respect 
to events in Vietnam. Japan’s attitude towards North Vietnam 
was said to provoke the 'sharpest confrontation' on 10 April
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between Ingersoll and Miyazawa in Washington.
The Washington talks were polarised by the US’ desire, 
on the one hand, for more backing for Saigon, and Japan's 
commitment to dialogue with Hanoi, on the other, with a view 
to stabilising the situation in Vietnam as a whole. The US 
believed it still possible to prop up the Thieu regime militari­
ly to defend the area it still held. But this presupposed Cong­
ressional support and aid in any case did not mean a halt to 
the PAVN advance. Japan's negotiations with Hanoi, the 
issue of non-reimbursable aid and the establishment of the 
embassy were taken as an affront to US policy. Tokyo's 
position had previously been seen as complementary to that 
of the US since it urged respect for the Paris Agreement and 
a settlement based on non-interference. Throughout the talks 
Japan continued nevertheless to urge cooperation with North 
Vietnam through dialogue and the setting up of the mission. 
To US charges that Hanoi was violating the Paris Agreement, 
the Japanese response was that the breakdown of the ICCS
made it impossible to verify the parties responsible for viola- 
52
tions on the ground.
President Ford's 'State of the World' Address on 10 April 
1975 affirmed the US position on the need for emergency 
military aid to South Vietnam. But Japan still questioned the 
credibility of the American commitment to Vietnam. The Kis- 
singer-Miyazawa talks on 11 April reaffirmed the pledge to
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maintain the US-Japan security structure, but the exchanges
on Vietnam, expected to arouse bitter controversy, exposed the
fundamental gap in the two allies' positions. The assessment
53
of the Indochina problem remained unresolved. Both sides 
apparently exercised restraint and avoided delving too deeply 
into the issue. No details were divulged.
In Tokyo 'Ambassador-at-large' Nakayama's return from 
Saigon on 11 April saw a thorough examination of the situa­
tion in South Vietnam. The military situation, he said at a 
press conference on 12 April, was 'extremely serious' but 
there was no immediate danger of an imminent collapse;
Thieu though desperate, was confident about securing aid
and remained unflinching in his allegiance to conserving
54
the area the RVN still held.
MWWith whatit' perceived to be the inevitable demise of US
influence in Asia, Miyazawa's return to Tokyo on 13 April
from Washington saw the Foreign Ministry expressing the
intention, US objections notwithstanding, to 'hasten its deci-
55
sion' on aid to both North and South Vietnam. Some Yen 
3 billion in emergency aid for refugees, the Foreign Minis­
ter said, would be extended to both the areas controlled by 
Saigon as well those under the PRG. Yen 600 million initia­
lly promised would be contributed to the IOG. Inner govern­
ment circles were concerned that aid administered via the 
IOG might result in PRG areas receiving a larger share.
Tokyo however braced itself for problems arising from US
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objections to Japanese apportioning of the aid.
By mid-April Japan augmented what it called its 'go-it
-alone' stance in its Asian diplomacy. Four days later, on 17
April 1975, Phnom Penh fell to the Khmer Rouge. Nothing
daunted, the new Japanese Ambassador to Saigon, Hitomi
56Hiroshi, presented his credentials on 18 April to Thieu.
The naming of a new Japanese Ambassador to the RVN 
at this late stage raises questions. Did the the Japanese imagine 
that there might be a steady transition towards a genuine PRG 
Government, and that Tokyo would be in a position to recog­
nise it promptly and transfer to it arrangements previously 
made with Thieu? On 21 April however Tokyo decided to 
postpone the Yen 9 billion it had earlier agreed to extend to
Saigon since the 'sudden development’ of the situation there
57
made it difficult for Japan to fulfil its promise. President 
Thieu of the RVN resigned the same day.
Nguyen Van Thieu himself had been bent on survival. In
Saigon the aftermath of Nixon's resignation and the events
surrounding Vietnam compounded Thieu's dilemma; the idea
58
of 'truncating South Vietnam’ reemerged as a possibility.
In the spring of 1975 this resulted in a strategic withdrawal 
from the two northern regions of South Vietnam to bring the 
forces back to shorter, more easily defensible perimeters, 
including Saigon and the 'rice bowl' of the Mekong Delta.
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The cutback in US aid funds forced Thieu to reduce the 
territory of South Vietnam to cede the central half to North 
Vietnam so that the former might then be consolidated by 
a line that would include Saigon and the Mekong.
Thieu had been considering since the summer of 1974 a 
contingency plan called the 'Aid Loan Plan* under which 
the RVN would approach Congress for a military aid loan 
to be repaid later. Saigon's offshore oil revenues would be 
offered as collateral for the loan; an alternative to 'open-end­
ed aid' which might also forestall widespread criticism in 
59
Congress. The idea, Thieu believed, could boost military 
planning with some assurance of a 'level and structure' of 
aid.
Another option was the suggestion by Vuong Van Bac
in the autumn of 1974 that Thieu make a secret approach to
China to request Peking to temper its support for both Hanoi 
60
and the PRG. In return Saigon would come to an arrange­
ment with Peking on offshore oil exploration in the South Ch­
ina Sea where a sea battle had been fought over the Paracels 
in January 1974 (See p.367). At the end of 1974 an approach 
was made on Saigon's behalf by a 'British Conservative Mem­
ber of Parliament' to Deputy Foreign Minister Qiao Guanhua 
in Peking. But the Chinese remained committed to the PRG 
because Peking anticipated Hanoi's domination of Indochina.
In January 1974, Vuong Van Bac, as we; have seen, visit­
ed Saudi Arabia for an exchange on oil technology (p.364).
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That autumn he embarked on a campaign to win diplomatic
support for Saigon from Morocco, the Ivory Coast and Saudi- 
61
Saudi Arabia. In early 1975 King Saud al Faisal in Riyadh 
agreed 'in principle' to a loan of several hundred million doll­
ars to finance Saigon's purchase of fuel and ammunition as
62
well as to revive the South Vietnamese economy. Another
proposal was also confirmed, Saudi Arabia would guarantee a
US military aid loan to the RVN. Unfortunately the King was
assassinated on 25 March 1975. Bac was sent to Riyadh soon
after to urge the Saudis to consider the plan anyway. On 14
April Bac cabled Thieu to inform him that new King Khalid
had given him 'strong assurances' about continued support 
63
and assistance.
Meanwhile an alternative to military aid was conceived by 
Thieu in Saigon. Nguyen Tien Hung was dispatched to Wash­
ington on 15 April to seek postponement of a Congressional 
vote on the US$722 million requested by Ford in aid to South 
Vietnam. With more aid, Saigon might hold out long enough 
so that a negotiated end to the war could still be achieved -
either in the form of a coalition government - or by Thieu’s
64
plan to hold Saigon and the Mekong delta.
In his letter of 14 April 1975 to Ford, Thieu outlined the 
'new and grave situation' on the ground and now asked the 
US President to request Congress for a 'final' longterm 
loan of US$3 billion. With a ten-year grace period, the 
loan, to be disbursed in three years, would have an interest
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rate 'determined by Congress'. South Vietnam's 'oil pot­
ential’ and 'agricultural resources' were offered as collater­
al for the loan, called a 'Freedom Loan' to enable the South 
Vietnamese to defend themselves and to survive as a nation.
Unknown to Thieu and Hung however, the Senate Forei­
gn Relations Committee, in a rare move, requested a meeting
with Ford the same day to discuss the situation in Southeast 
66
Asia. The meeting, attended by Ford, Kissinger, Schlesin-
ger and Scowcroft did not augur well for Saigon.
Hung had to make the final feasibility of the loan and
complete his mission by 19 April, the deadline set by Ford
for Congress to respond to his aid request. He was also to
67
cable Thieu to dispatch the letter to Ford via Martin. On
18 April the Senate Foreign Relations Committee voted to
reject additional military aid for Vietnam. The Vietnam
debate, Kissinger said at that point, 'was over, the admin-
tration will accept the Congress' verdict without recrimin-
68
ation and vindictiveness'.
The Freedom Loan was not discussed. Hung gives a de­
tailed account of the correspondence between Kissinger and 
Martin in the last days of the RVN administration emphasis­
ing that the Ambassador was convinced Saigon might still
survive since the ARVN could 'hold the approaches' to the 
69capital. Martin was also hopeful that a 'negotiated soluti-
70
on' with the North Vietnamese might be a 'final solution*.
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But this presupposed Thieu step down and the envoy, had 
to convince the President that this was the only way to ’save 
what was left' of Vietnam.
The onslaughts of the PAVN made it increasingly unten­
able for Thieu to hold office. On 21 April 1975 he reluctant 
-ly resigned: Tran Van Huong was named the new President. 
Barely nine days later Saigon fell to the communists.
Japan's initiatives were frozen with the withdrawal of its 
diplomats from Saigon. It was not until 10 October 1975
that the Japanese Embassy opened in Hanoi, a 'solid diplo-
71
matic foothold in post-Vietnam war Indochina’. The then
Japanese Ambassador to Laos, Suganuma Kiyoshi, handed
a 'note verbale’ to the Hanoi government at the opening of
the mission and signed a Yen 8,500 million economic aid
agreement. Imagawa Yukio remained Charg€ d'Affaires.
.......................................................  72
The DRV Embassy in Tokyo opened on 9 January 1976.
On 27 March 1976 Hasegawa Takaaki arrived in Hanoi to
73
take up his post as Japan's first Ambassador there.
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CONCLUSION
' we have to look at the intricacies of the peace agree­
ment of 1973. Had that agreement been implemented as it was, 
it would be a very different situation than it is at the present time.
But as you know, there were two aspects of the agreement. 
One has been totally forgotten. The two aspects were: one, that 
the US would continue to support South Vietnam, just as the 
Soviets would be expected to be supporting North Vietnam. The 
other was that the US, in the event that the North Vietnamese 
complied with the terms, would also support them economically. 
In other words there was the economic package.'
Richard Nixon, 
Time Magazine.
2 April 1990.
A prominent part of this thesis which emphasised Japan's 
role in the aftermath of the Paris Agreement to contribute to 
the stabilisation of Vietnam from 1973 until 1975 provides 
the basis for believing that the Paris Agreement of 1973 
contained the bare essentials for establishing a framework 
for multilateral aid and peaceful reconstruction. But this de­
pended entirely on the military and security situation: with­
out a more secure ceasefire in South Vietnam, it proved im­
possible to work out anything more concrete for its poten­
tial 'stabilisation'.
It is clear in retrospect that the accord was flawed by the
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first quarter of 1973 because it could not forestall the infiltra­
tion by Hanoi from Laos and the DMZ into South Vietnam. 
Even in mid-June 1973 when the Agreement was being ’re­
negotiated', the new communique did not contain any tough­
er clauses to guarantee its enforceability. By July-August 1973 
it was not possible to secure agreement in Washington to ext­
end the ceasefire to Cambodia. The Agreement was on the 
verge of collapse. By then it was evident that the Nixon Ad­
ministration was no longer powerful enough and could not 
secure the confidence to enforce its own interpretation of the 
Paris Agreement. From then until the end of the year it be­
came increasingly unlikely that the framework for stability 
in Indochina might work.
On the other hand, the Japanese 'dimension' providing 
the stabilising element to the peace which had its beginnings 
in early 1973, showed signs by 1974 of Tokyo increasingly 
undertaking a more responsible share of this role. In North 
Vietnam the visit of Miyake to Hanoi in April 1973 and the 
establishment of diplomatic relations in September seemed 
in the interim to have firmly secured a place for Tokyo in 
its dialogue with Hanoi.. As we have seen, the single most 
important development after Tokyo's recognition of Hanoi 
was the evolution of the oil question. The visit of Hoang 
Quoc Viet to Japan in late 1973 and the possibility of Tokyo 
playing a major part in oil exploration in the Tonkin Gulf in 
the transition to 1974 demonstrated that Hanoi was seriously
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contemplating the option of aid and reconstruction. But this 
had to be weighted against other considerations in Hanoi 
which ultimately favoured an offensive to secure 'victory'.
Although Japan's attempts in North Vietnam underwent 
some strains in the first quarter of 1974, by mid-year the 
momentum picked up again with construction, banking and 
industrial sectors expressing interest in reconstruction .Per­
haps because of, rather than despite President Nixon's resig­
nation in August 1974, it became imperative for Tokyo to 
set up an embassy in Hanoi and the process to do so was 
accelerated. Japan, it might be conjectured, wanted to have a 
place in Vietnam and a voice in its resolution. Until the very 
last days of the Nguyen Van Thieu regime, Tokyo exercised 
its unique position and was unrelenting in its commitment to 
play a critical part in the potential stabilisation of the 'peace' 
in Vietnam.
The oil factor and its possible part in the move towards 
economic self-sufficiency and possible survival in South 
Vietnam remains relevant to the pattern of economic develop­
ment of Indochina. Thieu's eight-year economic plan, the 
opening of concessions to international consortia in July 1973 
and again in August 1974, coupled with efforts on the part of 
Japanese big business to invest in the country, made the prob­
ability of an economic take-off very real, but only if the RVN 
continued to exist.
The notion that the war was being fought in Vietnam,
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particularly in the last stages in 1974-75, because of the 
potential oil wealth in the South, is an idea that might be 
further examined. Hanoi's furious offensives from January 
1975 onwards could have been directed in large measure to 
the oil potential that might eventually be generated in the 
South. Ironically 1975 was the year in which offshore explo­
ration of oil was to have moved into fullgear. South Vietnam 
might have been much less amenable to conquest had it been 
allowed more time to develop this resource.
The circumstances in Vietnam after January 1973 contain­
ed many ingredients that could have eased the transition 
there from war to peace and to eventual stability. But the 
authors of the Paris Agreement failed to comprehend the 
depth of Hanoi's commitment to reunification which would 
ultimately supercede any other consideration. Although Ha­
noi's victory in the South might have been a factor making 
for disruption, in the context of the intended framework for 
peace, the passage to the present has not seen a diminution 
of the essential importance of these ingredients for stable 
development of Indochina as a whole.
Its limitations notwithstanding, the Agreement exacerbated 
the growth in its aftermath of a new framework of relations in 
Indochina and East Asia to inaugurate the beginnings of the 
prevailing international order. It encouraged the emergence of 
Japan as participant in the shaping of an economic framework 
for Indochina, providing in the process the impetus for Japan's
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subsequent involvement in Asia in a role commensurate with 
its economic power.
At the time of writing, these themes appear to have re-emerged 
in Vietnam and to a lesser extent, in Cambodia, in the transition 
from the late 1980's to the early 1990's.
There is little doubt that Japan seriously intends in the last 
decade of the 20th century, to play a big pan in promoting the 
stability of Indochina, whose stability is 'necessary' for all Asia. 
Tokyo now plans to head effons in furthering the economic dev­
elopment of Indochina using Thailand as its base of operations. 
Bangkok's policy of turning the region's battlefields into a mar­
ketplace are also in line with Tokyo's principle of contributing 
to peace and the economic development of Indochina.
As the country expected to make the largest contribution to 
the economic reconstruction of Indochina after the settlement 
of the Cambodian issue, Japan might use the promise of finan­
cial aid as a 'card' to move things in the right direction.
Until recently, Japan was Vietnam's second biggest trading 
partner after the Soviet Union. In 1990, according to the Japan- 
Vietnam Trade Association, Japan surpassed the Soviet Union 
to become Vietnam's biggest trading partner with US$700 mill­
ion in bilateral trade. And as assistance from Moscow declines, 
Vietnam is expected to increase its contacts with the US and Jap­
an in the hope of obtaining assistance from both.
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Vietnam besides, appears keen to shift its centrally-controll­
ed economy to one governed by market forces. In 1987 Hanoi 
promulgated an Investment Law which was amended last year 
to allow both state-owned as well as private local companies to 
enter directly into joint ventures with foreign partners.
Already, Japanese trading houses are laying the groundwork 
for a big push into Vietnam in the 1990's because of the country's 
commercial potential. The belief too that Tokyo and Washington 
might soon lift economic sanctions against Hanoi has encouraged 
these moves. One of Japan's nine biggest trading companies, 
Nissho-Iwai - which as we have seen had been making forays 
into Vietnam in the early 1970's - already has an office in Vietnam 
and Mitsubishi, Marubeni and Sumitomo are waiting for approvals 
from Hanoi. These companies are now expected to engage in 
activities ranging from the development of natural resources to 
coordinating possible joint ventures between Japanese and Viet­
namese companies, a pattern reminiscent of the 1970's. Overall 
trade between Japan and Vietnam is also on the rise.
Vietnam has been producing oil off the coast of Vung Tau 
since 1981 through its joint venture with the Soviet Union, 
VIETSOVPETRO (Vietnam-Soviet Union Petroleum Company). 
In April 1984 the company initiated offshore drilling and dis­
covered two oilfields, the 'White Tiger' and the 'Dragon' on 
the continental shelf. Two years later commercial production 
began.
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Vietnam’s proven oil reserves are no doubt the most importa­
nt single factor for Japan, currently its biggest customer. In 1973 
'dummy' companies like Nikkyo Boeki were used to get a foot­
hold into North Vietnam. Since late 1987 Mitsubishi has been 
importing crude oil from Vietnam through the Meiwa Trading 
Co., an affiliate specialising in trade with communist countries.
In a remarkable development, again with parallels in the 1970's, 
Hanoi has been studying in 1990-91 the possibility of a three-way 
joint venture with the Soviet Union, the US and Vietnam to invol­
ve the American oil company, Mobil. Mobil, as we have seen, 
was one of the pioneers of oil exploration in South Vietnam hav­
ing discovered oil off its coast in late 1974. In early April 1991 
Vietnam set up a maritime shipping company that would export 
crude oil and natural gas and import fuels, responsible for trans­
porting crude oil overseas, beginning with Japan and Singapore.
There are other important parallels to events in the early 1970's. 
Following the meeting in early April 1991 between US Assistant 
Secretary of State Richard Solomon and Vietnam's Permanent Rep­
resentative to the UN, Trinh Xuan Lang, there is a prospect of the 
US normalising relations with Vietnam.This was evident in the 
Bush Administration’s proposal in mid-April of a time-table that 
might partially life the trade embargo against Hanoi by the end of 
1991. If Hanoi and its allies in Phnom Penh agree to sign a Cambo­
dian peace accord in the summer, a high-level US team might visit 
Vietnam to begin talks on normalisation by year's end.
A proposed four-step rapprochement centreing on the signature
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of the peace accord would see the establishment in the final phase, 
of an elected government in Cambodia and full diplomatic relations 
between the US and Vietnam. Most favoured nation trading status 
would be granted to Vietnam and all restrictions on lending by the 
World Bank, the ADB and other international financial institutions 
removed.
T o stabilise growth and improve the infrastructure of Vietnam, 
the idea of the consortium arrangement discussed may be resurrect­
ed in different form. Aid to Vietnam had been suspended in 1978 
because of its invasion of Cambodia. To examine the possibility 
of resuming aid, the ADB sent a top-secret economic mission to 
Vietnam in November-December 1988, followed a year later by 
another mission ^ to study possible funding for an irrigation project 
in the Red River delta.
In early February 1991 the World Bank sponsored a two-day 
symposium on development strategy in Kuala Lumpur attended 
by economic planners from Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia and 
South Korea. The symposium briefed Vietnam on the develop­
ment of a market economy. However until Vietnam resolves its 
arrears to certain countries and to the IMF in particular, it could 
encounter obstacles to obtaining foreign aid from the World Bank.
Vietnam itself has been making forays into the ASEAN region. 
Preceding his official visit to Malaysia (6-10 February 1991) by 
attending the World Bank symposium, Vo Van Kiet, Vietnam's 
current First Deputy Prime Minister, sought assistance in its own 
process of renoation, 'doi moi' inaugurated in 1986. Malaysia
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proposed that Vietnam join the East Asian Economic Grouping 
(EAEG), and a Malaysia-Vietnam Joint Committee be set up to 
study assistance to the latter, including expertise in oil explora­
tion from Petronas, the Malaysian national petroleum enterprise.
Ho Chi Minh City, formerly Saigon, played host to an 'In­
vestment Forum for Vietnam' (11-15 March 1991) aimed at 
encouraging the international business establishment to consider 
investing in the country. The forum was Vietnam's biggest effort 
in this direction; some 187 local industrial projects sought foreign 
partners. Vo Van Kiet, who opened the conference, reiterated that 
Vietnam was committed to economic reforms that would integrate 
its economy to that of the world market. The country was moreover 
attempting to develop its legal foundations, financial system and 
regulatory framework to encourage and protect businesses.
These themes are reminiscent of those in 1973-74 which form­
ed a significant part of Nixon's design for a 'structure of peace' in 
Asia. The immediate aftermath of the Paris Agreement might thus 
be placed in the context of the realities of the time, the passage of 
which has not diminished the essential relevance of the initiatives 
for stability.
466
APPENDICES
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APPENDIX I
TEXT OF THE PARIS AGREEMENT ON ENDING 
THE WAR AND RESTORING PEACE IN VIETNAM 
27 JANUARY 1973 
(THE NEW YORK TIMES. 28 JANUARY 1973.)
A. THE MAIN AGREEMENT
The parties participating in the Paris conference on 
Vietnam, with a view to ending the war and restoring peace 
in Vietnam on the basis of respect for the Vietnamese peo­
ple's fundamental national rights and the South Vietnamese 
people's rights to self-determination, and to contributing 
to the consolidation of peace in Asia and the world, have 
agreed on the following provisions and undertake to respect 
and implement them:
CHAPTER I
The Vietnamese people's fundamental national rights.
ARTICLE 1
The United States and all other countries respect the 
independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity 
of Vietnam as recognised by the 1954 Geneva agreements on 
Vietnam.
CHAPTER II
Cessation of hostilities - withdrawal of troops.
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ARTICLE 2
A ceasefire shall be observed throughout South Vietnam 
as of 24.00 GMT, on January 27, 1973.
At the same hour, the United States will stop all its 
military activities against the territory of the Democratic 
Republic of Vietnam, by ground, air and naval forces, where­
ver they may be based, and end the mining of the territorial 
waters, ports, harbours, and waterways of the Democratic Re­
public of Vietnam.
The United States will remove, permanently deactivate 
or destroy all the mines in the territorial waters, ports, 
harbours, and waterways of North Vietnam as soon as this 
agreement goes into effect.
The complete cessation of hostilities mentioned in 
this article shall be durable and without limit of time.
ARTICLE 3
The parties undertake to maintain the ceasefire and 
to ensure a lasting and stable peace.
As soon as the ceasefire goes into effect:
(A) The United States forces and those of the other 
foreign countries allied with the United States and the 
Republic of Vietnam shall remain in place pending the imple­
mentation of the plan of troop withdrawal. The four-party 
joint military commission described in Article 16 shall 
determine the modalities.
(B) The armed forces of the two South Vietnamese parti-
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es shall remain in place. The two-party joint military comm- 
ssion described in Article 17 shall determine the areas cont 
-rolled by each party and the modalities of stationing.
(C) The regular forces of all services and arms and the 
irregular forces of the parties in South Vietnam shall stop 
all offensive activities against each other and shall 
strictly abide by the following stipulations:
All acts of force on the ground, in the air, and on the 
sea shall be prohibited:
All hostile acts, terrorism and reprisals by both sides 
will be banned.
ARTICLE 4
The United States will not continue its military invol­
vement or intervene in the internal affairs of South Vietnam.
ARTICLE 5
Within 60 days of the signing of this agreement, there 
will be a total withdrawal from South Vietnam of troops, mi­
litary advisers, and military personnel, including technical 
military personnel and military personnel associated with 
the pacification programmes, armaments, munitions and war 
material of the United States and those of the other foreign 
countries mentioned in Article 3 (A). Advisers from the 
above-mentioned countries to all paramilitary organisations 
and the police force will also be withdrawn within the same 
period of time.
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ARTICLE 6
The dismantlement of all military bases in South Viet­
nam of the United States and of the other foreign countries 
mentioned in Article 3(A) shall be completed within 60 days 
of the signing of this agreement.
ARTICLE 7
From the enforcement of the ceasefire to the formation 
of the Government provided for in Articles 9 (B) and 14 of 
agreement, the two South Vietnamese parties shall not accept 
the introduction of troops, military advisers, and military 
personnel, including technical military personnel, armaments 
munitions, and war material into South Vietnam.
The two South Vietnamese parties shall be permitted to 
make periodic replacements of armaments, munitions and war 
material which have been destroyed, damaged, worn out or 
used up after the ceasefire, on the basis of piece-for-piece 
of the same characteristics and properties, under the super­
vision of the joint military commission of the two South Vie 
-tnamese parties and of the international commission of con­
trol and supervision.
CHAPTER III
The return of captured military personnel and foreign 
civilians, and captured and detained Vietnamese civilian 
personnel.
ARTICLE 8
(A) The return of captured military personnel and
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foreign civilians of the parties shall be carried out 
simultaneously with and completed not later than the same 
day as the troop withdrawal mentioned in Article 5. The 
parties shall exchange complete lists of the above-mentioned 
captured military personnel and foreign civilians on the day 
of the signing of this agreement
(B) The parties shall help each other to get informa­
tion about those military personnel and foreign civilians of 
the parties missing in action, to determine the location and 
take care of the graves of the dead so as to facilitate the 
exhumation and repatriation of the remains, and to take any 
such other measures as may be required to get information 
about those still considered missing in action.
(C) The question of the return of Vietnamese civilian 
personnel captured and detained in South Vietnam will be 
resolved by the two South Vietnamese parties on the basis of 
the principles of Article 21 (B) of the agreement on the 
cessation of hostilities in Vietnam of July 20, 1954.
The two South Vietnamese parties will do so in a spirit 
of national reconciliation and accord, with a view to ending 
hatred and enmity, in order to ease suffering and to reunite 
families. The two South Vietnamese parties will do their ut­
most to resolve this question within 90 days after the cease 
-fire comes into effect.
CHAPTER IV
The exercise of the South Vietnamese people’s right of
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self-determination.
ARTICLE 9
The Government of the United States of America and the 
Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam undertake 
to respect the following principles for the exercise of the South 
Vietnamese people's right to self-determination:
(A) The South Vietnamese people's right to self-deter­
mination is sacred, inalienable, and shall |Jbe respected by 
all countries.
(B) The South Vietnamese people shall decide themselves 
the political future of South Vietnam through genuinely free 
and democratic general elections under international 
supervision.
(C) Foreign countries shall not impose any political 
tendency or personality on the South Vietnamese people.
ARTICLE 10
The two South Vietnamese parties undertake to respect 
the ceasefire and maintain peace in South Vietnam, settle 
all matters of contention through negotiations, and avoid 
all armed conflict.
ARTICLE 11
Immediately after the ceasefire, the two South Vietnam­
ese parties will:
Achieve national reconciliation and concord, end hatred 
and enmity, prohibit all acts of reprisal and discrimination 
against individuals or organisations that have collaborated 
with one side or the other;
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Ensure the democratic liberties of the people: personal 
freedom, freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of 
meeting, freedom of organisation, freedom of political activ 
-ities, freedom of belief, freedom of movement, freedom of 
residence, freedom of work, right to property ownership and 
right to free enterprise.
ARTICLE 12
(A) Immediately after the ceasefire, the two South 
Vietnamese parties shall hold consultations in a spirit of 
national reconciliation and concord, mutual respect and' 
mutual non-elimination to set up a national council of 
national reconciliation and concord of three equal segments.
The council shall operate on the principle of unanimity. 
After the national council of national reconciliation and 
concord has assumed its functions, the two South Vietnamese 
parties will consult about the formation of councils at low­
er levels.
The two South Vietnamese parties shall sign an agreeme­
nt on internal matters of South Vietnam as soon as possible 
and do their utmost to accomplish this within 90 days after 
the ceasefire comes into effect, in keeping with the South 
Vietnamese people's aspirations for peace, independence and 
democracy.
(B) The national council of national reconciliation and 
concord shall have the task of promoting the two South Viet­
namese parties' implementation of this agreement, achieve­
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ment of national reconciliation and concorde and ensurance 
of democratic liberties.
The national council of national reconciliation and con­
cord will organise the free and democratic general elections 
provided for in Article 9 (B) and decide the procedures and 
modalities of these general elections.
The institutions for which the general elections are to 
be held will be agreed upon through consultations between 
the two South Vietnamese parties. The national council of 
national reconciliation and concord will also decide the pro 
-cedures and modalities of such local elections as the two 
South Vietnamese parties agreed upon.
ARTICLE 13 '
The question of Vietnamese armed forces in South Viet­
nam shall be settled by the two South Vietnamese parties in 
a spirit of national reconciliation and concord, equality and 
mutual respect, without foreign interference, in accordance 
with the postwar situation:
Among the questions to be discussed by the two South 
Vietnamese parties are steps to reduce their military effec­
tives and to demobilise their troops being reduced. The two 
South Vietnamese parties will accomplish this as soon as 
possible.
ARTICLE 14
South Vietnam will pursue a foreign policy of peace and 
independence.lt will be prepared to establish relations with
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all countries irrespective of their political and social systems 
on the basis of mutual respect for independence and sover­
eignty, and accept economic and technical aid from any 
country with no political conditions attached.
The acceptance of militaiy aid by South Vietnam in the 
future shall come under the authority of the government set 
up after the general elections in South Vietnam provided for 
in Article 9 (B).
CHAPTER V
The reunification of Vietnam and the relationship bet­
ween North and South Vietnam.
ARTICLE 15
The reunification of Vietnam shall be carried out step 
by step through peaceful means on the basis of discussion 
and agreements between North and South Vietnam, without 
coercion or annexation by either part, and without foreign 
interference. The time for reunification will be agreed 
upon by North and South Vietnam.
Pending the reunification:
(A) The military demarcation line between the two zones 
at the 17th parallel is only provisional and not a political
or territorial boundary, as provided for in Paragraph 6 of 
the final declaration of the 1954 Geneva conference.
(B) North and South Vietnam shall respect the demilita­
rised zone on either side of the provisional military demar­
cation line.
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(C) North and South Vietnam shall promptly start nego 
-tians with a view to reestablishing normal relations in 
various fields. Among the questions to be negotiated are 
the modalities of civilian movement across the provisional 
demarcation line.
(D) North and South Vietnam shall not join any military 
alliance or military bloc and shall not allow foreign powers 
to maintain military bases, troops, military advisers, and 
military personnel on their respective territories, as stipula­
ted in the 1954 Geneva agreements on Vietnam.
CHAPTER VI
The joint military commissions, the international comm- 
ssion of control and supervision, the international conference.
ARTICLE 16
(A) The parties participating in the Paris conference 
on Vietnam shall immediately designate representatives to 
form a four-party joint military commission with the task of 
ensuring joint action by the parties in implementing the 
following the following provisions of this agreement:
The first paragraph of Article 2, regarding the enforce 
-ment of the ceasefire throughout South Vietnam:
Article 3 (A), regarding the ceasefire by United States 
forces and those of the other foreign countries referred to 
in that article;
Article 3 (C), regarding the ceasefire between all par­
ties in South Vietnam;
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Article 5, regarding the withdrawal from South Vietnam 
of United States troops and those of the other foreign coun­
tries mentioned in Article 3 (A);
Article 6, regarding the dismantlement of military bas­
es in South Vietnam of the United States and those of the 
other foreign countries mentioned in Article 3 (A);
Article 8 (A), regarding the return of captured milita­
ry personnel and foreign civilians of the parties:
Article 8 (B), regarding the mutual assistance of the 
parties in getting information about those military personn­
el and foreign civilians of the parties missing in action.
(B) The four-party joint military commission shall 
operate in accordance with the principle of consultations 
and unanimity. Disagreements shall be referred to the 
international commission of control and supervision.
(C) The four-party joint military commission shall 
begin operating immediately after the signing of the 
agreement and end its activities in 60 days, after the 
completion of the withdrawal of United States troops and 
those of the other foreign countries mentioned in Article 3
(A) and the completion of the return of captured military 
personnel and foreign civilians of the parties.
(D) The four parties shall agree immediately on the 
organisation, the working procedure, means of activity, and 
expenditures of the four-party joint military commission.
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ARTICLE 17
(A) The two South Vietnamese parties shall immediately 
designate representatives to form a two-party joint military 
commission with the task of ensuring joint action by the two 
South Vietnamese parties in implementing the following provi 
-sions of this agreement:
The first paragraph of Article 2, regarding the enforce­
ment of the ceasefire throughout South Vietnam, when the 
four-party joint military commission has ended its activities:
Article 3 (B), regarding the ceasefire between the two 
South Vietnamese parties;
Article 3 (C), regarding the ceasefire between all par­
ties in South Vietnam, when the four-party joint military 
commission has ended its activities;
Article 7 regarding the prohibition of the introduction 
of troops into South Vietnam and all other provisions of 
this article;
Article 8 (C), regarding the question of the return of 
Vietnamese civilian personnel captured and detained in South 
Vietnam;
Article 13, regarding the reduction of the military eff 
-ectives of the two South Vietnamese parties and the demobi­
lisation of the troops being reduced.
(B) Disagreements shall be referred to the internation­
al commission of control and supervision.
(C) After the signing of this agreement, the two-party
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joint military commission shall agree immediately on the 
measures and organisation aimed at enforcing the ceasefire 
and preserving peace in South Vietnam.
ARTICLE 18
(A) After the signing of this agreement, an intematio 
-nal commission of control and supervision shall be establi 
-shed immediately.
(B) Until the international conference provided for in 
Article 19 makes definitive arrangements, the international 
commission of control and supervision will report to the 
four parties on matters concerning the control and supervi­
sion of the implementation of the following procedures of 
this agreement:
The first paragraph of Article 2, regarding the enfor­
cement of the ceasefire through South Vietnam;
Article 3 (A), regarding the ceasefire by United States 
forces and those of the other foreign countries referred to 
in that article:
Article 3 (C), regarding the ceasefire between all the 
parties in South Vietnam;
Article 5, regarding the withdrawal from South Vietnam 
of South Vietnamese troops and those of the other foreign 
countries mentioned in Article 3 (A);
Article 6 regarding the dismantlement of military bases 
in South Vietnam of the United States and those of the other 
foreign countries mentioned in Article 3 (A);
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Article 8 (A), regarding the return of captured milita 
-ry personnel and foreign civilians of the parties.
The international commission of control and supervision 
shall form control teams for carrying out its tasks. The 
four parties shall agree immediately on the location and 
operation of these teams. The parties will facilitate their 
operation.
(C) Until the international conference makes definitive 
arrangements, the international commission of control and 
supervision will report to the two South Vietnamese parties 
on matters concerning the control and supervision of the 
implementation of the following provisions of this 
agreement:
The first paragraph of Article 2, regarding the enforce 
-ment of the ceasefire throughout South Vietnam, when the 
four-party joint military commission has ended its activit­
ies;
Article 3 (B), regarding the ceasefire between the two 
parties;
Article 3 (C), regarding the ceasefire between all par­
ties in South Vietnam, when the four-party joint military 
commission has ended its activities;
Article 7, regarding the prohibition of the introduct­
ion of troops into South Vietnam and all other provisions 
of this article;
Article 8 (C), regarding the question of the return of
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Vietnamese civilian personnel captured and detained in South 
Vietnam;
Article 9 (B), regarding the free and democratic gener­
al elections in South Vietnam;
Article 13, regarding the reduction of the military eff 
-ectives of the two South Vietnamese parties and the demobil 
-isation of the troops being reduced.
The international commission of control and supervision 
shall form control teams for carrying out its tasks. The two 
South Vietnamese parties shall agree immediately on the loca 
-tion and operation of these teams. The two South Vietnamese 
parties will facilitate their operations.
(D) The international commission of control and supervi 
-sion shall be composed of representatives of four countries 
Canada, Hungary, Indonesia and Poland. The chairmanship of 
this commission will rotate among the members for specific 
periods to be determined by the commission.
(E) The international commission of control and super­
vision shall carry out its tasks in accordance with the prin 
-ciple of respect for the sovereignty of South Vietnam.
(F) The international commission of control and super­
vision shall operate in accordance with the principle of con 
-sultations and unanimity.
(G) The international commission of control and supervi 
-sion shall begin operating when a ceasefire comes into for­
ce in Vietnam. As regards the provisions in Article 18 (B)
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concerning the four parties, the international commission 
of control and supervision shall end its activities when the 
commission's tasks of control and supervision regarding the­
se provisions have been fulfilled.
As regards the provisions in Article 18 (C) concerning 
the two South Vietnamese parties, the international commiss 
-ion of control and supervision shall end its activities on 
the request of the government formed after the general elec­
tions in South Vietnam provided for in Article 9 (B).
(H) The four parties shall agree immediately on the org 
-anisation, means of activity, and expenditures of the inter 
-national commission of control and supervision. The relati­
onship between the international commission and the interna­
tional conference will be agreed upon by the international 
commission and the international conference.
ARTICLE 19
The parties agree on the convening of an international 
conference within 30 days of the signing of this agreement 
to acknowledge the signed agreements; to guarantee the end­
ing of the war, the maintenance of peace in Vietnam, the res 
-pect of the Vietnamese people's fundamental national rights 
and the South Vietnamese people's right to self-determinati­
on; and to contribute to and guarantee peace in Indochina.
The United States and the Democratic Republic of Viet­
nam, on behalf of the parties participating in the Paris Con 
-ference on Vietnam, will propose to the following parties
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that they participate in this international conference: 
the People's Republic of China, the Republic of France, the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, the 
four countries of the international commission of control 
and supervision, and the Secretary-General of the United Nat 
-ions, together with the parties participating in the Paris 
Conference on Vietnam.
CHAPTER VII
Regarding Cambodia and Laos.
ARTICLE 20
(A) The parties participating in the Paris Conference on 
Vietnam shall strictly respect the 1954 Geneva agreements on 
Cambodia and the 1962 Geneva agreements on Laos, which 
recognised the Cambodian and the Lao people’s fundamental 
national rights, i.e. the independence, sovereignty, unity 
and territorial integrity of these countries. The parties shall 
respect the neutrality of Cambodia and Laos.
The parties participating in the Paris conference on 
Vietnam undertake to refrain from using the territory of 
Cambodia and the territory of Laos to encroach on the sover 
-eignty and security of one another and of other countries.
(B) Foreign countries shall put an end to all military 
activities in Cambodia and Laos, totally withdraw from and 
refrain from reintroducing into these two countries troops, 
military advisers, and military personnel, armaments, munit­
ions and war material.
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(C) The internal affairs of Cambodia and Laos shall be 
settled by the people of each of these countries without for 
-eign interference.
(D) The problems existing between the Indochinese coun­
tries shall be settled by the Indochinese parties on the ba­
sis of respect for each other’s independence, sovereignty 
and territorial integrity and non-interference in each
other's internal affairs.
CHAPTER VIII
The relationship between the United States and the 
Democratic Republic of Vietnam.
ARTICLE 21
The United States anticipates that this agreement will 
usher in an era of reconciliation with the Democratic Repub­
lic of Vietnam as with all the peoples of Indochina. In pur­
suance of its traditional policy, the United States will con 
-tribute to healing the wounds of war and to postwar recons­
truction of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and through­
out Indochina.
ARTICLE 22
The ending of the war, the restoration of peace in Viet 
-nam, and the strict implementation of the agreement will 
create conditions for establishing a new, equal and mutually 
beneficial relationship between the United States and the 
Democratic Republic of Vietnam on the basis of respect for
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each other's independence and sovereignty, and non-interfer­
ence in each other's internal affairs. At the same time, this will 
ensure stable peace in Vietnam and contribute to the preserva­
tion of lasting peace in Indochina and Southeast Asia.
This agreement will enter into force upon signature by 
plenipotentiary representatives of the parties participating 
in the Paris conference on Vietnam. All the parties concerned 
shall strictly implement this agremeent and its protocols.
Done in Paris this twenty-seventh day of January, one 
thousand nine hundred and seventy-three, in Vietnamese and 
English. The Vietnamese and English texts are officially and 
equally authentic.
For the Provisional For the Government of
Revolutionary Government the Democratic Republic
of the Republic of South of Vietnam
CHAPTER IX
Other Provisions
ARTICLE 23
Vietnam.
NGUYEN THIBINH NGUYEN DUY TRINH
Minister for Foreign Affairs Minister for Foreign Affairs
For the Government of the For the Government of
United States of America the Republic of Viemam
WILLIAM P. ROGERS TRAN VAN LAM
Secretary of State Minister for Foreign Affairs
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APPENDIX II
TEXT OF TWO PARTY JOINT COMMUNIQUE 
PARIS, 13 JUNE 1973;
fDSB. 9 July 1973, pp.50-55.)
From May 17 to May 23, from June 6 to June 9, and on 
June 12 and June 13, 1973, Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, on behalf 
of the Government of the United States of America, and Mr.Le 
Due Tho, on behalf of the Government of the Democratic Rep­
ublic of Vietnam, reviewed the implementation of the Paris 
Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam 
and its Protocols and discussed urgent measures to ensure the 
correct and strict implementation of the Agreement and its 
Protocols.
The Government of the United States of America, with 
the concurrence of the Government of the Republic of Viet­
nam,
The Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, 
with the concurrence of the Provisional Revolutionary Govern 
-ment of the Republic of South Vietnam,
Considering that strict respect and scrupulous implemen 
-tation of all provisions of the Paris Agreement and its Pro 
-tocols by all the parties signatory to them are necessary 
to ensure the peace in Vietnam and contribute to the cause 
of peace in Indochina and Southeast Asia,
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Have agreed on the following points (in the sequence of 
the relevant articles in the Agreement):
1) In conformity with Article 2 of the Agreement, the Uni­
ted States shall cease immediately, completely, and indefinitely 
aerial reconnaissance over the territory of the Democratic Rep­
ublic of Vietnam.
2) In conformity with Article 2 of the Agreement and 
with the Protocol on Mine Clearance:
(A) The United States shall resume mine clearance opera 
-tions within five days from the date of signature of this
Joint Communique and shall successfully complete those opera 
-tions within thirty days thereafter.
(B) The United States shall supply to the Democratic Re 
-public of Vietnam means which are agreed to be adequate and 
sufficient for sweeping mines in rivers.
(C) The United States shall announce when the mine clea 
-ranee in each main channel is completed and issue a final 
announcement when all the operations are completed.
3) In implementation of Article 2 of the Agreement, at 1200 
hours, GMT, June 14,1973, the High Commands of the two 
South Vietnamese parties shall issue identical orders to all 
regular and irregular armed forces and the armed police un­
der their command, to strictly observe the ceasefire through 
-out South Vietnam beginning at 1400 hours, GMT, June 15, 
1973, and scrupulously implement the Agreement and its-Proto 
-cols.
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4) The two South Vietnamese parties shall strictly imp­
lement Articles 2 and 3 of the Protocol on the Ceasefire in 
South Vietnam which read as follows:
"ARTICLE 2
(A) As soon as the ceasefire comes into force and until 
regulations are issued by the Joint Military Commissions, 
all ground, river, sea and air combat forces of the parties 
in South Vietnam shall remain in place; that is, in order to 
ensure a stable ceasefire, there shall be no major redeploy­
ments or movements that would extend each party's area of 
control or would result in contact between opposing armed 
forces and clashes which might take place.
(B) All regular and irregular armed forces and the arm­
ed police of the parties in South Vietnam shall observe the 
prohibition of the following acts:
(1) Armed patrols into areas controlled by opposing arm 
-ed forces and flights by bomber and fighter aircraft of all 
types, except for unarmed flights for proficiency training 
and maintenance;
(2) Armed attacks against any person, either military
or civilian, by any means whatsoever, including the use of 
small arms, mortars, artillery, bombing and strafing by air­
planes and any other type of weapon or explosive device;
(3) All combat operations on the ground, on rivers, on 
the sea and in the air;
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(4) All hostile acts, terrorism or reprisals; and
(5) All acts endangering lives or public or private 
property.
ARTICLE 3
(A) The above-mentioned prohibitions shall not hamper 
or restrict:
(1) Civilian supply, freedom of movement, freedom to 
work, and freedom of the people to engage in trade, and civi 
-lian communication and transportation between and among all 
areas in South Vietnam;
(2) The use by each party in areas under its control of 
military support elements, such as engineer and transportat­
ion units, in repair and construction of public facilities
and the transportation and supplying of the population;
(3) Normal military proficiency training conducted by 
the parties in the areas under their respective control 
with due regard for public safety.
(B) The Joint Military Commissions shall immediately 
agree on corridors, routes, and other regulations governing 
the movement of military transport vehicles, and military 
transport vessels of all types of one party going through 
areas under the control of other parties."
5) The Two-Party Joint Military Commission shall imme­
diately ,carry out its task pursuant to Article 3 (B) of the
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Agreement to determine the areas controlled by each of the 
two South Vietnamese parties and the modalities of station­
ing. This task shall be completed as soon as possible. The 
Commission shall also immediately discuss the movements 
necessary to accomplish a return of the armed forces of the 
two South Vietnamese parties to the positions they occupied 
at the time the ceasefire entered into force on January 28, 
1973.
6) Twenty-four hours after the ceasefire referred to in 
paragraph 3 enters into force, the commanders of the oppos­
ing armed forces at those places of direct contact shall meet 
to carry out the provisions of Article 4 of the Protocol on 
the Ceasefire in South Vietnam with a view to reaching an 
agreement on temporary measures to avert conflict and to 
ensure supply and medical care for these armed forces.
7) In conformity with Article 7 of the Agreement:
(A) The two South Vietnamese parties shall not accept 
the introduction of troops, military advisers, and military 
personnel, including technical military personnel, into 
South Vietnam.
(B) The two South Vietnamese parties shall not accept 
the introduction of armaments, munitions, and war material 
into South Vietnam. However, the South Vietnamese parties 
are permitted to make periodic replacement of armaments, 
munitions, and war material, as authorised by Article 7 of
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the Agreement, through designated points of entry and sub­
ject to supervision by the Two-Party Joint Military Commiss 
-ion and the International Commission of Conntrol and Super­
vision.
In conformity with Article 15 (B) of the Agreement re­
garding the respect of the Demilitarised Zone, military equi 
-pment may transit the Demilitarised Zone only if introduc­
ed into South Vietnam as replacements pursuant to Article 7 
of the Agreement and through a designated point of entry.
(C) Twenty-four hours after the entry into force of the 
ceasefire referred to in paragraph 3, the Two-Party Joint 
Military Commission shall discuss the modalities for the 
supervision of the replacements of armaments, munitions, and 
war material permitted by Article 7 of the Agreement at the 
three points of entry already agreed upon for each party. 
Within fifteen days of the entry into force of the ceasefire 
referred to in paragraph 3, the two South Vietnamese parties 
shall also designate by agreement three additional points of 
entry for each party in the area controlled by that party.
8) In conformity with Article 8 of the Agreement:
(A) Any captured personnel covered by Article 8(A) of 
the Agreement who have not yet been returned shall be return 
-ed without delay, and in any event within no more than thir 
-ty days from the date of signature of this Joint Communique
(B) All the provisions of the Agreement and the Protocol
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on the Return of Captured Personnel shall be scrupulously 
implemented. All Vietnamese civilian personnel covered by 
Article 8(C) of the Agreement and Article 7 of the Protocol 
on the Return of Captured Personnel shall be returned as 
soon as possible. The two South Vietnamese parties shall 
do their utmost to accomplish this within forty-five days 
from the date of signature of this Joint Communique.
(C) In conformity with Article 8 of the Protocol on
the Return of Captured Personnel, all captured and detained 
personnel covered by that Protocol shall be treated humanely 
at all times. The two South Vietnamese parties shall immedia 
-tely implement Article 9 of that Protocol and, within fifteen 
days from the date of signature of this Joint Communique 
allow National Red Cross Societies they have agreed upon 
to visit all places where these personnel are held.
(D) The two South Vietnamese parties shall cooperate in 
obtaining information about missing persons and in determin­
ing the location of and in taking care of the graves of the 
dead.
(E) In conformity with Article 8 (B) of the Agreement, 
the parties shall help each other to get information about 
those military personnel and foreign civilians of the part­
ies missing in action, to determine the location and take 
care of the graves of the dead so as to facilitate the ex­
humation and repatriation of the remains, and to take any 
such other measures as may be required to get information
493
about those still considered missing in action. For this 
purpose, frequent and regular liaison flights shall be made 
between Saigon and Hanoi.
9) The two South Vietnamese parties shall implement 
Article 11 of the Agreement, which reads as follows:
"Immediately after the ceasefire, the two South Vietnam 
-ese parties will:
- achieve national reconciliation and concord, end hat­
red and enmity, prohibit all acts of reprisal and discrimina 
-tion against individuals or organisations that have collab­
orated with one side or the other;
- ensure the democratic liberties of the people: person 
-al freedom, freedom of speech, freedom of the press, free­
dom of meeting, freedom organisation, freedom of political 
activities, freedom of belief, freedom of movement, freedom 
of residence, freedom of work, right to property ownership 
and right to free enterprise."
10) Consistent with the principles for the exercise of 
the South Vietnamese people's right to self-determination 
stated in Chapter IV of the Agreement:
(A) The South Vietnamese people shall decide themselves 
the political future of South Vietnam through genuinely free 
and democratic general elections under international super­
vision.
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(B) The National Council of National Reconciliation and 
Concord consisting of three equal segments shall be formed 
as soon as possible, in conformity with Article 12 of the 
Agreement.
The two South Vietnamese parties shall sign an agree­
ment on the internal matters of South Vietnam as soon as 
possible, and shall do their utmost to accomplish this with 
-in forty-five days from the date of signature of this Joint 
Communique.
(C) The two South Vietnamese parties shall agree throu­
gh consultations on the institutions for which the free and 
democratic general elections provided for in Article 9 (B) 
of the Agreement will be held.
(D) The two South Vietnamese parties shall implement 
Article 13 of the Agreement, which reads as follows:
"The question of Vietnamese armed forces in South Viet­
nam shall be settled by the two South Vietnamese parties in 
a spirit of national reconciliation and concord, equality and 
mutual respect, without foreign interference, in accordance 
with the postwar situation. Among the questions to be dis­
cussed by the two South Vietnamese parties are steps to 
reduce their military effectives and to demobilise the troops 
being reduced. The two South Vietnamese parties will 
accomplish this as soon as possible."
11) In implementation of Article 17 of the Agreement:
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(A) All the provisions of Articles 16 and 17 of the Proto­
col on the Ceasefire in South Vietnam shall immediately be 
implemented with respect to the Two-Party Joint Military Com­
mission. That Commission shall also immediately be accord­
ed the eleven points of privileges and immunities agreed upon 
by the Four-Party Joint Military Commission. Frequent and 
regular liaison flights shall be made between Saigon and the 
headquarters of the Regional Two-Party Joint Military Com­
missions and other places in South Vietnam as required for 
the operations of the Two-Party Joint Military Commission. 
Frequent and regular liaison flights shall also be made 
between Saigon and Loc Ninh.
(B) The headquarters of the Central Two-Party Joint 
Military Commission shall be located in Saigon proper at a 
place agreed upon by the two South Vietnamese parties where 
an area controlled by one of them adjoins an area controlled 
by the other. The locations of the headquarters of the Reg­
ional Two-Party Joint Military Commissions and of the teams 
of the Two-Party Joint Military Commission shall be determin 
-ed by that Commission within fifteen days after the entry 
into force of the ceasefire referred to in paragraph 3.
These locations may be changed at any time as determined by 
the Commission. The locations, except for teams at the poin­
ts of entry, shall be selected from among those towns speci­
fied in Article 11 (B) and (C) of the Protocol on the Cease­
fire in South Vietnam and those places where an area control
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-led by the other, or at any other place agreed upon by the 
Commission.
(C) Once the privileges and immunities mentioned in pa­
ragraph 11(A) are accorded by both South Vietnamese parties 
the Two-Party Joint Military Commission shall be fully staff 
-ed and its regional commissions and teams fully deployed 
within fifteen days after the locations have been determined
(D) The Two-Party Joint Military Commission and the Int 
-emational Commission of Control and Supervision shall clos 
-ely cooperate with and assist each other in carrying out 
their respective functions.
12) In conformity with Article 18 of the Agreement and 
Article 10 of the Protocol on the International Commission of 
Control and Supervision, the International Commission, inclu­
ding its teams, is allowed such movement for observation as is 
reasonably required for the proper exercise of its functions as 
stipulated in the Agreement.In canying out these functions, the 
International Commission, including its teams shall enjoy all 
necessary assistance and cooperation from the parties concerned. 
The two South Vietnamese parties shall issue the necessary inst­
ructions to their personnel and take all other necessary measures 
to ensure the safety of such movement.
13) Article 20 of the Agreement, regarding Cambodia and 
Laos, shall be scrupulously implemented.
14) In conformity with Article 21 of the Agreement, the
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United States-Democratic Republic of Vietnam Joint Economic 
Commission shall resume its meetings four days from the date 
of signature of this Joint Communique and shall complete the 
first phase of its work within fifteen days thereafter.
Affirming that the parties concerned shall strictly respect 
and scrupulously implement all the provisions of the Paris 
Agreement, its Protocols, this Joint Communique, and a Joint 
Communique in the same terms signed by representatives of 
the Government of the United States of America, the Govern­
ment of the Republic of Vietnam, the Government of the Demo­
cratic Republic of Vietnam, and the Provisional Revolutionary 
Government of the Republic of South Vietnam, the representa­
tive of the United States of America, Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, 
and the representative of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, 
Mr. Le Due Tho, have decided to issue this Joint Communique 
to record and publish the points on which they have agreed.
Signed in Paris, June 13, 1973.
For the Government of For the Government of 
the United States of the Democratic Republic
America of Vietnam
HENRY A. KISSINGER
President of the
Assistant to the
LE DUC THO 
Representative of the 
Government of the
United States of Democratic Republic of 
VietnamAmerica
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APPENDIX III
SECRETARY KISSINGER RESPONDS TO SENATOR KENNEDY 
ON INDOCHINA POLICY ISSUES
(PSB. 22 April 1974, pp.425-431.)
Following is the text of a letter dated March 25 1974, 
from Secretary Kissinger to Senator Edward M.Kennedy, 
Chairman of the Subcommittee on Refugees of the Senate 
Committeee on the Judiciary.
TEXT OF LETTER 
March 25, 1974
DEAR MR. c h a ir m a n : In response to your letter of March 
13 on various aspects of United States policy toward Indo­
china, I am enclosing our comment on the nine specific items 
you have outlined. I hope this information will be useful to 
you. As to the recommendations of the Subcommittee's Study 
Mission to Indochina last year, which were enclosed with 
your letter, I have asked Governor Holton (Linwood Holton, 
Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations) to review 
these and to prepare our comments for submission to you as 
soon as possible.
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Your letter also expressed concern over a March 6 cable 
by Ambassador (Graham) Martin commenting on a recent press 
article on the United States role in Vietnam. I do not beli­
eve the Ambassador is suggesting a cause-and effect relation 
-ship between decisions in Hanoi and the views of any indivi 
-dual Members of Congress or their staffs. What he is descri 
-bing is a very real and sophisticated propaganda effort by 
North Vietnam to bring to bear on a wide spectrum of Ameri­
cans its own special view of the situation in Indochina. The 
Ambassador believes, and in this he has our full confidence 
and support, that we must counter these distortions emanat­
ing from Hanoi and continue to provide the best answers to 
the concerned questions many Americans have about our Indo­
china policy.
Warm regards,
HENRY A. KISSINGER
Enclosure:
Comment on Indochina Policy Issues
THE HONOURABLE EDWARD M. KENNEDY, 
Chairman, Subcommittee on Refugees, 
Committee on the Judiciary,
United States Senate.
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TEXT OF ENCLOSURE
1) 'The general character and objectives of American 
policy towards Indochina as a whole and towards each govern 
-ment or political authority in the area;’
There are two basic themes in our policy toward Indo­
china. The first is our belief that a secure peace in Indo­
china is an important element in our efforts to achieve a 
worldwide structure of peace. Conversely, we believe that an 
evolution toward peace in other troubled areas helps bring 
about the stability for which we strive in Indochina. Conse­
quently, our Indochina policy has been geared to bring about 
the conditions which will enable the contending parties to 
find a peaceful resolution of their differences.
A resolution of differences can, of course, be achieved 
by other than peaceful means. For example, North Vietnam 
might seek to conquer South Vietnam by force of arms. Such a 
resolution, however, would almost certainly be a temporary 
one and would not produce the longterm and stable peace 
which is essential. Therefore, a corollary to our search for 
peace, and the second theme of our policy, is to discourage 
the takeover of the various parts of Indochina by force. For 
-cible conquest is not only repugnant to American traditions 
but also has serious destabilising effects which are not 
limited to the area under immediate threat.
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We would stress the point that the United States has no 
desire to see any particular form of government or social 
system in the Indochina countries. What we do hope to see is 
a free choice by the people of Indochina as to the govern­
ments and systems under which they will live. To that end we 
have devoted immense human and material resources to assist 
them in protecting this right of choice.
Our objective with regard to the Government of Vietnam, 
the Government of the Khmer Republic and the Royal Lao Gover 
-nment is to provide them with the material assistance and 
political encouragement which they need in determining their 
own futures and in helping to create conditions which will 
permit free decisions. In Laos, happily, real progress has 
been made, partly because of our assistance. The Vientiane 
Agreement and Protocols give clear evidence of the possibili 
-ty for the peaceful settlement our policies are designed to 
foster. We have supported the Royal Lao Government and, when 
it is formed, we will look with great sympathy on the Govern 
-ment of National Union. We welcome a peaceful and neutral 
Laos and, where appropriate, we will continue to encourage 
the parties to work out their remaining problems.
In Cambodia we are convinced that longterm prospects 
for stability would be enhanced by a ceasefire and a nego­
tiated setdement among the Khmer elements to the conflict. 
Because such stability is in our interests we are providing 
diplomatic and material support to the legitimate government
502
of the Khmer Republic, both in its self-defence efforts and 
in its search for a political solution to the war.
Our objective in Vietnam continues to be to help streng 
-then the conditions which made possible the Paris Agreement 
on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam. With this 
in mind we have supported the Republic of Vietnam with both 
military and economic assistance. We believe that by provid­
ing the Vietnamese Government the necessary means to defend 
itself and to develop a viable economy, the government in 
Hanoi will conclude that political solutions are much pre­
ferable to renewed use of major military force. The presence 
of large numbers of North Vietnamese troops in the South 
demonstrates that the military threat from Hanoi is still 
very much in evidence. Because of that threat we must still 
ensure that the Republic of Vietnam has the means to protect 
its independence. We note, however, that the level of violen 
-ce is markedly less than it was prior to the ceasefire and 
believe that our policy of support for South Vietnam has 
been instrumental in deterring major North Vietnamese offen­
sives.
Our objective with regard to the Democratic Republic of 
Vietnam, and its southern arm, the Provisional Revolutionary 
Government is to encourage full compliance with the Paris 
Agreement We have been disappointed by North Vietnam's ser­
ious violations of important provisions of the Agreement. 
However, we still believe that the Agreement provides a work
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-able framework for a peaceful and lasting settlement, and 
we will continue to use all means available to us to support 
the ceasefire and to encourage closer observance of it. Our 
future relations with Hanoi obviously depend in large part on 
how faithfully North Vietnam complies with the Agreement.
2) 'The general content and nature of existing obligations 
and commitments to the governments in Saigon, Phnom 
Penh and Vientiane.'
The US has no bilateral written commitment to the Gov­
ernment of the Republic of Vietnam. However, as a signa- 
tor of the Paris Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring 
Peace in Vietnam, the United States committed itself to 
strengthening the conditions which made the ceasefire possi­
ble and to the goal of the South Vietnamese people's right 
to self-determination. With these commitments in mind, we 
continue to provide to the Republic of Vietnam the means 
necessary for its self-defence and for its economic viability.
We also recognise that we have derived a certain obliga 
-tion from our long and deep involvement in Vietnam. Per­
ceiving our own interest in a stable Vietnam free to make 
its own political choices, we have encouraged the Vietnamese 
people in their struggle for independence. We have invested 
great human and material resources to support them in protect 
-ing their own as well as broader interests. We have thus 
committed ourselves very substantially, both politically and
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morally. While the South Vietnamese Government and people 
are demonstrating increasing self-reliance, we believe it is 
important that we continue our support as long as it is needed.
Our relations with the Government of the Khmer Republic 
also do not stem ffon a formal commitment but are based on 
our own national interests. Recognising that events in Cambo 
-dia relate directly to the bitter hostilities in other parts of Indo­
china, we have sought to help create stability in that country 
as a part of our effort to encourage the development of peace 
in the entire region. We, therefore, support the legitimate gov­
ernment of Cambodia, in the hope that its increasing strength 
will encourage the Khmer Communists toward a political 
settlement rather than continued conflict.
We have also undertaken our assistance to Laos and supp 
-on for the Royal Lao Government because of our own broad 
national interests, not because of any formal commitment to 
that country. The most important and visible of our intere­
sts is our desire for a just settlement of the tragic war in 
Indochina. Laos plays a key role in this effort to achieve 
the peace. Indeed, Laos is the bright spot in Indochina 
where the fruits of our efforts to assist and support the Royal 
Lao Government are most clearly seen. A ceasefire based on 
an agreement worked out by the two Lao parties has endured 
for more than a year. The two parties have together organised 
joint security forces in the two capital cities of Vientiane and 
Luang Prabang and a coalition government may not be far
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away. We feel that these large steps toward a lasting peace in 
Laos would probably not have succeeded but for our steadfast 
support for the efforts of the Royal Lao Government.
3) 'The kinds, categories and levels of support and 
assistance given or projected to the governments in Saigon, 
Phnom Penh and Vientiane for fiscal year 1975 through 1975 - 
including (a) a breakdown of the number, distribution, acti­
vities and agency/departmental association of official Amer­
ican personnel, as well as those associated with private 
business and other organisations under contract to the Unit­
ed States government; and (b) a breakdown from all sources 
of humanitarian assistance, police and public safety orient- . 
ed assistance, general supporting and economic development 
assistance, and military assistance.'
(a) US Economic Assistance
Our annual Congressional Presentation books provide the 
data requested here in considerable detail. These Congress­
ional Presentation books for FY 1975 will shortly be deliver 
-ed to the Congress. We provide these first, as a matter of 
course, to the authorising and appropriations Committees of 
the Senate and the House and then routinely make them avail­
able to all Members as well as the interested public. We will 
be happy tp provide your Subcommittee on Refugees with 
copies as soon as possible.
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The Congressional Presentation books focus, of course, 
on our proposals for the coming year, FY 1975, but also con 
-tain data of both the current fiscal year, FY 1974 and the 
preceding, FY 1973. This year, as last, we are preparing a 
separate book providing the details of our economic assistan 
-ce programmes for the Indochina countries.
These Congressional Presentation books form a partial 
basis, of course, for extensive Hearings held each year by 
the authorising committees in the Senate and House, and then 
by the appropriations committees. We would expect the quest­
ion you pose, as well as many others, to be further explored 
in explored in considerable depth during the course of these 
hearings.
(b) US Military Assistance
Our military assistance to South Vietnam and Laos is 
provided under MASF (military assistance service funded).The 
breakdown of this assistance for the period you requested is 
as follows:
Year Ceiling New Obligational
Authority
FY 1973 $2,735 Billion $ 2.563 Billion
FY 1974 $1,126 Billion $ 907.5 Million
a
FY 1975 $1.6 Billion $ 1.450 Billion
(Requested)
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The level of official US military/civilian personnel in 
South Vietnam during the same period is as follows:
Year Military Civilian
January, 1973 23,516 (Assigned) 730
January, 1974 221 (Authorised) 1200
June, 1974 221 (Authorised) 936
The number of US civilian contractors has declined from 
5,737 in January 1973, to 2,736 in January 1974. This number 
is expected to decrease further to 2,130 by June 1974. We do 
not yet have a projected level of US civilian contractors for FY 
1975.
Our military' assistance to Cambodia is furnished under 
MAP (military assistance programme). This assistance totall­
ed $148.6 million in FY 1974. The level of our military ass­
istance for FY 1975 is now under review. The amount to be 
proposed will be included in the Congressional presentation 
documents on military assistance which we expect to submit 
to Congress shortly.
US military and civilian personnel in Cambodia during 
the period you requested is as follows:
Year Military Civilian
December 1972 112 53
December 1973 113 55
December 1974 113 DNA
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dUS military and civilian personnel in Laos during the 
period you requested is as follows:
Year Military Civilian
December 1972 185 457
December 1973 180 424
**
December 1974 30 DNA
4) 'The current status and problems of reported efforts 
to establish an international consortium for general recons­
truction assistance to the area.1
In April 1973 President Thieu asked the International Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) to help form 
an aid group for the Republic of Vietnam. The IBRD agreed 
to make the effort, provided that this would be acceptable 
to the Bank membership and that the group could be organised 
in association with both the IBRD and the Asian Development 
Bank. In May the World Bank sent a study mission to Vietnam 
to review the situation. In August, Japan suggested that the 
Bank arrange a preliminary meeting to exchange views on aid 
to the countries of Indochina. The Japanese also proposed 
that the member countries discuss the formation of a loose 
Indochina consultative group for the areawide coordination, 
with subgroups for any of the four countries concerned which 
might request such a group and where conditions were satis­
factory.
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An initial meeting was held at the Bank's Paris office 
in October. The United States supported the Bank's efforts 
as well as the Japanese proposal. The Bank sent a second 
mission to Vietnam in November and subsequently proposed 
that a follow-on meeting be held in February of this year to 
discuss the formation of the Indochina consultative group. 
However, the reactions of the participating countries to the 
energy crisis and to the Congressional decision on IDA (Int­
ernational Development Association) replenishment led the 
Bank to postpone the meeting, tentatively until late Spring.
In February, at the request of the Lao Government, a World 
Bank team also visited Laos to assess the situation and to 
discuss a possible consultative group for that country.
The United States continues to support efforts to form 
an Indochina consultative group. We also favour the proposal 
that there be subgroups for each recipient country to which 
donors may contribute as they wish. The subgroups would be 
formed when considered appropriate by donors and at the re­
quest of the recipient. We remain in close consultation with 
the World Bank and other interested parties on the matter.We 
are hopeful that a second meeting of participants might be 
held in the near future and that such a meeting might lead 
to the establishment of the groups in question. A reversal 
of the negative Congressional action on IDA replenishment 
would clearly enhance the possibility of success in this 
regard.
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5) 'The current status and problems of the Administrat­
ion's stated intention to encourage internationalising human 
-itarian assistance to the area;’
In addition to US bilateral humanitarian assistance to 
the Indochina countries which totals $111.4 million for FY 
1974, the Department and the Agency for International Devel 
-opment (AID) continue to encourage other donors, including 
international organisations, to provide such assistance.AID 
made a grant of $2 million on November 1, 1973, to the Indo 
-china Operations Group of the International Committee of 
the Red Cross and discussions are continuing about an additi 
-onal grant to that organisation. UNICEF (United Nations 
Children’s Fund) has recently completed its study of the pro 
-blems in the Indochina countries and has just submitted its 
proposed programme to possible donor countries. We have en­
couraged UNICEF in its study and are pleased that it is now 
prepared to expand its activities in all three countries.
The World Health Organisation has had meaningful program 
-mes in Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam which supplement and do 
not overlap with activities supported by the United States.
We have encouraged that organisation to play an even more 
important role, particularly in the malaria control program­
me, and we at the same time would phase out of our activiti­
es in that field.
Our discussions with Indochina countries have stressed
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the desirability of establishing plans and priorities for prog­
rammes and projects which require assistance so that other 
donor countries and organisations can fit their assistance 
efforts into the host country requirements.
6) The current status of negotiations between Washington 
and Hanoi on American reconstruction assistance to North 
Vietnam.'
Following the conclusion of the Peace Agreement last 
year, preliminary discussions of postwar reconstruction were 
held in Paris between US and North Vietnamese members of 
the Joint Economic Commission. These talks have been sus 
-pended since last July. The Administration's position, whi 
-ch we believe is shared by the great majority of members of 
Congress, is that the US cannot at this time move forward 
with an assistance programme for North Vietnam. To date, 
North Vietnam has failed substantially to live up to a number 
of the essential terms of the Agreement, including those re­
lating to the introduction of troops and war material into 
South Vietnam, the cessation of military activities in Cam­
bodia and Laos, and the accounting for our missing-in-action 
Should Hanoi turn away from a military solution and demons­
trate a serious compliance with the Agreement, then we would 
be prepared, with the approval of Congress, to proceed with 
our undertaking regarding reconstruction assistance to North 
Vietnam.
5 1 2
7) 'The Department's assessment on the implementation 
of the ceasefire agreements for both Vietnam and Laos.1
The ceasefire in Vietnam has resulted in a substantial 
decrease in the level of hostilities; for example, military 
casualties since the ceasefire have been about one-third the 
level of casualties suffered in the years preceding the Par­
is Agreement. Nonetheless, it is unfortunately evident that 
significant violence continues to occur and that the cease­
fire is far from scrupulously observed. The fundamental pro 
-blem is that the North Vietnamese are atill determined to 
seize political power in the South, using military means if 
necessary. To this end they have maintained unrelenting mili 
-tary pressure against the South Vietnamese Government and 
have continued widespread terrorism against the population. 
In particularly flagrant violation of the Agreement North 
Vietnam has persisted in its infiltration of men and materi­
el into the South, bringing in more than one hundred thousa­
nd troops and large quantities of heavy equipment since the 
ceasefire began. South Vietnamese forces have reacted again­
st these attacks by North Vietnamese forces and several 
sizeable engagements have taken place.
Despite these serious violations, we continue to belie­
ve that the Paris Agreement has already brought substantial 
benefits and continues to provide a workable framework for 
peace. After more than a quarter century of fighting it wou-
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Id have been unrealistic to expect that the Agreement would 
bring an instant and complete end to the conflict. What it 
has done, however, is to reduce the level of violence signi­
ficantly and provide mechanisms for discussion. The two Viet 
-namese parties are talking to each other and are achieving 
some results, even if these results are much less than we 
would like to see. The final exchange of prisoners which 
was completed on March 7 is illustrative.
We assess the ceasefire agreement in Laos as being so 
far largely successful. The level of combat was reduced sub­
stantially immediately following the ceasefire and has since 
fallen to a handful of incidents per week. There is hope 
that if developments continue as they have, the Laos cease­
fire will work and the Lao, through their own efforts, will 
be able to establish a coalition government and a stable 
peace in their country.
8) 'The Department's assessment of the overall situation in 
Cambodia and the possibility for a ceasefire agreement.
Despite continued pressure by the Khmer insurgents, now 
generally under the control of the Khmer Communist Party,the 
Khmer armed forces have successfully repulsed two major in­
surgent operations, one against Kompong Cham and, more recen 
-tly, against Phnom Penh, with no US combat support. Serious 
military problems remain, and continued hard fighting during 
the next few months is expected, both in the provinces and 
around the capital.
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A broadened political base, a new Prime Minister and a 
more effective cabinet offer signs of improvement in the civ 
-il administration. The enormous dislocation of war, destroy 
-ing production, producing over a million refugees and encou 
-raging spiralling inflation, face the leaders of the Khmer 
Republic with serious problems.
Nonetheless, we are convinced that with US material and 
diplomatic support the Khmer Republic's demonstration of mil 
-itary and economic viability will persuade their now intran 
-sigent opponents to move to a political solution of the Cam 
-bodian conflict. The Khmer Republic's Foreign Minister on 
March 21 reiterated his government's position that a soluti­
on for Cambodia should be peaceful and not forced by arms or 
capitulation. Instead, his government will continue to seek 
talks with the other side.His government hopes their efforts 
for peace will achieve some results after the current insur­
gent offensive.
9) 'Recent diplomatic initiatives, involving the United 
States, aimed at a reduction of violence in Indochina and a 
greater measure of normalisation in the area.'
Since the signing of the Vietnam ceasefire agreement, 
the United States has been in constant liaison with the in­
terested parties, including those outside of the Indochina 
area. While it would not be useful to provide details of all 
these contacts, we can assure the Congress that we have used
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every means at our disposal to encourage a reduction in the 
level of violence and an orderly resolution of the conflict.
We believe these measures have had some success. The level 
of fighting is down substantially from 1972 and the Vietnam­
ese parties have taken at least beginning steps toward a sat 
-isfactory accomodation. Further, the interested outside par 
-ties remain basically committed to building on the frame­
work of the ceasefire agreement.
When Hanoi established a pattern of serious violations 
of the Agreement shortly after its conclusion, Dr. Kissinger 
met with Special Adviser Le Due Tho and negotiated the Paris 
communique of June 13, 1973, with a view to stabilising the 
situation. Secretary Kissinger returned to Paris in December 
1973, to again discuss with Special Adviser Tho the status 
of the implementation of the Agreement. We will continue to 
maintain such contacts with Vietnamese and other parties in 
the hope that Hanoi will eventually be persuaded that its in 
-terests lie in peaceful development rather than in conflict
In Laos, we have offered every encouragement to an evo­
lution toward peace. At this time the Laotian parties are 
making great progress in the formation of a government of 
national union. We can help in this regard with our sympathy 
and encouragement while properly leaving the issue in the 
hands of those most interested, the Lao people.
The Government of the Khmer Republic, with our complete 
endorsement, has made notable efforts to terminate the hosti
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-lines in that country. Following the ceasefire in Vietnam, 
the Cambodian Government unilaterally ceased hostile activi­
ty by its forces in the hope that the other side would respond. 
Unfortunately that striking gesture was rebuffed. On frequent 
occasions thereafter the Khmer Republic made proposals 
designed to move the conflict from the battlefield to political 
fora, with our strong support in each instance. Although all 
of those proposals have been ignored by the Khmer commun­
ists, we continue to hope that the current relative military bal­
ance will make apparent to the other sidewhat the Khmer Rep­
ublic has already perceived, that peace is a far more hopeful 
prospect for Cambodia than incessant conflict.
a Vietnam only; Laos will be included under MAP for
FY-75.
* Data Not Available.
** Based on the assumption that a coalition
government will be formed in Laos before 
the end of this year.
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